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https://doi.org/10.1007/s00712-017-0547-3
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Título: | Endogenous market regulation in a signaling model of lobby formation |
Fecha de publicación: | ene-2018 |
Editorial: | Springer |
Cita bibliográfica: | Journal of Economics, 123(1), 2018, 23-47. |
ISSN: | 0931-8658 |
Materias relacionadas: | CDU::3 - Ciencias sociales::33 - Economía |
Palabras clave: | Asymmetric information; lobby formation; signaling |
Resumen: | This paper aims at explaining industry protection in a context in which the government cannot observe the state of market demand. We develop an asymmetric information model and use the tools of contract theory in order to understand (i) how the level of industry protection is endogenously determined, and (ii) why some industries decide to engage in large lobbying costs to become politically active. Our model offers plausible explanations to phenomena such as the "loser's paradox", where weak industries receive the most protection although strong industries are the ones that spend more resources on lobbying activities. The model also allows for an analysis of the influence that lobbying costs have on the decision to organize actively as a lobby. |
Autor/es principal/es: | Candel-Sánchez, Francisco Perote-Peña, Juan |
Facultad/Departamentos/Servicios: | Facultades, Departamentos, Servicios y Escuelas::Departamentos de la UMU::Fundamentos del Análisis Económico |
Forma parte de: | Proyecto de investigación: |
URI: | http://hdl.handle.net/10201/103086 |
DOI: | https://doi.org/10.1007/s00712-017-0547-3 |
Tipo de documento: | info:eu-repo/semantics/article |
Número páginas / Extensión: | 41 |
Derechos: | info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess Atribución-NoComercial-SinDerivadas 3.0 España |
Aparece en las colecciones: | Artículos: Fundamentos del Análisis Económico |
Ficheros en este ítem:
Fichero | Descripción | Tamaño | Formato | |
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Endogenous_market_regulation_Journal of Economics-1.pdf | 459,06 kB | Adobe PDF | Visualizar/Abrir |
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