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Title: Lobbyin to prevent commercial piracy
Issue Date: 23-Jun-2010
Date of creation: Jun-2010
Keywords: Common agency
Commercial piracy
Consumers and government
Abstract: In this paper we develop a common agency model to analyze the problem of pirates entering the market, in which the incumbent and the consumers form pressure groups to lobby the government on policies to prevent piracy while the pirates try to avoid being stopped. We show that a monopoly is not an equilibrium when both the incumbent and consumers lobby the government, and that the cost of monitoring commercial piracy is very important in determining (truthful) equilibria, as is the case where there is no lobby competition. However, it is now more difficult getting the pirate to enter the market.
Primary author: Martínez Sánchez, Francisco
Faculty / Departments / Services: Departamentos y Servicios::Departamentos de la UMU::Métodos Cuantitativos para la Economía y la Empresa
Collection: WP-UMUFAE
Published in: Proyecto de investigación:
Document type: info:eu-repo/semantics/article
Number of pages / Extensions: 16
Rights: info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
Appears in Collections:Informes o documentos de trabajo

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