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Campo DC | Valor | Lengua/Idioma |
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dc.contributor.author | Martínez Sánchez, Francisco | - |
dc.contributor.other | Facultades, Departamentos, Servicios y Escuelas::Departamentos de la UMU::Métodos Cuantitativos para la Economía y la Empresa | es |
dc.date.accessioned | 2024-01-12T09:13:59Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2024-01-12T09:13:59Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2021-04-19 | - |
dc.identifier.citation | International Game Theory ReviewVol. 24, No. 02, 2150011 (2022) | es |
dc.identifier.issn | Print: 0219-1989 | - |
dc.identifier.issn | Electronic: 1793-6675 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10201/137232 | - |
dc.description | © 2021. This document is made available under the CC-BY-NC-ND 4.0 license http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ This document is the submitted version of a published work that appeared in final form in International Game Theory Review | es |
dc.description.abstract | In order to analyze the privatization policies undertaken by the national and regional governments, I consider a horizontal differentiation model with price competition in which a country consists of two regions of different sizes. I show that public-sector intervention by either the national or regional government is essential for achieving the social optimum. The preferences of consumers and firms about privatization policy are completely opposite: consumers prefer a regional public-sector intervention, while firms prefer a national public-sector intervention. Finally, I find that the preferences of the two regions about market structures are also opposite: the least populated region prefers the private duopoly, while the most populated region prefers a government intervention in the market. | es |
dc.format | application/pdf | es |
dc.format.extent | 17 | es |
dc.language | eng | es |
dc.relation | Crecimiento y Ciclos Económicos. Entidad: Agencia Estatal de Investigación Ámbito Del Proyecto: Nacional Comienzo: 01/06/2020, Fin: 31/10/2023 PID2019-107192GB-I00 | es |
dc.rights | info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess | es |
dc.rights | Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 Internacional | * |
dc.rights.uri | http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ | * |
dc.subject | Horizontal differentiation | es |
dc.subject | National and regional governments | es |
dc.subject | Mixed duopoly | es |
dc.subject | Region size | es |
dc.subject | Partial privatization | es |
dc.title | Privatization Policies by National and Regional Governments | es |
dc.type | info:eu-repo/semantics/article | es |
dc.identifier.doi | https://doi.org/10.1142/S0219198921500110 | - |
Aparece en las colecciones: | Artículos: Métodos Cuantitativos para la Economía y la Empresa |
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