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dc.contributor.authorSánchez Marín, Gregorio-
dc.contributor.authorLozano Reina, Gabriel-
dc.contributor.authorBaixauli Soler, J. Samuel-
dc.contributor.otherFacultades, Departamentos, Servicios y Escuelas::Departamentos de la UMU::Organización de Empresas y Finanzases
dc.date.accessioned2025-01-08T12:31:40Z-
dc.date.available2025-01-08T12:31:40Z-
dc.date.issued2024-06-11-
dc.identifier.citationBusiness Ethics, the Environment & Responsibility, 2024, Vol. 33, Issue 3, pp. 308-330es
dc.identifier.issnElectronic: 2694-6424-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10201/148051-
dc.description© 2023 The Authors. This manuscript version is made available under the CC-BY-NC-ND 4.0 license http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/. This document is the Published Manuscript version of a Published Work that appeared in final form in Business Ethics, the Environment and Responsibility. To access the final edited and published work see https://doi.org/10.1111/beer.12604-
dc.description.abstractThe widespread critical evidence surrounding executive compensation of listed corporations has boosted shareholder activism in recent decades. The say-on-pay (SOP) mechanism—a vote in which shareholders express their (dis)agreement with executive pay designs—is one of the corporate governance mechanisms that has led to this activism among listed firms. Merging agency and socioemotional wealth (SEW) arguments, this paper analyzes how effective SOP voting results are among listed family firms in terms of CEO compensation efficiency and equity. Using a sample of UK listed firms from 2011 to 2018, our results show that SOP effectiveness is positively influenced by family ownership and is strongly moderated by family involvement in management and in governance as well as by family generation. Our findings stress the strong family effect and the ethical perceptions of family shareholders on SOP voting, showing how family participation in the firm encourages fairer and more aligned CEO compensation packages. SOP institutional and practical implications oriented to preserve shareholder value and family wealth are finally outlined.es
dc.formatapplication/pdfes
dc.format.extent23es
dc.languageenges
dc.publisherWiley-
dc.relationThis work was supported by the Spanish Ministry of Science, Innovation and Universities (under Project ECO2017-84209-P) and the Fundación Cajamurcia.es
dc.rightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccesses
dc.rightsAttribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 Internacional*
dc.rights.urihttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/*
dc.subjectCEO compensation-
dc.subjectFamily heterogeneity-
dc.subjectFamily listed firms-
dc.subjectFamily ownership-
dc.subjectSay on pay effectiven-
dc.titleShareholder activism in listed family firms: exploring the effectiveness of say-on-pay on CEO compensationes
dc.typeinfo:eu-repo/semantics/articlees
dc.relation.publisherversionhttps://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/beer.12604es
dc.identifier.doihttps://doi.org/10.1111/beer.12604-
dc.contributor.departmentDepartamento de Organización de Empresas y Finanzas-
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