Say on Pay Effectiveness, Corporate Governance Mechanisms, and Ceo Compensation Alignment

Sánchez Marín, Gregorio; Lozano Reina, Gabriel; Baixauli Soler, J. Samuel; Lucas Pérez, María Encarnación

Publication:
Say on Pay Effectiveness, Corporate Governance Mechanisms, and Ceo Compensation Alignment

dc.contributor.author	Sánchez Marín, Gregorio
dc.contributor.author	Lozano Reina, Gabriel
dc.contributor.author	Baixauli Soler, J. Samuel
dc.contributor.author	Lucas Pérez, María Encarnación
dc.contributor.department	Organización de Empresas y Finanzas
dc.contributor.other	Facultades, Departamentos, Servicios y Escuelas::Departamentos de la UMU::Organización de Empresas y Finanzas	es
dc.date.accessioned	2024-03-18T09:01:40Z
dc.date.available	2024-03-18T09:01:40Z
dc.date.issued	2017-07-31
dc.description	© 2017. ACEDE. This document is made available under the CC-BY-NC-ND 4.0 license http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0 This document is the published version of a published work that appeared in final form in Janus. To access the final work, see DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.brq.2017.07.001	es
dc.description.abstract	Say on pay (SOP) is a relatively new governance mechanism that allows shareholders to pronounce on the suitability on executives’ compensation. The literature has mainly examined SOP effects on Anglo Saxon contexts of corporate governance, reporting mixed results and highlighting the need to deepen our understanding of its real impact, as well as its interactions with other mechanisms of governance. Concerning these gaps, the present research analyzes the effectiveness of SOP as a mechanism for aligning CEO compensation in the context of Spanish listed companies – a good representative model of continental European systems of corporate governance–. It also examines the moderating effect of board monitoring and ownership structure. Using panel data and linear regression methodologies on a set of companies from 2013 to 2016, the results show that SOP generally increases the alignment of CEO compensation, although its effectiveness is reduced in companies with overcompensated CEOs and in owner-managed companies.	es
dc.format	application/pdf	es
dc.format.extent	14	es
dc.identifier.citation	BRQ Business Research Quarterly (2017) 20, 226-239
dc.identifier.doi	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.brq.2017.07.001
dc.identifier.issn	Electronic: 2340-9444
dc.identifier.uri	http://hdl.handle.net/10201/140299
dc.language	eng	es
dc.publisher	SAGE Publications	es
dc.relation	Financial support from the Research Program of Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness of Spain (Project ECO2014- 54301-P) and Fundación Cajamurcia is acknowledged.	es
dc.relation.publisherversion	https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2340943617300439?via%3Dihub	es
dc.rights	info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess	es
dc.rights	Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 Internacional	*
dc.rights.uri	http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/	*
dc.subject	CEO compensation	es
dc.subject	Say on pay	es
dc.subject	Corporate governance	es
dc.subject	Board monitoring	es
dc.subject	Ownership structure	es
dc.title	Say on Pay Effectiveness, Corporate Governance Mechanisms, and Ceo Compensation Alignment	es
dc.type	info:eu-repo/semantics/article	es
dspace.entity.type	Publication	es