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https://doi.org/10.1142/S0219198921500110
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Título: | Privatization Policies by National and Regional Governments |
Fecha de publicación: | 19-abr-2021 |
Cita bibliográfica: | International Game Theory ReviewVol. 24, No. 02, 2150011 (2022) |
ISSN: | Print: 0219-1989 Electronic: 1793-6675 |
Palabras clave: | Horizontal differentiation National and regional governments Mixed duopoly Region size Partial privatization |
Resumen: | In order to analyze the privatization policies undertaken by the national and regional governments, I consider a horizontal differentiation model with price competition in which a country consists of two regions of different sizes. I show that public-sector intervention by either the national or regional government is essential for achieving the social optimum. The preferences of consumers and firms about privatization policy are completely opposite: consumers prefer a regional public-sector intervention, while firms prefer a national public-sector intervention. Finally, I find that the preferences of the two regions about market structures are also opposite: the least populated region prefers the private duopoly, while the most populated region prefers a government intervention in the market. |
Autor/es principal/es: | Martínez Sánchez, Francisco |
Facultad/Departamentos/Servicios: | Facultades, Departamentos, Servicios y Escuelas::Departamentos de la UMU::Métodos Cuantitativos para la Economía y la Empresa |
URI: | http://hdl.handle.net/10201/137232 |
DOI: | https://doi.org/10.1142/S0219198921500110 |
Tipo de documento: | info:eu-repo/semantics/article |
Número páginas / Extensión: | 17 |
Derechos: | info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 Internacional |
Descripción: | © 2021. This document is made available under the CC-BY-NC-ND 4.0 license http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ This document is the submitted version of a published work that appeared in final form in International Game Theory Review |
Aparece en las colecciones: | Artículos: Métodos Cuantitativos para la Economía y la Empresa |
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