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https://doi.org/10.1016/j.infoecopol.2020.100896
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Título: | Preventing commercial piracy when consumers are loss averse |
Fecha de publicación: | dic-2020 |
Editorial: | Elsevier |
Cita bibliográfica: | Information Economics and Policy Volume 53, December 2020, 100896 |
ISSN: | Print: 0167-6245 Electronic: 1873-5975 |
Palabras clave: | Reference-dependent utility Loss aversion Commercial piracy Government Incumbent Pirate |
Resumen: | I analyze how the loss aversion of consumers affects the strategies of the government and the incumbent for preventing commercial piracy. To that end, I develop a sequential duopoly model of vertical product differentiation with price competition in which con- sumers have a reference-dependent utility. Regardless of the quality of the illegal copy, conventional models that do not take into account the loss aversion of consumers overes- timate the government’s effort to deter piracy but underestimate the incumbent’s effort. Contrary to conventional wisdom, I find that blocking the entry of a pirate by the govern- ment can provide more welfare than accommodating it. However, the government will not block it because socially it is better to encourage the incumbent to establish a price low enough to deter the pirate from entering. |
Autor/es principal/es: | Martínez Sánchez, Francisco |
Facultad/Departamentos/Servicios: | Facultades, Departamentos, Servicios y Escuelas::Departamentos de la UMU::Métodos Cuantitativos para la Economía y la Empresa |
Versión del editor: | S0167624520301402 |
URI: | http://hdl.handle.net/10201/137243 |
DOI: | https://doi.org/10.1016/j.infoecopol.2020.100896 |
Tipo de documento: | info:eu-repo/semantics/article |
Número páginas / Extensión: | 28 |
Derechos: | info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 Internacional |
Descripción: | © 2020. This document is made available under the CC-BY-NC-ND 4.0 license http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ This document is the submitted version of a published work that appeared in final form in Information Economics and Policy |
Aparece en las colecciones: | Artículos: Métodos Cuantitativos para la Economía y la Empresa |
Ficheros en este ítem:
Fichero | Descripción | Tamaño | Formato | |
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2020_09 piracy loss aversion.pdf | 386,75 kB | Adobe PDF | Visualizar/Abrir |
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