Publication: Family control and earnings quality
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Date
2007
Authors
Bona Sánchez, Carolina ; Pérez Alemán, Jerónimo ; Santana Martín, Domingo Javier
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Publisher
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DOI
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info:eu-repo/semantics/article
Description
Abstract
El trabajo analiza la relación entre el control familiar y la calidad de la información contable
en un contexto en el que el tradicional conflicto de agencia entre directivos y accionistas se
desplaza a la divergencia de intereses entre accionistas controladores y minoritarios. Los
resultados alcanzados muestran que, en comparación con las no familiares, las empresas de
naturaleza familiar divulgan unos resultados de mayor calidad, tanto en términos de menores
ajustes por devengo discrecionales como de mayor capacidad de los componentes actuales del
resultado para predecir los cash flows futuros. Además, el aumento en los derechos de voto en
manos de la familia controladora incrementa la calidad de los resultados contables. La evidencia
obtenida se muestra consistente con la presencia de un efecto reputación/vinculación a largo
plazo asociado a la empresa familiar. Adicionalmente, el trabajo refleja que a medida que
disminuye la divergencia entre los derechos de voto y de cash flow en manos de la familia
controladora, aumenta la calidad de la información contable
This work examines the relationship between family control and earnings quality in a context where the salient agency problem shifts away from the classical divergence between managers and shareholders to conflicts between the controlling owner and minority shareholders. The results reveal that, compared to non-family firms, family firms reveal higher earnings quality in terms of both lower discretionary accruals and greater predictability of future cash flows. They also show a positive relationship between the level of voting rights held by the controlling family and earnings quality. The evidence is consistent with the presence of a reputation/long-term involvement effect associated with the family firm. Moreover, the work reflects that, as the divergence between the voting and cash flow rights in the hands of the controlling family decreases, earnings quality increases
This work examines the relationship between family control and earnings quality in a context where the salient agency problem shifts away from the classical divergence between managers and shareholders to conflicts between the controlling owner and minority shareholders. The results reveal that, compared to non-family firms, family firms reveal higher earnings quality in terms of both lower discretionary accruals and greater predictability of future cash flows. They also show a positive relationship between the level of voting rights held by the controlling family and earnings quality. The evidence is consistent with the presence of a reputation/long-term involvement effect associated with the family firm. Moreover, the work reflects that, as the divergence between the voting and cash flow rights in the hands of the controlling family decreases, earnings quality increases
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