Browsing by Subject "CEO compensation"

Now showing 1 - 3 of 3
  • Thumbnail Image
    Publication
    Open Access
    Effects of family involvement on the monitoring of CEO compensation
    Sánchez-Marín, Gregorio; Carrasco-Hernández, Antonio J.; Danvila-del-Valle, Ignacio; Organización de Empresas y Finanzas; Facultades, Departamentos, Servicios y Escuelas::Departamentos de la UMU::Organización de Empresas y Finanzas
    This study examines the effectiveness of CEO compensation monitoring depending on the extent of family involvement in the firm. Considering the contradictory evidence on the effects of family involvement on CEO compensation reported by the literature to date, we adopt a procedural conception of CEO monitoring – that reflect processes and rules used in family firms for the alignment of CEO incentives structure to the firm interests –, to test four hypotheses derived from agency and socioemotional wealth (SEW) perspectives. Using a sample of 357 family and non-family Spanish companies, the results show that CEO compensation monitoring is inversely related to family status, and the relationship between CEO compensation monitoring and firm perfor mance is stronger in firms where family influence is higher. In addition, we found that the presence of a family CEO negatively affects the implementation of economically instrumental monitoring mechanisms, decoupling CEO compensation from firm per formance. Our research, aligned with recent socio-psychological literature on the study of processes of family firm’s management policies, thus contributes to a better under standing of the setting of CEO compensation in family firms as a result of a combina tion of common bonds and mutual expectations based on emotions and values with contractual and financial factors.
  • Thumbnail Image
    Publication
    Open Access
    Say on Pay Effectiveness, Corporate Governance Mechanisms, and Ceo Compensation Alignment
    (SAGE Publications, 2017-07-31) Sánchez Marín, Gregorio; Lozano Reina, Gabriel; Baixauli Soler, J. Samuel; Lucas Pérez, María Encarnación; Organización de Empresas y Finanzas; Facultades, Departamentos, Servicios y Escuelas::Departamentos de la UMU::Organización de Empresas y Finanzas
    Say on pay (SOP) is a relatively new governance mechanism that allows shareholders to pronounce on the suitability on executives’ compensation. The literature has mainly examined SOP effects on Anglo Saxon contexts of corporate governance, reporting mixed results and highlighting the need to deepen our understanding of its real impact, as well as its interactions with other mechanisms of governance. Concerning these gaps, the present research analyzes the effectiveness of SOP as a mechanism for aligning CEO compensation in the context of Spanish listed companies – a good representative model of continental European systems of corporate governance–. It also examines the moderating effect of board monitoring and ownership structure. Using panel data and linear regression methodologies on a set of companies from 2013 to 2016, the results show that SOP generally increases the alignment of CEO compensation, although its effectiveness is reduced in companies with overcompensated CEOs and in owner-managed companies.
  • Thumbnail Image
    Publication
    Open Access
    Shareholder activism in listed family firms: exploring the effectiveness of say-on-pay on CEO compensation
    (Wiley, 2024-06-11) Sánchez Marín, Gregorio; Lozano Reina, Gabriel; Baixauli Soler, J. Samuel; Organización de Empresas y Finanzas; Facultades, Departamentos, Servicios y Escuelas::Departamentos de la UMU::Organización de Empresas y Finanzas
    The widespread critical evidence surrounding executive compensation of listed corporations has boosted shareholder activism in recent decades. The say-on-pay (SOP) mechanism—a vote in which shareholders express their (dis)agreement with executive pay designs—is one of the corporate governance mechanisms that has led to this activism among listed firms. Merging agency and socioemotional wealth (SEW) arguments, this paper analyzes how effective SOP voting results are among listed family firms in terms of CEO compensation efficiency and equity. Using a sample of UK listed firms from 2011 to 2018, our results show that SOP effectiveness is positively influenced by family ownership and is strongly moderated by family involvement in management and in governance as well as by family generation. Our findings stress the strong family effect and the ethical perceptions of family shareholders on SOP voting, showing how family participation in the firm encourages fairer and more aligned CEO compensation packages. SOP institutional and practical implications oriented to preserve shareholder value and family wealth are finally outlined.