Publication: Razonamiento y contenido conceptual en el papel de la obra de arte:
un análisis de las nociones de representación, expresión e inferencia.
Authors
Sambade Martínez, Mónica
item.page.secondaryauthor
item.page.director
Publisher
Ateneo Cantonal de Estudios Políticos (ACEP)
publication.page.editor
publication.page.department
DOI
item.page.type
info:eu-repo/semantics/article
Description
Abstract
¿Qué significa decir que en arte, un espectador reaccione ante la obra por razones? En
primer lugar, se pone en cuestión la visión por la que la agencia de las obras pueda
operar fuera de cualquier relación basada en conceptos. Si el arte es un trabajo de
comprensión, entonces involucra un razonamiento conceptual, aunque ello requiera de
una redefinición de los términos que envuelven dicho proceso. En segundo lugar, se
introduce la búsqueda de qué sea un contenido conceptual, empleando las nociones de
representación, expresión e inferencia. Se propone que la obra de arte se asimila al objeto
ordinario en tanto que ambos son construcciones de tipo conceptual, y se diferencia de
éste por alterar esencialmente el orden de las habilitaciones y compromisos inferenciales
que uno está dispuesto a asumir.
What does it exactly mean to say there are “some good reasons” for the reaction of the spectator to an artwork? In the first place, no concept-using explanation for the art agency or artistic comprehension in general should be call into question. Art involves reasoning, thus requires conceptual means, even though this fact may require a redefinition of the conceptual process. In second place, we examine representation, expression and inference as useful notions for the understanding of what a conceptual content is. A working hypothesis is that art pieces and non-artistic objects make meaning through concept use; however, there is a critical difference between them: art experience essentially modifies the kind of inferentially articulated entitlements and commitments we may undertake.
What does it exactly mean to say there are “some good reasons” for the reaction of the spectator to an artwork? In the first place, no concept-using explanation for the art agency or artistic comprehension in general should be call into question. Art involves reasoning, thus requires conceptual means, even though this fact may require a redefinition of the conceptual process. In second place, we examine representation, expression and inference as useful notions for the understanding of what a conceptual content is. A working hypothesis is that art pieces and non-artistic objects make meaning through concept use; however, there is a critical difference between them: art experience essentially modifies the kind of inferentially articulated entitlements and commitments we may undertake.
publication.page.subject
Citation
item.page.embargo
Collections
Ir a Estadísticas
Este ítem está sujeto a una licencia Creative Commons. http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/