Browsing by browse.metadata.contributordepartment "Filosofía"
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- PublicationRestrictedA professional guide to explanation. commentary on “A methodological problem of choice for 4E research”(Springer, 2023) Sanches de Oliveira, Guilherme; FilosofíaOn the face of it, the perspective that Casper puts forward in his paper (Chap. 2) and the one I offer in mine (Chap. 4)are completely at odds with each other. He sees the current diversity of explanations, theories and methods in embodied cognitive science as problematic and calling for some kind of integration, whereas I defend an extreme pluralist stance and don’t see the diversity as a problem. Not only that, but while he argues for coordination between the disparate approaches, I propose that expecting such coordination is in many cases unrealistic and moreover that, even when it’s possible, it might be counterproductive. The straightforward thing to do now would be for me to double down and use this space to try to show why I’m right and Casper is wrong. But I don’t think he’s wrong. He and I do disagree, but I don’t think it’s that sort of disagreement where only one side can be right and the other must be wrong. In particular, I don’t think that focusing on the different conclusions he and I draw in our respective chapters is a fruitful way to understand the nature of our disagreement. My goal in this commentary will be to explain why. I don’t know if Casper will agree with my assessment or not, but I won’t be surprised if he doesn’t—in fact, as I will suggest, this would make perfect sense given what I propose in my chapter. Still, my hope is that, by clarifying how (from my perspective) our different views relate to each other, I can help some readers better appreciate both his proposal and mine.
- PublicationOpen AccessA theory of resonance: towards an ecological cognitive architecture(Springer, 2018-03) Raja Galián, Vicente; FilosofíaThis paper presents a blueprint for an ecological cognitive architecture. Ecological psychology, I contend, must be complemented with a story about the role of the CNS in perception, action, and cognition. To arrive at such a story while staying true to the tenets of ecological psychology, it will be necessary to flesh out the central metaphor according to which the animal perceives its environment by ‘resonating’ to information in energy patterns: what is needed is a theory of resonance. I offer here the two main elements of such a theory: a framework (Anderson’s neural reuse) and a methodology (multi-scale fractal DST).
PublicationOpen AccessA Wittgensteinian conception of animal mindsGarcía Rodríguez, Ángel; Filosofía- PublicationOpen AccessA Wittgensteinian view of mind and self-knowledgeGarcía Rodríguez, Ángel; Filosofía
- PublicationEmbargoA world of minds: ecological psychology as a framework for comparative cognition(Routledge, 2025-07-27) Segundo-Ortin, Miguel; Calvo, Paco; Barrett, Louise; Filosofía
- PublicationOpen Access“Acaba con la razón”. La crítica a la tragedia en el libro X de la República de Platón(Universitat de València, 2025-05-30) Ramón Cámara, Begoña; Filosofía; Facultad de FilosofíaThis paper analyses Plato’s critique of tragedy in book X of the Republic. It is argued that the ultimate motivation of this critique is ethical and political in nature. For him, Greek tragedy is an influential cultural phenomenon that fosters irrationalism: far from purging the passions, it strengthens them, staging images of virtue and vice that are diametrically opposed to the conception of justice and happiness proposed in the Republic.
- PublicationEmbargoAclamación, crítica, opinión pública, gloria. La dimensión política de la esfera pública(Herder, 2021) Galindo Hervás, Alfonso; Filosofía
- PublicationEmbargoAd Reinhardt: “Art is art and everything else is everything else”(Oxford University Press, 2022) Pérez Carreño, Francisca; Filosofía
- PublicationOpen AccessAesthetic normativity and the expressive perception of nature(2021) Pérez Carreño, Francisca; FilosofíaAbstract The notion of a correct appreciation of nature, like the one put forward in Carlson’s environmental account, has been rejected by many other authors in the aesthetics of the natural environment. Their critics challenge the idea that only scientific categories can ground the aesthetic appreciation of nature as nature, and they hold that there is not a correct way of appreciating nature. However, they may share with Carlson the idea of correctness under an objectivist paradigm of aesthetic appreciation, according to which correctness means the adequation of the experience to properties of the object. My aim in the article is to claim that it is necessary to endorse an aesthetic standard of correctness that takes into consideration the subjective character of aesthetic appreciation. An aesthetic standard of correctness implies universal assent, or validity for everyone in Kantian terms, in place of an objectivist notion. This notion of correctness permits the inclusion of expressive perception of nature as an essential form of aesthetic appreciation.
- PublicationOpen AccessAgainst smallism and localism(University of Białystok, 2015-07-24) Chemero, Anthony; Sanches de Oliveira, Guilherme; FilosofíaThe question whether cognition ever extends beyond the head is widely considered to be an empirical issue. And yet, all the evidence amassed in recent years has not sufficed to settle the debate. In this paper we suggest that this is because the debate is not really an empirical one, but rather a matter of definition. Traditional cognitive science can be identified as wedded to the ideals of “smallism” and “localism”. We criticize these ideals and articulate a case in favor of extended cognition by highlighting the historical pedigree and conceptual adequacy of related empirical and theoretical work.
- PublicationOpen AccessAgency from a radical embodied standpoint: an ecologial-enactive proposal(Frontiers Media, 2020-06-26) Segundo Ortin, Miguel; FilosofíaExplaining agency is a significant challenge for those who are interested in the sciences of the mind, and non-representationalists are no exception to this. Even though both ecological psychologists and enactivists agree that agency is to be explained by focusing on the relation between the organism and the environment, they have approached it by focusing on different aspects of the organism-environment relation. In this paper, I offer a suggestion for a radical embodied account of agency that combines ecological psychology with recent trends in enactive cognitive science. According to this proposal, while enactivism focuses primarily on describing how our acquired sensorimotor schemes and habits mutually equilibrate, affecting our tendency to act upon some affordances instead of others, ecological psychology focuses on studying how perceptual information contributes to the actualization of the sensorimotor schemes and habits without mediating representations, inferences, and computations. The paper concludes by briefly exploring how this ecological-enactive theory of agency can account for how socio-cultural norms shape human agency.
- PublicationOpen AccessAn intertextual argument between two translators in Pedro de Toledo’s Translation of the Guide of the perplexed(2019) Fernández López, José Antonio; Filosofía
- PublicationOpen AccessAnálisis y crítica de la lectura de Aristóteles de la Idea platónica de Bien(Universidad Pontificia Comillas, 2023-11-23) Ramón Cámara, Begoña; FilosofíaEl objetivo de este trabajo es clarificar el sentido de los argumentos que elabora Aristóteles contra la concepción de la Idea dl Bien propuesta por Platón. También se calibra el alcance de dichos argumentos tomando como fundamento lo que sostiene Platón en sus Diálogos a propósito de la Idea de Bien.
- PublicationRestrictedApproaches to Scientific Modeling, and the (Non)Issue of Representation: A Case Study in Multi-model Research on Thigmotaxis and Group Thermoregulation(Springer, 2016) Sanches de Oliveira, Guilherme; Filosofía; Magnani, Lorenzo; Casadio, ClaudiaRecent contributions to the philosophical literature on scientific modeling have tended to follow one of two approaches, on the one hand addressing conceptual, metaphysical and epistemological questions about models, or, on the other hand, emphasizing the cognitive aspects of modeling and accordingly focusing on model-based reasoning. In this paper I explore the relationship between these two approaches through a case study of model-based research on the behavior of infant rats, particularly thigmotaxis (movement based on tactile sensation) and temperature regulation in groups. A common assumption in the philosophical literature is that models represent the target phenomena they simulate. In the modeling project under investigation, however, this assumption was not part of the model-based reasoning process, arising only in a theoretical article as, I suggest, a post hoc rhetorical device. I argue that the otherwise nonexistent concern with the model-target relationship as being representational results from a kind of objectification often at play in philosophical analysis, one that can be avoided if an alternative form of objectification is adopted instead.
- PublicationEmbargoApuntes para una historia de la discapacidad en España(Tirant lo Blanch, 2024) Cayuela Sánchez, Salvador; FilosofíaEn este capítulo de libro elaboro una historia de la discapacidad física en España, desde el siglo XVII hasta nuestros días.
- PublicationOpen AccessAre plants cognitive? A reply to Adams(Elsevier, 2018-12-06) Segundo-Ortin, Miguel; Calvo, Paco; FilosofíaAccording to F. Adams [this journal, vol. 68, 2018] cognition cannot be realized in plants or bacteria. In his view, plants and bacteria respond to the here-and-now in a hardwired, inflexible manner, and are therefore incapable of cognitive activity. This article takes issue with the pursuit of plant cognition from the perspective of an empirically informed philosophy of plant neurobiology. As we argue, empirical evidence shows, contra Adams, that plant behavior is in many ways analogous to animal behavior. This renders plants suitable to be described as cognitive agents in a non-metaphorical way. Sections two to four review the arguments offered by Adams in light of scientific evidence on plant adaptive behavior, decision-making, anticipation, as well as learning and memory. Section five introduces the ‘phyto-nervous’ system of plants. To conclude, section six resituates the quest for plant cognition into a broader approach in cognitive science, as represented by enactive and ecological schools of thought. Overall, we aim to motivate the idea that plants may be considered genuine cognitive agents. Our hope is to help propel public awareness and discussion of plant intelligence once appropriately stripped of anthropocentric preconceptions of the sort that Adams’ position appears to exemplify.
- PublicationOpen AccessArguing as a virtuous arguer would argue(2015) Gascón, José Ángel; FilosofíaA virtue approach to argumentation would focus on the arguers’ character rather than on her arguments. Therefore, it must be explained how good arguments relate to virtuous arguers. This article focuses on this issue. It is argued that, besides the usual logical, dialectical, and rhetorical standards, a virtuously produced good argument must meet two additional requirements: the arguer must be in a specific state of mind, and the argument must be broadly conceived of as an argumentative intervention and thus excel from every perspective.
- PublicationOpen AccessArgumentative bullshit(2021) Gascón, José Ángel; FilosofíaHarry Frankfurt characterised bullshit as assertions that are made without a concern for truth. Assertions, however, are not the only type of speech act that can be bullshit. Here, I propose the concept of argumentative bullshit and show how a speech acts account of bullshit assertions can be generalised to bullshit arguments. Argumentative bullshit, on this account, would be the production of an argument without a concern for the supporting relation between reasons and claim.
- PublicationEmbargoAristóteles: Deus existe?(Sindéresis-UPSA, 2024) García Lorente, José Antonio; Filosofía
- PublicationOpen AccessAugmented reality: an ecoloigcal blend(Elsevier, 2017-05) Raja Galián, Vicente; Calvo, Paco; FilosofíaIn this article we present Ecological Augmented Reality (E-AR), an approach that questions the theoretical assumptions of main-stream Augmented Reality (AR). The development of AR systems to date presupposes an information-processing theory of perceptionthat hinders the potential of the field.Generally, in AR devices, virtual symbolic information is superimposed upon the environment in such a way that the real and thevirtual may be processed, informationally speaking, in tandem. Thus, we find information in reality itself, as well as virtual symbolicinformation. But by increasing the burden of symbolic crunching, AR devices run the risk of saturating the user of the technology. AR systems developed under the principles of an ecological psychology may contribute to new and better levels of performance andadaptation to the user’s perceptual abilities. Our proposal is to develop AR devices such that reality itself is augmentednon-symbolically by blending real and virtual layers/information. Although there are seldom AR devices in the market that are designedecologically, two fields of research may well bring inspiration to AR developers. These are the design and manipulation of real objects,and ecological research in the field of sensory substitution. We consider them both in turn with an eye to putting forward a frameworkthat eschews any type of information-processing regarding the nature of our psychological processes. Ultimately, our aim is to providesome guidelines for the exploration.