Por favor, use este identificador para citar o enlazar este ítem: https://doi.org/10.1109/SEED61283.2024.00017

Título: A first exploration of fine-grain coherence for integrity metadata
Fecha de publicación: 5-nov-2024
Editorial: IEEE Computer Society
ISBN: 979-8-3315-0565-3
Palabras clave: Memory
Integrity
Security
Coherence
Resumen: Memory integrity protection is intended for secure execution, and it is typically associated with programs running on a single core. However, with the emergence of multi-processor systems-on-chip and chiplets, extending memory integrity protection to cache-coherent multiprocessors becomes essential. In this work, we explore for the first time the design space for maintaining coherence in fine-grain integrity metadata at the block level. We discuss various policies for updating the integrity tree using the underlying coherence protocol, and examine how these policies affect coherence traffic. We introduce the concepts of proactive and reactive update initiation, and discuss their implications for data and integrity-tree blocks. We also investigate the trade-offs between eager and lazy update propagation policies, focusing on coherence transactions such as invalidations and downgrades to analyse the pros and cons of different approaches. What we observe is that for some benchmarks the choice between the eager and the lazy update initiation policy does not make much difference, while for many other benchmarks one policy is better over the other, depending on how the benchmark shares its data.
Autor/es principal/es: Ekemark, Per
Ros Bardisa, Alberto
Sagonas, Konstantinos
Kaxiras, Stefanos
Forma parte de: International Symposium on Secure and Private Execution Environment Design (SEED), 2024, May 16-17, Orlando, pp. 62-72
Versión del editor: https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/10738370
URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10201/147579
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1109/SEED61283.2024.00017
Tipo de documento: info:eu-repo/semantics/article
Número páginas / Extensión: 11
Derechos: info:eu-repo/semantics/embargoedAccess
Descripción: © 2024 IEEE. This document is the Submitted version of a Published Work that appeared in final form in International Symposium on Secure and Private Execution Environment Design (SEED). To access the final edited and published work see https://doi.org/10.1109/SEED61283.2024.00017
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