Publication: El problema de las falacias: objeciones a la utilidad de un concepto teórico
Authors
Gascón, José Ángel
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https://doi.org/10.32995/cogency.v13i1.372
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info:eu-repo/semantics/article
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Esta obra está bajo una licencia internacional Creative Commons Atribución 4.0.
©<2021>. This manuscript version is made available under the CC-BY 4.0 license http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
This document is the Published, version of a Published Work that appeared in final form in Cogency: Journal of Reasoning and Argumentation. To access the final edited and published work see https://doi.org/10.32995/cogency.v13i1.372
Abstract
Aunque el concepto de falacia es ampliamente utilizado tanto dentro como fuera de la filosofía, también ha sido criticado recientemente por varios autores. En este artículo me uno a esas voces críticas con el objetivo de presentar varias razones para abandonar el concepto de falacia en teoría de la argumentación. Argumentaré que la noción de falacia está intrínsecamente unida a las taxonomías de falacias, y tales taxonomías resultan ser muy deficientes para distinguir argumentos genuinamente defectuosos. Los esquemas argumentativos falaces identifican tanto buenos como malos argumentos, de modo que carece de sentido mantener tales esquemas o tipos de argumentos en las clasificaciones de falacias. En los casos en los que, en lugar de basarse exclusivamente en los esquemas argumentativos, se establecen criterios pragmáticos y contextuales que identifican inequívocamente argumentos incorrectos, tales criterios están formulados en términos evaluativos, cuya aplicación no es directa e indiscutible. En consecuencia, las etiquetas de falacias no proporcionan un fundamento teórico para distinguir entre buenos y malos argumentos y tampoco desempeñan ningún papel en nuestras evaluaciones cotidianas de argumentos, que se basan más bien en apreciaciones de aspectos del contexto para cada argumento concreto. Finalmente, responderé a la objeción de que, aunque el concepto de falacia pueda ser teóricamente problemático, la enseñanza de las falacias resulta útil para el desarrollo de las habilidades argumentativas.
Even though the concept of fallacy is widely used both inside and outside philosophy, it has also been recently criticised by several authors. In this paper I join these critical voices with the aim of putting forward several reasons to abandon the concept of fallacy in argumentation theory. I will argue that the notion of fallacy is inextricably linked to taxonomies of fallacies, and such taxonomies turn out to be seriously deficient in order to distinguish genuinely flawed arguments. Fallacious argument schemes identify both good and bad arguments, so there is little sense in preserving those schemes or kinds of arguments in the classifications of fallacies. In those cases in which, instead of completely relying on argument schemes, pragmatic and contextual criteria are established that unequivocally identify incorrect arguments, such criteria are framed in evaluative terms, the application of which is not straightforward and uncontroversial. Hence, fallacy labels do not provide a theoretical foundation to discriminate between good and bad arguments and they play no role in our everyday evaluations of arguments, which are rather based on appreciations of aspects of the context for each particular argument. Finally, I will answer the objection that, even though the concept of fallacy might be theoretically problematic, the teaching of fallacies is useful for the development of argumentative skills.
Even though the concept of fallacy is widely used both inside and outside philosophy, it has also been recently criticised by several authors. In this paper I join these critical voices with the aim of putting forward several reasons to abandon the concept of fallacy in argumentation theory. I will argue that the notion of fallacy is inextricably linked to taxonomies of fallacies, and such taxonomies turn out to be seriously deficient in order to distinguish genuinely flawed arguments. Fallacious argument schemes identify both good and bad arguments, so there is little sense in preserving those schemes or kinds of arguments in the classifications of fallacies. In those cases in which, instead of completely relying on argument schemes, pragmatic and contextual criteria are established that unequivocally identify incorrect arguments, such criteria are framed in evaluative terms, the application of which is not straightforward and uncontroversial. Hence, fallacy labels do not provide a theoretical foundation to discriminate between good and bad arguments and they play no role in our everyday evaluations of arguments, which are rather based on appreciations of aspects of the context for each particular argument. Finally, I will answer the objection that, even though the concept of fallacy might be theoretically problematic, the teaching of fallacies is useful for the development of argumentative skills.
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Citation
Cogency, vol. 13, núm. 1 (2021) , 125–146
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