Publication: Aproximación a una razón afectiva desde la Ética de Spinoza
Authors
Hoyos Sánchez, Inmaculada
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Publisher
Universidad de Murcia
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Description
Abstract
El objetivo de este trabajo es mostrar
que, a partir de la filosofía de Spinoza, se puede
elaborar otro concepto de razón, esto es, el de
una razón afectiva, que, encontrando su envés
en las pasiones alegres, nos pone en el camino
de conquistar cierta dosis de libertad, virtud y
felicidad. El trabajo se estructura en dos partes.
En la primera, se trata de determinar cuáles son
las causas del estado de servidumbre en el que se
encuentra el hombre. En este sentido, prestaremos
especial atención a la tesis de que el conocimiento
es necesario, pero no suficiente para alcanzar
la libertad. La segunda parte se centra en el
naturalismo ético de Spinoza, y, así, muestra que
la razón no insta a extirpar nuestras pasiones, sino
a seleccionar las que son mejores.
Abstract: The aim of this paper is to establish, according to Spinoza´s philosophy, an another concept of reason, in other words, an affective reason that has its back in the passion of joy, and, therefore, it makes possible conquering little by little freedom, virtue, and happiness. This work is organized in two parts. Firstly, it deals with showing the causes of the human servitude. In this respect, this work maintains that the knowledge is necessary but not sufficient in order to obtain freedom. The second part bears in mind the naturalistic ethics of Spinoza, and, in this way, it shows that the reason doesn´t lie in eradicate our passions, but in select our best passions and channel them rationally to make use of their force in the meaning of the virtue and happiness.
Abstract: The aim of this paper is to establish, according to Spinoza´s philosophy, an another concept of reason, in other words, an affective reason that has its back in the passion of joy, and, therefore, it makes possible conquering little by little freedom, virtue, and happiness. This work is organized in two parts. Firstly, it deals with showing the causes of the human servitude. In this respect, this work maintains that the knowledge is necessary but not sufficient in order to obtain freedom. The second part bears in mind the naturalistic ethics of Spinoza, and, in this way, it shows that the reason doesn´t lie in eradicate our passions, but in select our best passions and channel them rationally to make use of their force in the meaning of the virtue and happiness.
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