Publication: Ecological psychology is radical enough: a reply to radical enactivists
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Date
2019-09-26
Authors
Segundo Ortin, Miguel ; Heras Escribano, Manuel ; Raja Galián, Vicente
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Publisher
Taylor and Francis Group
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Description
© 2019. This manuscript version is made available under the CC-BY-NC-ND 4.0 license http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/. This document is the Accepted version of a Published Work that appeared in final form in Philosophical Psychology. To access the final edited and published work see https://doi.org/10.1080/09515089.2019.1668238
Abstract
Ecological psychology is one of the most influential theories of perception in the embodied, anti-representational, and situated cognitive sciences. However, radical enactivists claim that Gibsonians tend to describe ecological information and its ‘pick up’ in ways that make ecological psychology close to representational theories of perception and cognition. Motivated by worries about the tenability of classical views of informational content and its processing, these authors claim that ecological psychology needs to be “RECtified” so as to explicitly resist representational readings. In this paper, we argue against this call for
RECtification. To do so, we offer a detailed analysis of the notion of perceptual information and other related notions such as specificity and meaning, as they are presented in the specialized ecological literature. We defend that these notions, if properly understood, remain free of any representational commitment. Ecological psychology, we conclude, does not need to be RECtified.
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