Publication: Dennett y el realismo fisicista
Authors
Maraguat, Edgar
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Publisher
Universidad de Murcia
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DOI
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info:eu-repo/semantics/article
Description
Abstract
El artículo explora las posibilidades
de la teoría de Dennett sobre los sistemas físicos,
funcionales e intencionales como punto de
vista no reduccionista sobre las intenciones y las
funciones. Dennett defiende que el aprecio de las
ventajas predictivas y los compromisos ontológicos
con ciertas pautas de las perspectivas funcional
e intencional impide el reduccionismo y,
por tanto, el fisicismo con respecto a funciones e
intenciones. Se propone aquí que ese argumento
se complemente con otro que muestre que las
pautas del comportamiento físico no son más
objetivas que las demás
The paper examines the possibility of interpreting Dennett’s theory of physical, functional and intentional systems as a non reductionist stance on intentions and functions. Dennett claims that if we appreciate the predictive benefits and the ontological commitments with certain patterns of adopting functional and intentional perspectives, then we rule out the plausibility of a reductionist and hence physicalist stance on intentions and functions. I propose to complement that argument by showing that patterns of physical behaviour are not more objective than functional and intentional patterns.
The paper examines the possibility of interpreting Dennett’s theory of physical, functional and intentional systems as a non reductionist stance on intentions and functions. Dennett claims that if we appreciate the predictive benefits and the ontological commitments with certain patterns of adopting functional and intentional perspectives, then we rule out the plausibility of a reductionist and hence physicalist stance on intentions and functions. I propose to complement that argument by showing that patterns of physical behaviour are not more objective than functional and intentional patterns.
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