Publication: Fuori dalla persona. L’impersonale in Bergson,
Merleau-Ponty, Deleuze
Authors
Lisciani-Petrini, Enrica
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Publisher
Universidad de Murcia
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DOI
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info:eu-repo/semantics/article
Description
Abstract
Il saggio parte da un’analisi storicocritica
della nozione di «persona», quale
dispositivo performativo di secolari concetti
culturali. Tra i quali quello di «soggetto»,
che ne deriva direttamente, inteso quale
«unione di anima e di corpo». Dove però tale
«unione» è realizzata sulla base di un processo
di rimozione o esclusione interna della parte
propriamente corporeo-materiale, che intanto
è «unita» all’anima, ovvero alla coscienza,
solo in quanto assoggettata a quest’ultima. Il
personalismo (di Maritain e Mounier) per un
verso e la fenomenologia husserliana per un
altro (in particolare nella figura di Edith Stein)
rappresentano le ultime formulazioni di un
processo teorico di così lungo corso.
Questo apparato categoriale, tipicamente
moderno, è oggetto, da più di un secolo, di una
radicale «decostruzione». Gli autori presi in
considerazione — Bergson, Merleau-Ponty e
Deleuze — consentono di curvare questa piega
decostruttiva nella direzione di un recupero della
falda «impersonale» da cui il soggetto stesso
proviene, in modo da riunirlo alla parte di sé
rimossa o esclusa.
Abstract: This essay starts from a historicocritical analysis of the notion of ‘person’ as a performing device of secular cultural concepts, among which that of ‘subject’, understood as ‘union of heart and soul’, that directly derives from it. However, this ‘union’ is achieved on the basis of a process of removal or internal exclusion of the truly corporeo-material part, which is ‘linked’ to the soul, namely the consciousness, only because it is dependent from it. The personalism (of Maritain and Mounier) on the one hand, and the husserlian phenomenology on the other (represented above all by Edith Stein) represent the last formulations of a long lasting theoretical process. This categorial apparatus, tipically modern, has been object of a radical ‘deconstruction’ for more than a century. The authors considered here — Bergson, Merleau-Ponty and Deleuze — allow to bend this deconstructionist turn towards a retrieval of the ‘impersonal’ layer from which the subject itself comes, so as to reunite it to the part of itself removed or excluded.
Abstract: This essay starts from a historicocritical analysis of the notion of ‘person’ as a performing device of secular cultural concepts, among which that of ‘subject’, understood as ‘union of heart and soul’, that directly derives from it. However, this ‘union’ is achieved on the basis of a process of removal or internal exclusion of the truly corporeo-material part, which is ‘linked’ to the soul, namely the consciousness, only because it is dependent from it. The personalism (of Maritain and Mounier) on the one hand, and the husserlian phenomenology on the other (represented above all by Edith Stein) represent the last formulations of a long lasting theoretical process. This categorial apparatus, tipically modern, has been object of a radical ‘deconstruction’ for more than a century. The authors considered here — Bergson, Merleau-Ponty and Deleuze — allow to bend this deconstructionist turn towards a retrieval of the ‘impersonal’ layer from which the subject itself comes, so as to reunite it to the part of itself removed or excluded.
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