Publication: Vida y valor vital en Max Scheler y Hans Jonas
Authors
Martínez Gallego, Miguel Armando
item.page.secondaryauthor
item.page.director
Publisher
Ateneo Cantonal de Estudios Políticos (ACEP)
publication.page.editor
publication.page.department
Description
Abstract
En su ética fenomenológica, Max Scheler interpreta el significado de los valores vitales
basándose en una conceptualización de la esencia de los fenómenos vitales opuesta al
mecanicismo y al vitalismo. Por su parte, Hans Jonas también desarrolla su ética
ecológica de la responsabilidad desde una cierta comprensión antimecanicista del ser
vivo. Una vez expuestas en detalle las ideas de Scheler acerca de la esencia de la vida y
del valor vital, veremos que las de Jonas difieren de ellas en aspectos fundamentales,
más allá de todo parecido inicial. Lo cual, por su parte, conlleva disensiones éticas
profundas entre ambos autores acerca del sentido de los valores vitales y de su puesto
jerárquico frente a otras clases de valor
In his phenomenological ethics, Max Scheler conceptualized the essence of vital values in accordance with his understanding of the essence of life itself, in opposition to mechanism and vitalism. On the other hand, Hans Jonas also developed his environmental ethics of responsibility according to his own antimechanist ideas on the living being. We will present in detail Scheler's conceptions of the essence of life and vital value and show that those of Jonas differ from them in certain crucial respects, despite their apparent similarity. Which also implies radical ethical dissensions between both philosophers, concerning the meaning of vital values and their hierarchical rank before other species of value
In his phenomenological ethics, Max Scheler conceptualized the essence of vital values in accordance with his understanding of the essence of life itself, in opposition to mechanism and vitalism. On the other hand, Hans Jonas also developed his environmental ethics of responsibility according to his own antimechanist ideas on the living being. We will present in detail Scheler's conceptions of the essence of life and vital value and show that those of Jonas differ from them in certain crucial respects, despite their apparent similarity. Which also implies radical ethical dissensions between both philosophers, concerning the meaning of vital values and their hierarchical rank before other species of value
Citation
item.page.embargo
Ir a Estadísticas
Este ítem está sujeto a una licencia Creative Commons. Licencia Creative Commons