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https://doi.org/10.1080/17487870.2021.1941958
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| Campo DC | Valor | Lengua/Idioma |
|---|---|---|
| dc.contributor.author | Candel Sánchez, Francisco | - |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2025-01-26T11:30:10Z | - |
| dc.date.available | 2025-01-26T11:30:10Z | - |
| dc.date.issued | 2021-07-08 | - |
| dc.identifier.citation | Journal of Economic Policy Reform, 2021, Vol. 25 (3), pp. 287-304 | es |
| dc.identifier.issn | Print: 1748-7870 | - |
| dc.identifier.issn | Electronic: 1748-7889 | - |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10201/149297 | - |
| dc.description | © 2021 Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group. This manuscript version is made available under the CC-BY-NC-ND 4.0 license http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ This document is the Accepted Manuscript version of a Published Work that appeared in final form in Journal of Economic Policy Reform. To access the final edited and published work see https://doi.org/10.1080/17487870.2021.1941958 | - |
| dc.description.abstract | In this paper, we propose a game theoretic approach to deal with the problem of implementing the efficient allocation of aid and reform through policy conditionality. We show that optimality can only be attained by a conditional scheme that takes into account the characteristics of both donor and recipient. Moreover, the levels of aid and reform induced by such a mechanism are, under certain conditions, compatible with the goals of the recipient government. This result reconciles ownership with a specific form of conditionality. | es |
| dc.format | application/pdf | es |
| dc.format.extent | 19 | es |
| dc.language | eng | es |
| dc.publisher | Taylor and Francis Group | es |
| dc.relation | This work was supported by the Ministerio de Economía y Competitividad (Spain) [ECO2016-75631-P]. | es |
| dc.rights | info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess | es |
| dc.rights | Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 Internacional | * |
| dc.rights.uri | http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ | * |
| dc.subject | Policy conditionality | es |
| dc.subject | Ownership | - |
| dc.subject | Structural reform | - |
| dc.subject.other | CDU::3 - Ciencias sociales::33 - Economía | es |
| dc.title | On foreign aid effectiveness: when conditionality met ownership | es |
| dc.type | info:eu-repo/semantics/article | es |
| dc.relation.publisherversion | https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/17487870.2021.1941958 | es |
| dc.identifier.doi | https://doi.org/10.1080/17487870.2021.1941958 | - |
| dc.contributor.department | Departamento de Fundamentos del Análisis Económico | - |
| Aparece en las colecciones: | Artículos | |
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| Fichero | Descripción | Tamaño | Formato | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| JEPR_2021.pdf | 832,45 kB | Adobe PDF |  Visualizar/Abrir |
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