Publication: La superación de las paradojas del sujeto intérprete en Wittgenstein y Apel: ¿A través de Frege o Peirce?
Authors
Ortiz de Landázuri, Carlos
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Publisher
Universidad de Murcia
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DOI
http://dx.doi.org/10.6018/daimon/352811
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info:eu-repo/semantics/article
Description
Abstract
Wittgenstein y Apel pretendieron definir el constitutivo formal del sujeto intérprete del lenguaje a partir de las propuestas de Frege o de Peirce, pero en ambos casos sus propuestas se acabaron volviendo paradójicas. Primero, Wittgenstein por no poder fundamentarlo de un modo crítico-transcendental a partir de una noción de “yo” metafísico o en virtud de unos juegos del lenguaje en sí mismos conductistas que tampoco permiten remitirse a unos signos intérprete, al modo exigido por Frege. De todos modos, posteriormente, Apel habría propuesto evitar estas paradojas mediante una interpretación pragmático-transcendental del sujeto intérprete a partir de Peirce, aunque finalmente comprobaría cómo también se acabarían fomentando el mismo tipo de paradojas.
Wittgenstein and Apel tried to define the formal constitutive of the interpreter subject of the language from the proposals of Frege or Peirce, but in both cases their proposals ended up becoming paradoxical. First, Wittgenstein for not being able to substantiate it in a critical-transcendental way from a notion of metaphysical “I” or in the realm of some behavioral language games that do not allow us to refer to some interpreter signs, as required by Frege. Anyway, later, Apel would have proposed to avoid these paradoxes through a pragmatic-transcendental interpretation of the interpreter from Peirce, although he would finally verify how they would also end up promoting the same type of paradoxes.
Wittgenstein and Apel tried to define the formal constitutive of the interpreter subject of the language from the proposals of Frege or Peirce, but in both cases their proposals ended up becoming paradoxical. First, Wittgenstein for not being able to substantiate it in a critical-transcendental way from a notion of metaphysical “I” or in the realm of some behavioral language games that do not allow us to refer to some interpreter signs, as required by Frege. Anyway, later, Apel would have proposed to avoid these paradoxes through a pragmatic-transcendental interpretation of the interpreter from Peirce, although he would finally verify how they would also end up promoting the same type of paradoxes.
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