Publication: Ser sí mismo y ser otro. Schelling sobre la segunda persona y el amor (1802-1810)
Authors
Rodríguez, Juan J.
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Publisher
Universidad de Murcia. Servicio de Publicaciones
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DOI
http://dx.doi.org/10.6018/daimon.547351
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info:eu-repo/semantics/article
Description
Abstract
En este artículo presentamos la concepción del amor de Schelling, tal como esta se desarrolla en los años 1809 y 1810, como el comienzo de una tradición menor en las teorías del reconocimiento (1). Nuestro objetivo es mostrar cómo Schelling articula una visión del sí mismo y de la segunda persona en tanto elementos independientes uno del otro, pero que pueden entrar en relación por medio de una decisión libre, esto es, no condicionada por un todo que los sobre y predetermina. Para lograr este objetivo expondremos en primer lugar los presupuestos metafísicos de la individualidad en el contexto de la metafísica intermedia de Schelling entre 1804-1820 (2). En segundo lugar, introducimos la vinculación entre ser sí mismo, ser otro y el problema del mal surgido por el advenimiento de lo real, es decir, de la escisión entre la primera y la segunda persona (3, 4). Finalmente, pondremos en evidencia el lazo que une indisolublemente a lo real, esto es, al sí mismo y al ser otro, en términos de la unidad de elementos diversos que Schelling denomina “amor” (5).
In this article we present Schelling’s conception of love, as it develops in the years 1809 and 1810, as the beginning of a minor tradition in theories of recognition (1). Our aim is to show how Schelling articulates a view of the self and the second person as independent elements from one another, but which can be brought into a relationship through a free decision, i.e., not conditioned by a whole that overrides and predetermines them. To achieve this goal, we will first present the metaphysical presuppositions of individuality in the context of Schelling’s middle metaphysics between 1804-1820 (2). Secondly, we will show how the link between being oneself, being other, and the problem of evil arises from the advent of the real, that is, the split between the first and the second person (3, 4). Finally, we will highlight the bond that indissolubly unites the real, the self, and the being-other, in terms of the unity of diverse elements that we call “love” (5).
In this article we present Schelling’s conception of love, as it develops in the years 1809 and 1810, as the beginning of a minor tradition in theories of recognition (1). Our aim is to show how Schelling articulates a view of the self and the second person as independent elements from one another, but which can be brought into a relationship through a free decision, i.e., not conditioned by a whole that overrides and predetermines them. To achieve this goal, we will first present the metaphysical presuppositions of individuality in the context of Schelling’s middle metaphysics between 1804-1820 (2). Secondly, we will show how the link between being oneself, being other, and the problem of evil arises from the advent of the real, that is, the split between the first and the second person (3, 4). Finally, we will highlight the bond that indissolubly unites the real, the self, and the being-other, in terms of the unity of diverse elements that we call “love” (5).
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