Publication:
Optimal incentives on multiple prosocial activities when reputation matters

dc.contributor.authorCandel Sánchez, Francisco
dc.contributor.authorPerote-Peña, Juan
dc.contributor.departmentFundamentos del Análisis Económico
dc.date.accessioned2021-02-15T11:11:29Z
dc.date.available2021-02-15T11:11:29Z
dc.date.issued2020-07
dc.description.abstractIn this paper we present a signaling model in which individuals engage in socially bene cial but costly activities to convey information about their willingness to cooperate with other agents. When several activities are available, the inclusion of monetary compensations in anyone of them affects the relative costs of undertaking each activity and, therefore, their informative value for agents. We fi nd the subsidies that maximize social welfare, which are shown to depend critically on the reputation gained from each activity. Finally, we use comparative statics analysis to study the effects on optimal subsidies of changes in their determinants.es
dc.formatapplication/pdfes
dc.format.extent37es
dc.identifier.citationThe Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 122(3), 2020, 1207-1230.
dc.identifier.doihttps://doi.org/10.1111/sjoe.12369
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10201/103318
dc.languageenges
dc.publisherWileyes
dc.relationÁmbito del proyecto (Europeo, nacional o regional): Nacional/Europeo Agencia/entidad financiadora: Ministerio de Economía y Competitividad/FEDER Convocatoria: 2016 Nombre del proyecto: La solidaridad como motor del crecimiento económico Código: ECO2016‐75631‐Pes
dc.relation.ispartofProyecto de investigación: La solidaridad como motor del crecimiento económicoes
dc.rightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccesses
dc.rightsAtribución-NoComercial-SinDerivadas 3.0 España*
dc.rights.urihttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/es/*
dc.subjectProsocial activities; signaling; economic incentives; social welfarees
dc.subject.otherCDU::3 - Ciencias sociales::33 - Economíaes
dc.titleOptimal incentives on multiple prosocial activities when reputation matterses
dc.typeinfo:eu-repo/semantics/articlees
dspace.entity.typePublicationes
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