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Reading René Girard in Light of
Emmanuel Levinas

Una lectura de René Girard a la luz de
Emmanuel Levinas

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Introduction

René Girard is a controversial scholar, whose theory has triggered two opposite responses. First, his theory has had a great impact on human sciences because it deals with social mimesis, one of the most basic phenomena in human behaviours, upon which the human sciences stand. The Girardian impact on the human science is recognizable in many areas such as politics (Stephen L. Gardner, 2011), psychology (Jean-Michel Oughourlian, 1991), economics (Andrew Feenberg, 1988; and Andre Orlean, 1988), among others. The Girardian impact is also recognizable in biblical studies in that many scholars, such as Sandor Goodhart, Michael Hardin, Charles Mabee, among others, haveinterpreted the Bible based upon his ethical view on the Bible (Goodhart, 1996; Hardin, 2000; and Mabee, 2000). The Girardian impact on the academic fields, however, is only part of the story; he has been blamed not only for overlooking violence (Scubla, 1988), but also for appealing to violence (Domenach, 1988; and Price, 2000). However, none of these accusations is more unjust than the accusation that Girard is anti-Semitic in that the anti-Semitic accusation results from exactly the way in which Girard tries to listen to the prophetic voice in the Hebrew Bible by reading the Hebrew Bible in light of the gospels' preaching of the kingdom.

To clarify my position, let me show first how Girard ends up to the anti-Semitic allegation. According to Girard, there is a serious lack in human subjectivity since we do not know ourselves by nature. Of course, we know our names and positions, our merits and demerits, our rights and duties, and so on. These identities, however, cannot be truly subjective, for they are given not by nature, but culturally or socially acquired by others, or in relation to others, in the world. The lack in human subjectivity gives rise to our desire for "being" in the world since nobody knows oneself by nature that everybody tries to identify (know) oneself by gathering

one's identity, one's being, in the world.[1]Here, the word "being" refers to the Heideggerian idea

of human identity that is gathered in the world. In the Heideggerian philosophy, my identity, or

mybeing, in which I feel at home, is not my own self, but what has been gathered to myself

under my vision, in that, while dwelling in the world, I already project my vision on the world

and absorb what is known to my vision in order that I may feel at home and identify myself

asbeing in the world.[2] In other words, for Heidegger, my vision, in its power to know, plays a

major role for my identity since I identify myself not by my own substance,such as my flesh and

bones, but by what is known to my eyes. The Heideggerian self cannot be truly subjective since

it identifies itself not by its material substance that exists in itself, but by gathering itsbeing, its

identity, in relation to the world.

Human desire for being in the world gives rise to social mimesis in that, while

identifying ourselves in relation to the world, we already take each other as a model and imitate

each other's styles, behaviors, opinions, or whatsoever, in order that we may feel at home and

identify ourselves asbeing in the world.[3] The social mimesis gradually develops into violence

because, while imitating each other as a model, we also imitate each other's violence and

become violent doubles. The mimetic violence then quickly snowballs into a mob situation since

the doubles try to end violence with violence, but only find themselves in the same cycle of

reprisal. The mob situation ends up to a sacrificial killing of a surrogate victim on the logic that

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[1] René Girard, *Violence and the Sacred,* trans. Patrick Gregory (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1977), 146.
[2] Martin Heidegger, *Being in Time*, trans. John Macquarrie & Edward Robinson (Yew York and Evanston: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1962), 82
[3] Girard, *Violence and the Sacred,* 145.

the violent impulses can be appeased only by killing "a third party" who cannot take another cycle of reprisal.[4]

From the sacrificial killing arises the dazzling illusion on the victim because, after the violent impulses become appeased through the victim, the same victim looks like a magical "god" who has brought the miraculous harmony to the community.[5] The dazzling illusion on the victim is the very origin of human culture, a relatively harmonious system in the world, for the magical god, who is now singled out from the ordinary crowd, brings "difference" and orders to the community in order that the ordinary crowd may be purged of the social mimesis or double-ness and differentiated or identified from one another.[6] In other words, for Girard, culture originates not from the victim him/herself who lives with his/her bodily materials, but from the dazzling image of the victim affected by vision and its illusion.

The illusory culture cannot but return to the social mimesis because, while differentiating ourselves from one another, we also take each other as a model imitate each other until we lose our individual difference and remain undifferentiated. In other words, there is an irony inside culture in that human desire to differentiate the self from one another results in the same identity of the self. The social mimesis calls for another cycle of reprisal in that those, who become undifferentiated through mimesis, must be purged of the sameness by bringing new difference through another victim in order that they may be re-differentiated or re-identified from one another. In other words, human culture, or a relatively harmonious system in the world, changes nothing in the serious lack in human subjectivity, for, even after the violent impulses are

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[4] Girard, *Violence and the Sacred*, 259.
[5] Girard, *Violence and the Sacred*, 161.
[6] Girard, *Things Hidden Since the Foundation of the World*, trans. Michael Metteer (Book I) and Stephen Bann (Books II & III) (London: The Athlone Press, 1987), 312.

purged through the victim, we still identify ourselves not by ourselves, but by bringing new difference at the cost of innocent victims, i.e. in relation to others.

Thecultural or interpersonal self-identity never knows others as they are because, while identifying ourselves in relation to others, we touch everything with eyes and differentiate it from one another in order that we may gather up the phenomenal difference and fill the lack of our social difference or identity. In other words, objective knowledge is impossible inside culture since things are known not by their own (material) difference, but by being differentiated with eyes. The cultural or invalid knowledge is already violence since what is differentiated by sight cannot be a thing itself that lives with its material substance, but its image, its phenomenon, stripped of the material substance. In other words, for Girard, violence turns out to be intellectual since it is identified in human desire to fill the lack of being with what is known by sight: "The essential violence returns to us … not only in the form of a violent history but also in the form of subversive knowledge."[7] Therefore, if we know others by sight, we cannot but end up to our intellectual violence on others, for others are stripped of their material substance and reduced to their outward image or knowledge, which is so thin and fragile, thereby, easily absorbable to our knowledge, our property, to fill the lack of our individual or social identity in the world. According to Girard, the cultural or intellectual violence has dominated all over the Western theories, such as Freud, Levi-Strauss, Derrida, etc., for, in the Western theories, nothing is known by itself, but by vision and its phenomenal (image-like) knowledge gatherable to human identity.[8]

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[7] Girard, *Violence and the Sacred*, 318.
[8] Girard, *Violence and the Sacred*, 170, 174, 180; Girard, *Things Hidden Since the Foundation of the World*, 65, 74, 110, 353. 370; Girard, "Theory and its Terror," in *Mimesis and Theory*, ed. Robert Doran (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2008), 200, 212; Richard Golsan, *René Girard and Myth* (New York: Garland Pub., 1993), 24, 26.

As a solution to the cultural violence, Girard suggests the biblical ideal of the kingdom on the assumption that, in the Bible, the cultural violence is revealed little by little until it is reversed to the kingdom.[9] In other words, for Girard, the Bible serves as an alternative to the cultural violence not because it is entirely free of violence, but because it reverses the cultural violence to the kingdom, not by violence, only by revealing it. The way in which the Bible reveals the cultural violence is through victims because, in the Bible, victims are the ones who bear witness to what has been inflicted behind the cultural orders. For instance, in the story of Cain and Abel, Abel is the one who bears witness to the truth of Cain's fratricide behind the Canaanite culture. The revealing power in the biblical victims introduces the kingdom ideal, the ideal of human responsibility for the innocent suffering, because, as revelation continues through the victims, people gradually accept the limit of the sacrificial culture and follow justice and ethics for those (victims) who serve as a witness to the sacrificial origin of human culture.

The kingdom ideal in the Bible reaches its "climax" in the gospels because, as the Bible continues, the sacrificial culture in the Hebrew Bible gradually reaches its limit and finally reverses itself to the kingdom in the time of the gospels.[10] In other words, there is a time reference to the kingdom, for violence in the Hebrew Bible is gradually lessened and reversed to the kingdom in the time of the gospels. According to Girard, the kingdom ideal climaxed in the time of the gospels does not mean that the biblical kingdom has been fulfilled in the gospels in that, even after the gospels, violence has served to keep the social harmony, although it is not physically visible.Rather, it simply represents a human condition liberated from the blood cycle of culture because, in the time of the gospels, the bloody cycle in the Hebrew Bible is already

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[9] Girard, *Things Hidden Since the Foundation of the World*, 251.
[10] Girard, *Things Hidden Since the Foundation of the World*, 268.

reversed to the kingdom that it is impossible for humanity to return to the bloody culture: "it is impossible to put the clock back;" "the point of no return had already been reached."[11] The humanity devoted to the kingdom ideal guarantees not only the subjectivity of the self but also objective knowledge in relation to others, for the one who is purged of the bloody culture and reversed to the kingdom no longer gathers up the phenomenal knowledge at the cost of others, but try to respond to others' needs by offering one's live materials, e.g. food and shelter, to others (victims).

The Girardian theory of revelation is the solution to the problem in the Christian theory of Jesus' blood atonement. For traditional Christians, Jesus died to take away the sin of the world since they believe that, while dying on the cross, Jesus paid the price for the sin of the world once for all (Hebrews 7: 27, 10:10). The atonement theory gives rise to the idea of the kingdom, for, while paying the price for the sin, Jesus appeased God's wrath against the world and brought the divine kingdom to the world in order that we may share the kingdom as far as we believe in Jesus' blood sacrifice for the sin. The Christian idea of the kingdom is already violence on Jesus, for the one, who brought the sacrificial reconciliation, cannot be Jesus the innocent victim who died to reveal the sacrificial culture, but the magical god who is stripped of the revealing power and assimilated into the sacrificial culture. The Christian violence on Jesus, however, can be overcome by the revelation theory since, in the theory of revelation, the bloody culture is already revealed through Jesus before he is stripped of the revealing power and divinized to the magical god under the Christian theory of atonement.

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[11] Girard, *Things Hidden Since the Foundation of the World*, 205, 206.

The kingdom ideal in the Bible brings about a question of how to interpret the sacrificial violence exercised by YHWH and Jesus in the Bible. Is it YHWH or Jesus who is responsible for the sacrificial violence in the Bible? Of course, we cannot attribute the sacrificial violence to YHWH or Jesus since they are the ones who reveal the sacrificial violence behind the cultural orders. Then, it is none other than we humans since we are the ones who identify ourselves not by our own self, but by gathering up our essence at the cost of the biblical figures (others). The sacrificial violence, which is human violence but attributed to YHWH and Jesus, should not be read literally because those who unfairly assume our violence would be neither exhausted to the literal knowledge nor absorbed to our essence, but remain as innocent victims and serve as a witness to our intellectual violence. Then it must be read in terms of our responsibility for the innocent victims, for those (YHWH and Jesus), who escape the intellectual violence, can be identified only when we give up our intellectual identity and follow our responsibility for those irreducible to our intellectual identity. In other words, for Girard, violence in the Bible is a burden to the self since it is intended not to fill the lack of our essence, but to teach our responsibility for the innocent victims.

The Girardian or ethical view on the Bible, however, does not exhaust the anti-Semitic implication in it, for, no matter how sincerely we pursue the ethical view on the Bible, the Hebrew Bible with YHWH's violence still appears inferior to the gospels' preaching of the kingdom. Girard deals with this problem based on his theory of revelation. According to Girard, YHWH's violence should not be read literally in that the Hebrew Bible describes YHWH's violence not to disgrace YHWH to the violent sacred, the phenomenal (image-like) god, absorbable to human essence. Instead, it must be read in light of the gospels' preaching of the kingdom (Mark 1: 15) since the Hebrew Bible describes YHWH's violence only to "bring to

light" the terror of our sacrificial violence, which has been unfairly attributed to YHWH, in order that we may be warned by our own violence and listen to the gospels' prophetic (non-violent) teaching.[12] In other words, Girard reads YHWH's violence in light of the gospels' preaching not because YHWH is inferior to Jesus, but because YHWH's violence, in which YHWH unfairly assumes our violence, already serves as a warning against our violence and leads us to follow the kingdom ideal preached by Jesus. The way in which Girard reads the Hebrew Bible should not be taken as anti-Semitic since it is intended not to replace Judaism with Christianity, but to listen to the biblical warning against our sacrificial violence on innocent victims, including the Jews. Therefore, if we still see Girard as anti-Semitic, then, we cannot but return to our own violence on YHWH and Jesus because, in the Girardian reading of the Bible, neither YHWH nor Jesus would be differentiated as inferior vs. superior nor absorbed to human essence, but only bear witness to our sacrificial violence on YHWH and Jesus, due to the revealing power of the biblical figures.

Unfortunately, however, the Girardian work on the Bible has been stripped of the kingdom ideal and subjected to anti-Semitic controversies because, while reading YHWH's violence in light of the gospels' preaching, Girard seems to change nothing in the traditional view that the Hebrew Bible with YHWH's violence appears somewhat inferior to the gospels' preaching that it must be replaced with the latter. Michael Weingrad, for instance, insists that the Girardian favor of the gospels still "echoes" the traditional view that Judaism, in its stubborn

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[12] Girard, *Things Hidden Since the Foundation of the World*, 268.

loyalty to the sacrificial laws, is somewhat outdated or inferior to the gospels' preaching of the kingdom.[13]

Now, the question is: "What triggers the anti-Semitic controversies over Girard. Is it Girard himself?" The answer is "No!" because he neither understands the Bible by letters nor replaces the Hebrew Bible with the gospels, but tries to overcome all sorts of sacrificial violence, including the literal or anti-Semitic violence, by revealing it. Then, it is nothing other than the Western framework, within which Girard has been interpreted, because, when read within the Western framework, none of the biblical texts would be identified by the kingdom ideal, but only understood by letters and exhausted to the anti-Semitic (literal) knowledge that the Hebrew Bible with YHWH's violence appears inferior to the gospels' preaching of the kingdom. In other words, there has been a serious misunderstanding of Girard since what originated from the biblical/Judaic ideal of responsibility has been read in light of the Western-Greek literalism and misinterpreted as anti-Semitic, appealing to the traditional view on the Bible. Here, the terms, the biblical-Judaic vs. the Western-Greek, come from Emmanuel Levinas' two pillars of human civilization: Greek universalism and Judaic particularism. Greek universalism refers to the Western ideal of "transparent language," which pursues the phenomenal knowledge gatherable to being.[14] Judaic particularism refers to the "biblical" ideal of responsibility irreducible to the Greek-Western ideal of transparent language.[15]

In response to the anti-Semitic allegation against Girard, I argue that, if Girard had recognized the idea of diachrony that has been signaled in his revelation theory, he would not

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[13] Michael Weingrad, "Jews (in Theory): Representations of Judaism, Anti-Semitism, and the *Shoah* in Postmodern French Thought," *Judaism* 45 (1996): 95.
[14] Gerald L. Bruns, "The Hermeneutical Significance of Emmanuel Levinas's Talmudic Readings," in *The Idea of Biblical Interpretation*, ed. Hindy Najman, Judith H. Newman (Leiden: Boston: Brill, 2004), 550.
[15] Bruns, "The Hermeneutical Significance of Emmanuel Levinas's Talmudic Readings," 547.

have been involved in the allegation on the assumption that the idea of diachrony serves as the antidote to the Western-Greek misunderstanding of Girard. In other words, Girard is not entirely innocent from the allegation since he fails to recognize the idea of diachrony, which is already signaled in his revelation theory and serves to liberate his theory itself from the Western-Greek misunderstanding. Here, diachrony, which comes from the compound word, diachronic (*dia+chronos,* passing time), refers to what Levinas calls "lapse of time," or loss of time.[16] According to Levinas, in Judaism, moments are neither differentiated by vision nor gathered up to human essence, but entirely elapse before the intellectual violence takes place. In other words, in Judaism, time is diachronic, due to the lapse of moments.

The Judaic diachrony is materiality itself since what escapes the intellectual power of vision cannot be the phenomenal data, such as images and knowledge, available to human essence, but the material data, such as smells, sounds, heats, colds, hardness and softness, which already fleeted away before they are differentiated and gathered up to human essence.[17] The material diachrony covers everything in the world, for nothing in the world belongs to the phenomenal (present) data, but to the fleeting (past) materials. For instance, a rock belongs to diachrony since it lives with its fleeting materiality, such as hardness and dryness, entirely inaccessible to vision and its phenomenal essence. Even dusts and airs belong to diachrony, due to their fleeting materials, such as moistures and gases, irreducible to human essence. In other words, in Judaism, nothing belongs to the self, but to diachrony, due to the limit of our vision in relation to the material world.

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[16] Levinas, *Otherwise Than Being*, trans. Alphonso Lingis (Pittsburgh, Pa: Duquesne University Press, 1998), 8.
[17] Levinas, *Otherwise Than Being*, 31, 50.

The Levinasian idea of diachrony is also signaled in the Girardian idea of revelation. In the Girardian reading of the Bible, victims are the key to understand the idea of revelation since they are the ones who reveal the cultural violence until it is reversed to the kingdom. The idea of revelation presupposes diachrony because the only way for the biblical victims to reveal the cultural violence is to elapse with their fleeting materials such as pains and tears before they are exhausted to the literal knowledge of the Bible and gathered up to human essence. In other words, at the bottom of the revelation theory, there is diachrony in that, without the lapse of the biblical victims, there would be neither revelation nor the kingdom, but only the literal or intellectual violence. The diachronic foundation of the revelation theory is the solution to the anti-Semitic allegation against Girard because, in the Girardian reading of the Bible, nobody would be exhausted to the anti-Semitic knowledge, but entirely elapse before the anti-Semitic interpretation takes place that that we cannot but give up the anti-Semitic interpretation and follow our responsibility for those who already fleeted away and remain as the very witness to our intellectual violence until it is reversed to the kingdom.

Here is evidence to the diachronic solution to the anti-Semitic allegation against Girard. In the Girardian reading of the Bible, Jesus was resurrected by God not because he took away the sin of the world, but because, in the time of the gospels, violence was fully reversed to the kingdom that there was no place to keep him in the cultural (human) world.[18] God's resurrection of Jesus seems to appeal to the Christian anti-Semitism because, after his death, Jesus was favored by God and raised from the dead. However, the anti-Semitic suspicion is impossible, for the resurrection results from the biblical diachrony that serves as the antidote to

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[18] Girard, *Things Hidden Since the Foundation of the World*, 206.

the anti-Semitic allegation against Girard. The resurrection results not from the illusory culture

in that, after his resurrection, Jesus was neither divinized behind the dazzling illusion nor

assimilated into the Christian culture. On the contrary, it results from the biblical diachrony, for,

before the divinization takes place behind the dazzling illusion Jesus already escaped the

dazzling illusion and elapsed from the cultural world. The lapse of Jesus serves as the solution to

the anti-Semitic allegation against Girard in that, while elapsing from the cultural world, Jesus

already defeats the Christian (cultural) messiah by revealing the limit of the latter until we give

up the cultural messiah and follow our responsibility for Jesus who already elapsed, thus,

irreducible to the cultural messiah.

Unfortunately, Girard is so unfamiliar to the idea of diachrony that he fails to

recognize the diachronic foundation of his revelation theory. As a result, the revelation theory

has been stripped of the kingdom ideal and subjected to anti-Semitic controversies because,

without elapsing, none of the biblical victims would remain as a witness to our sacrificial

violence, but can be affected by the Western-Greek literalism and exhausted to the traditional or

anti-Semitic view on the Bible that the Hebrew Bible with YHWH's violence is still inferior to

the gospels' prophetic teaching. In other words, the anti-Semitic controversies over Girard result

not from his theory itself, but from his failure to recognize the idea of diachrony that already

grounds his theory and serves as the antidote to the literal or Western-Greek misinterpretation of

Girard. The Western-Greek literalism is already violence in that, while reading the Bible in

terms of the literal or anti-Semitic sense, we already strip the Bible of its prophetic teaching and

absorb the literal or anti-Semitic essence to ourselves in order that we may feel at home and

identify ourselves as being in the world. So fortunately, however, thanks to the Levinasian work

on diachrony, the anti-Semitic controversies can be overcome, for the Levinasian work on

diachrony will lead us to re-illuminate the idea of diachrony, which grounds the revelation theory and serves as the antidote to the Western-Greek misunderstanding of Girard. In other words, I propose the Levinasian work on diachrony as a guideline for the Girardian work on the Bible on the assumption that the latter is also founded on diachrony, but fails to recognize it and attracts anti-Semitic controversies.

To clarify my proposal, let me begin with the Levinasian critique of the Western time-framework. In the Western philosophy, moments never fleet away to the past, but can be remembered (gathered) by vision and reproduced to the present.[19] In other words, in the Western philosophy, time is synchrony, due to the reproduction (synchronization) of moments. The Western synchrony never knows things and others as they are, either, for, when moments are stripped of their fleeting data and reproduced to the present, so are things and others that exist with their fleeting moments. The synchronized knowledge is also violence in that what is reproduced to the present cannot be a thing itself that lives with its fleeting moments, but its "plastic" image, so thin and fragile, thus, easily absorbable to human essence.[20] In other words, the Western synchrony is another strategy forbeing since it is also intended to fill the lack of human essence or being at the cost of others. According to Levinas, the violent synchrony has dominated all over the phenomenological traditions, such as Kant, Husserl, Heidegger, among others, in that, no matter how genuinely it pursues objectivity, phenomenology is still intended to bring things into light in order that they may be reproduced to the present and become available to human identity.[21]

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[19] Levinas, *Otherwise Than Being*, 133.
[20] Levinas, *Otherwise Than Being*, 90.
[21] Levinas, *Otherwise Than Being*, 80, 133; Levinas, *The Theory of Intuition in Husserl's Phenomenology*, trans. André Orianne (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1973), 41, 147, 150; Levinas, *Totality and Infinity*, trans.

As a solution to the violent synchrony in the West, Levinas suggests the Judaic ideal of responsibility for everything in the world on the ground that, in Judaism, nothing is reproduced to human essence, but entirely lost to the past that we cannot but give up our present identity and follow our responsibility for those who already elapsed, thus, entirely inaccessible to our present identity. In other words, we are confirming an undeniable parallelism between Girard and Levinas, for it turns out that both scholars try to overcome the intellectual violence not by violence, but by diachrony in the Bible and in Judaism. Therefore, if there is difference between the two, while Levinas directly supports the idea of diachrony, Girard fails to recognize it and attracts the anti-Semitic allegation, the allegation that Girard still reads the Bible literally and supports the Christian desire to replace Judaism, namely, the Christian supersessionism.

In Judaism, time is diachronic, due to the lapse of moments. The Judaic diachrony already reveals its height and glory in relation to human essence, or the limit of human essence in relation to the Judaic diachrony, because moments elapse so immediately that we are always too late to synchronize the moments to our essence. The diachronic height and glory defeats the violent synchrony in that, before the diachronic height and glory, we have no choice other than to accept the limit (lateness) of our essence gathered by the violent synchrony and submit ourselves to what is higher than our synchronic essence. In other words, diachrony defeats the violent synchrony not by the reprisal, but by revealing the limit (lateness) of the violent synchronyand its essence. The diachronic revelation in Judaism introduces the ethic of self-denuding to the innocent suffering in diachrony in that those, who reached to the limit of their synchronic essence, have no choice other than to give up the synchronic (present) identity, in which they feel

Alphonso Lingis (Pittsburgh, Pa: Duquesne University Press, 1969), 46, 67.

at home,and vulnerably denude (reveal) themselves to the innocent suffering (just as they give up their home and denude themselves to a bitter cold) until they are cored out of their self-sufficiency and reversed to their sensitivity to the innocent suffering, which lives with its fleeting data, such as pains and tears, irreducible to the self-sufficiency.[22] In other words, in Judaism, ethics is intended not to keep the social harmony at the cost of others' suffering, but to accept the limit (lateness) of the sacrificial harmony and return to human sensitivity to others' suffering in diachrony irreducible to the sacrificial reconciliation. The ethic of self-denuding in Judaism guarantees not only human subjectivity but also objective knowledge in relation to others, for the one, who is cored out of one's self-sufficiency and awakened to the diachronic suffering, no longer gathers up the phenomenal essence at the cost of others, but tries to respond to others' needs by offering one's material resources to others (victims).

The Judaic ethic founded on the diachronic height gives rise to the "Here I am" (Exodus 3: 4), for diachrony, in its height and glory, reveals the limit (lateness) of our literal (intellectual) language so quickly that we cannot but give up our literal language and unwittingly utter the ethical saying of "Here I am."[23] In Judaism, the "Here I am" refers to the way, in which the subject shows its absolute passivity to the diachronic height and glory.[24] The ethical saying in Judaism is irreducible to the Greek said, the written text, for what is unwittingly uttered at the limit of the literal language is nothing but sounds and vibrations, which already fleeted away before they are stripped of the fleeting materials and reproduced to the Greek said.The exteriority of the Judaic saying, however, does not undermine the validity of the Greek said because, while

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[22] Levinas, *Otherwise Than Being*, 15.
[23] Levinas, *Otherwise Than Being*, 146.
[24] Levinas, *Otherwise Than Being*, 49.

fleeting away to the past, the saying leaves its "trace" or voice only in the said.[25]Here, the trace, which diachrony leaves in the present, refers to what already elapse from the present, but disturbs the present; "This way of passing, disturbing the present…, is what we have called a trace."[26]

The Greek or written text, which serves as the only trace of the saying, should not be read literally, for the trace or voice in the text would be neither exhausted to the literal knowledge nor assimilated into human identity, but still bears its historical resonance irreducible to human identity.[27] Then, it must be read in terms of our self-denuding to the voice in the text since the voice, which escapes the intellectual violence, can be heard or identified only when we give up our intellectual identity and denude ourselves to the voiceuntil we are cored out of our intellectual identity and reversed to our sensitivity to the voice in diachrony.[28] In other words, in Judaism, reading the text is a burden to the self, for it is not about the literal knowledge available to the self, but about our self-denuding to the fleeting voice irreducible to the self. For the Jews, the ethical burden for the text is so grave that no persecution can stop it, for, without listening to the voice in the text, they have no choice other than to follow the cultural phenomena, such as images, gods, myths, and become a plaything of their own (cultural) wisdom.[29] In other words, the Jewish loyalty to the text is not about the pride of being chosen by God, but about the recognition that the voice in the text is the only source to liberate the self from the cultural wisdom.

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[25] Levinas, *Otherwise Than Being*, 37, 161.
[26] Levinas, *Otherwise Than Being*, 100.
[27] Levinas, *Otherwise Than Being*, 44.
[28] Levinas, *Otherwise Than Being*, 36, 88.
[29] Levinas, *Difficult Freedom: Essays on Judaism*, trans. Sean Hand (London: The Athlone Press, 1990), 99.

Girard also supports the ethical language irreducible to the literal language. Girard labels the ethical language the Christian (biblical) logos, and the literal language the Greek logos. The biblical logos, which corresponds to the "Here I am" in Judaism, refers to "the logos of love" irreducible to the Greek letters.[30] The Greek logos, which corresponds to the Greek said, refers to "the violence of the sacred" that pursues the literal knowledge gatherable to the cultural orders.[31] The exteriority of the biblical logos leads Girard to argue that violence exercised by YHWH should not be read literally, but in light of the gospels' prophetic teaching, in that YHWH the innocent victim would be neither divinized to the literal (violent) sacred nor absorbed to our essence, but only bears witness to the terror of our intellectual violence attributed to YHWH himself in order that we may be warned by our own violence and follow the kingdom idealpreached by Jesus. So ironically, what is intended to overcome the Greek literalism has been affected by the latter and misinterpreted as anti-Semitic, for, when read in light of the Greek literalism, none of the biblical victims remain as a witness to the intellectual violence, but can be understood by letters and reduced to the traditional or anti-Semitic view on the Bible that the Hebrew Bible with YHWH's violence is something outdated in relation to the gospels' preaching.

Fortunately, thanks to the Levinasian work on diachrony, the Greek misunderstanding of Girard is no longer possible because, while reading Girard in light of Levinas, we recognize that the Girardian work on the Bible is also founded on diachrony that serves as the antidote to the Greek literalism and its misinterpretation of Girard. In other words, the Levinasian work on diachrony serves as a guideline to liberate the Girardian work on the Bible from anti-Semitic allegation, due to the diachronic framework of the latter. Some may still

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[30] Girard, *Things Hidden Since the Foundation of the World*, 274.
[31] Girard, *Things Hidden Since the Foundation of the World*, 265.

accuse Girard for his anti-Semitism on the excuse that, in his reading of the Bible, violence in the Hebrew Bible is gradually reversed to the kingdom in the gospels, not vice versa. This accusation is impossible, however, for violence is reversed to the kingdom not by Jesus who has been divinized under the Christian theory of atonement, but by the lapse of all the biblical victims, including Jesus, who remain as a witness to the bloody culture. Others may argue that, no matter how sincerely we read the Bible in light of diachrony, the Hebrew Bible still appears more violent than the gospels. The anti-Semitic interpretation is also impossible, due to the diachronic revelation in the Bible.

This study finally reverses the general allegation that Girard is anti-Semitic, for it turns out that Girard reads the Bible not based on the Christian doctrine of Jesus' messiahship, but in light of the Judaic diachrony that serves as the antidote to the Christian messiahship. In this study, the cultural system is already idolatry in that, while gathering our cultural or social identity at the cost of others, we already take refuge in our eyes and idolize others to the magical god or the sacred, which is so fragile, thus, easily absorbable to our social or cultural divinity. The cultural idolatry, however, can be overcome by God in the Bible because God, who lives in the biblical diachrony, reveals the limit (lateness) of the cultural idolatry until we give up the cultural idolatry and listen to the voice in the Bible. The biblical antidote to the cultural idolatry raises a critical question against the Christian doctrine of Jesus' messiahship in that the one, who is differentiated from other biblical figures, e.g. YHWH, and divinized to the messiah, cannot be Jesus himself who lived and died in the first century Palestine, but his idol, his sacred available to the cultural divinity.

The cultural messiahship also can be overcome by Jesus himself in that the historical Jesus, who also lives in the biblical diachrony, reveals the limit of the cultural messiah until we

give up the cultural messiah and listen to the voice in the gospels. This study finally reverses the general allegation that Girard is anti-Semitic in that, while reading Girard in light of Levinas, we recognize that Girard supports not the Christian messiah who tries to supersede YHWH, but the historical Jesus who belongs to the diachronic height in Judaism and defeats the Christian messiah by revealing the limit of the latter. In other words, despite his favour on the gospels, Girard is the pro-Jewish, a lover of Judaism, since it turns out that he reads the Bible not based on the Christian messiahship, but in light of the Judaic diachrony that serves as the solution to the latter.

The Girardian or diachronic view on the Bible predicts a Jewish-Christian reunion in that, as the diachronic revelation continues in human history, Jews and Christians will have no option other than to give up their sibling rivalry and listen to the voice in the Bible. In the gospels, Jesus appears as a Jew since he did not teach something new to Judaism, but simply followed what was taught in Judaism: the messianic kingdom in the Torah. The Jewish identity of Jesus signals the Christian root in Judaism, for it is clear that, after Jesus' death, his followers preached Jesus the Jew within Judaism. However, as the Jewish Christians were replaced with the gentiles, the Christian root in Judaism has been wiped out from the Christian writings since the gentile church gave up Jesus the Jew and adopted Jesus' messiahship that did not fit to the Jewish ideal of the messianic kingdom in the Torah.

Since the Christian split from Judaism, Jews and Christians have identified themselves not by their own self, but by blaming each other; the Jews have blamed the Christians for divinizing Jesus to the messiah, and the Christians have blamed the Jews for not accepting Jesus the messiah. The sibling rivalry, however, can be overcome by diachrony in the Bible, for the biblical diachrony reveals the limit of the sibling rivalry until Jews and Christians give up the

sibling rivalry and listen to the voice in the Bible. The diachronic solution to the sibling rivalry

predicts a Jewish-Christian reunion, for those, who are freed from the sibling rivalry and listen to

the fleeting voice, no longer gather up their religious or social identity at the cost of others, but

try to respond to others' needs by offering their live resources to others. In this diachronic

reunion, the church will give up Jesus' messiahship and return to Judaism because, while

listening to the voice in the Bible, Christians will have no option other than to accept the limit of

Jesus' messiahship and follow the Judaic ideal of responsibility, for which Jesus the Jew risked

his life thousands years ago. On the other hand, Judaism will accept the Christian legacy

because, while experiencing the Christian return to Judaism, Jews will be freed from the fear of

the Christian idolatry and listen to the voice of Jesus who lived and died for the messianic

kingdom in the Torah.

Using the previous arguments, this study will be titled "Reading René Girard in

Light of Emmanuel Levinas" because it is intended to reverse the general allegation that Girard

is anti-Semitic on the assumption that Girard supports not the Christian doctrine of Jesus'

messiahship, but the Judaic diachrony that serves as the antidote to the latter. To develop this

study, first, the Levinasian time-framework will be examined: the Western synchrony vs. the

Judaic diachrony (Chapter I and II). Chapter I will deal with four issues; how the Western

synchrony ends up to the intellectual violence; and how the intellectual violence has penetrated

into Kant, Husserl, and Heidegger, respectively. Chapter II will deal with three issues; how

diachrony works in the Levinasian writings; how the Judaic diachrony teaches the ethic of self-

denuding; and how to interpret the diachronic voice of "Here I am" in the written texts. Using

the Levinasian time-framework as a guideline, Girard will be re-examined:the cultural synchrony

vs. biblical diachrony (Chapter III and IV). Chapter III will deal with four issues; how the

cultural system ends up to the intellectual violence; and how the intellectual violence has penetrated into Freud, Levi-Strauss, and Derrida, respectively. Chapter IV will deal with three issues; how the idea of diachrony works in the Girardian reading of the Bible; how the biblical diachrony teaches the ethic of self-denuding; and how to interpret the logos of love in the Bible.

This study will be followed by the two subsequent issues: Girard the pro-Jewish (Chapter V), and a diachronic reunion(Chapter VI). Chapter V will deal with four issues; how the cultural system turns into idolatry; how the Bible overcomes the cultural idolatry; why Jesus' messiahship does not fit to the biblical ideal of anti-idolatry; and why Girard is the pro-Jewish. Chapter VI will deal with four issues; how Jesus lived as a Jew in the first century Palestine; how Christianity originated from Judaism; how the gentile church became separated from Judaism; and how diachrony makes possible the Jewish-Christian reunion. In conclusion, we will predict that this study will have some impacts on the future inquiries on the theory of revelation.

서시
윤동주

죽는 날까지 하늘을 우르러 한점 부끄럼이 없기를,
잎새에 이는 바람에도 나는 괴로워했다.
별을 노래하는 마음으로 모든 죽어가는것을 사랑해야지
그리고 나한테 주어진 길을 걸어가야겠다.

오늘밤에도 별이 바람에 스치운다.

Prologue[32]
Dong-ju Yun

Until the day I die I long to have no speck of shame
When I gaze up toward heaven, so I have tormented myself,
even when the wind stirs the leaves.
With a heart that sings the stars, I will love all dying things.
And I will walk the way that has been given to me

Tonight, again, the wind brushes the stars.

Dong-ju Yun (1917-1945). A Korean Independence fighter who died in the prison during the Japanese colonization of Korea (1910-1945).

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[32]Dong-ju Yun, "Prologue," in *Sky, Wind, Star, and Poem*, trans. Chae-Pyong Song and Darcy Brandel (Seoul: Jeong-Eum Press, 1948): 15. accessed September. 5, 2019, https://jaypsong.blog/2012/03/13/prologue-by-yun-dong-ju/

The Levinasian Time-framework (Chapters I- II)

In the Introduction, the Levinasian work on diachrony was introduced as a guideline for the Girardian work on the Bible in that Girard also reads the Bible in light of diachrony, but has been misinterpreted to beanti-Semitic, due to his failure to clarify the idea of diachrony in the Bible. To develop this thesis, the first two chapters will be devoted to the Levinasian time-framework, for this primary task will help us verifythe diachronic foundation of the Girardian work on the Bible. The Levinasian theory deals with two types of time: synchrony and diachrony. Synchrony refers to the Western concept of time because, in the West, time never fleets away to the past, but can be remembered by consciousness and gathered up to the present. The Western synchrony is already violence because what is remembered and gathered to the present cannot be actual time that already elapsed, but its knowledge gatherable to being. As a solution to the violentsynchrony, Levinas suggests the Judaic diachronyin that, in Judaism, time is neither remembered nor gathered up to being, but disturbs the violent synchrony by elapsing before it is synchronized into being. The Levinasian time-framework, namely, the Western synchrony and the Judaic diachrony, will lead us to illuminate the Girardian work based on two types of time-framework, namely, cultural synchrony and biblical diachrony, because, just as Levinas sees the diachronic revelation in Judaism as a solution to the synchronic violence in the West, so does Girard seethe diachronic revelation in the Bible as a solution to the cultural violence in the West. To clarify the Levinasian time-framework, two issues will be discussed: the Western synchrony (Chapter I); and the Judaic diachrony (Chapter II).

I. The Western Synchrony

In the West, time never goes to the past, but can be gathered to human essence by vision because vision opens a space and illuminates everything on the surface in order that the

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whole world may be cleared of its material contents in diachrony and reabsorbed to human

essence. The violent synchronyhas penetrated all over the phenomenological traditions. The

Kantian space, for instance, cannot resist the violent synchronybecause, in the Kantian space,

nothing is presented as it is, but only re-presented by vision and become available to human

essence. Neither can the Husserlian time-consciousness resist the violent synchrony, for it is not

the consciousness of moments in diachrony, but the consciousness of the self that tries to fill the

lack of its essence at the cost of the fleeting moments in diachrony. The same logic can be

applied to the Heideggerian *Dasein* (Being-in-the-world), for it also aims to fill the lack of

human essence at the cost of the material world in diachrony. To clarify the Western synchrony,

four issues will be discussed: A. synchrony in the West; B. Kant; C. Husserl; and D. Heidegger.

A. Synchrony in the West

In the phenomenological traditions, especially in Kant, "space" is necessary for knowing

because we come to know objects only when they appear in a space.[33] The Kantian or

phenomenological space requires light becauseit is light, which drives out "the shadows" and

opens a space for the objects to appear.[34] It also requires visionbecause the light, which opens

the space, is not something independent of vision, but a "visual datum" that must be seen by

vision.[35]The power of vision in the space is so great that it leaves nothing as it is, but illuminates

everything to be seen, because vision, in its freedom to see, "traverses" the whole space and

lights up everything on the surface.[36] The illuminated space cannot be objective, for it designates

not the actual space maintained with the bodily objects in diachrony, but what is opened by the

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[33] Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, trans. Werner S. Pluhar (Indianapolis: Hackett Pub. 1996), 78.
[34] Levinas, *Totality and Infinity*, 189.
[35] Levinas, *Totality and Infinity*, 192.
[36] Levinas, *Totality and Infinity*, 189.

subject to see the bodily objects to appear. The subjective ground of the space is problematic

because, while illuminating objects on the surface, vision already clears the objects of their

material contents, such as tissues and bones, and reduces them to their outward phenomena, such

as shapes and colors, gatherable to being.The spatial illumination, Levinas labels "enjoyment," in

that to illuminate something on the surface is to enjoy it on the surface.[37]

As subjective as it is, the illuminated space calls for the idea of synchrony because, in the

illuminated space, time never goes to its irrevocable past, but loses its past character and gathers

itself to the present. The idea of synchrony identified in the illuminated space cannot be

objective, either, for it designates not the actual moment maintained with its material objects in

diachrony, but what is assembled by the subject in the course of the spatial illumination. The

subjective ground of synchrony presupposes the Husserlian idea of time-consciousness because

time can be gathered to the present only whenconsciousness "encompasses" the past and the

present and gather up the past moments into the present.[38] The Husserlian time-consciousness

cannot be objective, either, for it designates not the objective consciousness disturbed by the

lapse of moments, but the subjective consciousness that assembles the elapsed moments to the

present. The subjective consciousness, Levinas compares to "a historian" talented with memory

in that, while combining the elapsed moments to the present, the consciousness forgets no

moment, but remembers every single moment.[39]

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[37] Levinas, *Totality and Infinity,* 191.
[38] Edmund Husserl, *The Phenomenology of Internal Time-Consciousness*, trans. James S. Churchill (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1964), 36.
[39] Levinas, *Otherwise Than Being*, 133.

The temporal synchronization, Levinas labels "re-presentation" in that to assemble the past moments to the present is to bring them to re-presentation.[40] According to Levinas, the synchronic re-presentation has manifested itself in artworks because, in artworks, the essence of the past can be re-presented; in music, the "sounds" of the past events can be reheard; in painting, the "forms" of the historical others can be gathered to the present and re-presented; in literary works, the essence of the past events can be "recuperated."[41] As the synchronic re-presentation, artworks bring about the cultural unity because, in artworks, the world is stripped of "human multiplicity," which might disturb the social unity, and disclosed into a calm and peaceful place to dwell.[42] In other words, artworks are not a simple means to express individuals' feelings, but intellectual resources to bring peace and unity to the community. The cultural unity gathered by artworks, however, changes nothing inside communitybecause what is gathered at the cost of human multiplicity cannot be the absolute unity that exists in itself, but a homogeneous unity that must be purged of the sameness by bringing a new unity through another piece of artworks.

The homogeneous unity is the main theme of the West because, in the West, the question is not about how to respond to human multiplicity irreducible to the homogeneous unity, but about how to eliminate human multiplicity and gather up "the unity of the One" under the principle of one deity, one religion, one history.[43]For example, the Kantian unity of "the transcendental apperception" aims to create the unity of the One at the cost of human multiplicity.[44]The homogeneous unity in the space calls for the Heideggerian idea of being

[40] Levinas, *Entre Nous: On Thinking-of-the-Other*, trans. Michael B. Smith and Barbara Harshav (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998), 171.
[41] Levinas, *Otherwise Than Being*, 34, 40.
[42] Levinas, *Entre Nous: On Thinking-of-the-Other*, 184.
[43] Levinas, *Entre Nous: On Thinking-of-the-Other*, 184.
[44] Levinas, *Entre Nous: On Thinking-of-the-Other*, 179.

because what is gathered to the homogeneous unity cannot be an actual moment, which entirely elapsed to the irrevocable past, but its outward phenomenon, which can be remembered and assimilated into human essence gatherable to being. The Heideggerian being cannot be objective, either, for it exists without the object that lives with its material contents in diachrony. The subjective ground of being in the space is so persistent that nothing can resist its sovereignty because, even after the space is emptied, the spatial "nothingness" or non-being, which might threaten the idea of being, can be illuminated by vision and turns into what is there; "The intelligibility of being is always high noon without shadows."[45] For instance, the Hegelian nothingness cannot resist being's sovereignty because what is emptied of its contents cannot be the "pure" nothingness entirely exterior to vision, but a spatial nothingness that can be touched by vision and appropriated into the phenomenal being.[46]

The sovereign being cannot but shut up itself in itself because, while gathering our being at the cost of the elapsed moments, we already show ourselves to ourselves and take "refuge" within our own eyes.[47] The narcissistic self, Levinas labels "the same" in that we are so fascinated to our being that we make it a love-object and lose our "opposition" to the object.[48]Human identity reduced to the same never reaches its responsible subjectivity because the one, wholoses its opposition to its object and becomes the same as the object, cannot be the historical subject maintained with its bodily properties, such as bones and flesh, but a phenomenal subject that can be illuminated by vision and dissolved into the same being.

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[45] Levinas, *Otherwise Than Being*, 133, 175.
[46] Levinas, *Otherwise Than Being*, 175.
[47] Levinas, *Otherwise Than Being*, 92.
[48] Levinas, *Totality and Infinity,* 126.

The phenomenal subject seems to support justice and ethics, for it neither asserts its sovereignty nor dominates its objects, but enters the same plane withthe objects and forms a "subject-object correlation."[49] However, what appears just and righteous turns out to be unjust and violent because the subject-object correlation takes place not based on human multiplicity in diachrony, but based on the illuminated space that has been divested of the historical multiplicity and assimilated into the homogeneous unity. Violence committed by the same, Levinas labels "everyday killing," for it is committed not by heinous criminals, but by the same being, the phenomenal subject, which feels at home with the homogenous unity.[50]The everyday killing explains why the *Shoah*, or the Holocaust, was committed by those who knew the catechism, who knew right from wrong with "a good conscience."[51] It also explains why Adolf Eichmann, the Nazi criminal, was accounted to be"normal"because no psychiatrist found any evil desire against the Jews in him.[52]The everyday violence, however, cannot but returnto the community because, the more we gather up our being at the cost of the elapsed moments, the more we are stripped of ourindividual identity, which lives with its elapsedmoments, and dissolved into the same being. Theviolent contagion identified in the illuminatedspace tells us that we need another space entirely exterior to vision because, as far as vision is involved, nothing, including the subject, remains in itself, but loses its individual difference and remains undifferentiated.

As a solution to the illuminated space, Levinas suggests a space of darkness in that, in the space of darkness, nothing is illuminated into being that we have no choice other than to give up our being and return to our sensitivity prior to being. According to Levinas, the essence of a

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[49] Levinas, *Otherwise Than Being*, 135.
[50] Levinas, *Is It Righteous to Be*, ed. Jill Robbins (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2001), 131.
[51] Levinas, *Is It Righteous to Be*, 137.
[52]Hannah Arendt, *Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil* (New York: The Viking Press, 1963), 23.

thing lies not in its outward forms, but in "its matter,"because things are formed out of their

matters, not vice versa.[53] A furniture, for instance, is formed out of its matters, such as wood, not

vice versa. The biblical story of creation also supports the material origin of forms; in Genesis 1,

all living and non-living creatures are formed out of the deep "waters" irreducible to any forms

(vs.2). The Levinasian idea of matters presents itself as multiplicity because each matter can be

converted into various forms or shapes. A piece of "wood," for example, can be chopped into

multiple forms, such as a table, chair, box, or anything else.[54] Such forms become names

because things are named according to their outward forms, which appear different in different

things. The formal names, however, are so limited that they can be identified only when light is

available because, when night comes, things lose their illuminated forms or names and return to

formless or "anonymous" matters prior to the formal names.[55]

The formless or anonymous matters, which exist even at night, already signal another

space because, even when night comes and things are stripped of their names and become

anonymous, there still remains "a nocturnal space," a space of darkness, or a space of night,

which exists without light, without vision, without names.[56] The nocturnal space, or the space of

night, Levinas labels the "*there is*," "the simple fact of being," or the "absolutely impersonal

being," in that it is simply there without light, without vision, without forms.[57]The space of night,

or the "*there is*,"dims the illuminated spacebecause, even after the space of light fades away, the

space of night remains there and diffuses what remains only in the daylight. In other words, the

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[53] Levinas, *Totality and Infinity,* 192.
[54] Levinas, *Totality and Infinity,* 192.
[55]Levinas, *Existence and Existents*, trans. Alphonso Lingis (Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania: Duquesne University Press, 2001), 54.
[56]Levinas, *Existence and Existents*, 53.
[57] Levinas, *Is It Righteous to Be*, 46, 212.

space of night dims the space of light not by violence, but by revealing the limit of the latter, or by revealing its exteriority in relation to the latter.

The nocturnal space, which comes from the formless matters, is so dense that it is horrifying, because it is opened neither by the subject nor by the object, but infinitely emerges at the bottom of all the bodily objects and continue to rustle and bustle, echoing or reverberating the "murmur" of the bodily objects in diachrony.[58]In other words, the nocturnal space horrifies us not with violence, but with its extreme density. Theextreme density of the nocturnalspace is the very place, in which we split ourselves from the idea of being, because, in the space of night, nothing would be illuminated by vision or assimilated into being, but always remains as a bodily objectand continues to reverberate its murmur, that we cannot but give up our being and return to our "sensibility" to the murmur or voice of the bodily object prior to our being.[59] In other words, we split ourselves from the idea of being not based on our intellectual reasoning, but based on the extreme density of the nocturnal space prior to our being. The self split from the idea of being is a "responsible" self because, while returning to our sensibility to the murmur or voice of the bodily object prior to our being, we feel guilty of "being late" in response to the innocent suffering of the otherthat we try to expiate the guilt of being late by offering our material resources to those who have suffered in the course of ourphenomenal identification.[60]In other words, we become responsible not based on our being, but by based on our sensibilityto the silent voice of the bodily objectprior to our being.

The responsible self in the nocturnal space guarantees its own subjectivity because to offer one's material resources to the suffering others presupposes to be torn up from one's being,

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[58] Levinas, *Otherwise Than Being*, 163.
[59] Levinas, *Is It Righteous to Be*, 46; Levinas, *Otherwise Than Being*, 75.
[60] Levinas, *Otherwise Than Being*, 87, 116.

in which one feels at home, and exiled to what is entirely foreign to one's being, which is the *there is*, and become "unique and irreplaceable" in relation to one's being.[61]In other words, we become subjective not by gathering the homogeneous essence, but by opening our being to what is foreign and exterior to our being. Human subjectivity identified in the nocturnal space, Levinas labels "goodness" in that what is torn up from being and opened to the foreign world no longer gathers up the homogeneous essence at the cost of others, but, quite contrarily, deposes itself from the homogeneous essence and ruptures into its "nobility," its "disinterestedness," prior to the homogeneous essence.[62]As good as it is, the responsible subjectivity serves as a solution to the narcissistic self or the same because what lives with its goodness and nobility neither makes itself a love-object nor loses its opposition to its object, but entirely elapses to the sheerdarkness before it loses its opposition to the object and becomes the same as the object.

The space of night, which lives without light, challenges the synchronic view on art. According to Levinas, art is light, which either shines the world from above, or reveals the dark side of the world from below. The Heideggerian art is a light that shines the world since it comes from "on high" and illuminates the world on the surface.[63] The world illuminated by a lightis a "sedentary" world, calm and comfortable, because, thanks to the light of brilliance, the world is freed from the horror of darkness and becomes suitable to live in.[64]The art of illumination is problematic because what is illuminated by the light of brillianceno longer belongs to the material world in diachrony, butto the world of "image," which is inserted between the self and the world in order that the world may be enjoyed on the surface and

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[61] Levinas, *Otherwise Than Being*, 123.
[62] Levinas, *Totality and Infinity,* 35; Levinas, *Otherwise Than Being*, 54.
[63] Levinas, *Proper Names*, trans. Michael, B. Smith (Stanford. California: Stanford university Press, 1996), 137.
[64] Levinas, *Proper Names*, 136.

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gathered to the homogeneous culture.[65] For instance, when a flower is illuminated and

photographed by the light of brilliance, it no longer belongs to the material world, but to the

world of image, which is inserted between the self and the flower in order that the flower may be

enjoyed on the surface and assimilated into our homogeneous culture.

As a solution to the art of illumination supported by Heidegger, Levinas suggests the

art of revelation supported by Maurice Blanchot. According to Blanchot, art does not shine the

world, but leads us to "the deepest recess" of the sedentary world because, while dealing with the

world as their object, the artists recognize that the world is so dark and unintelligible that no

artistic vision can access the world to illuminate it.[66]In other words, art does not illuminate the

world, as Heidegger says, but, rather, reveals the limit of artistic illumination and leads us to the

deepest recess of the sedentary world. The art of revelation, Levinas labels "a black light" in that

whatreveals the limit of artistic illumination cannot be the light of brilliance, which comes from

on high, but the light of darkness, which comes from "below," and leads us back to the origin of

the world.[67]The black lightfrom belowdims the light of brilliance because, even after the lightof

brilliancefades away, the black light remains without brilliance and "uncovers" what the light of

brilliance cannot illuminate, the deepest recess of the unilluminated world.[68]

As the art of revelation, the black light brings us back to "a nomadic memory,"a memory

of the homelessness in a desert, because, when the light of brilliance is gone, we are stripped of

the calm and sedentary world and exiled to a desert, a land of wandering and homelessness, in

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[65]Levinas, *Existence and Existents*, 46.
[66] Levinas, *Proper Names*, 137.
[67] Levinas, *Proper Names*, 137.
[68] Levinas, *Proper Names*, 136.

which we build up "makeshift" shelters to dwell.[69] According to Levinas, the homelessness wandering is the"essence" of humanity because, as soon as we feel at home in the sedentary world, the memory of homelessness emerges at the bottom of our sedentary life and casts us into the world of nakedness prior to the world of coverings, the world of arts, science, technologies,etc."[70]The wandering humanity explains why we are always tired of the sedentary life and begin to search for somewhere to go. So far, we have seen how the phenomenological traditions in the West have confined themselves in the spatial illumination and resulted in the violent synchrony. From now on, we will see how the violent synchrony has worked inthe three phenomenological thinkers: Kant, Husserl, and Heidegger.

B. Kant

According to Kant, when it comes to the issue of knowledge, the question is not about "things in themselves" because things in themselves are neither accessible to our senses nor gatherable to our sensory knowledge that it is impossible to know things in themselves.[71]Rather the question is about things as the object of our "senses" because, no matter how radically we are isolated fromthings in themselves, we still perceive them to our sensesand make them appear as phenomena.[72] The sensory phenomena or knowledge requires space because only in a space can we stretch out our senses to the objects and make them appear as phenomena. According to Kant, his idea of space is possible only because we have "an *a priori* presentation"of space inside usbecause, otherwise, there would be neither perception nor the sensoryphenomena or

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[69] Levinas, *Proper Names*, 136, 137.
[70] Levinas, *Proper Names*, 136.
[71] Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, 28.
[72] Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, 318.

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knowledge, but only things in themselves, or *noumnena*.[73] Kant sees the internal space as "objectively valid" in that it is already presented inside us *a priori*, i.e., before we are involved in theoutside world.[74]Levinas acknowledges the "strength" of the Kantian space in that it considers the sensory perception prior to understanding.[75] However, according to Levinas, the Kantian space cannot be objectively valid because what is presented inside the subject *a priori*cannot be the absolute interval or the *there is*, in which the objects exist with their material contents as they are, but an illuminated void, "a modality of enjoyment," in which the objects are stripped of the material contents and reduced to the sensory phenomena gatherable to being.[76]

The Kantian or *a priori*space presents itself as "infinite" because, in the*a priori*space, things appear as many phenomena as there are different places, times, feelings, causalities, etc.[77] For instance, a rock appears many phenomena as there are spatiotemporal circumstances. The infinitespaceserves as the outer condition for knowledge, for it does not determine things in terms of their internal meaning, but simply present them as "outward appearances."[78] The outer condition for knowledge presupposes "sensibility," human ability to be affected by objects,because, without sensibility, nothing would be presented as outward phenomena, but remains as a thing in itself, i.e., as a *noumenon*.[79] The Kantian sensibility differs from the Levinasian counterpart because, for Levinas, sensibility can be identified only after we are cored out of our being and become sensitive to others' voice in diachrony, but, for Kant, it is identified when we present things and others inside us and make them appear as outward phenomena

[73] Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, 78.
[74] Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, 82.
[75] Levinas, *Totality and Infinity,* 136.
[76] Levinas, *Totality and Infinity,* 191.
[77] Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, 79.
[78] Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, 78.
[79] Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, 81.

gatherable to our being. The Levinasian sensibility dims the Kantian sensibility because, when

we are cored out of our being and become sensitive to others' voice, we are also cored out of all

the outward phenomena gatherable to our being, which belong to the Kantian sensibility.

As the outer condition for knowledge, the Kantian space requires the inner condition for

knowledge because the "undetermined"phenomena in the space must be determined as such

inside us.[80] In the Kantian space, we perceive things or objects not at once, but "by a line," orone

by one.[81]For instance, we perceive a house only by a line, e.g., from the landscape, to the details,

such as the roof, the doors, the windows, and so on. The linear perception in the space is the

place in which Kant comes up with the idea of "time" in that, while perceiving objects by a line,

we already take moments by a line.[82] In other words, Kant comes up with the idea of time not

based on moving objects in diachrony, but based on the linear perception in the space.

According to Kant, his idea oftime is possible only because we have the "*a priori*" presentation

of time inside us because, otherwise, no moment would be perceived by a line, but remain as a

thing in itself, i.e., as a *noumenon*.[83] The *a priori*time cannot be valid, either, because what is

presented inside the subject *a priori* cannot be an actual moment, which already elapsed to the

irrevocable past, but its phenomenon gatherable to being.

The Kantian or *a priori*time is the inner condition for knowledge because, thanks to the *a

priori* time, which proceeds by a line, we "combine" the undetermined phenomenatogether and

reproduce them to what is intelligible, such as ideas and concepts.[84] The inner condition for

knowledge presupposes "understanding," human ability to combine the unknown data in time,

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[80] Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, 73.
[81] Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, 88.
[82] Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, 86.
[83] Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, 404.
[84] Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, 199.

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because, without understanding, there would be neither the combination of the undetermined phenomena nor the intelligible ideas and concepts, but only the outward presentation.[85]According to Kant, the spatiotemporal knowledge must be integrated through categories, such as causality and relation, the *a priori* concepts, because the synthetic unity of all different knowledge in "one consciousness" is the very condition for knowledge.[86] Kant completely dissociates the synthetically united knowledge from things in themselves in that what is united in one consciousness is nothing but a phenomenon, which is "utterly unknown" in relation to things in themselves as *noumena*.[87]The sharp division between *noumena* and phenomena, however, is impossible because the *a priori* space and time, upon which Kant dissociates phenomena from *noumena*,already have their prototype in the physical or *noumenal* world.[88]

Unfortunately, Kant fails to recognize the physicalor *noumenal* origin of the *a priori* space and time because, in the time of Kant, the Newtonian absolutism was the only ground to think about space that he had no choice other than to adopt the Newtonian absolutism and purify the physical or *noumenal* pace and time into the *a priori* space and time, which exist without the physical or *noumenal* world. In the Newtonian physics, space serves as "a preexisting container," into which objects are placed by God or by nature.[89] The Newtonian space presents itself as "absolute" and "immoveable"because it is already fixed by God or by nature*a priori*, i.e., before it is involved in the outside objects.[90]So is the Newtonian time because, just as space exists independently of the outside objects, so does time exist "of itself" and flow "from its own nature,"

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[85] Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, 167.
[86] Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, 169.
[87]Eftichios Bitsakis, "Space and Time: The Ongoing Quest," in *Foundations of Physics* 35 (January 2005), 81.
[88] Bitsakis, "Space and Time: The Ongoing Quest," 64.
[89] Patricia Kitcher, introduction to *Critique of Pure Reason*,by Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, trans. Werner S. Pluhar (Indianapolis, Ind.: Hackett Pub. Co., c1996), xxxv.
[90] Bitsakis, "Space and Time: The Ongoing Quest," 59.

without any involvement in the external objects.[91]Kant follows the Newtonian physics and defines space and time as whatare situated inside the subject *a priori*, i.e., before the subject is involved in any experience of the external objects.

The Newtonian or absolutespace, however, has been discarded, for it does not fit to the physical world. The Newtonianspace calls for the idea of Euclidian geometry because, while defining space to be absolute, Newton strips space of its physical or *noumenal*character and reduces it to a Euclidian geometry, which exists independently of the physical or *noumenal*world.[92] The Euclidian geometry presents itself as pure and absolute, for it is founded on the "axiomatic" or self-evident principles; e.g., in a triangle, two sides together are greater than the third; the angles of a triangle sum up to 180; and so on.[93]The Euclidian geometry had dominated until it was challenged by the 19th century non-Euclidian geometry. However, the traditional authority of the Euclidian geometry has been discarded since the 19th century when "non-Euclidian geometries" disproved some of the Euclidian principles.[94]   For example, the Euclidean principle that the angles of a triangle sum up to 180 is "falsified" bythe non-Euclidian geometry because, when it is applied to spheres, the angles do not sum up to 180.[95]As the Euclidian geometry was falsifiedby the non-Euclidian geometry, so was the Kantian space, which depends on the Newtonian or Euclidian idea of the absolutespace.

Then, the question is: "Is thegeometrical or absolute space essentially wrong?" According to Einstein, this is not the case because the geometrical spacealready has its

[91] Bitsakis, "Space and Time: The Ongoing Quest," 59.
[92] Bitsakis, "Space and Time: The Ongoing Quest," 67.
[93] Bitsakis, "Space and Time: The Ongoing Quest," 67.
[94] Bitsakis, "Space and Time: The Ongoing Quest," 64.
[95] Bitsakis, "Space and Time: The Ongoing Quest," 64.

"prototype" in the real space.[96]The geometrical triangle, for instance, has its prototype in the physical world, for it originated not from the ideal form of triangle, but from human experience of the "real and imperfect" triangles.[97]However, the empirical basis of the geometrical space has been "forgotten" until the publication of the non-Euclidian geometry in the 19th century.[98] Why? If we follow the diachronic order of the physical world, the answer is simple because the physical space in diachrony is so deep and profound that it can be identified only when we give up the ideal form of the Euclidian space and follow our responsibility for the physical space irreducible to the latter. In other words, we lost the empirical basis of the Euclidian geometry not because of the lack of our logic, but because of the diachronic profundity of the real and imperfect space. The loss of the empirical basis leads Kant, the 18th century philosopher, to purify the physical space into the *a priori*space because, in his days, the Euclidian or absolute space was the only and "necessary" ground to think about the issue of space.[99]

As a solution to the Euclidian or Kantian space, Einstein introduces a space of matters in diachrony. For Einstein, things are physical bodies that are "independent of" the sensory phenomena.[100]The physical bodies or things directly forms space itself because space is nothing but a "totality' of the physical bodies and their contents.[101] The physical space supported by Einstein is the solution to the Kantian space because, in the physical space, things are neitherstripped of their bodily contents nor disclosed into the outward phenomena, as in the Kantian space, but remain as real and imperfect bodies irreducible to the outward

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[96] Bitsakis, "Space and Time: The Ongoing Quest," 64.
[97] Bitsakis, "Space and Time: The Ongoing Quest," 64.
[98] Bitsakis, "Space and Time: The Ongoing Quest," 68.
[99] Bitsakis, "Space and Time: The Ongoing Quest," 68.
[100] Bitsakis, "Space and Time: The Ongoing Quest," 67.
[101] Bitsakis, "Space and Time: The Ongoing Quest," 71.

phenomena.The Kantian or *priori* time, which proceeds by a line, was also discarded by modern physics, for it does work in the real world. In the real world, time does not proceed unilaterally by a line, as Kant insists, because, thanks to the spinning of the globe, time proceeds on different speeds in different latitudes on earth; the nearer to the equator, the faster timeflows, and vice versa.

Unfortunately, Kant fails to recognize the physical or empiricalorigin of space and time because, in his days, thephysical origin of space and time was forgotten that he had no choice other than to adopt the Newtonian or Euclidian space and purify space and time into the *a priori* space and time, whichexist independently of the physical world. As a result, Kant cannot but dissociate the spatiotemporal knowledge from things in themselves as*noumena*because what is synthetically united in the *a priori* space and time is nothing but a phenomenon, which is utterly unfamiliarto things in themselves as*noumena*.[102]However, the sharp division between *noumena* and phenomena is impossible because the *a priori* space and time, upon which the synthetic knowledge is achieved, have their prototypes in the physical world.[103]

According to Kant, the synthetic knowledge detached from *noumena* is so familiar to the subject that it can be governed by reason, human ability to engage principles, and overcome its boundaries because reason extends itself to our understanding and gives it a "greater unity" in order that our synthetic knowledge may overcome its limit and reach a general level through categories.[104]The Kantian reason cannot be objectively valid, either, for it designates not the reason awakened by the historical others irreducible to the greater unity, but human desire to gather up the greater unity at the cost of the historical others. Kant admits the subjective ground

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[102] Bitsakis, "Space and Time: The Ongoing Quest," 81.
[103] Bitsakis, "Space and Time: The Ongoing Quest," 64.
[104] Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, 661.

of reason when he argues that reason has no direct involvement in the objects, but simply gives more unity to "all possible empirical cognition," such as ideas and concepts, which are produced by the synthetic understanding of the objects.[105]

The greater unity gathered by the subjective reason is the very locus in which we are lead to what Kant calls *a priori* knowledge because, thanks to the greater unity, we overcome the limit of understanding, which serves to synthesize the outward phenomena into knowledge, and reach the *a priori* knowledge entirely independent of the synthetic understanding. For example, once we learned how to add numbers through experience, we no longer rely on our "experience" because reason extends itself to the synthetic understanding and leads us to the arithmetic rules independent of the synthetic understanding.[106] However, the Kantian or *a priori* knowledge is impossible becauseevery form of knowledge, including the *a priori* knowledge, has its empirical basis in the physical world. For instance, the mathematical knowledge, 2+3=5, cannot be *a priori* but empirical because there is no ideal numbers, such as 2, 3, and 5 that we have to rely on our experience of the numbers in the physical world; e.g. 2 boxes + 3 boxes= 5 boxes, or 2 chairs + 3 chairs= 5 chairs.

The Kantian or subjective reason governs not only the intellectual world but also the "moral" world since it gives greater unity not only to our knowledge but also to our actions.[107] For Kant, his idea of unity presupposes the idea of God, the "highest" cause of the world, becausethe idea of God is the only ground to think about the unity of all that exist in the world.[108] The supreme God presents him/herself as the *a priori* because to be the cause of the whole world

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[105] Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, 645.
[106] Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, 668.
[107] Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, 738.
[108] Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, 645.

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presupposes to be"outside the world," thus, entirely exterior to the physical world.[109] The *a priori* God differs from the biblical God. In the Bible, God presents him/herself as the supreme cause, from which the world and its contents have emanated (Genesis 1-3). The biblical God cannot be reduced to the Kantian or *a priori* God,because, in the Bible, the idea of Godoriginates not from the rational assumption that there must be God as the highest cause of the world, upon which we think about the unity of all, as Kant says, but from human experience of the world; it is well known that the creation story in the Bible was shaped only after the Jewish experience of the Babylonian captivity in the sixth century BCE. Eftichios Bitsakis also argues that the idea of cause was first formed within the "animistic" framework and later transferred to the religious framework to explain the beginning of the world.[110]

The rational assumption of the supreme cause or God is the very ground, upon which Kant comes up with the original goodness of humanity in that we humans proceed from "God's being" (Genesis 1: 17-18).[111]The Kantian good differs from the Levinasian counterpart because, for Levinas, the idea of good can be achieved only after we are torn up from our being and ruptured into our nobilityirreducible to being, but, for Kant, it is naturally given to our rational or *a priori*being. The Levinasian good dims the Kantian counterpart because, while the Levinasian good overcomes the rational being and extends itself to what is entirely exterior to the natural being, the Kantian good still belongs to the rational being.

The rational goodnesscharacterizes itself as "incomprehensibility" because what is given by God *a priori*, i.e., we are involved in the outside world, is so deep and profound that it

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[109] Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, 644.
[110] Bitsakis, "Space and Time: The Ongoing Quest," 79.
[111]Kant, *Religion within the limits of reason alone* (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1960), 54.

never shows itself to be seen, but always remains hidden and unintelligible.[112] For Kant, the incomprehensible good is problematic since nobody can display one's goodness to be seen that there is no" example" to follow.[113] The lack of the moral ideal calls for human obligation because there is no ideal humanity in the world that it is our "duty" to be a better person and set up an ideal humanity inside us.[114]Then, the question is how to become a better person. According to Kant, we have to adopt moral laws into our maxims because, while adopting the moral maxims, we discipline our undisciplined inclinations andelevate ourselves to "the archetype of the moral disposition," which God places inside our rational being.[115] The moral laws adopted as our maxims are as imperative as they are because reason in its practical use dedicates itself to the moral laws "unconditionally"and commands us to obey the moral laws.[116]Kant distinguishes the practical reason dealing withthe empirical issues, such as duties, desires, feelings, etc., from the speculative reason dealing with cognitive issues, such as understanding and categories.

The adoption of the moral maxims is not simple, though, because we havefreedom of "choice" that there is a possibility to adopt maxims other than from the moral laws, e.g., from impure desires, etc.[117]For Kant, the bad choice is the very ground of the radical evil because, while adopting our maxims other than from the moral laws, we already substitute our duties for our self-love and reverse the whole ground of "the moral order."[118] According to Kant, the origin of the bad choice remains "inscrutable" because we cannot find any reasonable ground for

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[112]Kant, *Religion within the limits of reason alone*, 45.
[113]Kant, *Religion within the limits of reason alone*, 55.
[114]Kant, *Religion within the limits of reason alone*, 36.
[115]Kant, *Religion within the limits of reason alone*, 54.
[116]Kant, *Religion within the limits of reason alone*, 23.
[117]Kant, *Religion within the limits of reason alone*, 17.
[118]Kant, *Religion within the limits of reason alone*, 31.

it.[119]Kant engages the story of Adam and Eve (Genesis 3) to prove the inscrutable origin of the bad choice. In the text, the couple is originally good, but falls to the "seduction" of the serpent, the unknown evil, and makes a bad choice by eating the forbidden fruit.[120] The Kantian reading of the Hebrew text, however, is out of context because the main concern in the Hebrew text is not about the philosophical question of good and evil, but about human choice of the "practical" knowledge of good and evil, which is indispensable to the life of adults and their procreation, and about the subsequent "responsibility" for the choice of the practical knowledge, entirely exterior to the philosophical question of good and evil.[121]

According to Kant, the bad choice, however, does not exhaust "a hope" for the good because, no matter how we are corrupted by the bad choice, we are naturally good that there is a hope to return to the original good.[122]Therefore, it is not surprising thatthose, who are guilty in actions, turn out to be "morally" good before God, before the Supreme Judge, due to the original goodness behind the guilty actions.[123] But Kant does not rule out the possibility of the radical evilwhen he insists that, if we repeatedly defile the moral ground by choosing maxims from the impure desires, we only pile up the moral "debt" inside us and wipe out the hope to return to the original good.[124] All these arguments tell us that, in Kant, we are entirely "good" or entirely "bad," never in between, depending on whether or not we choose maxims from the moral laws.[125] The Kantian extremism, however, cannot explain the contingency of human actions. For

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[119]Kant, *Religion within the limits of reason alone*, 38.
[120]Kant, *Religion within the limits of reason alone*, 39.
[121]KonradSchmid,"The Ambivalence of Human Wisdom: Genesis 2–3 as a Sapiental Text," in *"When the Morning Stars Sang": Essays in Honor of Choon Leong Seow on the Occasion of his Sixty-Fifth Birthday*, ed. Scott C. Jones and Roy Yoder (Berlin, Boston: De Gruyter, 2018), 284, 285.
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[122]Kant, *Religion within the limits of reason alone*, 39.
[123]Kant, *Religion within the limits of reason alone*, 68.
[124]Kant, *Religion within the limits of reason alone*, 66.
[125]Kant, *Religion within the limits of reason alone*, 16-17.

instance, it cannot explain the contingency of atomic bombing that claims not only intended victims but also unintended ones.[126]Levinas depicts the contingency of human actions in such a vivid way that, while stretching our hand, we unintentionally leave wrinkles on our jacket, and, trying to straighten the wrinkles, we leave another "nonintended" trace.[127]

Now, we have to tackle with the trickiest question; "How to keep humanity from the bad choice?" According to Kant, we may have two options. First, we may want to eradicate the undisciplined inclinations in order that we may be freed from those unruly inclinations and adopt the moral laws into maxims. This option, however, is not only "futile" but also "harmful" because the unruly inclinations are not only good but also interminable.[128] Then, the only option is to exercise the free will prescribed by reason because, while following the purelyrational will, we can overcome all the irrational natures, such as naiveté, frailty, impurity, etc., until they are "tamed" and ruptured into the original good.[129]Kant presents Jesus as an example for the free will in that, while suffering on the cross, the Son of God exercised the purely rational will and fulfilledthe "supreme justice" demanded by God.[130]

The moral integrity achieved bythe rational will leads Kant to suggest a theodicygrounded on moral virtues, such as faith and sincerity. Traditionally, God's wisdomor justice has been defended based on the speculative knowledge that God rewards good deeds and punishes bad ones. According to Kant, the traditional theodicy is problematic because, while defending God's wisdom and justice based on the speculative knowledge of God's rewards and

[126]Susan Neiman, "Mass Murders: Why Auschwitz?" in *Evil in Modern Thought* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002), 252.

[127] Levinas, *Basic Philosophical Writings*, ed. Adriaan T. Peperzak, Simon Critchley, and Robert Bernasconi (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1996), 4.

[128]Kant, *Religion within the limits of reason alone*, 51.

[129]Kant, *Religion within the limits of reason alone*, 51.

[130]Kant, *Religion within the limits of reason alone*, 69.

punishments, the traditional theodicy cannot respond to "the doubts" raised against God's wisdom and justice.[131] As a solution to the traditional theodicy, Kant suggests "an *authentic*" theodicy grounded on moral virtuesin that God's wisdom must be defended based on our moral virtues, such ashonesty, sincerity,faith, etc., upon which we "openly" admit our doubts against God's wisdom and bravely take up the doubts into our"reason," with a faith in God whose unknown wisdom will finally bring us to justice and righteousness.[132]

According to Kant, the biblical Job plays as a model to defend God's wisdom based on theauthentic theodicy because Job admits his frailty before God, but still "indignantly" complains about his innocent suffering andtakes up his complaints into his reason.[133] On the contrary,Job's friends play as a model to defend God's wisdom based on the traditional theodicy because they defend God's wisdom based on the speculative knowledge of God's rewards and punishments andjudge all sufferings, including Job's, in terms of "God's justice,"without knowing God's hidden wisdom encountered by wrestling with the issue of suffering with moral virtues, such as honesty, sincerity, faith, etc.[134] Job's friends appear more humble than Job because, while Job openly raises his doubts about God's wisdom by complaining his innocent suffering before God, the friends try to defend God's wisdom by blaming Job's doubts about God's wisdom. But God shows a favor to Job's doubts about God's wisdom over his friends' speculative knowledge of Godby allowing Job a glimpse into "the wisdom of his creation," while

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[131]Kant, *Religion and Rational Theology*, trans. and ed. by Allen W. Wood, and George Di Giovanni (Cambridge university press, 2001), 30.
[132]Kant, *Religion and Rational Theology*, 31, 33, 34.
[133]Kant, *Religion and Rational Theology*, 32.
[134]Kant, *Religion and Rational Theology*, 32.

condemning the friends as hypocrites, who pretend to know God's wisdom based on their limited knowledge.[135]

As a moral principle as it is, though, theKantian reason never knows the responsible subjectivity or goodness because, while exercising our reason for the moral integrity, we are neither cored out of our being nor ruptured into our nobility or goodness, but simply return to the original good that belongs to being. As a solution to the Kantian or irresponsible reason, Levinas suggests the Judaic wisdom, which dims the Kant reason. In Judaism, reason serves not to gather up the moral integrity, as Kant says, but to ensure the "coexistence" of different voices irreducible to the moral integrity.[136] The Judaic reason presupposes discourse because discoursebrings alldifferent voicesto"the unity of presence,"in whichindividuals directly engage themselves in a face to face dialogue by listening, arguing, and negotiating each other's views and opinions.[137]In other words, in Judaism, reason depends not on"the thinking subjects" who shine themselves with illuminated knowledge and gather themselves to theunity of the One, but on the speaking community maintained with different voices.[138]The Judaic reason depending on the speaking community can beidentified in Plato where reason begins not from the shiny knowledge among the thinking subjects, but from a "living" discourse among individuals.[139] According to Levinas, the power of discourse in Judaism is so great that even a formal "greeting" can promote the relationship among the dialogue partners and ensure the priority of goodness over enmity.[140] The Judaic discourse is prior to the Kantian idea of the unknown evil because, in

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[135]Kant, *Religion and Rational Theology*, 33.
[136] Levinas, *Otherwise Than Being*, 165.
[137] Levinas, *Entre Nous: On Thinking-of-the-Other*, 162.
[138] Levinas, *Entre Nous: On Thinking-of-the-Other*, 162.
[139] Levinas, *Totality and Infinity*, 73.
[140] Levinas, *Is It Righteous to Be*, 212.

Judaism, before the unknown evil settles down inside the community, there is discourse; e.g., in the story of Adam and Eve, before the seduction of the unknown evil, there is discourse between human and animal subjects.

Depending on the different voices inside the speaking community, the Judaic reason satisfies the demand of "the universal logic" and serves as "wisdom" itself, for it puts all the different voices on the same logic and principles and lets them be heard at once, which is wisdom itself.[141] The universal reason or wisdomin Judaismdims the Kantian reason because, while listening to all the different voices under the same logic and principles, the speaking community already makes contact with all individuals that it has no time to follow the moral principle supported the Kantian or subjective reason.[142] To clarify the diachronic otherness of the Judaic or universal wisdom, Levinas engages the story of the sun and the moon in the HebrewBible (Genesis 1: 16-18). In the text, God orders the moonto reign "day and night,"and the sun to reign only daytime.[143]

According to Levinas, the sun can be compared withthe thinking subject because, while illuminating in the daytime, the sun shines the world and makes it "transparent" and intelligible.[144]On the other hand, the moon can be compared with"the wisdom of the night"because, while remaining "visible"day and night, the moon dims the sun's glory that remains only in the daytime.[145]And the way, in which the moon dims the sun, designates "the greatness of humility" because the moon dims the sun's glory not with itsbrilliance, but with its

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[141] Levinas, *Is It Righteous to Be*, 248.
[142] Levinas, *Is It Righteous to Be*, 248.
[143] Levinas, *In the Time of the Nations*, trans. Michael B. Smith (Bloomington and Indianapolis: 1994), 117.
[144] Levinas, *Difficult Freedom: Essays on Judaism*, 209.
[145] Levinas, *In the Time of the Nations*, 117.

humble presence, which endures day and night without brilliance.[146] The greatness of humility is

God's "humility" because, while diming the sun's glory with the moon's humblepresence, God

already holds him/herself responsible for blurring the border between the sun's glory and moon's

humble presence.[147] The story of the sun and the moon in the Hebrew Bible tells us that, in

Judaism, wisdom is not about the smart reasoning, but about the greatness of humility because

the moon's humble presence dims the sun's glory, not vice versa. Unfortunately, we are so

familiar to the idea of the smart reasoning that we forget the greatness of humility and try to

shine ourselves with brilliant knowledge gatherable to being.

C. Husserl

According to Husserl, objects are "temporal" objects because they are constituted by the

temporal or inexact data, such as colors, sounds, shapes, etc., which appear different in different

times.[148] The temporal objects should not be studied under the guidance of natural sciences, such

as physics, because, when studied under the natural sciences, objects are inevitably subject to

scientific categories and reduced to "exact" data, although they are temporal or inexact objects.[149]

As an alternative to the natural sciences, Husserl proposes the *epoché* in that, when studied

through the *epoché*, objects are neither offered to the scientific categories nor reduced to the

exact data, but can be directly perceived in "consciousness of" thetemporal or inexact

objects.[150] Here, the word, *epoché*, which means a cessation or suspension in Greek, refers to a

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[146] Levinas, *In the Time of the Nations*, 118.
[147] Levinas, *In the Time of the Nations*, 118.
[148] Husserl, *The Phenomenology of Internal Time-Consciousness*, 47.
[149] Levinas, *The Theory of Intuition in Husserl's Phenomenology*, 118.
[150] Husserl, *The Phenomenology of Internal Time-Consciousness*, 88.

method to stop our natural or scientific attitudes toward objects in order that they may be perceived in our consciousness deeper than the natural or scientific attitudes.[151]

The Husserlian *epoché* begins from the temporal structure of consciousness because, in the *epoché*, consciousnessis a consciousness of time. In the *epoché*, objects are temporal objects because every object does not vanish immediately, but "endures"for a moment in the present.[152] The temporal or enduring objects give rise to what Husserl calls "the temporal moment" deeper than the global time because, while enduring in the present, objects are extended to the next moment and give rise to a temporal or enduring moment deeper than the global time.[153] For instance, when a whistle sounds, the whistle does not vanish at once, but endures in the present "like an extended line" and leads us to a temporal moment deeper than the global time.[154] A color also produces its temporal moment, due to the temporary duration of the color in the present. The temporal or enduring moment, Husserl attributes to human "phantasy" in that it is our phantasy that extends a past moment to the present and produces the enduring moment.[155] In other words, in the *epoché*, time proceeds not from the moving objects in diachrony, but from our phantasy or imagination. For Husserl, the imagery timeis prior to the global time, which is composed of past, present, and future, because, without our imagination or phantasy, there would be neither the past nor the future, but only a repetition of the "ever fresh now."[156]Seemingly, the Husserlian time differs from the Kantian counterpart because, for Kant, time proceeds from human ability to take moments by a line, but, for Husserl, it proceeds from human phantasy that

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[151] See Husserl, "Phenomenology," in *Encyclopedia Britanica*, 14th ed. (1929), 660.
[152] Husserl, *The Phenomenology of Internal Time-Consciousness*, 43.
[153] Husserl, *The Phenomenology of Internal Time-Consciousness*, 31.
[154] Husserl, *The Phenomenology of Internal Time-Consciousness*, 151.
[155] Husserl, *The Phenomenology of Internal Time-Consciousness*, 31.
[156] Husserl, *The Phenomenology of Internal Time-Consciousness*, 168.

extends the past to the present. But, from the diachronic point of view, both are the same idea of synchrony because, while taking moments by a line, or extending the past to the present, we already divest the past of its fleeting data and make it available to the present.

The Husserlian synchrony calls for "perception"because what is synchronized to the present cannot be a moment itself, which already elapsed to the past, but its material data, such as multilayered colors and sounds, perceivable to our senses.[157] The sensory perception cannot be a perception of the present, but a perception of "a past," because, when we perceive the sensory or material data in the present, what is perceived to us is not the present moment, but the previous moment, from which the sensory data have been animated and lasted in the present.[158] For instance, the perception of yesterday cannot be a perception of today, but a perception of the day before yesterday, because yesterday is perceived as yesterday only when we recognize thatthe day before yesterday "had passed" in a full and experience today as the day after yesterday.[159] The perception of the past makes it possible to distinguish moments from one another because each perception has its own past to perceive; "the appearances … have their time."[160] Temporal distinction, however, does not undermine "temporal succession" because we perceive each moment in relation to its previous and following ones.[161] Temporal succession in the *epoché*cannot be valid, either, for it does not fit to the physicalor global time, which proceeds on different speeds in different latitudes on earth, due to the spinning of the earth.

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[157] Husserl, *The Phenomenology of Internal Time-Consciousness*, 42.
[158] Husserl, *The Phenomenology of Internal Time-Consciousness*, 93.
[159]OPT Design, "Edmund Husserl: Inner Time-Consciousness," accessed December 17, 2010, *http://www.optdesign.com/Philosophy/Husserl.htm.*
[160] Husserl, *The Phenomenology of Internal Time-Consciousness*, 150.
[161] Husserl, *The Phenomenology of Internal Time-Consciousness*, 104.

The temporal perception in the *epoché* is followed by what Husserl calls retention, "a momentary consciousness" of recent pasts, because, when a new perception emerges, what is previously or recently perceived does not vanish in the air, but continuously reappears to us until it is sinking back to a remote past.[162] Here, Husserl distinguishes the primary retention from the following ones in that, while the primary retention is "the consciousness of the past," the following ones are only the retentions of the primary intention that they do not have"what is past."[163] Put in detail,[164] the consciousness of the past is retained in itself. To the primary retention, the second moment is joined as another retention with the retention of the first one. To the second moment of retention, the third one is joined as a new retention with the retention of the second retention and the retention of the retention of the first, and so on. The series of retentions inevitably change the past becauseevery retention is "a continuous modification" that new retentions are continuously added to the primary one and renew the latter.[165]

The renewal of the past, however, does not undermine the continuity of it because each series of retention bears the "heritage of the past."[166] The continuity of the past makes it possible to look back on the past events because, when perceptions sink back to the past, they lose only the "now-character" not theirtemporal positions.[167] For example, thanks to the continuity of the retentions, we still remember the whistle sound as the same as what we heard before, even though we lost its now character. The retention or memory makes possible the idea of the future because, while looking back on the past, we imagine the future and anticipate "what

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[162] Husserl, The Phenomenology of Internal Time-Consciousness, 161.
[163] See Husserl, *The Phenomenology of Internal Time-Consciousness*, 64.
[164] Husserl, *The Phenomenology of Internal Time-Consciousness*, 57, 63.
[165] Husserl, *The Phenomenology of Internal Time-Consciousness*, 51.
[166] Husserl, *The Phenomenology of Internal Time-Consciousness*, 51.
[167] Husserl, *The Phenomenology of Internal Time-Consciousness*, 87, 161.

is coming."[168]What is retained and anticipated calls for "recollection" or reproductionbecause retentions and anticipations are aimed to reproduce.[169] The reproduction presents itself as "just-having-been," for it is nothing but a simultaneous appearance of what have been retained and anticipated in different times.[170]

The simultaneous appearance of the past data, Husserl again attributes to phantasy in that what appear to us at once cannot be actual moments that already elapsed, but an illusion that we have the "memory" of the elapsed moments.[171] The reduction of the past into the memory of it, Husserl characterizes as "phenomenological" in that it is not a reduction in which objects are subject to the scientific categories and reproduced to exact data, but a reduction in which objects are liberated from the scientific reduction and animated into imperfect phenomena, such as memories and appearances, irreducible to the scientific or perfect data.[172]The phenomenological reduction is possible only through consciousness because, without "the constant flowing-forth" of human consciousness, nothing would be animated into imperfect phenomena, but unilaterally studied under the scientific categories and reduced to the perfect or scientific data.[173]Human consciousness identified in the *epoché*, Husserl names time-consciousness or "consciousness of the past" in that it is constituted by the past that has been animated inside the subject.[174]

The time-consciousness asserts its"independence" because our consciousness is already inside us and continuously flows in itself, without any external object to perceive.[175]The

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[168] Husserl, *The Phenomenology of Internal Time-Consciousness*, 161.
[169] Husserl, *The Phenomenology of Internal Time-Consciousness*, 63.
[170] Husserl, *The Phenomenology of Internal Time-Consciousness*, 64.
[171] Husserl, *The Phenomenology of Internal Time-Consciousness*, 137.
[172] Husserl, "Phenomenology," 660.
[173] Husserl, *The Phenomenology of Internal Time-Consciousness*, 108.
[174]Husserl, *The Phenomenology of Internal Time-Consciousness,* 64.
[175]See also Levinas, *The Theory of Intuition in Husserl's Phenomenology*, 29.

independent existence ofconsciousness, however, is not confined in itself, but still moves toward

external objects because each consciousness is a "consciousness of something," a consciousness

of an object.[176] The consciousmovement toward the objects, Husserl attributes intentionality in

that it is our intentionality, whichtranscends its independent existence and moves toward the

external objects; "*Intentionality is, for Husserl, a genuine act of transcendence and the very

prototype of any transcendence.*"[177] The intentional consciousness is not only subjective but also

objective, for it designates the subject's activity of remembering, perceiving, at the same time,

the object's passivity of "being remembered, perceived."[178]For Husserl, the subjective-objective

intentionality in the *epoché*is not a link between *noesis* and *noema*, but "a signifying

intentionality," because, when intentionality directs itself to the external objects, it neither

projects itself on the objects nor passes any theoretical judgment on them, but simply signifies

them, or refers to them, in order that the objects may be objectified as they are and presented in

front of the independent consciousness inside us.[179]

Rather, it opens a gap between consciousness and objects because consciousness never

ends its perception of externalobjects that the objects are neither fully perceived nor identified

"in their totality," but always remain imperfectin front of the perfect consciousness.[180] Thanks to

the gap between the perfect consciousness and imperfect objects, the objects remain

transcendental in relation to the perfect consciousness because to remain in front of the perfect

consciousness presupposes to remain as concrete individuals and bear "the marks of relativity"

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[176] Husserl, *The Phenomenology of Internal Time-Consciousness*, 120.
[177]Levinas, *The Theory of Intuition in Husserl's Phenomenology*, 40.
[178]Levinas, *The Theory of Intuition in Husserl's Phenomenology*, 56.
[179]Levinas, *The Theory of Intuition in Husserl's Phenomenology*, 67.
[180]Levinas, *The Theory of Intuition in Husserl's Phenomenology*, 22.

with regard to the perfectconsciousness.[181] In other words, in the *epoché*, objects remain

transcendental not based on their material contents, which already elapsed to the irrevocable past,

but based on their concrete existence in front of the perfect consciousness.

The transcendental objectssignify "an ideal limit" because, while bearing the marks

of relativity, the objects refer back to the ideal of the absolute existence, but never reach it.[182] For

instance, a perceived red signifiesan ideal limit because the absolute time-consciousness never

ends its perception of the red that the red moves toward"an ideally pure red," but never reach

it.[183]For Husserl, his idea of imperfect beings is superior to the Kantian idea of perfect beings

becausethe Kantian idea of perfect beings is nothing but the "idealizations" of the imperfect

beings identified in the *epoché*.[184]In Kant whose philosophy begins from the *a prior* space,objects

present themselves as perfect and ideal because, in the *a priori* space, objects are stripped of their

imperfect phenomena and reproduced to what is perfect and exact. The Kantian idea of perfect

beings is nothing but the idealizations of the imperfect beings, for it hasoriginated from the

imperfect phenomena and gradually become idealized into something perfect.

Theexistence of the external objects is not *noumenal* but phenomenalbecause what is

animated into imperfect data inside the subjectcannot be a thing in itself, but "affective

predicates" attributable toindividual objects that are things in themselves.[185] For instance, the

existence of a tree is phenomenal because, in the *epoché*, the tree exists not as a thing in itself,

but as imperfect predicates, e.g.,"green, tall, hard and beautiful," etc., attributable to the tree as a

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[181]Levinas, *The Theory of Intuition in Husserl's Phenomenology*, 7.
[182] Husserl, *The Phenomenology of Internal Time-Consciousness*, 62.
[183] Husserl, *The Phenomenology of Internal Time-Consciousness*, 62.
[184]Levinas, *The Theory of Intuition in Husserl's Phenomenology*, 118.
[185]Levinas, *The Theory of Intuition in Husserl's Phenomenology*, 45.

thing in itself.[186]The phenomenal existence leads Husserl to insist that our intentions must be directed not to objects, but to our time-consciousness, because, in the *epoché*, every being, including "the being of God,"can be identified only in our consciousness.[187]

According to Husserl, his idea of *epoché* serves as a solution to the psychological reduction. In psychologist theories, objects present themselves as natural because the psychologists are so unfamiliar to the time-consciousness that they perceive objectsthrough the natural consciousness. Thepsychologist naturalism cannot but end up to the "exactness"of knowledge pursued by natural sciences because natural objects are so simple and obvious that they can be studied under the scientific categories and reproduced to something perfect and exact.[188] The psychological reduction includes consciousness because, while studying natural objects under the scientific categories, the psychologists also study "the act" of their own studying and find themselves on the same plane with what they are studying.[189]

As a result, the psychologists never reach what is deeper than the natural existence. For example, we experience beauty in our daily life. The beauty in our daily life never exists as an individual object, for it is nothing but a predicate or "essence" attributable to individual objects, e.g., flowers.[190]As a predicate, beauty calls for the *epoché* because the predicate is an imperfect datum, which is so "incompatible with" the natural categories that we have to give up the natural studies of the predicate and study it through the *epoché*, in which the flowers are presented in front of our consciousness and animated into inexact predicates as many as there are perceptions,

[186]Levinas, *The Theory of Intuition in Husserl's Phenomenology*, 55.
[187] Husserl, *Formal and Transcendental Logic*, trans. Dorion Cairns (Martinus Nijhoff/The Hague, 1969), 251.
[188] Husserl, "Phenomenology," 660.
[189]Levinas, *The Theory of Intuition in Husserl's Phenomenology*, 148.
[190] Levinas, *Unforeseen History*, trans. Nidra Poller (Urbana and Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 2004), 26.

e.g., beauty, glory, splendor, smallness, tallness, softness, hardness, etc.[191] The phenomenal

beauty identified in the *epoché*is deeper than the natural or perfect beauty because the natural

beauty originates from our consciousness of the imperfect beauty of the flowers and gradually

becomes idealized into something perfect, which exists without our consciousness.

The phenomenal character of existence is entirely unknown to the psychologists because,

in the psychological reduction, there is no time-consciousness, which animates imperfect

predicates out of objects, but only natural consciousness that studies objects under the scientific

categories and reproduce them to something perfect, although they are temporal objects

irreducible to the psychological idea of the perfect being. For Husserl, the psychological

reduction can be overcome through the *epoché* because, in the *epoché*, objects are neither offered

to scientific categories nor disclosed into perfect data, but directly perceived and animated into

imperfect predicates prior to the psychological reduction takes place under the categories.

Husserl knows well about the similarity between his *epoché* and the psychological

reduction because, as time passes, objects are inevitably purged of the imperfect predicates and

"coincide with" the psychological ideal of the perfect being.[192] Nevertheless, according to

Husserl, his *epoché* is the very condition for scientific studies because, while animating

imperfect phenomenaout of the objects, the *epoché* serves as "an *a priori* science" for scientific

studies, whose theories begin from imperfect phenomena.[193]The a priori *epoché*, Husserl

compares to "a religious conversion" in that it frees our consciousness from the scientific

reduction and converts our consciousness to what is deeper than the scientific

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[191]Levinas, *The Theory of Intuition in Husserl's Phenomenology*, 17.
[192]Levinas, *The Theory of Intuition in Husserl's Phenomenology*, 145.
[193] Husserl, "Phenomenology," 663.

knowledge.[194]However, from the diachronic point of view, the *epoché* is nothing but the Western synchrony because, while pursuing the *epoché*, we already strip objects of theirpast and synchronize them to imperfect phenomenagatherable to the same being.

     Levinas acknowledges the power of the Husserlian *epoché* in that it discovers the time-consciousness and leads us to the "inexact morphological" knowledge prior to the "exact mathematical" knowledge.[195] However, according to Levinas, the *epoché* should not be pursued because, even after discovering the "primacy" of the imperfect being, Husserl still tries to justify what he call the perfect being, namely, the time-consciousness, by relegating objects to the time-consciousness and become targeted for his intellectualism.[196]The Husserlian or intellectual *epoché*never reaches the responsible subjectivity because, in the *epoché*, nothing goes to the diachronic past, but can be identified in our consciousness that we forget our responsibility for the worldand enjoy our sedentary life with our perfect consciousness.

     As a solution to the Husserlian*epoché*, Levinas proposes the Judaic idea of material consciousness in that, in Judaism, consciousness is not a consciousness of temporal objects, but a consciousness of material supplies for human responsibility for the third party. In Judaism, diachrony calls for the third party because what exists with its material contents in diachrony, cannot enter the face to face relationship with me that it always remains asymmetrical in relation to me and "looks at me in the eyes of "the Other."[197]In other words, diachrony is not about *I-Thou* intimacy between equals, but about the third party irreducible to the *I-Thou* intimacybetween equals. Here, *I-Thou* refers to Martin Buber's term, which is intended to

[194]Husserl, *The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology: An Introduction to Phenomenological Philosophy* (Evanston: Northwestern University Press), 1970, 137.
[195] Levinas, *The Theory of Intuition in Husserl's Phenomenology*, 118.
[196] Levinas, *The Theory of Intuition in Husserl's Phenomenology*, 119.
[197] Levinas, *Totality and Infinity*, 213.

overcome what he calls *I-It*. According to Buber, there are two types of attitudes, in which I see the world: "*I-It*" and "*I-Thou*."[198] *I-It* is an attitude, in which I see the world as an object of "experience" and reduces it to the impersonal *It*.[199] In *I-It*, the subject never exists in the present but always remains in the past because, while experiencing the physical world as the impersonal *It*, I already give up the living relationship to the world available in the present that I have nothing present, but "only the past."[200] So does the world because what is experienced as an impersonal *I* cannot be the physical world, which is becoming and growing in the present, but one of many objects, which have been there and remain "in time that has been."[201]

   As an alternative to *I-It*, Buber suggests *I-Thou* in that, in *I-Thou*, I see the world as a dialogue partner and take relationship with it. According to Buber, *I-Thou* is a relationship in which I meets the world as a *Thou* because, in *I-Thou*, the world approaches me as a "total status" of its own being and becomes a dialogue partner with me.[202] The world identified as a *Thou* remains in the present because, when I meet the world as a *Thou*, the world presents itself as vivid as it is and becomes what is "present."[203] For instance, when I meet a tree as a *Thou*, the tree presents itself as vivid as it is with its "flowing veins," "breathing of the leaves," etc., and becomes what is present.[204] The world in the present, however, does not oppose the world as the past object because the world, which I have met "with the force of presence," can be reflected under my power and reduced to what is past that there is continuity between the world in the

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[198] Martin Buber, *I and Thou*, trans. Ronald Gregor Smith (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1937), 3.
[199] Buber, *I and Thou*, 6.
[200] Buber, *I and Thou*, 12.
[201] Buber, *I and Thou*, 13.
[202] Buber, *I and Thou*, 94.
[203] Buber, *I and Thou*, 12.
[204] Buber, *I and Thou*, 7.

present and the world as the past object.[205] The past origin in the present leads Buber to insist that past objects should be animated to the present in order that they may "blaze up" in the present and enter the relationship with the *Thou*, from whom they came.[206]

The "*I-Thou*" meeting in the present requires "sacrifice" because to meet with the world as a *Thou* is to overcome unruly impulses and respond to it with the whole gravity of my own being.[207] From the sacrifice of the unruly impulses emerges the idea of God because, the more we respond to the world with the whole gravity of my being, the more the world responds to me with the total status of its own being that no single part of the world remains isolated from the "*I-Thou*" meeting, but can be united into the "eternal" *Thou*, God, and enter the "full and complete relation" in the eternal *Thou* or God.[208]

The eternal *Thou* makes me spiritually mature because, the more I engage myself to the "*I-Thou*" meeting, the more I recognize "the unconditioned relation" with the *Thou* and risk everything for the meeting.[209] In other words, I becomes spiritually mature not based on my responsibility for the other in diachrony, but based on my willingness and sincerity to the "*I-Thou*" meeting. The spiritual maturity never dies but remains as "*teaching*" because the spirit survives the mortality of the subject and gives witness to how the subject overcomes the unruly impulses and lives a life in spirit for the *Thou*.[210] For Buber, the prophets are examples for the spiritual teaching because, while proclaiming God's message, the prophets take "the risk of

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[205] Buber, *I and Thou*, 40.
[206] Buber, *I and Thou*, 40.
[207] Buber, *I and Thou*, 59.
[208] Buber, *I and Thou*, 75, 79.
[209] Buber, *I and Thou*, 63.
[210] Buber, *I and Thou*, 42.

martyrdom" and respond to the eternal God with the whole gravity of their being.[211]The spiritual

subject already reaches its "subjectivity" since it no longer identifies itself based on *I-It*, in which

I lose mypresent being and remain with the past objects, but based on *I-Thou*, in which I see the

world as a *Thou* and devote myself to themeeting with the*Thou* with the whole gravity of my

being until I enter the full and complete relation with the eternal *Thou* or God.[212]

The Buberian or reciprocal *I-Thou*, however, is nothing but a strategy to gather up the

self-interest because, while sharing the mutual relationship in the present, the interlocutors

already expect another cycle of reciprocity that there would be no *I-Thou* meeting, but only

"exchange and commerce," upon which the interlocutors pursue the same interest.[213]Besides,

there is "no initial equality" such as the Buberian *I-Thou*, because every relationship to the other

is asymmetrical, due to my initial responsibility for the other.[214]As a solution to the Buberian or

reciprocal *I-Thou*, Levinas suggests the Judaic idea of justice because, in Judaism, the world

comes to us not as a *Thou*, who forms a reciprocal relationship with us, as Buber insists, but as a

third party, who breaks the reciprocal relationship and introduces our responsibility for the world

irreducible to the reciprocal relationship. If we followthe Levinasian metaphysics, the world

comes to us as a third party because the world, which lives with its material contents in

diachrony, neither remains in the present nor forms the reciprocal relationship withus, but

entirely elapses to the irrevocable pastand remains as a third party irreducible to the reciprocal

relationship. The world as the third party introduces human responsibility for the world because,

before the material world irreducible to the reciprocal relationship, we cannot but give up the

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[211] Buber, "Prophecy, Apocalyptic, and the Historical Hour," *Union Seminary Quarterly Review* 12-3 (1957): 16.
[212] Buber, *I and Thou*, 62-63.
[213] Levinas, *Is It Righteous to Be*, 213.
[214] Levinas, *Outside the Subject*, trans. Michael B. Smith (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1994), 44.

reciprocal relationship with the world and return to our sensibility to the voice of the world in

diachrony. Human responsibility for the worldis material responsibility because those, who

return to theirnobility or sensibility to the world, cannot gather up the phenomenal essence at the

cost of the world that they cannot butidentify themselves by offering theirmaterial supplies to

third parties,who have been expelled from the reciprocal relationship.

The material responsibility for the worldcalls for the Husserlian idea of exact

consciousness because the material supplies are so limited in the world that we have to exercise

our exact consciousness on the supplies in order that they may be distributed to the third partiesin

terms of justice and equity; "The foundation of consciousness is justice."[215] In other words, in

Judaism, consciousness is not a consciousness of the temporal objects, but a consciousness of the

material supplies for human responsibility for the third partiesirreducible to the temporal objects.

The material consciousness in Judaism is the solution to the phenomenological *epoché* because,

in Judaism, we are already indebted to the material world before we study the material world

through the phenomenological *epoché*that we cannot but give up the phenomenological

*epoché*and return to ourmaterial consciousness irreducible to the phenomenological *epoché*.

D. Heidegger

Heidegger begins his theory withthe Greek word "*phusis*,"the Being of

beings.According to Heidegger, the Greek word "phusis" designates emerging events, which can

be experienced "everywhere," e.g., in the growing of trees, in the rising of storms,

etc.[216]Emerging events or phusispresupposes "the concealed" because, without the concealed,

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[215] Levinas, *Otherwise Than Being*, 160.
[216] Heidegger, *Introduction to Metaphysics*, trans. Phillip Jacques Braunstein (Bloomington: Indiana University Press), 2011, 15.

nothing would emerge but remain concealed behind a veil.[217]The Greek "*phusis*"is"the Being of beings" because whatever emergesfrom the concealedgradually comesinto Being.[218]As the Being of beings, phusisincludes "becoming" becauseBeing is not yet fully developedthat it still remains inthe process of becoming.[219] It also includes "seeming" becausewhat remains in the process of becomingever changes itself that it seems like "this" or "that."[220]Seeming as Being, however,has been isolated from Beingbecause, since Plato, seeming is considered to be "apparent" or superficial.[221]Christianity finds itself in the Platonic isolation of seeming fromBeing because, in Christianity, the creator is considered to be "the real Being" in "the Above," andthe creatures are considered to be seeming likethe real Being in the Above. The Platonic isolation of seeming from Being calls for the spiritual darknessbecause, when seemingis separated from Being, there would be neither unreal mysteries norimaginary gods, but only the dominance of "the mediocre"that humanityloses its spiritual holiness and reduces itself to an ordinary "mass."[222]

TheGreek Beingor phusis is so broad that it is unlikely to ask "What is Being?" because beingsare everywhere in the worldthat they resist "every attempt at definition" in relation to the question of what Being is.[223] The unlikely question of what Being is, however, does not dissuade us from asking "What is the meaning of Being?" because we are also beings in the world that we cannot escape the question of what it means to be in the world.[224]Then, how to reach the meaning of Being, if Being is too elusive to define? The answer is by observing the

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[217] Heidegger, *Introduction to Metaphysics*, 16.
[218] Heidegger, *Introduction to Metaphysics*, 19.
[219] Heidegger, *Introduction to Metaphysics*, 121.
[220] Heidegger, *Introduction to Metaphysics*, 121.
[221] Heidegger, *Introduction to Metaphysics*, 111.
[222] Heidegger, *Introduction to Metaphysics*, 47.
[223]Heidegger, *Being in Time*, 21.
[224] Heidegger, *Introduction to Metaphysics*, 44.

way, in which our everyday *Dasein* reveals itself in the world, because the issue here is not to analyze Being through categories, but to unmask Being, which has been veiled behind the "undifferentiated" mode of our everyday Dasein.[225]Here, the Heideggerian term"Dasein," which is translated into Being-there or Being-in-the-world, refers to human existence in the world, meaning that we are in the world not as a thinking subject to pursue the question of what Being is within the scientific categories, but as a "historical Being" to bring forth the question of what it means to be in the world.[226] The human or historical *Dasein*is"Being-with" because to be in the world as a historical Being is to be with others.[227]Dasein's Being-with includes "Being-alone" because, even when we are alone, we are still in the world with others.[228]The Heideggerian Dasein as Being-withcannot be an individual Dasein, but the undifferentiated mode of everyday Dasein or average Dasein, for it never exists independently of others, but always remains undifferentiated from others.[229]

Heidegger offers three ways in which our everyday *Dasein* discloses itself in the world: "state-of-mind,""understanding," and "falling."[230]State-of-mindis an actual mode of *Dasein*, forit discloses*Dasein* as a "thrown Being" to the world.[231]The actual mode of *Dasein*signals *Dasein*'s "finitude" because whatever thrown to the world is already thrown to its death from birth.[232]*Dasein*'s finitude leads itself to anxiety, a basic state-of-mind, because, once we recognize our finitude in the world, we forgetour "'*worldly* possibilities" and become anxious

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[225]Heidegger, *Being in Time*, 69.
[226] Heidegger, *Introduction to Metaphysics*, 18.
[227]Heidegger, *Being in Time*, 161.
[228]Heidegger, *Being in Time*, 156.
[229]Heidegger, *Being in Time*, 69.
[230]Heidegger, *Being in Time*, 400.
[231]Heidegger, *Being in Time*, 295.
[232]Heidegger, *Being in Time*, 435.

to take up the finitude into our own.[233] Heidegger sees anxiety as "authentic" in that it is anxiety, which frees us from the uncertainty of the worldly possibilities and brings us back to our actual existence that has been thrown to death from birth.[234] Anxiety as authentic is the very basis, upon which we experience "fear," because only throughthe anxiety for the finite existence can we encounter fear as it is.[235] For instance, only through anxiety for the finite existence can we encounter a dangerous animal as it is, i.e. as something threatening to our finite existence. On the other hand, fear which comes from anxiety is "inauthentic" because, while encountering a threat as it is, fear forgets the finite existence and loses itself to what it encounters.[236] In sum, Heidegger opposes fear to anxiety in that, while anxiety brings us back to our finite existence, fear forgets the finite existence and loses itself to its objects.

As authentic as it is, anxiety finds itself in heroic individuals because the heroic individuals are so strong and courageous that they give up "the concerns of ordinary life" and dare to take up the finite existence into their own existence.[237] The heroic individuals are so uncanny in their willingness to death that they never step back for being, but risk everything for non-being, because to take over death into one's own existence is to give up all the security measures and endure "the uncertainty and insecurity" until one is cleared of one's being and finds one's existence in one's non-being.[238] Oedipus, a Greek hero, is an example for the uncanny willingness, for he gives up all the security measures and moves toward "what is wildest and most far-flung" until he found his existence in his non-being, in his blindness, in his

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[233]Heidegger, *Being in Time*, 394.
[234]Heidegger, *Being in Time*, 232.
[235]Heidegger, *Being in Time*, 230.
[236]Heidegger, *Being in Time*, 391.
[237]Jurgen Habermas, "Martin Heidegger: on the Publication of the Lectures of 1935," in *The Heidegger Controversy: A Critical Reader*, ed. Richard Wolin (Cambridge: The MIT Press), 1991, 194.
[238]Habermas, "Martin Heidegger: on the Publication of the Lectures of 1935," 194.

total darkness.[239] These uncanny heroes are the ones who repeat the Greek beginning, the beginning of "intellectual-historical existence," which has been handed down to us through arts and poetries, because, while enduring the uncertainty and insecurity, the uncanny heroes show their willpower to clear the world of its darkness and let it shine as it is.[240]Therefore, when Heidegger says, "Only a God can save us," he never means any supernatural intervention with humanity, but a repetition of the Greek beginning initiated by such uncanny ones, in which we give up the freedom of thinking and prepare ourselves to be ready for the "appearance" of God.[241]

But when it comes to the final analysis, there is no essential difference between the Heideggerian anxiety and fear, for both are aimed to comfort the finite existence. In Heidegger, anxiety is aimed to comfort the finite existence because, while bringing us back to our actual or finite existence, anxiety frees us from the uncertainty of the worldly possibilities and makes us feel at home. So is fear because, while encountering a threat as it is, fear protects us from the threat and makes us comfortable. In other words, in Heidegger, states of mind, such as anxiety and fear, concern not about human responsibility for the world, but about human desire for being and its survival. As a solution to the Heideggerian states-of-mind, Levinas introduces the Judaic sensitivity prior to the latter. According to Levinas, in Judaism, anxiety is more than a state of mind because, for the Jews, anxiety concerns not about the finite existence in the world, but about human sensitivity to bodily symptoms such as "sickness," "aging," "perishing," etc., irreducible to being and its state of mind.[242] So does fear because, in Judaism, fear concerns not

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[239] Heidegger, *Introduction to Metaphysics*, 112.
[240]Habermas, "Martin Heidegger: on the Publication of the Lectures of 1935," 193.
[241]Heidegger, "Only a God can Save Us": *Der Spiegel*'s Interview with Martin Heidegger,"in *The Heidegger Controversy: A Critical Reader*, ed. Richard Wolin (Cambridge: The MIT Press), 1991, 107.
[242] Levinas, *Collected Philosophical Papers*, trans. Alphonso Lingis (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1987), 179.

about my death, but about the death of "my neighbor" irreducible to my being or non-being (death) in the world.[243]

Jacob's story (Genesis 32) reflects the Judaic sensitivity to the bodily symptoms. In the text, at the news that Esau is marching against him, Jacob concerns not about his death, but about the "ethical moment," in which he may "have to kill" the other man, Esau.[244] The Judaic sensitivity to the bodily symptoms serves as a solution to the Heideggerian states-of-mind because we are already opened to the Judaic sensitivity to the bodily symptoms, such as aging and sickness, before we recognize the Heideggerian idea of finitude and take up anxiety and fear for our being and its safety in the world. Based on the Judaic sensitivity to the bodily symptoms prior to the Heideggerian states-of-mind, Levinas argues that the Heideggerian world built on the uncanny heroes is "a world of lords"because, so fascinated by the uncanny heroes, people build temples or shrines for the uncanny heroes and exalt them to gods in order that they may forget their finitude and serve the heroic gods, making themselvescalm and tranquil by "the visit" of the heroic gods.[245] In other words, the Heideggerian world serves not as a shelter for the ordinary mortals, but as a shrine for the heroic gods, in which the ordinary mortals forget their finitude and enjoy their tranquil life at the service for the heroic gods.

Understanding is a possible mode of *Dasein*, for it discloses *Dasein* as "Being-possible."[246]Thepossiblemode of understanding characterizes itself as "projecting"because only when we project our understanding on the world can the world be cleared of its darkness and

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[243] Levinas, *Entre Nous*, 131.
[244] Levinas, *Basic Philosophical Writings*, 164.
[245] Levinas, *Proper Names*, 138.
[246]Heidegger, *Being in Time*, 183.

shines itself to be seen.[247]In this possible mode of understanding, the world comes to us as

something "ready to hand"because, when we project the possible mode of understanding on the

world, the world is cleared of its material distance and becomes available to us.[248] A hammer, for

instance, comes to us as ready to hand because, when we project our understanding on

thehammer, the hammer is cleared of its material distance and comes close to us as

"equipment."[249] The world ready to hand, Heidegger attributes to the Greek words, such as

"*logos*" (saying), "*noein*" (thinking), "*legein*" (revealing), etc., in that, for the Greeks, to make

something ready to hand is not about study it under the categories, but about everyday act of

talking about it, thinking about it, letting it be revealed as it is, etc.[250]

   Falling is the everyday mode of *Dasein*, for it discloses *Dasein* as "Being-lost."[251]For

Heidegger, falling is inevitable because, while dealing with the world through understanding, we

lose ourselves and become "absorbed" intowhat we deal with, i.e., the world.[252]Our fallinginto

the world is not a big problem, for it simply represents the way in which weas *Dasein* existwith

"the world of its concern" and remain undifferentiated from the world.[253]Therefore, if there is a

problem in falling,falling occurs in our everyday life that it remains "hidden" from us.[254] The

fallen*Dasein*, Heidegger names the "*they*"in that what loses itself and plunges into what it

concernscannot be a single *Dasein*, but "a duplicate" of others.[255]As a duplicate of others, the

fallen *Dasein*cannot but give up its opinion and take up gossipsor public opinions because

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[247]Heidegger, *Being in Time*, 185.
[248]Heidegger, *Being in Time*, 135.
[249]Heidegger, *Being in Time*, 200.
[250] Heidegger, *Introduction to Metaphysics*, 181.
[251] See Heidegger, *Being in Time*, 219.
[252] Heidegger, *Being in Time*, 219.
[253] Heidegger, *Being in Time*, 220.
[254]Heidegger, *Being in Time*, 223
[255]Heidegger, *Being in Time*, 162, 164.

nobody assures one's understanding that everybody has to follow "the rout of gossiping."[256]The public opinions or gossips call for the "tranquilization" of *Dasein*becausethe gossips appear so self-evident that everybody feels at home with the gossips and enjoy one's tranquil life.[257] The tranquil lifewith gossipscalls forthe tyranny of the ordinarypeople because, when the community enjoy their tranquil life with gossips, there is no understanding, through which things are differentiated from one another and remain in their place in peace, but only the "averageness" of the fallen *Dasein*, which brings down every difference and remains in chaos without difference.[258]

Falling, however, can be overcome throughthe uncanny voice of conscience. According to Heidegger, conscience is an "uncanny" voice,which comes from states-of-mind and summons *Dasein* to "Being-guilty" for falling.[259] The uncanny voice brings the fallen *Dasein* back to its singleness because what is summoned to its Being-guilty for falling has no choice other than to listen to the uncanny voice and resolutely return to its single *Dasein*. *Dasein*'s return to the singleness is possible through the cultural heritages, such as arts, poetries, tales of heroes, etc., because, thanks to the cultural heritages that have been handed down to us, we feel guilty of falling and resolutely return to our single *Dasein* for the certainty of our finite existence.[260]According to Heidegger, the single *Dasein*recovered from falling finds its greatest potential in "death" because death is not only the most certain in the world but also it is the only means, through which we are freed from the uncertainty of worldly possibilities and stand in

[256]Heidegger, *Being in Time*, 212
[257]Heidegger, *Being in Time*, 222
[258]Heidegger, *Being in Time*, 165.
[259]Heidegger, *Being in Time*, 314, 322.
[260]Heidegger, *Being in Time*, 437, 442.

ourselves without the uncertainty possibilities.[261]In Heidegger, death is the most certain in the world becausedeath begins at the very moment of birth that it remains the greatest potential in the world. The certainty of *Dasein*'s death is well described in Heidegger's dictum that death is not the end of *Dasein*, but what begins as soon as *Dasein* "comes to life."[262]Death as the great potential makes it arguable that understanding must be projected on what is coming with death because only when we anticipate what is coming with death can we "fully" taste our death, the great potential, and reach our true being that has been covered up in our everyday *Dasein*.[263]

According to Heidegger, the future, which is coming with death, appears "*not later*than having been" because, just as death is as primordial as birth, so is the future that is coming with death.[264] At the same time, the having been appears "*not earlier*" than the present because, while projecting our understanding on the future, we already liberate the present from the uncertain possibilities in the world and directly insert the present between the future and the having been.[265] In other words, in Heidegger, time belongs neither to the future nor to the present but to the pastbecause, while projecting our understanding on the future, we put the future and present moments prior to the having been, i.e., prior to the past. The Heideggerian time as the past can be attributed to our openness to the world as well because only when we stand outside ourselves can we project our understanding on the future and put the future moment prior to the past, and then, insert the present between the future and the past.

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[261]Heidegger, *Being in Time*, 294.
[262]Heidegger, *Being in Time*, 289.
[263] Hilary Putnam, "Levinas and Judaism," in *The Cambridge Companion to Levinas*, ed. Simon Critchley and Robert Bernasconi (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 39.
[264]Heidegger, *Being in Time*, 401.
[265]Heidegger, *Being in Time*, 401.

Heidegger distinguishes his idea of time from the ordinary time or clock time. In the ordinary context, time appears infinite since it keeps coming and going without "beginning," without "end."[266] The infinite or ordinary time gives a privilege to the present because we already lost the temporal beginning and ending that we cannot but see a moment from the present view by defining the past as "no longer present," and the future as "not yet present."[267]According to Heidegger, the ordinary time is meaningless because what is defined as such is so pure and simple that it can be reckoned by the clock and recorded into a historiography, in which historical events are stripped of their historical contents and reduced to pure "numbers" that can be replaced by any other numbers depending on which point of history we begin to account the historical events.[268]

On the other hand, in Heidegger, time appears as finite, for it begins from birth and ends in death. The Heideggerian or finite time resists any scientific measurement because, while reckoning time, we are already in "spending" our time time that we already lose time, while we are measuring it.[269] The immeasurable time, however, cannot escape being reckoned because being in the world is being in time that we already reckon our time, creating a series of time units, such as "morning," "evening," "today," tonight," seasons, years, etc.[270] The time-reckoning has a "*public character*" because, while reckoning time, we must use public measures, e.g., the length of shadows, or the sun's positions in the sky, which create various time-units, such as sunrise,

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[266]Heidegger, *Being in Time*, 476.
[267] Heidegger, *Becoming Heidegger: On the Trail of His Early Occasional Writings, 1920-1927*, ed. Theodore Kisiel and Thomas Sheehan (Illinois, Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 2007), 210.
[268] Heidegger, *Becoming Heidegger: On the Trail of His Early Occasional Writings, 1920-1927*, 72.
[269]Heidegger, *Being in Time*, 423.
[270] Heidegger, *Becoming Heidegger: On the Trail of His Early Occasional Writings, 1920-1927*, 203.

midmorning, midday, sunset, midnight, etc.[271] The public character of time-reckoning can be

also attributed to our openness to the world because only when we remain outside ourselves can

the sun be cleared of its astronomical distance and ready to hand as a sundial. According to

Heidegger, the finite time measured by the sundial is prior to the ordinary time measured by the

clock because, as a technical device, the clock must be "adjusted" to the sundial.[272]

From the astronomical point of view, however, the Heideggerian sundial is nothing but

an illusion because what makes possible the sundial is not the sun itself, but the vision that sees

the sun's journey from the earth spinning around the sun. Of course, Heidegger knows the

difference between the astronomical truth and the illusion affected by vision.But what is

important to Heidegger is not the astronomical truth, but that the sun is there in order that it may

be cleared of its astronomical farness and becomes available to us. The Heideggerian time may

appear different from the Kantian and the Husserlian counterparts because not only Kant but also

Husserl see time as infinite and successive, Heidegger sees it as what endures only from birth to

death, i.e., only during the life time of *Dasein*. But there is no essential difference between them

because what endures from birth to death finally forms a temporal unity inside the *Dasein* and

hands itself down to the next generation in order that it may be repeated by those to come.

Besides, the Heideggerian *Dasein*, which remains between birth and death, is so limited that its

relationship to the world only remains only during its life time, because, when *Dasein* dies, so

does its relationship to the world.

As an alternative to theHeideggerian ethic limited to the life time, Levinas

suggests the Judaic ethic that survivesthelife time. In Heidegger, death is mine because my death,

[271]Heidegger, *Being in Time*, 468.
[272]Heidegger, *Being in Time*, 466.

which begins at the very moment of my birth, forms "a unity" with my birth inside me and becomes mine for my finite existence.[273]On the other hand, in Levinas, death comes from an unknown moment, on which we cannot exercise the power of our understanding; "The last part of the route will be cross without me."[274] The Levinasian idea of death is not mine but"the death of someone" or "the death of the other" in diachrony because what comes from the unknown moment cannot be mine, but the death of the other.[275]As the death of the other, the Levinasian idea of death brings an involuntary guilt to me because every death, which comes from the unknown moment, neither forms a unity in me nor comforts my finitude, but approaches me so urgently, i.e., before I recognize the other's death in my consciousness, that I am already a guilty "survivor" regarding the other's death and suffering.[276] The involuntary guilt teaches me ethics because, as a guilty survivor, I have no exit that I give up my guilty being and listen to the other's voice in diachrony until I am cored of my being and reversed to my sensitivity to others' suffering and death. The ethical burden laid down by the other's death is so grave to me that it even survives my own death since my death, in which my guilty being ceases to be in the world, is not so important that it cannot stop my love and my relationship to the other; "in my death I die the death that is my fault."[277] The Judaic ethic is the solution to the Heideggerian relationship limited to the life time, for it survives human finitude or death, which the latter cannot.

Abraham's story in Genesis 18 describes the Judaic ethic that survives human finitude or death. In the text, Abraham shows his "humility" before God because, while pleading

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[273]Heidegger, *Being in Time*, 427.
[274] Levinas, *Totality and Infinity*, 235.
[275] Levinas, *God, Death, and Time*, trans.Bettina Bergo, ed. Jacques Rolland (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2000), 12.
[276] Levinas, *God, Death, and Time*, 12.
[277] Levinas, *New Talmudic Readings*,118; Levinas, *God, Death, and Time*39.

with God for Sodom, Abraham reduces himself to "dust and ashes" (vs. 27).[278]Abraham's plea

before God introduces human responsibility inexhaustible to death because, in response to others'

suffering, Abraham vulnerably opens himself to others' suffering and brings "altruism" to the

point in which he gives up his being in the world andsees himself as mere dust and ashes, i.e., as

the dead or non-being.[279] This Abraham open to others' suffering, Levinas labels the "father" of

humanism in that, while opening himself to others' suffering before God, Abraham overcomes

his death and produces his fecundity, namely, Israel, which literally means the children of God in

Hebrew.[280]According to Levinas, Abraham's story raises humanity to "another level," for it

introduces the biblical humanism that survives human finitude and produces its fecundity.[281]

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[278] Levinas, *New Talmudic Readings,* 123.
[279] Levinas, *New Talmudic Readings,* 117.
[280] Levinas, *New Talmudic Readings,* 117.
[281] Levinas, *New Talmudic Readings,* 114.

II. The Judaic Diachrony

In the previous chapter, we had two questions: how the Western synchrony has ended up to the phenomenological violence, and how the phenomenological violence in the West has dominated Kant, Husserl, and Heidegger. In the present chapter, wewill have two questionsas well: how the Judaic diachrony overcomes the phenomenological violence in the West, and how it teaches the ethic of responsibility for the other in diachrony. In Judaism, time is diachronic, due to thelapse of it. The Judaic diachrony leads us to the ethic of self-denuding to the otherbecause, thanks to the lapse of time, we have no time to gather our being that we inevitably recognize the limit of our being and denude ourselves to the other in diachrony until we are cored out of our being and animated into our bodily sensitivity to the otherentirely exteriorto our being. The ethic of self-denuding in Judaism can be fulfilled in the ethical sayingof "Here I am"before the other because, while denuding ourselves to the diachronic other, we forget our grammatical language and unwittingly utter the ethical saying of "Here I am" to the other. To clarify the diachronic teaching in Judaism, three issues will be discussed: A. diachrony in Judaism; B. the ethic of self-denuding in Judaism; and C. the "Here I am."

A. Diachrony in Judaism

In Judaism, time comes to us like"formless" materials, foritisneither gathered to the present nor assimilated into our being, but immediately presses down our being withitsmaterialqualities, e.g.,smells and noises,heats and colds, etc., just as formless materials, e.g., winds and clouds, immediately press down our being with their formless qualities,

e.g.,"thickness, coarseness, massivity, wretchedness."[282] The Judaic time, Levinas labels

diachrony, or lapse of time, in that what presses us down with its formless qualities, such as

smells and noises, is a fleeting datum, which never remains inthe present, but only "bypasses"

the presentand irrevocably elapses to the past.[283]According to Levinas, diachronyor lapse of

timedisturbs the present because, while bypassing the present, the fleeting diachrony leaves its

"trace" in the present and defeats the present with the very trace it leaves in the present.[284]   In

other words, diachrony disturbs the present not by using violence, butby bypassing the present

and leaving a trace in the present at the very moment of bypassing the present. Here, the trace,

with which diachrony disturbs the present, refers to what never remains in the present but

disturbs the latter; "This way of passing, disturbing the present…, is what we have called a

trace."[285] The Judaicdiachronyis higher than the present because what disturbs the present not

withviolence, but only by bypassing the present without entering it, already signals its height in

relation to the present.

The story of the shewbread in the Hebrew Bible (Exodus 25: 23-30) reflects the

Judaic diachrony higher than the present. In the text, the shewbread is supposed to remain on the

table all times before God. In the Jewish tradition, the shewbread, which means the "bread of

faces" in Hebrew, symbolizes "the face of God," which looks at people and feeds them (v.

30).[286]On the other hand, the table, on which the shewbreadremains all times before God,

symbolizes "the king" or "political power," whose obligation is to feed people.[287]According to

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[282]Levinas, *Existence and Existents*, 51.
[283] Levinas, *Otherwise Than Being*, 11.
[284] Levinas, *Otherwise Than Being*, 12.
[285] Levinas, *Otherwise Than Being*, 100.
[286] Levinas, *Beyond the Verse*, trans. Gary D. Mole (Indiana: University Press Bloomington and Indianapolis), 19.
[287] Levinas, *Beyond the Verse*, 18.

the Jewish tradition, in order that the shewbread may remain all times before God, the old bread must be replaced with new one. In this replacement, three tables are required: one of "marble" at the door where the fresh bread is prepared, and one of "gold" where the old bread is paced, which has just been taken away from "the table of gold" located inside the sanctuary.[288]Put in detail, the new bread, which is prepared on the table of marble, must be raised on the table of gold to remain before God, while the old bread, which has remained on the table of gold before God, must be raised on the table of gold to be replaced with the new one. Here it must be noted that, in Judaism, what is exalted is not something present, but what is past, because, while the fresh bread is laid on the table of marble, and then, raised on the table of gold to remain before God, the old bread, which has remained on the table of gold before God, must be raised on the table of gold to be replaced with the new one. The biblical story on the shewbread reflects the height of the Judaic diachronybecause, in Judaism, what israised from the table of gold to the table of gold is not the new bread, but the old bread, drawing our attention to "an ageing value."[289]

The diachronic height in Judaismis the place forwhat Levinas calls the other or the beyond beingbecause what disturbs the present only bypassingit, without entering it, is absolutely unthinkable that it would be neither understood nor assimilated into our being, but entirely "exceeds" the sphere of our being and its understanding.[290] The Judaic notion ofthe other or the beyond being can beidentified in the West as well. The Platonic "Good," for instance,belongs to the other, forit finally designate what goes beyondthe sphere of our being and

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[288] Levinas, *Beyond the Verse*, 20.
[289] Levinas, *Beyond the Verse*, 20.
[290] Levinas, *Otherwise Than Being*, 51.

its understanding.[291]   Levinas introduces two types of the other in Judaism: the feminine and the absolute.   The feminine other begins from dwelling because dwelling presupposes the feminine welcome irreducible to being.   The absolute other begins from consciousness because consciousness also contains what goes beyond the sphere of being.

1.   The Feminine Other

In Judaism, theworld, in which we dwell, comes to us without "forms," forit lives with its material contents, such as earth, sky, sea, etc., which would be neither offered to vision in a spacenor disclosed into forms, but immediately weigh down us without the medium of forms.[292]   The formless world, Levinas labels "elemental" in that to be formless is to be divested of all the outward coverings and remain in a basic state of being.[293]   The elemental world characterizes itself "non-possessable" becausewhat remains ina basic state of being, e.g., air and dust,breaks through all the restrictions and possessions and endlessly"extends" itself to the "*there is*" absolutely exterior to possession.[294]The Hebrew Bible attributes the non-possessable world to God: "… the land is mine, because you are but strangers…" (Leviticus 25: 23).   The non-possessable worldis supposed to possessus because, while dwelling in the world, we are already immersed in the world and"live from"its contents, not vice versa.[295]   The supposition, however, has been reversed becausewhat is immersed in the worldalreadygets "a foothold" in the world and takesupthe material contents of the world for living.[296]

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[291] Levinas, *Otherwise Than Being*, 19.
[292] Levinas, *Totality and Infinity,* 131.
[293] Levinas, *Totality and Infinity,* 131.
[294] Levinas, *Totality and Infinity,* 131, 142.
[295] Levinas, *Totality and Infinity,* 110.
[296] Levinas, *Totality and Infinity,* 131.

Thepossession of the worldpresupposes human identity as a corporealbody because to possess the material contents of the world presupposes to remain as a corporeal body and "enjoy" the material worldby touching, smelling, tasting the material qualities of the world.[297]From the corporeal bodycomes the idea of vision because only after putting a "foot" on the world and standing firm as a corporeal bodyon earth can we take a vision and see the world as the object of understanding.[298] In other words, in Judaism, the corporeal body is prior to vision because vision comes from the corporeal body, not vice versa. Human identity as a corporeal body calls for someone who offers "the primary hospitable welcome" because to enjoy the material worldas a corporeal body is to be welcomedby someone and attended with food and shelter.[299] The one who offers the primary hospitable welcome, Levinas attributes to "woman" in that it is woman who stays at home and greets uswith food and shelter.[300]In Judaism,woman at home is the vey condition for man's peace because, without the feminine welcome at home, there would be no "joy," no "blessing," no "good," for man.[301]Proverbs 31 describes the woman as "the home of men."[302] The "Sabbath," the day of rest in Judaism, and the "*sheckhinah*," God's dwelling place, also reflectthe feminine welcome at home.[303]

Derridasuggests the feminine welcome as a solution to the Kantian peace. For Kant, natural peace is impossible in the world because, by nature, we are not "in a state of peace," but "in a state of war."[304] The natural hostility in the world leads Kant to insist that astate of peace

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[297] Levinas, *Totality and Infinity,* 137.
[298] Levinas, *Totality and Infinity,* 128.
[299] Levinas, *Totality and Infinity,* 155.
[300] Levinas, *Totality and Infinity,* 155.
[301] Levinas, *Difficult Freedom: Essays on Judaism*, 33, 34.
[302] Levinas, *Nine Talmudic Readings,* trans. Annette Aronowicz (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1990), 169.
[303] Levinas, *Difficult Freedom: Essays on Judaism*, 37.
[304]Kant,*Toward Perpetual Peace and Other Writings on Politics, Peace, and History*, ed. Pauline Kleingeld, trans. David L Colclasure (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2006), 72.

must be instituted based onsome "principles of the *freedom* of the members of a society" because,

before establishing the institutional peace, there would be no peace in the world.[305] Derrida

opposes the Kantian or institutionalpeace in that what is situated on some principles still bears

the natural hostility that it can be reserved only by the "threat" of violence.[306] As a solution to

the Kantian peace, Derrida suggests the Judaic ideal of thefeminine welcome in that, in Judaism,

we are already indebted to the "absolute precedence" of the feminine welcome before we

establish the Kantian or institutional peace.[307]

Then the question is how to interpret the gender metaphors, such as woman at home

and man's peace, in the Levinasian texts. Of course, they should not be read literally because

Levinas adopts the metaphors not to designate gender roles, but to demonstrate the feminine

exteriority to the masculine. In the Levinasian texts, woman at home is gender-inclusive because,

if woman at home represents the one who offers the hospitable welcome to the male stranger,

then, the feminine welcome can be attributed not only to woman but also to man who is willing

to offer the hospitable welcome at home to the stranger. So is man's peace at the feminine home

because, if man represents the stranger who entertains the feminine hospitality at home, then, the

masculine peacecan be attributed not only to man but also to woman who is given home to dwell.

Then, why Levinasadopts such gender metaphors, if they are gender-inclusive. This is

becausewe are not only masculine but also feminine. In the Levinasian texts, the place, in which

man entertains the feminine hospitality, belongs not to man but to woman. The Bible describes

the feminine ownership to the place; e.g.,the city of God, orJerusalem, is referred to asthe

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[305]Kant,*Toward Perpetual Peace and Other Writings on Politics, Peace, and History*,74.
[306]Derrida, *Adieu to Emmanuel Levinas*, trans. Pascale-Anne Brault and Michael Naas (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1999), 89.
[307]Derrida, *Adieu to Emmanuel Levinas*, 43.

feminine (Psalm 46: 4-5). The feminine ownership to the place calls for the Judaic idea of the other or God because the place with its formless qualities would beneither offered to vision in a space nor gathered up into being, but entirely exceeds the sphere of being. The exteriority of thefeminine ownership in the Levinasian texts signals that, for Levinas, the feminine refers to something irreducible to the masculine because, while attributing the feminineownership to the other or God, Levinas inevitably relegates the masculine residence to somethingsecondary to the feminine ownership. In other words, in the Levinasian texts, the feminine serves not as the counterpart to the masculine, but as what isirreducibleto the masculine counterpart, due to the exteriority of the feminine ownership prior to the masculine residence.

The feminine ownership irreducible to the masculine residence does not necessarilyundermine the gender equality because the feminine owner who opens hometo the masculine stranger signals her suffering and vulnerability, while the masculine resident who entertains the feminine hospitality signals his glory and majesty. Nor does the masculine glory at the feminine homeundermine the gender equality because the masculine glory is already indebted to the feminine suffering. The gender equality in the Levinasian texts introduces human identity as masculine and as feminine because we are not only masculine but also feminine at once. We are masculine because, while dwelling at the feminine home, we alreadytake up the feminine home into our possession and become the masculine or secondary owner. The masculine or secondary ownership to the feminine home gives rise to human identity as feminine because, as the masculine owner to the feminine home, we are already "indebted" to the feminine welcome that we try to pay the debt by opening the door,and then,

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offering our feminine welcome to the stranger.[308] In other words, in the Levinasian texts, we are

masculine and feminine at once not because we are confused with our gender identity, but

because, as the masculine owner to the feminine home, we overcome the limit of the masculine

ownership and become ruptured into the one who offers the feminine hospitality to the stranger.

Human identity as masculine and as feminine makes it arguable that, at the end of the world,

there will be no gender "differences" because, as time passes, we accept the limit of the

masculine or secondary ownershipto our home and open our home to offerthe femininewelcome

to the stranger.[309]

       The feminine exteriority irreducible to the masculine, however, has been stripped of

its exteriority and reduced to the feminine sexuality that must be controlled by the

patriarchalauthority because, in the patriarchal society, without controlling the feminine sexuality,

there would be no peace, no harmony, but only violence and warsamong men fighting for the

feminine sexuality. In the Levinasian texts, women appear more vulnerable than men, for they

are born with the biological sufferings, such as menstrual bleeding and childbearing. The

vulnerability of the feminine body is good and bad at once for the community. It is good

because, while suffering from the bodily vulnerability, women becomemore responsive to others'

suffering than their male partners. It is bad as well because the feminine body, in its beauty and

tenderness, is so tempting to men that it causes violence among men. In other words, the

feminine sexuality is bad not because it is violent by nature, but because of its beauty and

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[308] Levinas, *Is It Righteous to Be*, 192.
[309] Levinas, *Difficult Freedom: Essays on Judaism*, 35.

desirabilityto men. Girard also talks about the danger of the feminine sexuality when he sees the feminine sexuality as the very cause to "mimetic rivalries" among men.[310]

According to Girard, the danger of the feminine sexualitycalls for the prohibition of "women"inside the community because the community tries to overcome the sexual rivalries among the male membersby prohibiting women from any sexual relationship with the male members who were born to the community.[311] Theinternal prohibition of women leads itself to the "matrimonial exchange" of women among the tribes because, while prohibiting women from any sexual relationship inside the community, the tribeshave no choice other than to give and take the female members in the form of marriage exchangein order thatthey may provide the male members with women for the family life.[312]The marriage exchangegives rise to the confinement of womanat home because the tribes have to keep thefemale members at home in order that the female members may be given and taken in the form of marriage exchange without being contaminated by any sexual relationship inside the community.

The confinement of the feminine sexualityat home is commonto every traditionalor male-dominant society because, in a male-dominant society, without keeping the community from the sexual rivalries among men, there would be no peace not only for men but also for women. For example, the Chinese language, 安(peace in English), which consists of 宀(house) +女 (woman), reflects the patriarchal effortto control the feminine sexuality. In Korean, it is said that wife at home is the key to husband's success. Of course, no civil society tries to control the feminine sexuality based onsuch patriarchal measures against women as prohibitions and the tribal

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[310] Girard, *Things Hidden Since the Foundation of the World*, 76.
[311] Girard, *Things Hidden Since the Foundation of the World*, 74.
[312] Girard, *Things Hidden Since the Foundation of the World*, 75.

exchange. But it must be alsoadded that suchpatriarchal measures against women are nothing

butthe counterevidence for the feminine exteriority to the masculine because, if the feminine

sexuality were something possessable tothe masculine, there would not have been such

patriarchal measures against women.

According to Levinas, eroticlove is the most powerful sceneto illustratethe feminine

sexuality non-possessable tothe masculine. In a sexual relationship, none of the couple submit

themselves to possession because the relationship happens not in theilluminated space, where the

couple can be stripped of their material density and gathered up to each other's possession.

Instead, the couple remain in "the very plurality"as they are because the relationship happens in a

bodily caress,where the couple are divested of all the outward coverings and directlyexposed to

each other's nakedness, endlessly searching for each other's formlesspresence but only

recognizing themselves as perfect equals non-possessable to anyone of the couple.[313]The erotic

love is the solution to the terror of "the sacred" becausethe bodilycaress would be neither offered

to vision in a spacenor disclosed into thesacred, but break up all the sacred by bypassing the

present, in which the phenomenal sacred is provoked by vision.[314]

Thecreation story (Genesis 3) reflectsthe feminine sexuality non-possessable to the

masculine. In the text, woman is unique in her origin because, while man and other creatures are

formed from dust, woman is directly ruptured from man. The uniqueness of the feminine

originexplains why, despite her rupture from man, woman remains non-possessable to man and

declared to beequal by man. Therefore, when the couple become one flesh, they do sonot as part,

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[313] Levinas, *Totality and Infinity,* 277.
[314] Levinas, *Totality and Infinity,* 269.

but as "two totalities."[315] The creation story confirms human identity as masculine and feminine at once because man is created first, and then, woman"from man."[316]The relationship between the two totalities leads itself to a "society" because the couple remain as plural as they are and form a society of equals.[317]Thesocietyofequals, though,cannot be universalbecause therelationship is so intimate that it unknowingly excludes "the third party" from dialogue.[318]

The feminine otherin Judaismremains immemorial to usbecausenoneof us remembers the woman who has granted us home to dwell. The forgottenother leads us to "guilt without fault" because, while dwelling at the feminine home, we are unwittingly indebted to the woman that it is too late to pay the debt for the woman.[319]The involuntaryguilt without fault is prior to the Heideggerian guilt because we are already guilty of being late to pay the debt forthe woman before we lose ourselves and feel guilty offalling. The involuntary guiltin Judaism, Levinas compares to "a thief" in that, just as a thief slips into a house before the owner recognizes him/her, so does the involuntary guilt intoconsciousness.[320]The city of refuge in the Hebrew Bible (Numbers 35: 6-34) reflectsthe involuntary guilt prior to consciousness. In the text, God orders Moses to set up the city of refuge for the involuntary murdererto be protectedfrom being avenged. The refuge also aims to punishthe involuntary murdererbecause the involuntary murdereris not a criminal, but stillguilty of "negligence."[321]

The guilt of negligence explains why the refuge is given to the involuntary murderernot permanently, but only temporarily, i.e., until the death of the high priest in his/her time (vs.28).

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[315] Levinas, *Difficult Freedom: Essays on Judaism*, 35.
[316] Levinas, *Difficult Freedom: Essays on Judaism*, 34.
[317] Levinas, *Totality and Infinity,* 265.
[318] Levinas, *Totality and Infinity,* 265.
[319] Levinas, *Is It Righteous to Be*, 52.
[320] Levinas, *Otherwise Than Being*, 13.
[321] Levinas, *Beyond the Verse*, 39.

According to Levinas, the temporary refuge in the Bible blurs the distinction between the voluntary and involuntary guilt because the involuntary killer is not completely forgiven, but remains in"half-innocence" and "half-guilt."[322] The ambiguity between the voluntary and involuntary guiltmakes it arguable that a refuge must be prepared for everybody because nobody is "awake enough" to escape the guilt of negligence that everybody requires a refuge.[323]The city of refuge, Levians labels "the city of a civilization" in that it originates from the awareness ofthe involuntary guilt prior to consciousness.[324]

Theinvoluntary guilt prior to consciousnessgives rise to the rupture of being into its "fecundity,"into its "goodness," because, while suffering from the involuntaryguilt for the feminine welcome, we try to compensate the guilt by opening home and offeringthe hospitable welcome to the stranger.[325]The fecundity or goodness ruptured from being, Levinas attributes to "paternity" in that it is the father, who has suffered from the involuntary guilt and breaks intohis fecundity, his child, his goodness,prior to his guilty being and its consciousness.[326]The paternal fecundity is also gender-inclusivebecause, if the father is the one, whose guilty being produces his goodness, then the father's fecundity can be attributed not only to the father but also to anyone,whose guilty being breaks into one's goodness.

The paternal fecundityin Judaism is not a pride but a burdenbecause the child, as the fecundity of the father, would be neither offered to vision in a space nor assimilated into the father's glory, but remains as "a stranger," who demands welcome and hospitalityto the

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[322] Levinas, *Beyond the Verse*, 40.
[323] Levinas, *Beyond the Verse*, 39.
[324] Levinas, *Beyond the Verse*, 51.
[325] Levinas, *Totality and Infinity,* 269.
[326] Levinas, *Totality and Infinity,* 267.

father.[327]The child as a stranger brings "pluralism"to the family because the child comes to the couple as the third partyand breaks up the intimate couple.[328] From the family pluralism comesthe Jewish idea of fraternity because the child, as the third party, is so "unique" that both the father and the son count themselves as equals.[329] In other words, in Judaism, human fraternity lies not in the horizontal relationship between biological brothers,e.g., Cain and Abel, but in the vertical relationship between the father and the son. Thevertical fraternity between the father and the son is the very place for the Jewishidea of "monotheism," the idea of One God, who, in his/her "goodness," regards his/her people as "children," because, while counting themselves as equals, the father and the sonsee themselves as the children of God.[330] The Jewish monotheism, Levinas labels "humanism" in that it originates from human fraternity inside the family.[331]As humanism, the Jewish monotheism challenges the Christian doctrine of the Son of God because, in Judaism, not only Jesus but also anyone with one's involuntary guiltcan be ruptured into one's goodness and become a child of God.

The monotheistic family leads itself to "a universal society"because every members of the familyis counted as a child of God that nobody would be excluded fromdialogue.[332]For Levinas, dialogue inside the monotheistic familydoes not need the verbal "eloquence" because the verbal eloquence is too "beautiful,"too majesty, that it arouses the numinous feelings for the sacred and entices the fraternal community to give up the social discourse and choose a solitary

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[327] Levinas, *Totality and Infinity,* 267.
[328] Levinas, *Totality and Infinity,* 302.
[329] Levinas, *Totality and Infinity,* 279.
[330] Levinas, *Difficult Freedom: Essays on Judaism*, 143.
[331] Levinas, *Difficult Freedom: Essays on Judaism*, 275.
[332] Levinas, *Unforeseen History*, 120.

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life for the sacred.[333] Instead, it requires "everyday parlance" because even a daily blessing signalsthe antecedence of good over evil andinitiates dialogue among strangers.[334] The everyday dialogue in Judaism is irreducible to the Buberian dialoguebecause, while the Buberian dialogue is available only between intimate equals, the everyday dialogue in Judaism is available among strangers, who break up the intimate equals.

The father-son relationship in Judaism is not limited to the present, but extends itself to the "future" because the sonsurvives the father's death and openshis own future.[335]In other words, in Judaism, the idea of future begins not from the father's being, but from his fecundity, his son, the complete stranger to the father' being. The Judaic futureis so solid that it will never cease to exist, for it is opened not by the father whoceases to exist with death, but by the "recommencement" of the son's "absolute youth," whose son will open a new future after his death, and so on.[336] The solid and infinite future in Judaism proceeds not in series but in a"discontinuous" mode, for it occasionallyruptures from the recommencement of theson's absolute youth.[337] The discontinuousfuturein Judaism is prior to the Husserlian counterpart because, in Judaism, we already dwell with the feminine other and conceive a son, a new future, before we derive the idea of future from the Husserlian fantasy.

Based on the previous analysis, we see the feminine welcome as a precondition for the masculine fecundity because, only after entertaining the feminine welcome, man is ruptured into his fecundity and formsa universal society, in which everyone is counted as a child of God and participates in dialogue as equals. The feminine exteriority, however,is stripped of its exteriority

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[333] Levinas, *Outside the Subject*, 140.
[334] Levinas, *Outside the Subject*, 139.
[335] Levinas, *Totality and Infinity,* 267.
[336] Levinas, *Totality and Infinity,* 282.
[337] Levinas, *Totality and Infinity,* 284.

and interpreted in terms ofgender rolessubmissive to the masculine fecundity simply because the

critics fail to know the Judaic diachrony, upon which Levinas comes up with his theory of the

feminine welcome prior to the masculine fecundity. For example, Eric R. Severson fails to know

the diachronic foundation of the Levinasian texts andresults in his invalidview on the latter.

According to Severson, the Levinasian diachrony never accomplishes the moral responsibility

because, if time is diachronic, there would be no common ground, upon which the community

gather themselves in peace and step into "the fair balancing of responsibility."[338]

Therefore, the *Otherwise than Being*, in which Levinas deals with his theory of

diachrony,is not only "a dizzying book to read"but also "gibberish and nonsense" because, in the

Otherwise than Being,Levinas provides no common ground for the moral responsibility, but

simply moves back and forth to various issues without any structure to organize the various

issues.[339]As a solution to the Levinasian theory of diachrony, Severson suggests synchrony as the

moral groundin that only "some universal and synchronized history" providesrules to bringthe

unity inside the community and allows us to step into the moral responsibility.[340]Based on his

synchronic view on the moralobligation, Seversonreads the Levinasian adoption of gender

metaphors in terms of sexismin that, while adopting the gender metaphors, such as woman at

home and the paternal fecundity,Levinas confines womanto her domestic and biological roles

"supportive"of the father's fecundity to bring the son.[341]

Here is our response to Severson's critique on the Levinasian texts. First, if synchrony is

the moral ground for the unity of the community, as Severson says, then how to listen to the third

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[338] Eric R. Severson, "The Missing Sequel Levinas and Heidegger's Unfinished Project," in *Levinas Studies*, Volume 9, 2014, 141.
[339] Severson, "The Missing Sequel Levinas and Heidegger's Unfinished Project," 140, 142.
[340] Severson, "The Missing Sequel Levinas and Heidegger's Unfinished Project," 141.
[341] Severson, "The Missing Sequel Levinas and Heidegger's Unfinished Project," 139.

party, who is excluded from the synchronic time, because, in the synchronic time, only those, who directly communicate each other and share the face to face dialogue, can be heard. Second, Severson's choice of synchrony as the moral ground is violence against the otherbecause, while pursuing synchrony as the moral ground, Severson has to justify the synchronic values, such as "synchrony" and "symmetry," at the cost of the diachronic values, such as theinvoluntary guilt for the feminine welcome, irreducible the synchronic values.[342]Third, the Levinasian adoption of gender metaphors should not be read in terms of sexism becauseLevinas adopts the metaphorsnot to reduce the feminine to something submissive tothe masculine, but to argue that the feminine welcome is the final destiny of man. In the Levinasian texts, the feminine welcome is the final destiny of man because, after being ruptured into his fecundity, man tries to repay the involuntary guilt for the feminine welcome by openingthe doorto the stranger, just as woman did to him when he was wandering without home.

Finally, Severson's critique onthe *Otherwise than Being*simply signals his limited understanding on the *Otherwise than Being*. Seversontries his best to understand the Levinasian idea of diachrony when he deals with the Levinasian terminologies, such as diachrony, the other, the face, proximity, alterity, immemorial time, etc. However, it is indisputable that Severson fails torecognizethe revelatory power in diachrony because, in his dealing with the Levinasian terminologies, Severson never understand the Levinasian idea of diachrony in terms of its power to reveal the limit of synchrony until we give up the synchronic values and bear the ethical responsibility for the other in diachrony. As a result, Severson inevitablyreducesthe *Otherwise than Being* to something dizzy, gibberish, nonsense because, without knowing the Levinasian

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[342] Severson, "The Missing Sequel Levinas and Heidegger's Unfinished Project," 142.

diachrony which reveals the limit of synchrony, Severson cannot but confound the Levinasian

diachrony with the Western synchrony and finally distorts the *Otherwise than Being*, which is

established on diachrony and its revelation, upon which we give up synchrony and bear the

ethical burden for the other in diachrony.[343]Therefore, it is not Levinas but Severson himself, who

must be blamed, because Severson fails to know the diachronic foundation of the *Otherwise than*

Being and results in his invalid view on the latter.

Simon Critchleyis another critic who fails to knowthe diachronic foundation of the

Levinasian texts and results in his invalid view on the latter. Critchleyaccuses the Levinastexts

for being "androcentric" in that, while supporting the Judaic ideals, such as family, fraternity,

monotheism,etc., Levinasexcludes the feminine and exclusively advocates thefather-son

relationship.[344]However, the accusation is invalidagain because Levinas adoptsthe father-son

relationshipnot to exclude the feminine, but to support the father's feminine role, such as his

fecundity, hisgoodness, his hospitality to the stranger, etc. The invalid view on the Levinasian

texts is not an accidentbecause, while accusing the Levinasian texts, Critchley does not mention,

let alone understands, the Judaic diachrony, upon which Levinas supports the male fecundity.

Based on his critique of the Levinasian texts supportive of the Judaic ideals, Critchley

imposesnon-Jewish ideals, which he characterizes as "nonfraternalistic, nonmonotheistic,

nonandrocentric, nonfilial, nonfamilial," etc., on the Judaic ideals because, while accusing the

Levinasian textssupportive of the Judaic ideals, Critchley has no option other than to impose his

non-Jewish idealson the Judaic ideals supported by the Levinasian texts.[345] Critchley is so

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[343] Read Severson, "The Missing Sequel Levinas and Heidegger's Unfinished Project," 140-142.
[344]Simon Critchley, "Five Problems in Levinas's view on Politics and the Sketch of a Solution of them," in *Political Theory*, 32-3, 2004, 174.
[345]Critchley, "Five Problems in Levinas's view on Politics and the Sketch of a Solution of them," 177.

enthusiastic about his non-Jewish ideals that he cannot hide his hostility against his opponent.

For example, while opposing the Jewish ideal of family in the Levinasian texts, Critchley draws his attention to the family "wrangling," which refers to a property dispute, which happened inside Levinas' family after his death.[346] The way in which Critchley deals with the Levinasian texts is another strategy to gather up the self-satisfaction because, while imposing his non-Jewish ideals on the Judaic ideals supported by the Levinasian texts, the critic already gathers up his self-sufficiency at the cost of others' suffering. The critics' invalid view on the Levinasian texts confirms the parallelism between Girard and Levinas because, just as Girard is stripped of his diachronic foundation and misunderstood by the critics, so is Levinas.

2. The Infinite Other

The image, which we create in the world, requires vision because it is vision that clears the world of its material messes and clothes it with glaring images. The glaring images call for idolatry because what is cleared of its material messes and clothed with the glaring images appears so charming and tempting that it can be stuffed with non-deteriorating matters, such as marbles and bronzes, and converted into idols that have a mouth, eyes, and ears, but are dumb, blind, and deaf. The idolization of the glaring images has nothing to do with the real world because, while idolizing the glaring images, we already strip the world of its material messes, e.g., smells and noises, which can be intelligible by smelling, tasting, touching, etc., and make the intelligible world senseless idols. Girard also knows the idolization of the glaring images when he talks about the dazzling illusion on the victim because the one who is subjected to the dazzling illusion cannot be the real victim who lives with his/her material messes, such flesh and

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[346]Critchley, "Five Problems in Levinas's view on Politics and the Sketch of a Solution of them," 176.

bones, but his/her glaring image that can be stuffed into the senseless idols.Levinas distinguishes

imagefrom concept. ForLevinas, concept contains "a living relationship"with a real object, for it

designates"the object*grasped*," "the intelligible object."[347]As theintelligible object, concept

differs from image because, while image strips the real objectof its intelligibility and makes

itsenseless idols, concept still contains a living relationshipwith the real object, without losing

the intelligibility of the object.

According to Levinas,there is a possibility thatthe other can beaffected byvision in a

space and disclosed into his/her "visage" when he/she appears the material surface, such as

mirrors and windows.[348] But it is impossible to crystallize the otherinto theplastic visage because

he/she is the one who"breaks through"his/her visage as soon as it appears on the material surface.

The way, in which the other breaks through his/her visage, is not with his/her glaring presence,

but with his/her bodily "immediacy" or "straightforwardness" because the way in which he/she

walks, eats, sleeps, etc., is so immediate, so straightforward, that it would be neither affected by

vision in a space nor disclosed into his/her glaring presence, but entirely overflows the glaring

presence affected by vision.[349] The bodily immediacy, with which the other effacesthe

plasticvisage, Levinas labels "the face of the other," meaning that, for Levinas, the face includes

not only the bodily part made of eyes, a nose, a mouth, etc., but also a totality of bodily

expressions, such as walking, eating, sleeping, etc.[350] In other words, Levinas adopts the word

"face" not to express the other's visual imagewhich appears charming or ugly, but to express

his/her bodily immediacy, which breaks through all the charming or uglyimages.

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[347] Levinas, *Collected Philosophical Papers*, 3.
[348] Levinas, *Basic Philosophical Writings*, 53.
[349] Levinas, *Otherwise Than Being*,91.
[350] Levinas, *Totality and Infinity*, 50

The face as thebodily immediacy of the otheris so poor that it presents itself as "aging," as "nudity," evenas "skin with wrinkles," because to remain as the face, i.e., to remain as the bodily immediacy, is to remain withoutoutward coverings, i.e.,to remain without outward splendor and glory.[351] The nudity of the faceis the very condition, in which the other appeals to"peace"by demanding us not to kill (Exodus 20: 13),because what remains in nudity withoutoutward coveringsappears sobrazen, so straightforward, that it"resists" our being and stirs up"the temptation to kill" inside us.[352] The facial nudity, with which the other appeals to peace, leads Judaism to prefer "the expression of the face" to the "dogmatic tale" of the sacred origin because, before the facial nudity prior to the dogmatic tale of the sacred origin, we inevitably give up the dogmatic tale of the sacred originand directly respond to the expression of the faceprior to the latter.[353] The Judaic preference of dialogueover dogmas explains why the Hebrew Bible concerns not so much about the glaringknowledge asabout "apologues" and "parables" dealing with human relationships and dialogue.[354]According to Levinas, the facial demand for peace justifies human right to "existence," human right to "live," because, no matter how wretchedand miserable we are in our outward coverings, we can speak by the face and make an appeal to peace.[355]

On the other hand, the temptation to kill, which is stirred up by the face, does not necessarily end up to killing becausethe face in resistance toour beingalready signals its height,

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[351] Levinas, *Otherwise Than Being*, 88.
[352] Levinas, *Basic Philosophical Writings*, 167; Levinas, *Collected Philosophical Papers*, 19.
[353] Levinas,*Ethics and Infinity: Conversations with Philippe Nemo*, trans. Richard A. Cohen (Pittsburgh: Duquesne Universerity Press, 1985), 117.
[354] Levinas, *Outside the Subject*, 130.
[355]Levinas, "Being Jewish," in*Continental Philosophy Review*, 2007, 205.

its "transcendence,"in relation toour being and its temptation to kill.[356]The height of the face gives rise to "the welcome of the face" because, before the face higher than our being, we give up ourbeing and welcome the face irreducible to ourbeing.[357]The welcome of the face does not exhaust human freedom of choice because the face with its height is impossible to interfere with human freedom that it always remains "asymmetrical" in relation to human freedom to choose, either the face or being.[358]Noritgoes againstreason because reason also works only when it accepts the limit of being and welcomes thefacehigher than being; "*In the welcoming of the face the will opens to reason*."[359]

As a reasonable choice,the welcome of the face isso exceptional that it gives rise to the "goodness" of the subject because we give up what is desirable to our being and welcomewhat is undesirable to our being.[360] Thegoodness of the subjectbecomes the subjectivity of the subject because, while welcoming the nudity of the face, we are freed from the "ennui" of the same being and ruptured into what is unique and irreplaceable.[361]Thesubjectivityof the subject, Levinas labels "the other in the same"in that it is identified in the same, but contains what is more than the same.[362] Here, the Levinasian idea, the other in the same comes from the Latin word "*ideatum*,"which means"the more in the less," or"the infinite in the finite."[363]For example, thePlatonic Good belongs to*ideatum*, forit containsthe more in the less, or the infinite in the finite. So does Hanukkah, the eight-day festival in Judaism. According to a Talmudic text, around 150s

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[356] Levinas, *Totality and Infinity,* 199.
[357] Levinas, *Totality and Infinity,* 197.
[358] Levinas, *Totality and Infinity,* 216.
[359] Levinas, *Totality and Infinity,* 219.
[360] Levinas, *Totality and Infinity,* 200.
[361]Levinas, *Otherwise Than Being*, 124.
[362] Levinas, *Otherwise Than Being*, 25.
[363] Levinas, *Totality and Infinity,* 50.

BC when the Maccabees expelled the Greeks from Judea, they found a small amount of oil in the Temple. The oil was enough to burn only for one-day, but lasted for eight days. The eight-day-burning of the oil leads Judaism to celebrate Hanukkah, for itwas "the miracle" of the more from the less.[364]

As the subjectivity of the subject, the other in the same is the "Master"in the same because the one, who has been ruptured into what is unique and irreplaceable,commands us to overcome the ennui of the same and to be the "master" of ourselvesin order that we may stand firm on earth as a corporeal body and return to our sensitivityirreducible to the same.[365]The Master in the same, Levinas labels "the Other"or"the absolutely other," in that the one, whocommands us inside us, would be neither conceived nor absorbed into being, but entirely overflows the sphere of our being and itsconsciousness.[366] The absolute other or the Otheridentified inside consciousness differs from the feminine other identifiedin dwelling because, while dwelling in the world, we take up ourplace and its material contents into possession, but there is no way to take up into possession what surpassesthe power of our being and itsconsciousness.

The story of the divine epiphany (Exodus 33: 17-23) introduces the face of the biblical other or God irreducible to images. In the text, Moses encounters God asa passing by (vs. 22) because the biblical other or God in diachrony cannot enter the face to face relationship to Moses that he/she simply bypasses Moses. The divine passing-by is the face of God because to be a passing-by is to be immediate, to be straightforward, the very characteristic of the face. The face of Godeffacesthe idolatrous images because, while bypassing Moses, God leaves a trace in

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[364] Levinas, *Difficult Freedom: Essays on Judaism*, 229.
[365] Levinas, *Totality and Infinity,* 213.
[366] Levinas, *Totality and Infinity,*39.

Moses and breaks all the idolatrous images created by thevision of Moses; "God…, effaces all phenomena."[367]The biblical rejection of the idolatrous images explains why there is "no icon, no oracle, no god, no image," but only the two tablets in the ark (2 Chronicles 5: 10).[368] It also explains Moses' destruction of the first tablets "in response to" the idolatry (Exodus 32: 19).[369] The loss of the first tablets leads the Hebrew Bible to begin with the second letter of the aleph-bet (alphabet), while the Talmud "has no first page."[370]Besides, the second tablets carved by Moses are now "lost," signaling that we have no direct access to God's epiphany, which Moses encountered at Sinai, but only the written text as a trace of trace of God's epiphany.[371] The divine epiphany by the face teaches us the ethic of "forgiveness" because, while effacing allthe idolatrous images by the face, the biblical other or God also effaces the memories inspired by the images, which is indispensable for forgiving.[372] The biblical ethic of forgiving is impossible in the Western philosophy because, in the Western philosophy, all the memories are gathered by consciousness and disclosed into the sacred that must be appeased by another sacred.

The biblical teaching by the face is prior to the Kantian teaching by reason. In Kant, reason teaches us that happiness is available not to everybody, but only to those who are "worthy of happiness."[373] The Kantian teaching leads us to a moral question of what we oughtto do, if we wantto be worthy of happiness. From the moral question comes the idea of God because reason

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[367] Robert Gibbs, "Enigmatic Authority: Levinas and the Phenomenal Effacement," *Modern Theology* 16 (2000): 330.
[368] Richard A. Cohen, introduction to *New Talmudic Readings,* by Emmanuel Levinas, trans. Richard A. Cohen (Duquesne Univ. Press, 1999), 6.
[369] Cohen, introduction to *New Talmudic Readings,* 8.
[370] Cohen, introduction to *New Talmudic Readings,* 8.
[371] Gibbs, "Enigmatic Authority: Levinas and the Phenomenal Effacement," 333.
[372] Ruud Welten, "Image and Oblivion: Emmanuel Levinas' Phenomenological Iconoclasm,"*Literature & Theology* 19 (2005): 65.
[373] Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, 737.

advises us to behave, "as if God existed," if we want to be worthy of happiness.[374] The Kantian

teaching by reason gives way to the biblical teaching by the face because the biblical God

already effaces the rational teaching by the face before we are advised by reason and behave, as

if God existed, in order that we may deservehappiness.

B. The Ethic of Self-Denuding in Judaism

Theabsolute other in the same "obsesses" us because the one, who livesinside us but

exceeds our being, approaches usso urgently, so immediately without the medium of vision, that

we have no time to gather up our being at the cost of the other; "Extreme urgency is the modality

of obsession."[375]The urgency or immediacy, with which the other obsesses us, Levinas labels

"proximity,"which means closeness closer to us than our own being, in that nothing is closer to

us than the other who approaches usbefore we gather up our being.[376] Levinas takes formless

materials to illustrate the urgency or proximity of the other in that, just as formless materials

obsess us with proximity, so does the other. For instance, a piece of "bread" obsesses us with its

proximity because the bread with its material immediacy approaches us so urgentlythat we have

no time to gather up our being at the cost of the bread, i.e., by projecting our vision on the bread

and absorbing the phenomenal knowledgeof the bread into our being.[377]It is indisputable that the

Levinasian term "proximity" has owed to Heidegger because Heidegger already adopts similar

expressions,such as "'proximal'" and "proximally," to describe the nearness of the entities that

are encountered "as closest"to us, closer than ourindividual *Dasein*.[378]

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374 Levinas, *God, Death, and Time*, 65.
375 Levinas, *Otherwise Than Being*, 88.
376 Levinas, *Otherwise Than Being*, 74.
377 Levinas, *Otherwise Than Being*, 74.
378Heidegger, *Being in Time*, 95, 96.

According to Heidegger, the world is closest to us, closer than our individual *Dasein*, because the world is already there as a "primordial" spatialityfor our being before we identify ourselves as being-in-the-world, as *Dasein*.[379] The Heideggerianclosenesslooks similar to the Levinasian proximity because both are adopted to describe the closeness of the world to us. But there is an insuperable gap between the two because, while the Levinasian proximity designates the material nearness to the world, the Heideggerian closeness designates the phenomenal nearness to the world. The Heideggerianor phenomenal closeness serves for the self-sufficiency because what is there as a primordial spatiality for our being cannot be the real or material world, which obsesses us with its proximity, but its illuminatedimage, which appears so charming and desirableto us that we forget the suffering of the real world and feel at home with the glaringimage. The phenomenal satisfaction never reaches the ethical subjectivity because, while satisfying ourselves with the glaring image of the real world, we already take refuge in the phenomenal world and turn a deaf ear to the miserable world. From the self-satisfied subjectivity comes"the petit bourgeois" because whatwe have to do is to create normsto support a particular group that fits to our phenomenal world and cover up our insensitivity to the miserable world behind the norms.[380]

On the other hand, the Levinasian or material proximityserves to isolate us from our beingbecause, before the proximity or immediacy of the other,we are too late to gather up our being that we inevitablyremain isolated from our being.The subject isolated from its being calls for the "enjoyment" of the proximity becausewhat is separated from its being has no option other than to return to its bodily sensitivity and enjoy the proximity of the other, whose formless

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[379]Heidegger, *Being in Time*, 155.
[380] Levinas, *On Escape* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2003), 50.

qualities, such as hotness and coldness, can be identified only when wegive upour being andreturn to our bodily sensitivity to the obsessive other by touching, tasting, smelling the obsessive other.[381]For instance, when we deal with a piece of bread, we cannot butenjoy the proximity of the bread because the bread with itsformless qualities, e.g., flavors and tastes, would be neither offered to vision in a space nor assimilated into our being, but can be identified only when wegive upour being and return to our bodily sensitivity to theformless qualitiesby "biting" on the bread, by savoring its flavor, and enjoying or suffering the material proximity of the bread.[382]

The enjoyment of the material proximity is the very moment in which the other teaches us the ethic of self-denuding because to enjoy the material proximity is toforget the phenomenal identity and "open" or denude the self to the obsessive other by touching and tasting the obsessive other irreducible to the phenomenal identity.[383]The ethic of self-denudingto the obsessiveother cannot be a phenomenal showing of the self-presence, but the bodily act of "giving"the self to the obsessiveother, becauseto open the self to the obsessive other is to give up the phenomenal showing of the self-presence and to give the self to the bodily senses by touching and tasting the other who obsessesthe self with proximity.[384]The bodily act of givingentails "vulnerability" because, while giving the self to the obsessed other by touching and tasting the other who obsessesus with proximity, we areinevitably "stripped bare" of our being and vulnerably exposed to "death."[385]

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[381] Levinas, *Otherwise Than Being*, 74.
[382] Levinas, *Otherwise Than Being*, 73.
[383] Levinas, *Otherwise Than Being*, 49.
[384] Levinas, *Otherwise Than Being*, 49.
[385] Levinas, *Otherwise Than Being*, 54.

The vulnerable giving is not a giving of one's glaring knowledge, but a giving of one's

material substance, because what is stripped bare of its being and exposed to death has no choice

other than to identify itself by giving one's material substance to the obsessiveother, e.g., by

sheltering"the wretched,"nourishing"the famished,"clothing the naked, etc.[386]Levinas reads the

offering ofa tithe (Malachi 3; 10) in terms of the vulnerable giving. In the text, God demands his

people to bring a tithe to the Temple. The divine demand entails the donors' vulnerability

because theyare to bring the tithes withoutknowing who will benefit from the tithes, how the

"beneficiary" will respond to their generous giving, and what will be the reward for the generous

giving.[387]The vulnerable giving in Judaism challenges the Christian doctrine of the original sin

because those, who vulnerably offer their material substance to the obsessive other, cannot be

originally sinful, but as good as "the original goodness of creation."[388]

As vulnerable as it is, the ethic of self-denuding to the obsessive other gives rise to

human identity substituted for the other because what is vulnerably denuded to the other and

exposed to deathno longer gathers up its essence at the cost of the other, but only substitutes

itself for the other and identifies itself as"the one-for-the-other."[389] Human identity substituted

for the other, Levinasattributes to "maternity" in that to be the one-for-the-other isto bear

the"immemorial weight" of the other"by feeding, clothing, and sheltering those in needs, just as

a mother does for her baby.[390] Here, the Levinasian term "maternity" is also gender-inclusive

because Levinasadopts this termnotto designate the mother's role for the baby, but to express the

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[386] Levinas, *Otherwise Than Being*, 74.
[387] Levinas, "The Jewish Understanding of Scripture," trans. Joseph Cunneen, in *Cross Currents*: Winter 1994, 4, 499.
[388] Levinas, *Otherwise Than Being*, 121.
[389] Levinas, *Otherwise Than Being*, 26.
[390] Levinas, *Otherwise Than Being*, 76.

ethical virtues, such as "pity" and "compassion,"which can be attributed not only to the mother but also to anybody who is willing to bear the weight of the other by feeding, clothing,sheltering those in needs.[391] For example, many great figures in human history, such as Jesus, Abraham Lincoln, Martin Luther King Jr., etc., can be countedas a model for the male maternity, due to their mercy and compassion on others' suffering. The Bibleintroduces Moses as a model for the male maternity when Moses complains about the people, whom God has loaded on his shoulder (Numbers11:12); "Did I conceive all these people? Did I give them birth?"[392] According to Levinas, the ethical link to themotherhas been reflected in two Hebrew words which share the same root: "*rekhem*" which means uterus, and "*rakhamim*" which means pity and compassion.[393]

Predictably enough,theidea of maternity in the Levinasiantexts has been stripped of its gender-neutralityand interpreted in terms of purely feminist concerns.To verify our position, we begin with Jennifer Rosato's study on the Levinasian maternity. According to Rosato, the Levinasian maternityhas been targeted by the critics with following questions. How can such a highly ethical motherhood reconcile with "actual empirical" women?[394]   How can it apply to women who are "not mothers"?[395] How can it respond to the "pro-choice" advocates for the issue of abortion?[396] These questions verify our position because none of them recognizesthe ethical or gender-inclusive values, such as mercy and compassion, the very characteristics of the Levinasian maternity, but only reduce the gender-inclusive values to purely feminist concerns,

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[391] Levinas, *Otherwise Than Being*, 117.
[392] Read Levinas, *Otherwise Than Being*, 91.
[393] Levinas, *Humanism and the Other*, trans. Nidra Poller, Introduction by Richard A. Cohen (Urbana, Illinois: University of Illinois Press, 2003), 76n6.
[394] Jennifer Rosato, "Woman as Vulnerable Self: The Trope of Maternity in Levinas's Otherwise Than Being," in *Hypatia* 27- 2, 2012, 360.
[395] Rosato, "Woman as Vulnerable Self: The Trope of Maternity in Levinas's Otherwise Than Being," 360.
[396] Rosato, "Woman as Vulnerable Self: The Trope of Maternity in Levinas's Otherwise Than Being," 362.

such as the gap between the motherhood and the empirical women,and the issues of childless

women and abortion. Of course, thereduction is the same mistake made by the critics'

unawareness of the Judaic diachrony because, as we see above, in the Judaic diachrony or lapse

of time, there is no clear difference between the masculine and the feminine, but only the bodily

sensitivity, upon which both men and women can be ruptured into the goodand bear the weight

of the other. Some may argue that metaphors are important, for they designate meaning by

differentiating themselves one from another. But for Levinas, metaphors also designate "a

transference of sense," which goes beyond the differentiatedmeaning, that they must be

"demetaphorized" in order that we may reach the sense"beneath" the metaphors.[397]

Steven Shankma readsShakespeare's play *King Lear*in terms ofthe maternal substitution

for the other. In the play, King Lear is so flattered by his two older daughters, Regan and

Goneril,that he inherits them his kingdom. In other words, Learinheritshis kingdom not based on

theethical virtues of the heirs, but based on the flattery, the give-and-take principle.   The give-

and-take flatteryis already violence and injustice to the third party because, while inheriting his

kingdom based on the give-and-take flattery, Lear alienates the youngest daughter, Cordelia,

who gives up the give-and-take flattery and candidlyexpresses her love and loyaltyto the father.

However, Lear finally wakes up from the illusion of the give-and-take flatterywhen he is

deposed from his power and comes to his "maternal mercy"onCordelia who has suffered from

the alienation.[398] So unbearably moved by his maternal compassion on Cordelia, Lear forgets his

own being and substitutes himself for Cordelia;at the very moment of his death, Lear concerns

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[397] Levinas, "Notes on Metaphor," trans. Andrew Haas, in *International Journal of Philosophical Studies* Vol. 20 (3),
326; Levinas, *Basic Philosophical Writings*, 45; Levinas, *In the Time of the Nations*, 54.
[398] Steven Shankma, "From Solitude to Maternity Levinas and Shakespeare," in *Levinas Studies* 8, 2013, 78.

not about his upcoming death, but about whether there are "some signs of life" on the lips of

Cordelia who is now dead.[399]

The maternal substitution in Judaism is the very condition in which the idea of God

comes to us because, while bearing the burden of the other with mercy and compassion, we are

separated from the idolatrous essence, such as images, icons, gods, etc., and elevated into our

"holiness" irreducible to the idolatrous essence.[400]The idea of God in Judaism puts "the universe"

on human shoulders because, for the Jews, to be holy or to be God is to forget all the

idolatrousessence and take up the weight of theuniverse with mercy and compassion.[401]The

creation story in the Bible (Genesis 2) introduces human obligation for the whole universe. In

Genesis 2: 7, God breathes "the breath of life" into man, and man becomes "a living being."

According to Levinas, the biblical passage already signals human obligation for the universe

because, when God breathed the breath of life into man, God "must have put" the whole universe

into man.[402] Human obligation for the whole universe leads Judaism to insist that, if we sin to

God, it will be "forgiven" by God on the Day of Atonement, but, if we sin to a human fellow,

even God cannot forgive it; only the human fellow can.[403] The Levinasian God identified in the

maternal substitution is prior to the Buberian God identified in the *I-Thou* because the Levinasian

God puts the universe on our shoulders before we meet the world as an eternal Thou or God and

identify ourselves in the intimate relationship of *I-Thou*.

Theethical"tie" to the universe, Levinas labels "religion" in that religion also aim to

overcome the idolatrous essence and take up the weight of the universe, which God puts on our

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[399] Shankma, "From Solitude to Maternity Levinas and Shakespeare," 79.
[400] Levinas, *Is It Righteous to Be*, 52.
[401] Levinas, *In the Time of the Nations*, 126.
[402] Levinas, *In the Time of the Nations*, 125.
[403] Levinas, *Nine Talmudic Readings*, 16.

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shoulders from the beginning.[404] Religionwith its ethical tie tothe universe leads Judaism to put "ethical laws" alongside with "ritual prescriptions" because we become ethical not based on the religious passions, e.g., fear and awes, but based on the laws andprinciplesthat strictly regulate every corner of our life for the ethical obligation for human fellows.[405] For the Jews, these laws are not a burden but a "joy" because, in Judaism, the issue is how to please God by obeying thelawsprescribed for human fellows.[406]Therefore, if there is something that brings religion to a crisis, it is not the absence of God, but lack of distance betweenGod and humanity because, as soon as God is cleared of his/her distance from humanity, the idea of God "dissipates" into air.[407]

According to Levinas, the idea of God in Judaism does not necessarily ensure the idea of the good because, if people choose the self-satisfying knowledge, instead of the maternal compassion, then there would be no God, "the very principle of the triumph of good," but only the triumph of "evil."[408] The triumph of evilgives rise to the Jewish messianism because, when Jews were suffering under the evil reign, they anticipated the coming of "the Messiah" who would put an end to the evil reign and restore the kingdom ofDavid on earth.[409]Theetymological origin of the Hebrew word "messiah"helps us understand the Jewish anticipation of the messiah. In the Jewish tradition, kings were anointed with oil not crowned (1 Samuel 10: 1, 16: 12-13). From the Jewish tradition comes the Hebrew word, the messiah, which means the anointed one. The messiah, or the anointed one, is supposed to be a descendent of King David because, in the Jewish tradition, King David is regarded as aman who lived"a double life" before God; he took

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[404] Levinas, *Basic Philosophical Writings*, 7.
[405] Levinas, *Beyond the Verse*, 141.
[406] Levinas, *Outside the Subject*, 132.
[407] Levinas, *Basic Philosophical Writings*, 67.
[408] Levinas, *Difficult Freedom: Essays on Judaism*, 77.
[409] Levinas, *Beyond the Verse*, 55.

care of the kingdom by day, but studied the laws by night.[410] The messianic link to King David leads Judaism to insist that the messianic salvation must be led by the "political power" because the messiah represents a king, a political leader, who would put an end to the evil reign and bring peace to the world.[411]

As time passes, however, the Jews gave up the messianic salvation because, while experiencing the messianic salvation, e.g., from the Babylonian captivity in the 530s BC, they began to realize that the salvation by the messianic king did not end violence completely, thus, it was not "the supreme salvation."[412] The limit of the messianic salvation, however, does not exhaust the Jewish anticipation ofthe salvationfrom violence because the Jewsbegan to anticipatewhat is "higher" than the messianic salvation:the salvation by "God Himself."[413]TheJewish anticipation of the salvation byGod Himselfcalls for everybody's messiahship becauseevery Jew must facilitate the salvation by God himself by behaving "as though" he/she were a messiah.[414] Everybody's messiahship in Judaism inevitably entails "the suffering of humanity" because to be a messiah is to risk one's life by bearing the weight of others' suffering, let alone one's own suffering, in the midst of the evil reign.[415]For Levinas, to be "Myself" is to be "the Messiah" because only when we are ruptured into what is unique and irreplaceable can we bear the suffering of all with compassion in the midst of the evil reign.[416]

The Judaic salvation depending everybody's messiahship is not limited to the Jews, butextendedeven tothe enemies, because, in Judaism, we are already indebted tothe feminine

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[410] Levinas, *Beyond the Verse*, 181.
[411] Levinas, *Beyond the Verse*, 18.
[412] Levinas, *Difficult Freedom: Essays on Judaism*, 83.
[413] Levinas, *Difficult Freedom: Essays on Judaism*, 82.
[414] Levinas, *Difficult Freedom: Essays on Judaism*, 90.
[415] Levinas, *Difficult Freedom: Essays on Judaism*, 72.
[416] Levinas, *Difficult Freedom: Essays on Judaism*, 89.

hospitality before we take each other as the enemies to each other. For instance, despite their

cruelty to the Jews, the Edomites will participate in the kingdom of God Himself (Deuteronomy

23: 8) because every Edomite is a "brother" to the Jews; the Edomites are the descendants of

Esau, the twin brother of Jacob, the Jewish patriarch.[417] So will the Egyptians, for they offered

"the shelter" to the Jews when they were enslaved inEgypt.[418] So will the Romans, for they have

the power to gather up "food and wares" for "the entire world."[419] For Levinas, the kingdom of

God anticipated by the Jewsisabsolutely hiddento humanitybecause no one, even the prophets,

has ever seen it;the prophets predicted only the coming of "the messianic age," not the kingdom

of God Himself.[420] The unknown kingdom will be "greater" than the lost paradise in the Eden

(Genesis 3) because the lost paradise was "irrigated" by an unpredictable fecundity, which we

will find "near the end."[421]

C. The "Here I am"

To clarify the Levinasian theory of "Here I am,"we begin with the Heideggerian theory

of language because Levinas develops histheory of "Here I am" based on his critique of the latter.

For Heidegger, language is the way, in which we articulate "the intelligibility" of things because

things can be disclosed into what is intelligible and articulated by discourse.[422]The Heideggerian

languageincludes nonverbal expressions, such as listening and silence, because theyalsomake

things intelligible. Silence, for instance, makes things intelligible because consciencesummons

*Dasein*to the guilt of falling not with a verbal discourse, but with "the soundlessness of

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[417] Levinas, *In the Time of the Nations*, 99.
[418] Levinas, *In the Time of the Nations*, 98.
[419] Levinas, *In the Time of the Nations*, 107.
[420] Levinas, *Difficult Freedom: Essays on Judaism*, 211.
[421] Levinas, *Difficult Freedom: Essays on Judaism*, 67.
[422]Heidegger, *Being in Time*, 204.

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uncanniness."[423] Therefore, those who keep "*silent*" can signify something, whilethose who talk much signify nothing, because, when somebody talks, we listen not to the words, but to the message expressed by the words.[424]Language as the articulation of the intelligibility of things, Heidegger attributes tothe Greeks in that it is the Greeks who find the "essence" of language in making things "appear" and letting them beintelligible.[425]

The Heideggerian languageis prior to being, for it is already there to be spoken; "being comes to language."[426]Language as being-there is so broad thatbeing-in-the-world is already "being in language" because everything in the world can be expressed in language.[427]Likewise,being in language is being-with because whatever expressed inlanguage can be "'explicitly' *shared*"with others.[428]Even monologue is "a privative way" of being-with because what we talk to ourselves is the same world we share with others.[429]Language prior to being, Heidegger labels "the house of being" in that language is home, to which we are born and belong.[430]Therefore, seemingly, we speak language, but in reality, "*Language* speaks," because language is already there and speaks to us before we speak it.[431]

Based on his idea of language prior to being,Heidegger opposes the Western translation of the Greek word "logos" (discourse in English) into "assertion" in that, when translated into assertion, the Greek logos is divested of its "readiness-to-hand"and reduced to grammatical signs

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[423]Heidegger, *Being in Time*, 343.
[424]Heidegger, *Being in Time*, 208.
[425]Heidegger, *What is Called Thinking?*, trans. Fred D. Wieck and J. Glenn Gray (New York: Harper & Row, 1968), 202.
[426] Heidegger, "Letter on 'Humanism,'" 239.
[427] John Llewelyn, "Levinas and Language," in *The Cambridge Companion to Levinas*, ed. Simon Critchley and Robert Bernasconi (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 122.
[428]Heidegger, *Being in Time*, 205.
[429] Llewelyn, "Levinas and Language," 123.
[430] Heidegger, "Letter on 'Humanism,'" 239.
[431] Llewelyn, "Levinas and Language," 123.

that can be studied through categories.[432] Furthermore, according to Heidegger, even the Western translation cannot escape the existential readiness of the Greek logos because, while asserting something, we already disclose the "ready-to-hand" of what we assert.[433] For example, when we assert, "The hammer is heavy," we designate not the grammatical meaning of the hammer, but the way in which hammer is "ready-to-hand;" e.g., the hammer is "too heavy" that we need another one.[434]

The Heideggerianlanguage as being-there, however, cannot be universal but only cultural since it originates not fromuniversal rules, to which everybody agrees, but from the cultural heritage, which is already there prior to our individual *Dasein*. The Heideggerianor cultural languageleads itself toartistic creation because, while articulating things by discourse, to which we belong, we are inspired into artistic imagination and createthe "non-natural" objects," such as songs, which appear so desirable to our being that we feel at home with the non-natural or artistic objects.[435] The artistic creation is the very origin of poetic fantasies because, while creating the artistic objects through imagination, we forgetthe unbearable noise of the world and listen to mythical deities, e.g.,"the muse,"whosemusic entices us into "the poetic delirium."[436]The poetic fantasies are already idolatry, for they produce "deceptive" knowledge and unconsciously lead us to all sorts of "impure" messes, e.g.,"magic and sorcery, whose existenceis so fragile that it requiressomething supernatural, e.g.,idols andgods.[437]

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[432]Heidegger, *Being in Time*, 200.
[433]Heidegger, *Being in Time*, 196.
[434]Heidegger, *Being in Time*, 196.
[435] Levinas, *Basic Philosophical Writings*, 40.
[436] Levinas, *Difficult Freedom: Essays on Judaism*, 7.
[437] Levinas, *Difficult Freedom: Essays on Judaism*, 48; Levinas, *Basic Philosophical Writings*, 45.

Unfortunately, Heidegger fails to recognize the poetic idolatry because, for him, the issue is not about how to respond to the non-possessable world, but about how to feed the self-sufficiency by gathering the poetic or deceptive knowledge, which entailsidolatry. As a result, Heideggermakes a terrible mistake by insisting that being in language is being-with because it turns out that being in language is nothing but a strategy to gather up the self-sufficiency at the cost of the non-possessable world. For example, the Heideggerian monologueis the same strategy to gather up the self-sufficiency because, while talking to ourselves, we are inspired into artistic imagination and enticed into the poetic deliriumgatherable to our self-satisfaction. The self-satisfying language never reaches the responsible subjectivitybecause, while satisfying ourselves with the deceptive knowledge produced by language, to which we belong, weexcludethe third party, who remains outside our being and its self-satisfaction.

As a solution to the Heideggerian or cultural language, Levinas suggests the Judaic saying of "Here I am" in that the other in diachrony obsesses us so urgentlythat we unwittingly utter the "Here I am" to the obsessive other before we articulatethe intelligibility of things with the cultural language. According to Levinas, the facial expression in Judaism is prior to the Heideggerian articulation because the face with its nudity without coveringsapproaches us so immediately that we are too late to articulate the different intelligibilities by discourse.The antecedence of the facial expression leads us to the Judaic saying of "Here I am" because, before the facial immediacy of the other, we forget our grammatical language and unwittingly utter the "Here I am" to the obsessive other. The "Here I am"unwittingly uttered to the obsessive other never falls to the poetic fantasies because what is uttered at the limit of the grammatical language would be neither offered to artistic imagination nor enticed into the poetic delirium, but entirely elapse from the poetic delirium before the poetic deliriumis provoked through the artistic

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imagination. Instead, it remains as soundbecause what escapes the poetic deliriumis nothing but a sound, a material quality, which disturbs the poeticdeliriumin the present by bypassing the present in which the poetic delirium is provoked through artistic imagination.

Levinas distinguishes sound from vision. Visionserves for being, for itproduces images gatherable to being. On the other hand, sound serves for the other, for it is a "sensible" quality, which disturbs the present not by using violence, but only by bypassing the present, in which being is gathered at the cost of the other.[438]Therefore, if sound appears as phenomena, it is not because sound subordinates itself to vision, but because it overflows the "limits" of its existence and signifies in itself.[439]Levinas takes the teacher as a powerful example for the exteriority of sound. According to Levinas, as a visual source, the teacher appears similar to his/her students. But as "*a sound source*," the same teacher reveals his/her height in relation to the students because, once the teacher speaks, he/she overflows the limits of his/her phenomena and signifies him/herself inthe very position of teaching.[440]The heightof sound makes it arguablethat our relationship to the other must be situated in "hearing" because, inhearing, the other with his/her sensible qualities, such as sounds and voices, would be neither affected by vision in a space nor assimilated into the subject-object coexistence with our being, but disturbs the phenomenal coexistence so urgently, i.e.,with his/her proximity,that we inevitably give up our being and listen to his/her "word" higher than our being.[441]

The"Here I am," as a sensible datum, is the other's voice in the same, for it is nothing but a voiceinside us, which has been inscribed as a trace of the other and serves as a witness to the

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[438] Levinas, *Outside the Subject*, 148.
[439] Levinas, *Outside the Subject*, 148.
[440] Gary Peters, "Dissymmetry and Height: Rhetoric, Irony and Pedagogy in the Thought of Husserl, Blanchot and Levinas," in *Human Studies* 27, 2004, 194.
[441] Levinas, *Outside the Subject*, 148.

"fission" or wounds at the bottom of our inward consciousness.[442]In other words, the"Here I am" is another *ideatum*, for it is uttered from the mouth of our own, but serves as the witness to the internal fissionor wounds in our inward consciousness. As an *ideatum*, the saying of"Here I am" signalsits "suffering"because, while witnessing to itsinternal fission, the saying is stripped of its skinand vulnerably exposed to pains"at the edge of the nerves."[443] The vulnerable saying characterizesitself as"deathlike passivity"because what is exposed to pains at the edge of the nervesinevitably forgetsits voluntary consciousness and put on "a death mask" in relation to the voluntary consciousness.[444]The Hebrew Bible introduces the deathlike passivity of thesaying of the"Here I am." In response to the voice of God, Abrahamforget his voluntary consciousness and puts on thedead mask with the saying of "Here I am." (Genesis 22: 1). So does Moses in response to the divine epiphany in the burning bush(Exodus 3: 4). So doesIsaiah in front of the glory ofGod at the temple; "I am a man of unclean lips" (Isaiah 6: 5). So does Job in front of God who speaks in the storm; "I put my hand over my mouth" (40: 4).

The deathlike passivity of the saying is the very condition in which we move towardthe other because, the more we put up the death mask with the saying of "Here I am," the more we forget our being and move toward the other until we are substituted for the other on the "hither" side of our being.[445] The "Here I am," with which we move toward the other, Levinas compares to Abraham's journey in that, just as Abraham, in his journey, forgets his fatherland and keeps moving tothe unknown land, so does the saying in its journey toward the other forgets

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[442] Levinas, *Otherwise Than Being*, 147.
[443] Levinas, *Otherwise Than Being*, 15
[444] Levinas, *Otherwise Than Being*, 90, 124.
[445] Levinas, *Otherwise Than Being*, 46.

"the land of consciousness" and keeps moving tothe unknown land of the other.[446]Levinas puts

Abraham's journey in opposition to Ulysses' journey in that, while Abraham in his journey

toward the unknown land never returns to his homeland,Ulysses finally returns to his homeland.

According to Levinas, Ulysses' journey aims for the "complacency" of the

selfbecause Ulysses leaves for the unknown land only to return home in order that he may

complete his journey and enjoy the completion of the journey.[447]Levinas compares Ulysses'

journey to the philosophical "itinerary" to being in that, just as Ulysses leaves for the unknown

land, but finally returns home to enjoy the completion of his journey, so does philosophy leaves

for the other but finally returns to being, to its origin, to enjoy the completion of its journey

toward the other.[448]Derrida, in his *Adieu to Emmanuel Levinas*, introduces the "*a-Dieu*" as a

journey toward the other. According to Derrida, when we say "*a-Dieu*," the *a*, which means "to"

in English, forgets its being and opens itself to "infinity."[449] Therefore, when uttered at the

moment of death or in the encounter with others, the "*a-Dieu*" never returns to its origin, but

"crosses" to the infinite other and welcomes the face of the infinite other.[450]

The Judaic saying of "Here I am"is irreducible to the said, forit is not a visual datum,

which can be illuminated in a spaceand absorbed into the said, but a sensible datum that disturbs

the said by bypassing the present in which the saying is stripped of its sensible datum and

reduced to the said. What is irreducible to the said, however, has been stripped of the exteriority

and become "correlative" with the said because, while bypassing the present, the saying leaves

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[446] Krzysztof Ziarek, *Inflected Language: Toward a Hermeneutics of Nearness* (New York: State University of New York Press, 1994), 71.
[447] Levinas, *Humanism and the Other*, 26.
[448] Levinas, *Humanism and the Other*, 26.
[449] Derrida, *Adieu to Emmanuel Levinas*, 103.
[450] Derrida, *Adieu to Emmanuel Levinas*, 102.

atrace in the present and lets itself absorbed intothe said.[451] The said as a trace of the saying is the place for meaning or "signification" because, while letting itself absorbed intothe said, the saying directly defines the said as such and "signifies" itself in the said.[452] The meaningor signification identified in the said, Levinas labels "the kerygma of the said"in that it isdirectly signified in the saidwithout the medium ofvision and its illuminated space.[453]

The Judaic meaningdirectly signifiedin the said is prior to the Saussurean meaning nagatively isdifferentiated inside the linguistic structure. Levinas rarely mentions Saussure, but he clearly stands against the Saussurean or structural meaning. According to Saussure, signs are constituted by two linguistic units: "a sound pattern," and "a concept."[454]For instance, the English sign "chair"is constituted by [tʃeər] as a sound pattern, and a furniture to sit down as a conceptof the [tʃeər]. These signs are only "arbitrary" because there is no essential link between the two linguistic units which constitute the signs.[455]The English sign "chair" is arbitrary sincethere is no essential link between the [tʃeər] and its concept that, outside the English speaking community, nobody will recognize that the [tʃeər] signifies a furniture to sit down as its concept. The linguistic arbitrariness leads Saussure to insist on the social character of language in that, if there is no essential link between the sound pattern and its concept, then, the conceptor meaning of signs must bedetermined by the social "usage" within the speaking community.[456]

The concept or meaning determined within the speaking community cannot be positive butalways "negative and differential" because, inside thespeaking community, no sign has its

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451 Levinas, *Otherwise Than Being*, 37.
452 Levinas, *Otherwise Than Being*, 46.
453 Levinas, *Otherwise Than Being*, 37.
454 Ferdinand de Saussure, *Course in General Linguistics*, trans. Roy Harris (Oxford: Duckworth, 1976), 66.
455 Saussure, *Course in General Linguistics*, 67.
456 Saussure, *Course in General Linguistics*, 112.

intrinsicmeaningthat signs must be differentiated from one another and identified negatively based on their differences to one another.[457]According to Saussure, the negatively differentiated meaningis valid, for it shows no privilege, no prejudice, but identifies various signs based on "the simultaneous coexistence" of the various signs.[458]The meaning negatively differentiated inside the speaking community leadsSaussure to insist that speech eventsmust be "subordinated" tothe linguistic structure in that, without the linguistic structure constituted by the coexistence of the various signs, there would be no speech event.[459]

Saussure characterizesspeech events as "diachronic"in that they deal with "a phase of evolution," such as a sound change, whichrequiresthe historical or diachronic context.[460]On the other hand, he characterizes the linguistic structureas "synchronic" in that it deals with "a linguistic state," such asgrammatical meaning, whichrequires the present relationship between various signs.[461]TheSaussurean meaning gives way to the Judaic meaningbecause, in Judaism, meaning is directly proclaimed in the said, but in Saussure, it can be gained only after the speaking community determines the usage ofsigns and differentiatesthe signsfrom one another inside the linguistic system.Girard characterizes the Saussurean meaning as a"reconciliatory" victim in that what is differentiated from one another inside the linguisticsystem cannot be a sign itself which designates a real thing, but "the language of the sacred."[462]

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[457] Saussure, *Course in General Linguistics*, 118.
[458] Saussure, *Course in General Linguistics*, 113.
[459] Saussure, *Course in General Linguistics*, 18.
[460] Saussure, *Course in General Linguistics*, 81.
[461] Saussure, *Course in General Linguistics*, 81.
[462] Girard, *Things Hidden Since the Foundation of the World*,103.

The Judaic meaning proclaimed in the saidgives rise to the written texts because what isproclaimed in the said can be "synchronized" and printedinto books, poems, laws, etc.[463]For example, what was proclaimed by God has been synchronized and printed into the Bible. The written textsshould not be read literally because the said, which isinscribed in the written texts,would be never exhausted to the letters, but still bears the"echo" of the other irreducible to the letters; "The said… maintains the diachrony in which, holding its breath, the spirit hears the echo of the *otherwise*."[464] Instead, theymust be read in terms ofhuman obligation for the other because the said in the texts can be heard only when we forget the literal meaning of the texts and denude ourselves to thevoice or echo of the other with the"Here I am"until we are cored out of the literal essence and substituted for the other irreducible to the literal essence.

For example, the Bible must be read in terms ofhuman obligation for it, due to the possibility of listening to the voice or echoin the Bible. In Judaism, there is no evidence for the "existence" of God because God is the one who obsesses us with proximity until we forgetthe evidence for theexistence of Godand substitute ourselves for the one who obsesses us with proximity.[465] The absence of the evidence for God does not necessarily exhaust the possibility of listening to God because the biblical other in diachrony leaves a voice or echo in the Bible and opens a possibility of listening as far as we give up the biblical knowledge and denude ourselves to the voice in the Bible with the saying of "Here I am."The same obligation is required forthe possibility of listening tothe "amphibology" of being and entities because the verb "to be," which

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[463] Levinas, *Otherwise Than Being*, 42.
[464] Levinas, *Otherwise Than Being*, 44.
[465] Levinas, *Entre Nous: On Thinking-of-the-Other*, 158.

has been absorbed into nouns, still bears its historical echo that itopens a possibility of listening, as far as we give up its literal meaning and follow our responsibility for the echo.[466]

Robert Gibbs also talks about the possibility of listening to the Bible. In Judaism, there is no word for God's name because God in the Bible "effaces" all the phenomenal names.[467] The absence of word for God's name, though, does not exhaust a possibility of listening to God because the Bible itself gives the possibility of listening by replacing God's name with "The NAME (*ha-shem*)," an "abbreviation" of God's name, or the "euphemism" for it.[468] For instance, the story of the divine epiphany (Exodus 33: 17-23)replaces God's name with"THE NAME," giving us a possibility of listening to God's name; "I will proclaim the name of THE NAME before you" (vs. 18).[469] THE NAME on the forehead of the high priest (Exodus 39:30) also allows us to listen to the "unsayable" name.[470] For Gibbs, the possibility of listening in Judaism justifies the validity of writing because no writing means no listening; "we need to write."[471]

THE NAME as a substitute for God's name serves to overcome the phenomenal reduction in the Bible. Gibbs recognizes the danger of the phenomenal reduction in the Biblein that, in the Bible, there is no God's presence, but only the letters which can be interpreted and disclosed into the "appearance" of God.[472] The danger of the phenomenal reduction in the Bible, however, can be overcome by THE NAME because, in Judaism, THE NAME designates not God's image, but "God's voice," a sensible datum, which effaces all the phenomenal

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[466] Levinas, *Otherwise Than Being*, 42.
[467] Gibbs, "Enigmatic Authority: Levinas and the Phenomenal Effacement," 330.
[468] Gibbs, "Enigmatic Authority: Levinas and the Phenomenal Effacement," 329.
[469]Gibbs, "Enigmatic Authority: Levinas and the Phenomenal Effacement," 331.
[470] Gibbs, "Enigmatic Authority: Levinas and the Phenomenal Effacement," 329.
[471] Gibbs, "Enigmatic Authority: Levinas and the Phenomenal Effacement," 330.
[472] Gibbs, "Enigmatic Authority: Levinas and the Phenomenal Effacement," 330.

mages.[473]THE NAME in the Bible is "enigmatic," for it overcomes the phenomenal reduction and leads us to listen to what is unsayable.[474] This listening in Judaism differs from "seeing" in the West because, while seeing tries to disclose God into phenomena and results in idolatry, listening recognizes God's absence and satisfies itself with God's voice.[475]

Thewritten texts, which demand human obligation, bring dialogues, for they overcome their grammatical structure and preserve different voices, opening a possibilityof listening. The Jewish notionof seventy nations and seventy languages (Genesis 10) confirms the possibilityof listening to "the voices of all."[476]According to Levinas, "the Greek" is the most powerful possibility for the universal dialogue because, while pursuing the transparent language "without prejudice," the Greeks overcome "local particularism" and produce their "wisdom," such as the Platonic Goodness, to which everyone agrees.[477]Levinas adopts the term "Greek" to designate "Europe's inevitable discourse" in that everything in Europe has been inherited from the Greek language, whose transparency goes beyondgrammatical usages and pursues "harmony and the order" among local particularities.[478]The Greek transparency, which pursues harmony among local particularities, urges Levinas toinsist that everything must be "able to be" translated into Greek because, without satisfying the Greek transparency, justice becomes dangerous.[479]

The Greek translation of the Pentateuch, which is "the historical fact of the origin of the Septuagint," testifies not only the Bible's capability to be translated into Greek but also the

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473 Gibbs, "Enigmatic Authority: Levinas and the Phenomenal Effacement," 332.
474 Gibbs, "Enigmatic Authority: Levinas and the Phenomenal Effacement," 332.
475 Gibbs, "Enigmatic Authority: Levinas and the Phenomenal Effacement," 332.
476 Levinas, *In the Time of the Nations*, 1.
477 Levinas, *In the Time of the Nations*, 134, 135.
478 Levinas, *In the Time of the Nations*, 134; Levinas, *Is It Righteous to Be*, 183.
479 Levinas, *Is It Righteous to Be*, 224.

transparency of the Greek language.[480]The Septuagint, which means "seventy" in Greek, refers to the Greek translation of the Pentateuchin the second century BC.Here is the originof the Septuagint. Ptolemy II Philadelphus, the Greek King of Egypt in the second century BC, invitedthe seventy-two Jewish scholars, put them in separate rooms, and ordered to translate the Pentateuchinto Greek. The outcome was "miraculous" because the seventy-two Jewish scholars produced the same translations.[481]Levinas' recognition of the Greek language challenges to Derrida's suspicion that Levinas seems to kill the Greek speech. According to Derrida, Levinas seems to kill "the Greek speech" when he opposes the Heideggerian language depending on the Greek intelligibility.[482] Derrida's suspicion, however, should be challenged because, when Levinas opposes the Heideggerian language, he opposes not theGreek ideal of the transparent language appealing to the universal wisdom, but the way in which Heidegger ignores the Greek ideal of the transparent language and preoccupies himself with the poetic or deceptive language appealing to human satisfaction.

Based on the biblical ideal of welcome and the Greek ideal of the transparent language, Levinas suggests the Bible and the Greek as two pillars of human civilization in thatthey bring justice in their own ways. The Bible brings justice by responding to the other with the saying of "Here I am," the ethical language of welcome and hospitality. So does the Greek by preserving the ethical languagein the said. Not surprisingly, the Levinasian idea of the biblical-Greek civilization has been targeted for being Eurocentricbecause, while bringing the Bible and the Greek side by side as the two pillars of human civilization,Levinas already

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[480] Levinas, *In the Time of the Nations*, 47.
[481] Levinas, *In the Time of the Nations*, 47.
[482] Ziarek, *Inflected Language*, 73.

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propagates the Eurocentric supremacy that "the West is best."[483]Indeed, Levinas compares the

non-biblical and non-Greektoa "dancing" to the Bible and the Greek, relegating the non-biblical

and non-Greek, i.e.,the non-European, to something supplementary to the Bible and the

Greek.[484]He even names the Chinese communists "'yellow perils,'" showing his prejudice against

those who remain outside the non-biblical and non-European cultures.[485] But it is also true that

the accusation is simply redundant because, as Levinas himself says, we are not yet fully awake

to the good that none of us identify ourselves by bearing others' suffering, but by gathering our

superiority at the cost of others' suffering.

Furthermore, we cannot deny the great influence of the Bible and the Greek on

human civilization. For example, Christianity, which was born from the Bible and grew up in

the Greek culture, has brought a great influence on human civilization because, despite its

notorious crimes, such as the Inquisition and the Crusade, Christianity has served not only to

break through social bandages, such as slaveries, patriarchalism, idolatries, etc., but also to

promote human rights, especially for women and children. In other words, we must recognize

the Levinasian insistence on the biblical-Greek civilization, due to the historical evidence for it.

However, and more importantly, the real issue in the Levinasian texts is not about the mimetic

rivalry between the biblical-Greek and its counterpart, but about human obligation for the other

prior to the mimetic rivalry.

In the Levinasian texts, the issue is not about the mimetic rivalry between the biblical-

Greek and its counterpart because the other in diachrony obsesses us so urgently, i.e., with its

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[483] Oona Eisenstadt, "Eurocentrism and Colorblindness," *Levinas Studies* 7 (2012): 46.
[484] Levinas, *Is It Righteous to Be*, 149.
[485] Howard Caygill, "Levinas's Political Judgement: the Esprit Articles 1934-1983," in *Emmanuel Levinas: Criticial Assessment of leading Philosophers*, ed. Claire Elise Katz (London and New York: Routledge, 2005), 94.

proximity, that we are too late to compare the biblical-Greek with its counterpart and provoke the mimetic rivalry between the two cultures. Instead, it is human obligation for the other because, before the proximity of the obsessive other prior to the mimetic rivalry, we cannot but accept the limit of the mimetic rivalry and directly respond to the obsessive other with the saying of "Here I am" until we are cored out of the mimetic rivalry and substitute ourselves for the other. Therefore, if we keep accusing Levinas, then, we cannot but end up to our own violence because, while accusing Levinascontinually, we forget the ethical obligation for the other and identify ourselves based on our anger and hostility against Levinas.

Reading Girard in Light of Levinas (Chapters III- IV)

In the previous two chapters, we worked on the Levinasian time-framework, namely, the Western synchrony and the Judaic diachrony, because this primary task would provide us with a guideline for reading Girard in light of Levinas. In the next two chapters, we will read

Girard in light of Levinas because this task will help us verify the diachronic foundation of Girard, which is the key to defend Girard from the accusation of his sacrificial or anti-Semitic reading of the Bible. In Girard,violence gives rise to culture and the sacred because, after violence is mimetically deflected on the victim, the victimbrings the cultural order to the community that the community exalts him/her to the sacred. Thesacrificial culture belongs to the Levinasian idea of synchrony, for it is established not on the victim him/herself who already elapsed to the diachronic time, but his/her sacred, which can be offered to vision in a space and synchronized to the present. As an alternative to the synchronic order of the sacrificial culture, Girard suggests the biblical revelation of the sacrificial culturein that, inthe Bible, victim is neither exalted tothe sacred nor synchronized to the present for the sacrificial culture, but gradually reveals the synchronic order of thesacrificial culture until the sacrificial culture is reversed to the kingdom of God. TheGirardian theory of revelation belongs to the Levinasian idea ofdiachrony because the only way, in which the biblical victimreveals the synchronic order of thesacrificial culture, is to elapseto diachronybefore he/she is offered to vision in a spaceand synchronized to the sacred for the sacrificial culture.

The diachronic order of the biblical revelation is the key to defend Girard from the false accusation of his sacrificial or anti-Semitic reading of the Bible because diachrony reveals the limit of our being and its sacrificial or anti-Semitic reading of the Bible until we give up the sacrificial or anti-Semitic reading of the Bible, against which Girard stands, and listen to the voice of diachrony identified in the Girardian theory of revelation. To clarify the diachronic order of the biblical revelation, which is the key to defend Girard from the false accusation, we will readGirard in light of Levinas because, thanks to theLevinasian idea of diachrony identified in the Girardian theory of revelation, when read in light of Levinas, the Girardian theory of

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revelation would be neither confused with the literal or traditional reading of the Bible nor assimilated into the sacrificial or anti-Semitic knowledgeof the Bible, but can be returned to its diachronic order, which is the key to defend Girard from the false accusation. To read Girard in light of Levinas, next two chapters will be devoted to the two types of time-frameworkidentified in Girard: cultural synchrony (chapter III); and biblical diachrony (chapter IV).

III. Cultural synchrony

The synchronic order of sacrificial culture cannot escape its own mimesis because, while synchronizing the victimfor the sacrificial culture, we already strip the victim of his/herindividual difference and make him/herthe same being, the mimetic identity which exists without any individual difference. In other words, it turns out that culture is nothing but a human strategy to gather up the same being, the mimetic identity, at the cost of thevictim. The cultural mimesis is so common that it has penetratedall overthe structuralist theories in the West. For instance, Freud, who pursues two types of love, namely, self-love and object-love, cannot escape the cultural mimesis, for both self-love and object-love are the same desire to imitate. The same logic can be applied toLevi-Strauss and Derrida, who pursue knowledge inside the system, because, inside the system, nothing is identified in its individual difference, but can be offered to vision in a space and disclosed into the same being, the mimetic identity. To clarify the idea of cultural synchrony, four issues will be discussed: A. the cultural mimesis; B. Freud; C. Levi-Strauss, and D. Derrida.

A. The Cultural Mimesis

According to Girard, we are born with our "basic needs,"such ashunger and thirst.[486]As basic as they are, needs can be fulfilled because we can gratify our needs by consuming some amount of material supplies, such as food and water. For instance, we can gratify our thirst by drinking some amounts of water. The satiable needs have little to do with violence because, once gratified, needs come to rest until they demand another portion of material supplies. If needs have little to do with violence, then, the question is what brings about violence in the world. The answer is human desire for being because human desire for being never comes to rest, but always remains in struggle to gratify itself at the cost of the world. Human desire for being never comes to rest, for it demands not some amounts of material supplies, which can be provided for the satisfaction, but something charming and mesmerizing, which can be offered to vision and assimilated into the same being that we never satisfy our desire, but always remainin struggle to gratify it. The insatiable desire calls for violencebecause, the more we demand something charming and mesmerizing for the satisfaction of our being, the more we are stripped of our individual difference and assimilated into the same being that we have to fill the lack of our being by projecting our vision on the world and consuming the essence of the world into our being and its essence, just as we consume food into our body and its substance.

The story of Alexanderthe Great introducesthe insatiable desire for being. According to a Talmudic story, Alexanderthe Great comes to the Eden and orders to open the gate for him.[487]But nobody can open the gate because the gateis the gate of the Lord, which is reserved only for "the righteous" (psalms 118: 20). To decide whether he deserves the permit, Alexander is given an eyeball and advised to put everything he has in order that he may meet the weight of the eyeball

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[486] Girard, *Violence and the Sacred*, 146.
[487] See Levinas, *New Talmudic Readings,* 103-105.

and get the permit to the gate. But it turns out that the eye ball weighs more than what he has,

for it is"a human being's eye," whose desirenever comes to rest, but always remains in struggle

for the satisfaction.[488]According to Girard, the insatiabledesire for being is"a noose" tied to our

neckbecausenone of us can escape one's desire for being.[489]

Girard distinguishes desire from needs in that we pursueour desire for "*being*" only after

we gratify our needs.[490]As secondary as it is, desire characterizes itself as"acquisitive" because

no oneknows what to desire for one's being that we must learn it from others.[491]The way, in

which we learn what to desirefor our being, is not by others' wordsbecause no one knows what

to desire for one's being that people never talk about what we ought to desire for our being.

Quite contrarily, we learn it by imitating the model's desire for a particular itembecause, while

desiring a particular object, the model designates the particular object as something "desirable"

forour being that we imitate the model's desire by choosing the particular object, which the

model desires.[492]Human attraction to the modelis notnecessarily negativebecause, while imitating

the model's desire, we learn not only what we ought to desire for our being but also the

model'sstyles, opinions, languages, and so on; "all learning is based on imitation."[493]

Girardtakesa children's play as a scene to illustrate how we areattracted to the model's

desire. When two children play, as soon as a child chooses a toy, the other onetries to take it

away from the first one, not because the toy itself is a desirable object to possess, but because the

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[488] Levinas, *New Talmudic Readings,* 105.
[489] Girard, *The Scapegoat*, trans. Yvonne Freccero (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), 133.
[490] Girard, *Violence and the Sacred*, 146.
[491] Girard, *Things Hidden Since the Foundation of the World*, 8.
[492] Girard, *Things Hidden Since the Foundation of the World*, 295, 343.
[493] Girard, *Things Hidden Since the Foundation of the World*, 7.

second child takes the first one as a model and "imitates" the latter's desire for the toy.[494] On the other hand, the first child tries to keep the toy not because the toy is really desirable to possess, but because it also imitates the other's desire for the toy. The double mimesis between the two children calls fora "triangular" situation because, while imitating each other's desire, the children pursue the same object and polarize themselves around the same object: the toy.[495] The triangular situationbrings "more value"to the toy because, the more the childrenpolarize themselves around the toy, the more the toy appears desirableto possess.[496] The value increase in the triangular situation advises advertisersnot to say thattheir productisbetter than others, but to say that "Others" choose their product because we are attracted to a particular product not based on its superiority, but based on Others' desire for it.[497]According to Girard, the childhoodmimesisnever fades away, but only intensifies itself,because, as we approachour adulthood, weimitate each other "more fiercely" than before.[498]Therefore, if there is distinction between children and adults, children imitate others with "unsuspecting innocence,"but adults try to hide their mimesis and pretend to be a model to others because adults feel ashamed of their mimesis.[499]

Human attraction to the model gives rise tothedazzling illusion on the modelbecause, while imitating the model for our being, we alreadyproject our "fascinated gaze" on the model and produce the dazzling illusion on the model.[500]The dazzling illusion on the model turns into

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[494]Girard, *Resurrection from the underground: Feodor Dostoevsky*, trans. James G. Williams(New York: Crossroad, 1997), 145.

[495] Girard, *Things Hidden Since the Foundation of the World*, 356.

[496]Girard, *Resurrection from the underground: Feodor Dostoevsky*, 145.

[497]Girard, *Deceit, Desire, and the Novel* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1965), 104.

[498]Girard, *Resurrection from the underground: Feodor Dostoevsky*, 145.

[499] Girard, *Violence and the Sacred*, 174.

[500]Jean-Pierre Dupuy, "Totalization and Misrecognition," in *Violence and Truth: the Work of Rene Girard*, ed. Paul Dumouchel (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1988), 77.

his/her divinity because, the more we project the fascinated gaze on the model, the more we produce his/her"self-sufficiency," which can be attributed to "the deity" or gods.[501] The model godcalls fora huge gap between the model and the imitator because, while producing the model's divinity or self-sufficiency, we already create a gap between the model's "fullness of being" and our "nothingness" or nonbeing.[502]The huge gap, however, does not weakenhuman desire forthe model because only in our nothingnessor "humiliation" can weconvince of the model's divine powerto save usfrom the lack of ourbeing.[503]

Here Girardmakes an irrefutable argument thatthere is no huge gapbut only a double mimesis between the model and the imitatorbecause, while encouraging the discipleto imitate him/herself, the model also takes the discipleas a model and imitates the latter's desire; "the imitator becomes the model of his model, and the model the imitator of his imitator."[504]In other words, behind the scene, the model and the disciple are the same in desire and mimesis, for bothtake each other as a model and imitate each other's desire. The double mimesis behind the scene is "dissimulation" because the model tries best to hidehis/her desire for the disciple; otherwise, the model would lose his/her godly position overthe disciple.[505]Thedissimulationidentified in the double mimesis is thekey to "success" because to be a winner is to hide one's desire for others and pretend to be a model to others.[506]

However, as imitation continues,the model loses his/her "'distance'" to the disciple and risks his/her godly position because, the more the disciple imitates the model, the less distance

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[501] Girard, *Things Hidden Since the Foundation of the World*, 415.
[502] Girard, *Things Hidden Since the Foundation of the World*, 296.
[503]Golsan, *René Girard and Myth*, 25.
[504]Girard, "Violence and Religion: Cause or Effect?," *Hedgehog Review* 6-1 (2004):10.
[505]Girard, *Deceit, Desire, and the Novel*, 107.
[506]Girard, *Deceit, Desire, and the Novel*, 107.

between the two.[507]The risk of the godly position turns into an obstacle to imitation because, at the risk of the godly position, the model stopsencouragingthe disciple to imitate him/her and shows his/her "hostility" toward the latter.[508]The disciple may catch a glimpse of the model's hostility, but he/she never knows why the modelsuddenly changes his/her attitude, because the modeldoes his/her best to hide "the real reasons" for his/her hostility.[509]The mechanism, in which the model turns into the obstacle to imitation,is very dangerous to children because children with their unsuspecting naiveté never recognize the model-obstacle mechanism and find themselves in "the narrow circle" of the mechanism.[510]

The model-obstacle mechanism calls for the justification of social "barriers" because, without the social barriers against the model-obstacle mechanism, individuals blindly imitate one another and end up to anger and hostility to one another.[511]Girard reads the story of the prodigal son (Luke 15:11-32) in terms of the social barriers against the model-obstacle mechanism. In the Girardian reading of the text, the faithful son turns out to be a bad son, for he ignores the family barriers and "imitates" the father so closely that he ends up to the father's hostility.[512]On the other hand, the prodigal son turns out to be a "good" son, for he distances himself from the father and protects himself from the father's hostility.[513]The father's attitude toward his sons seems to be unfair, for he treats the prodigal sonwith luxurious meals and clothing, which has neverbeen done to the faithful son. However, from the Girardian point of view, the issue is not about right

[507] Girard, *Things Hidden Since the Foundation of the World*, 290.
[508] Girard, *Things Hidden Since the Foundation of the World*, 290.
[509] Girard, *Things Hidden Since the Foundation of the World*, 290.
[510] Girard, *Things Hidden Since the Foundation of the World*, 417.
[511] Girard, *Things Hidden Since the Foundation of the World*, 291.
[512] Girard, *Violence and the Sacred*, 178.
[513] Girard, *Violence and the Sacred*, 178.

or wrong, but about how to protect the communityfrom the model-obstacle mechanism, in which individuals blindly imitate one another and end up to anger and hostility to one another.

The double mimesis calls for a social chaos because, whenthe double mimesis spreads to the entire community, nobody remains in one'sindividual difference, but imitates each other untilthey lose their"distinctive characteristics" and remainundifferentiated.[514] The story of the Flood in the Bible (Genesis 6) describes the social chaos; in the text, men and gods imitate each other and end up to "a promiscuous union."[515]The social chaos turns intoviolence because, when undifferentiated from one another, individuals try to differentiate themselvesby eliminating each otheruntil they turnto violent "doubles."[516]The mimetic violence between the doubles, however,belongs to nobody because the doubles never see theirviolence as it is, but try to justify it as a "self-defence."[517]As a self-defence, the mimetic violence is "self-propagating"because, while justifyingtheir violence as a self-defence, the doubles confront each other's violence with another reprisalthat they find themselvesin the vicious cycle of reprisals.[518]

The self-propagating violence quickly boils into "a mob situation" because, the more the doubles confront each other's violence with another reprisal, the more they find themselves in the vicious cycle of reprisals.[519]Here, a mob involved in "a military operation" refers to a crowd, whose violent appetites drag the entire community to the vicious cycle of reprisals.[520]The mob situation, however, changes nothing inside the community because the doubles are the same in theirmimetic reprisals that neitherof them wins or loses the war completely, but endlessly

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[514] Girard, *Violence and the Sacred*, 51.
[515] Girard, *Things Hidden Since the Foundation of the World*, 148.
[516] Girard, *Violence and the Sacred*, 160.
[517] Girard, *Things Hidden Since the Foundation of the World*, 198.
[518] Girard, *Violence and the Sacred*, 26.
[519] Girard, *The Girard Reader*, ed. James G. Williams (New York: Crossroad, 1996), 12.
[520] Girard, *The Girard Reader*, 111.

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alternates between "victory and defeat."[521]In the *Oedipus* myth, Laius and Oedipus are violent

mobs, for they are the same in their "reciprocal acts of violence" that neither of them wins or

loses the war completely, but endlessly alternates between victory and defeat.[522] The mob

situation Girard labels a "sacrificial crisis," or "a crisis of distinctions,"in that, when a

societyloses individuals' differenceand boils into a mob situation, nobody can forbid oneself

from the mimetic or self-propagating violence.[523]

The sacrificial crisisis the very moment in which the doubles choose athird party as a

surrogate victimbecause the sacrificial crisis, or the crisis of distinctions,can be overcome only

by breaking the "symmetry" of reprisals that the doubles try to break the symmetry of reprisalsby

deflecting the violent mimesis on the third party who cannot take another cycle of reprisals.[524]The

choice of the surrogate victim in the sacrificial crisisshould not be taken as barbaric because,

without breaking the symmetry of reprisals through the victim, violence snowballs so quickly

that the entire community becomes dangerous.The technique, in which the community chooses

the surrogate victim,Girard labels the scapegoat mechanism in that it is a human strategy to break

the symmetry of reprisals by transforming the "war of *all against all*" into "a reconciliation of*all

against one*." [525]The sacrificial link to mimesis urgesGirard to oppose Plato who knows mimesis,

but who does not know the link between mimesis and the scapegoat,"the object" of the mimetic

polarization.[526]

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[521] Girard, *Violence and the Sacred*, 158.
[522] Girard, *Violence and the Sacred*, 48.
[523] Girard, *Violence and the Sacred*, 49.
[524] Girard, *Violence and the Sacred*, 27.
[525] Girard, *I See Satan Fall Like Lightning*, trans. James G. Williams (New York: Orbis Books, 2001), 53.
[526] Girard, *Things Hidden Since the Foundation of the World*, 15.

Here, the word "scapegoat"originally refers to the goat which is selected for Azazel, "an ancient demon," which is supposed to live in the desert (Leviticus 16: 21-22).[527] In Leviticus 23:27-28, the high priest casts lots over two goats in order that he may choose the one for the ritual killing, and the other for Azazel. Later the same wordincludes "a ritually designated victim,"who is selected to bear the guilt of the community.[528] It also includes psychological victims, who are selected to bear the blame for"tensions, conflicts, and difficulties" inside the community.[529]From the psychological implication of the word originates the English word, "scapegoating," which refers to the collective blame of the third party for the internaltensions and conflicts.[530]According to Girard, the guilt of scapegoating is thevery guilt of the original sin because none of us can resist one's own desireto blame the third party for the internal conflictsthat we are "equally guilty" of scapegoating.[531]

Girard takes the story of Salome's dance (Mark 6: 22-26)as a literary sourceto clarifyhow we ordinary people are affected by our own mimesis and result in the guilt of scapegoating. Inthe text, Herod is so pleased with Salome's dance that he pledges her to give whatever she wants. Salome, as a child, does not know what to desire that she asks her mother about "what she should desire."[532] Once she learns what to desire from the mother, Salome asks for John's head "right now" on a platter (vs. 25). According to Girard, when the mother asks for John's head, she does not mean the immediate decapitation of John, but simply "his death" because, in

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[527] Girard, *Things Hidden Since the Foundation of the World*, 131.
[528]Girard, "Generative Scapegoating," in *Violent Origins*, ed. Walter Burkert, René Girard, and Jonathan Z. Smith (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1987), 73-74.
[529]Girard, "Generative Scapegoating," 74.
[530]Girard, "Generative Scapegoating," 74.
[531]Girard, "The Crime and Conversion of Leontes in "The Winter's Tale,"" *Religion & Literature*22 (1990): 205.
[532] Girard, *The Scapegoat*, 131.

French and in Greek, to ask for someone's head is to ask for his/her death.[533]   However, Salome

goes further and asks for the immediate decapitation of John because desire with its own

mimesis always intensifies itself. According to the text, Herod has no courage to reject Salome's

request, due to "his dinner guests" (vs. 26). However, according to Girard, this is not because of

the dinner guest, but because Herod and his guests are already "possessed" by Salome's desire

for "something extraordinary," something erotic and possessive.[534] Furthermore, the violent

possession of the crowd is already signaled when Herod pledges to Salometo give whatever she

wants becauseHerod'sextravagant pledge to Salomeis only a "response" to the crowd's desire for

something extraordinary, somethingpossessive.[535]

The scapegoat is chosen "unanimously" because nobody wants to bear the full

responsibility for the scapegoat that everybody shares the same level of guilt and innocence by

choosing thescapegoatunder the logic of unanimity.[536] The logic ofunanimity is so powerful that

all the group members are forced to participate in scapegoating and bring "the most groundless

accusation" against the scapegoat.[537] To meet the logic of unanimity, the victim must be a half-

insider and a half-outsider because to victimize a pure outsiderfor the guilt of "the internal

dissensions" is awkward and unreasonable, on the other hand, to victimize a pure insider calls for

another cycle of reprisal.[538]Usually victims are "marginal individuals," e.g., ethnicminorities,

prisoners, slaves, children, etc., who share the common ground with the main society.[539]In this

case, "the most arbitrary difference," e.g., hair color, can be targeted for the guilt of the internal

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[533] Girard, *The Scapegoat*, 137.
[534] Girard, *The Scapegoat*, 134, 140.
[535] Girard, *The Scapegoat*, 141.
[536] Girard, *Violence and the Sacred*, 79.
[537] Girard, *Violence and the Sacred*, 79.
[538]Golsan, *René Girard and Myth*, 34.
[539] Girard, *Violence and the Sacred*, 12.

violence.[540]Or sometimes, kings are victimized because kings' position "at the center" estranges them from the majority and attracts the mimetic rebellion.[541] For example, in ancient Japan, princes were often victimized for their "conspiracy"against the majority.[542]

The anonymous choice of the victim calls for the idea of the victim god because, after the control of the self-propagating violence at the cost of the victim, the doubles reconcile themselves with one another that they exalt the victim to "a supernatural being" or god, who has brought the miraculous harmony from the self-propagating violence.[543]The victimgod, Girard labels "the monstrous double" in thatit appears guilty and divine at once.[544]At first, the victim appears guilty, for he/she is the one who has been blamed for the self-propagating violence. However, after his/her death, the same victim appears divine because, after the violent appetites are deflected on the victim, the same victim looks like a magical god who has brought the miraculous harmony to the community. Thedouble image of the victimis common in myths becausemyths are aimed to cover up the guilt of scapegoating fromthe victimizers' "self-exonerating perspective" by exalting the victim to the magical god.[545]For instance, Oedipus is a monstrous double, for he is the "son,husband,father andbrother" to the same person, namely, Jocasta, the biological mother of Oedipus.[546] So is Dionysus who appears as "god, man, and bull" at once.[547] So is the Roman Janus whoappears "warlike and peaceful" alternately.[548]All other

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[540] Goodhart, "I am Joseph: René Girard and the Prophetic Law," in *Violence and Truth: the Work of René Girard*, ed. Paul Dumouchel (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1988), 55.
[541] Girard, *Violence and the Sacred*, 12.
[542] Masao Yamaguchi, "Kingship, Theatricality, and Marginal Reality in Japan," in *Text and Context,* ed. Ravindra K. Jain (Philadelphia, Pa: Institute for the Study of Human Issues, 1977), 165.
[543] Girard, *Violence and the Sacred*, 86.
[544] Girard, *Violence and the Sacred*, 161.
[545] PJ Watson, "After postmodernism: Perspectivism, a Christian Epistemology of Love, and the Ideological Surround," *Journal of Psychology and Theology* 32 (2004): 259.
[546] Girard, *Violence and the Sacred*, 251.
[547] Girard, *Violence and the Sacred*, 251.

"mythological" figures, such asspirits, angels, etc., are also monstrous doubles that appear guilty and divine at once.[549]Even the story of the virgin birth (Matthew 1: 18-25) cannot escape"the monstrous births of mythology," although it has nothing to do with the sacrificial murder.[550]

Thevictim god brings difference to the community because, thanks to the victim god who hasbrought the miraculous peace from the self-propagating violence, the community is now purged of its violent appetites and reconciled with one another. The internal difference calls for taboos against mimesisbecause the communitytry to keep the internal difference by establishing taboos against all possible objects thatmay stir up the violent mimesis and threaten the internal difference. For instance, twins are prohibitedbecause twinsimitate each other so closely that they threaten "family distinctions."[551] So are women because women are the object of men's desire that they provoke mimeticrivalries among men.   The biblical taboos against "mixtures" (Deuteronomy 22: 9-11) are also aimedto bring difference to the community.[552]The same logic can be applied to binary oppositions because the community try to bring the "cultural order"and difference by establishing binary oppositions, e.g., good vs. bad, right vs. wrong, etc.[553]

Taboos against mimesis, however, cannot escape anothersacrificial crisisbecause, when thecommunity losesindividuals' difference andbecomes undifferentiated,nobody can forbid oneself from falling back toanother sacrificial crisis. The limit of taboos calls for rituals becausethe community tries to control the sacrificial crisiswith the "re-enactment" ofthe self-

[548] Girard, *Violence and the Sacred*, 251.
[549] Girard, *Violence and the Sacred*, 253.
[550] Girard, *Things Hidden Since the Foundation of the World*, 221.
[551] Girard, *Violence and the Sacred*, 62.
[552] Charles Mabee, "Text as Peacemaker: Deuteronomic Innovations in Violence Detoxification," in *Violence Renounced*, ed. Willard M. Swartley (Telford, Pa.: Pandora Press; Scottdale, Pa.: Herald Press, c2000), 81.
[553] Golsan, *René Girard and Myth*, 73.

propagating violence within a ritual framework.[554]The way, in which the community re-enactsthe

self-propagating violence within the ritual framework, is by mimetically pouring outits violent

appetites on a single victimuntil the collectiveviolence reaches its "climax"because, while

elevating the collective violence into its climax, the community is purged of its violent appetites

and enjoyspeace and harmony as a fruit of the collective violence.[555]

   The ritual link to violence urges Girard to oppose the Christian doctrine of expiation in

that religion is not about reimbursing the guilt of the sin, as Christianity says, but about

redirecting theself-propagating violence to a third party, to "a relatively indifferent victim."[556]

According to Gil Bailie, the ritual link to violence is reflected in the etymological origin of

religion (*religare* in Latin), which means to "bind back," because primitive religions try to

controlthe self-propagating violence by binding themselves back to the very moment, in which

the community polarizes itself around its "first victim."[557]The sacrificial religion, though, has

nothing to do with the Biblebecause, in theBible, violence is neitherredirected to a third party nor

ritualized, but reveals its vicious cycle until violence is reversed to the kingdom of justice.

Rituals appear opposite to taboos because, while taboos forbidviolent mimesis, rituals

maximizethe mimetic violence by elevating it into its climax. However, there is no clear

distinction because both are to bringdifference by forbiddingmimesis, or by elevating it to the

climax.

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[554] Girard, *Violence and the Sacred*, 92.
[555] Girard, *The Girard Reader*, 13.
[556] Girard, *Violence and the Sacred*, 4.
[557] Gil Bailie, *Violence Unveiled: Humanity at the Crossroads* (New York: Crossroad, 1995), 114.

Ritual sacrifice requires the divine authority because the community must ensure that it is "the god" who demands the bloodshed for the guilt of the self-propagating violence.[558] Otherwise, violence becomes illegal and entails another cycle of reprisals. The divine authority over rituals entails "misunderstanding" because, while practicing ritual sacrifice in the name of the god, the community attributes the guilt of bloodshed to god.[559] Ritual misunderstanding heals the disease of the self-propagating violence because what is justified in the name of the god is so "holy, legal, and legitimate" that it stops the self-propagating violence.[560] Ritual purification calls for the justification of all the collective behaviours in that, just as rituals are to purify the self-propagating violence, so are the collective behaviours. For instance, the stoning of the beggar is an "improvised" form of the *pharmakos* ritual, which was performed in Greece to heal the disease of the self-propagating violence.[561] A crowd satisfied with "food and drink" also serves as a cathartic outlet of the violent mimesis.[562] Individuals who pursue scenes of violence in the theatre are the same crowd that pursues the "cathartic" effect achievable through rituals.[563] The same logic can be applied to "festivals of atonement" and "sacred games" because they are also aimed to purify the self-propagating violence.[564]

On the other hand, any bloodshed outside rituals is considered illegal, for it demands another victim for the ritual purification of the bloodshed. For instance, women's menstrual bleeding is considered "impure," for it entails series of violence, e.g., "abduction, rape," etc., which

[558] Girard, *Violence and the Sacred*, 7.
[559] Girard, *Violence and the Sacred*, 7.
[560] Girard, *Violence and the Sacred*, 23.
[561] Girard, *I See Satan Fall Like Lightning*, 77.
[562] Girard, *The Scapegoat*, 140.
[563] See Girard, *I See Satan Fall Like Lightning*, 37.
[564] Girard, "Dionysus versus the Crucified," in *MLN*, 99- 4 (The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1984), 831.

demand another victim for the ritual purification.[565]The impurity of women's menstrual bleeding explains why women are excluded from the "masculine tragicomedy" of ritual killing, except for some occasions, such as the Dionysus rituals that are exclusively performed by women.[566]The female exclusionfrom the bloody ritualssignalsthe "superiority" of womenbecausethose who are excluded from the bloody rituals appear more ethical, more responsible, than those who are directly engaged in them.[567]The female superiority identified in Girardmarks another parallelism with Levinas because, just as Levinas supports the feminine superiority based onthe feminine welcome at home, so does Girard based on the female exclusion from the bloody rituals.

The holiness ofritualsacrifice calls for the necessity of religion because rituals are generallyperformed within the religious framework that, without religion, there would be neither rituals, nor the ritual cleansing of the illegal violence. The ritual cleansing within the religious frameworkdirectly challengestoday's demystification of religionbecause, whenreligions are demystified, thereis no way to cleanthe violent appetites that we have to rely on "sacrificial substitution" which is more dangerous thanthe ritual sacrifice.[568]For instance, in a society devoid of the ritual cleansing within the religious framework, wehave to choose sacrificial substitutesamong those at handbecause we cannotgratify our violent appetites directly on "the true object" of our anger.[569] This sacrificial substitution is more dangerous than the ritual sacrifice because, when deflected on the sacrificial substitutes, violence becomes illegal that it goes blindly without "bounds."[570]

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[565]Girard, *Violence and the Sacred*, 33, 36.
[566]Girard, *Violence and the Sacred*, 140.
[567] Girard, *The Girard Reader*, 275.
[568] Girard, *I See Satan Fall Like Lightning*, 156.
[569]Girard, *I See Satan Fall Like Lightning*, 156.
[570] Girard, *Violence and the Sacred*, 25.

The ritual killingofthe surrogate victim leads itself to "the choice of animal victims"becauseanimalsare verisimilar to humans that they aredesirable to replace human victims.[571]Ritual substitution is not a problem because, from the beginning,rituals are aimed to substitute a single victim for the entire community that it is possible to sacrifice an animal as "a substitute of the substitute."[572]Animalsubstitution includes "misunderstanding" because the substitution must be concealed; otherwise, violence goes illegal and calls foranother cycle of reprisals.[573] Jacob's story reflects the ritual misunderstanding. In Genesis 27,Jacob disguises himself with animal skins tosteal the father's blessing reserved for his twin brother. According to Girard, animal skins, with which Jacob's disguise himself, serve as a "sacrificial substitution," for they substitute Jacob, the human victim.[574]The animal substitution must be concealed; otherwise, the fatherwould be so angry with Jacob that he will bring another cycle of reprisal against Jacob.[575]According to Girard, the ritual link to animalssignals"the ritual character of hunting"becausewe humansare not carnivoresby nature that hunting begins not fromthe biological demand for food, but fromthe ritual demand for animal substitutes.[576]The same logic can be applied to animal domestication because animals are most human in nature that they are treated as "a quasi-human existence" and domesticated as the substitute for human victims.[577]

Unfortunately,even rituals do not heal the disease of the self-propagating violencebecause, when the communityloses individuals' difference and falls back to another sacrificial crisis, people try to overcome the sacrificial crisis by re-enacting the self-propagating violence within

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[571] Girard, *Violence and the Sacred*, 3.
[572] Girard, *Things Hidden Since the Foundation of the World*, 53.
[573] Girard, *Violence and the Sacred*, 5.
[574] Girard, *Violence and the Sacred*, 5.
[575] Girard, *Violence and the Sacred*, 5.
[576] Girard, *Things Hidden Since the Foundation of the World*, 73.
[577] Girard, *Things Hidden Since the Foundation of the World*, 69.

the ritual framework. The limit of rituals, however,has been overcome by today's judicial

system because today's judicial system can heal the disease of self-propagating violence, which

primitive religions cannot. Primitive religions have no judicial systemindependent of tribal

authorities because only "well-policed" societiesas ourscan produce such an independent

system.[578]The lack of the judicial system in primitive religionscalls for "preventive

measures"against the self-propagatingviolence because, in a society devoid of its judicial system,

an outbreak of the self-propagating violence is so dangerous to the entire community that the

community tries to stop it by re-enacting iton a third party within the ritual framework.[579]

On the other hand, today's judicial system directly chooses"curative" measures

because nobody can defy the "transcendental" authority of the judicialsystem that it heals the

disease ofthe internal violence by directly punishing the guilty party without fear of

reprisals.[580]According to Girard, thetranscendental authority of the judicial systemgoes "hand in

hand"with the divine authority on rituals because, just as the divine authority justifies the ritual

killing ofthesurrogate victim, sodoes thetranscendental authority of the judicialsystem justify the

punishment of the guilty party.[581]Today'sjudicial system has replaced primitive religions

becausethe judicial systemwith its curative measures is"more advanced" thanthe primitive

religions as a preventive system that it heals the self-propagating violence, which primitive

religions cannot.[582]The judicial replacement of primitive religionsleads itself tothe privatization

of capital punishment because, as primitive religions give way to the judicial authority, capital

[578]Girard, *Violence and the Sacred*, 15.
[579] Girard,*Violence and the Sacred*, 17.
[580] Girard,*Violence and the Sacred*, 21, 24.
[581] Girard,*Violence and the Sacred*, 23.
[582] Girard,*Violence and the Sacred*, 23.

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punishmentloses its public character and turns into a "private" event.[583] In primitive religions, capital punishment was performed as a public event of "scapegoating," the war of all against against a single victim.[584] The public event of capital punishmentturns into a private event in prison because, as primitive religions give way to the judicial authority,capital punishment no longer takes placeas a public event of scapegoating within the ritual framework.

So unfortunately, however, there is no historical evidence for the ritual sacrificebecause, while practicingthe ritual sacrifice, people feel guilty of innocent bloodshedsandgive up the ritual sacrifice; "So ritual forms are mutilated even before they reach those modern interpreters."[585]The onlyresidues of ritual sacrificeare secular games because, when people gave up thebloody rituals, some of the rituals were divested oftheir "sacred character" and transferred to secular activities, such as games.[586]Therefore, if there is distinction between rituals and games, rituals bring difference with violence, but games do without violence. As mentioned above, rituals bring difference with violence because, in rituals, violent appetites are mimetically poured out on a single victim until the violent appetites are purged and turn into peace andharmony. On the contrary, games bring difference without violence because, after games, the community is divided into the winner and the loser.

Girard introducessome of secular games, which bring differencewithout violence. According to Girard, in the funeral ofthe Canelos Indians, the participants are dividedinto two groups and cast their dice over the dead man's body on the assumption that "the sacred spirit" in

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[583]Mack Stirling and Scott Burton, "Scandals, Scapegoats, and the Cross: An Interview with René Girard," *Dialogue: A Journal of Mormon Thought*43 (2010): 128.

[584]Stirling and Burton, "Scandals, Scapegoats, and the Cross: An Interview with René Girard,"127.

[585] Girard, *Violence and the Sacred*, 300.

[586] Girard, *Violence and the Sacred*, 312.

the dead man will choose the winner.[587] Once selected, the winner isawarded one of the dead

man's domestic animals, which will be slaughtered "on the spot" and served as a meal for the

participants.[588] The divine selection of the winner brings difference because, after the divine

selection of the winner, the community is divided into two groups, the winner and the loser. In

other words, game of dice in the funeral brings difference notwithviolence, butwith the divine

selection of the winner. Theinternal difference serves to control the violent mimesisbecause,

thanks to the internal difference brought by the sacred spirit, people are purged of the violent

appetites, which may have been incited by desires for "the dead man's belongings," and

reconciled with one another over the meal served with the meat of the domestic animal.[589]

Game of lotteryin Jonah's story also brings differencewithout violence. In Jonah's story,

the community confrontsa "sacrificial crisis" because no difference is found in it.[590]The cargo

thrown into the sea (1: 5) indicates lack of social "distinctions," and the sailors' calling for their

gods(1: 5) indicateslack of "the religious order."[591]In this sacrificial crisis, the sailorscast lots (1:

7) on the assumption that gods, to whom they cry, will choose a victim. The selection of Jonah

by gods brings difference to the community because, after Jonah is selected and expelled from

the ship, the community comes to know"a new god," the Lord, and offers a sacrifice to the

Lord(vs. 16).[592]In other words,game of lottery in Jonah's storybrings differencenot withviolence,

but with the divine selection of the victim. The internal differencebrought by the Lord "saves"

the community from the sacrificial crisis because, thanks to the internal difference, the

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[587] Girard, *The Girard Reader*, 22.
[588] Girard, *The Girard Reader*, 22.
[589] Girard, *Violence and the Sacred*, 312.
[590] Girard, *The Girard Reader*, 24.
[591] Girard, *The Girard Reader*, 24.
[592] Girard, *The Girard Reader*, 25.

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community is purged of theviolentchaos and set in order.[593]Secular games above introduce the "sacred character of choice" because, in the games, the winner or victim is selected not by the community, but by the sacred spirit or the Lord.[594] The sacred character of choicecalls for the justification of the random victim becausevictims are often selected "by lot."[595]The choice of the victim by lotis still worthy of trust, for it reveals "the divine will" on some levels.[596]

The ritual origin of gamesurges Girard to stand against Levi-Strauss who puts games in opposition to rituals. According to Levi-Strauss, games bring "a difference" because, after games, players are divided into two groups: the winner and the loser.[597] Ritualsarequite opposite to games, for they bring "a union or an organic relation."[598] For instance, baptismal rituals bring a union because, afterthe baptismal rituals, individuals lose the "previous identity" and join the religious community.[599] Girardopposes Levi-Strauss in that not only games but also rituals bring difference. Games bring difference, as Levi-Strauss says, because, after games, players are divided into the winner and the loser. So do rituals. Baptismal rituals, for instance, bring difference because to be baptized is to be purged of the previous state of un-differentiation and differentiated from the unbaptized. Put in detail, whenindividuals submerge into the baptismal water, they lose their individual difference and plunge into "the undifferentiating waters of

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[593] Girard, *The Girard Reader*, 25.
[594] Girard, *Violence and the Sacred*, 314.
[595] Girard, *Violence and the Sacred*, 314.
[596] Girard, *Violence and the Sacred*, 313.
[597] Levi-Strauss, *The Savage Mind*, trans. George Weidenfeld and Nicolson Ltd (Herfordshire: The Garden City Press Limited, 1966), 32.
[598] Levi-Strauss, *The Savage Mind*, 32.
[599] Girard, *Things Hidden Since the Foundation of the World*, 29.

baptism."[600]However, after surfacing on the water, individuals are purged of the ""evil mixture""

of un-differentiation and differentiated from the unbaptized.[601]

So far, we have seen how the community tries to keep itself in harmonyby bringing

difference through taboos and rituals. Human desire fordifferencegives rise to culture because,

while bringingdifference through taboos and rituals, the community is purged of itsmimesisand

beginsto establish "the cultural order."[602]The cultural orderestablished on human desire for

differencecannot but return to violence and the sacred becausethe difference, upon which the

cultural orderstands, has beenmaintained not byindividuals' fleeting voicesin diachrony, but

bytaboos and rituals, the social phenomena, which can be offered to vision and assimilated into

the same being that the communityhas to controlthe sacrificial crisis, or the crisisof distinctions

by bringing new difference at the cost of another sacred. The cultural return to violence is not an

accident because, from the beginning, cultureis inseparable from the founding murder.At first,

violenceappears destructive, for it can be pacified only after being deflected on a single victim.

However,after being pacified at the cost the victim, violenceappears"generative,"for itgives rise

to"the founding mechanism" of culture.[603]

The founding murder is so common that it has penetrated all over the texts. Cain's

fratricide in the Bible (Genesis 4) brings about the Canaanite culture. In Genesis 4, Cain works

on the soil, and Abel keeps flocks. Cain offers to God some of fruits, and Abel does some of the

first-born of his flocks (vs. 4). According to Girard, Abel has a "violence-outlet" because, as a

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[600]Girard, "Differentiation and Undifferentiation in Levi-Strauss and Current Critical Theory,"*Contemporary Literature* 17- 3 (1976): 406.
[601]Girard, "Differentiation and Undifferentiation in Levi-Strauss and Current Critical Theory," 420.
[602]Girard, *Things Hidden Since the Foundation of the World,* 312.
[603]Girard, *Things Hidden Since the Foundation of the World,* 96.

shepherd, he regularlyoffers animal sacrifice, upon which he may deflect his violent impulses.[604]

Abel's violence-outlet attracts God's "favour" because it is God, who consumes the flesh of the

animal sacrifice and tranquilizes the violent appetites inside Abel.[605]On the contrary, Cain has no

violence-outlet because, as a farmer, he cannot offer animal sacrificeas an outlet of his violent

appetites.

Cain devoid of the violence-outlet ends up to his "jealousy" of Abel, who has a violence-

outlet, and subsequently, to his murder of Abel because, without aviolence-outlet, he has

nochoice other than to choose his twin brother, Abel, as a sacrificial substitute at hand.[606]In other

words, Cain killsAbel not because of his insatiable desire for killing, but because he has no

channel to redirect his violent impulses. Cain's fratricide brings about culturebecause God

forbids vengeance against Cain and lets him build Enoch, the first city, "the first civilization or

culture" in the Bible.[607]Here the biblical God, who consumes Abel's animal sacrifice, appears

similar to the primitive sacred because, just as the primitive sacred consumes the blood of the

victim, so does the biblical God. However, there is clear distinction between the two because, in

the Bible, God neither covers up nor justifies Cain's fratricide, but reveals it through the very

victim, Abel; "Your brother's blood cries out to me from the ground" (Genesis 4: 10).

The Ojibwa myth also describes the founding murder. The myth goes as follows.[608]

Six supernatural visitors came from the great water. One of the six could not see the Indians,

forhe had his eyes covered. One day, he was so anxious to see the Indians that he lifted the veil.

At the very moment, one of his eyes fell down on a human being and killed the human being

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[604] Girard, *Violence and the Sacred*, 5.
[605] Girard, *Violence and the Sacred*, 5.
[606] Girard, *Violence and the Sacred*, 5.
[607] Girard, "Is There Anti-Semitism in the Gospels?," *Biblical Interpretation* 1, 3 (1993): 342.
[608] Claude Levi-Strauss, *Totemism*, trans. Rodney Needham (Boston: Beacon Press, 1967), 19.

becausethe glance of his eye was so strong that it caused the death. After this incident, he was

forced to return to the water, while the five others remained among the Indians and became the

founder of the five clans: catfish, crane, loon, bear, and marten. For Levi-Strauss, the myth has

nothing to do with the founding murder because the Indian culture begins not from the victim,

but from the five supernatural visitors who remained among the Indians and became "a blessing"

to them.[609] Girard opposes Levi-Strauss' non-sacrificial reading of the myth in that the myth

introduces the sacrificial origin of the Indian culture. According to Girard, the one, who was

forced to return to the water, is a victim, for he was murdered "by drowning."[610] The victim is

theorigin of the Indian culture because, while drowning the victim in the water, the community is

purged of the violent mimesis and brings new orders for culture. In other words, according to

Girard, the myth describes the founding murder because the Indian culture originatesnot from the

five supernatural visitors, but from the victim who was murdered by drowning.

The bloodyculture, however,changes nothing inside the community because, even

after being purged of the violent mimesis, we still identify ourselves not based on our

individualdifference, but based on our mimetic relationship to others. Inside the community, the

victim appears quite different from the crowd because, while the crowd remains mortal and

secular, the victimovercomes his/her mortality andgains the "immortal divinity."[611] The internal

difference between the divine victim and the mortal crowd gives rise to human identity because,

thanks to the internaldifference, individuals are purged of the mimetic chaos and differentiated

from one another; "…the differences among individuals are used to establish their "identity" and

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[609] Levi-Strauss, *Totemism*, 19.
[610] Girard, *Things Hidden Since the Foundation of the World*, 108.
[611] Girard, *Things Hidden Since the Foundation of the World*, 107.

their mutual relationships."[612]Human identity differentiated from one anothercannot but return to

its ownmimesisbecause those, who are differentiated from one another, never go to the

diachronic time, but can be offered to vision and assimilated into the same being that individuals

try to distinguish themselves by "'imposing'" themselves as a model on others, provoking envy

and jealousy inside others.[613]The mimeticselfhood, Girard labels"*interdividual*" in that, the more

we try to distinguish ourselves by imposing ourselves on others, the more we provoke others'

envy and jealousytoward us that we cannot but remain in our mimetic or interpersonal

relationship to others.[614]The *interdividual*selfhoodis so fragile that it must be renewed by another

victim because those, who lose their individual difference and remain in the mimetic or

interpersonal relationship,cannot be the sensible other in diachrony, but the same being that must

be renewed by another difference at the cost of another victim.

Oughourliantakes the creation story (Genesis 1-3) as a literary sourceto clarifyhow we are

affected by our own mimesis and end up to inthe interdividual selfhood. In the text, God creates

"male and female" according to his/her image (1: 27).The creation story introduces God as a

model because, while creating male and female according to his/her image, God presents himself

as "the model" to the couple.[615] The biblical model opens a gap between the model andthe

imitator because, as a model, God forbids the couple from "the tree of the knowledge"in the

Eden (2:17) and distances him/herself from the couple. The relationship between the model and

the imitator in the Eden, however, does not result in the double mimesis because the "difference"

or gap between the model (God) and the imitator (the couple) is not yet perceived to the couple

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[612] Girard, *Violence and the Sacred*, 49.
[613] Girard, *Things Hidden Since the Foundation of the World*, 307.
[614]Girard, "The Crime and Conversion of Leontes in "The Winter's Tale,"" 215.
[615]Jean-Michel Oughourlian, *The Puppet of Desire: The Psychology of Hysteria, Possession, and Hypnosis*, trans. Eugene Webb (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1991), 23.

that it does not ignitehuman desire to be like the model.[616]Quite contrarily, it brings satisfaction

to the couplebecause, as the creator, God gratifies "every need" of the couple.[617] Theinitial stage

of human life in the Eden, Oughourlian labels "childhood" in that the couple is naked, but feels

"no shame," feels no difference.[618] The carefree stage of human life, however, comes to an end

and plunges intothe "mimetic" world because, as the couple approaches their adulthood, they

lose their childhood innocence and enter the mimetic world governed by desires and

temptations.[619]The creation story confirmsthat needs are anterior to desires becausethe couple is

attracted todesires and temptationsonly afterthe gratification of needs.

The couple'sentry into the mimetic world is facilitated by the serpent because the

shrewd animal draws the woman's "attention" to God's prohibition of the tree.[620]Thewoman's

attention to God calls for her desire for Godbecause, while drawing the woman's attention to

God's prohibition, the serpent draws her attention to God's "Difference"and incites her desire to

be like God; "you will be like God (3: 4)."[621]The woman's desire for Godturns into her desire for

the tree because the woman desires to be like God by possessing what God possesses: the tree.In

other words, the woman desires the tree notas a valuable object to possess, butas what arouses

her desire to be like God. Human attraction tothe forbidden tree makes it arguable

thatprohibition does notunderminehuman desirebecause, while forbidding the tree from the

couple, God attracts the woman's attention to the tree and "whips up" her desire for it.[622]

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[616] Oughourlian, *The Puppet of Desire: The Psychology of Hysteria, Possession, and Hypnosis*, 23.
[617] Oughourlian, *The Puppet of Desire: The Psychology of Hysteria, Possession, and Hypnosis*, 23.
[618] Oughourlian, *The Puppet of Desire: The Psychology of Hysteria, Possession, and Hypnosis*, 23.
[619] Oughourlian, *The Puppet of Desire: The Psychology of Hysteria, Possession, and Hypnosis*, 23.
[620] Oughourlian, *The Puppet of Desire: The Psychology of Hysteria, Possession, and Hypnosis*, 23.
[621] Oughourlian, *The Puppet of Desire: The Psychology of Hysteria, Possession, and Hypnosis*, 25.
[622] Oughourlian, *The Puppet of Desire: The Psychology of Hysteria, Possession, and Hypnosis*, 24.

Humandesire forthetree brings about "knowledge" because, after eating the fruit of

thetree, the couple wakes up to their own eyes and begins to recognize their nakedness, their

difference.[623]The knowledge of human nakedness becomes the very knowledge of "selfhood"

because, while recognizing their nakedness, the couple identify themselves by differentiating

themselves from each other.[624]The differential selfhoodcannot but return to its own mimesis

because, while differentiating themselves from each other, the couple takes each other as a model

and imitates each other. Adam "imitates" Eve by eating what she ate: the fruit of the forbidden

tree.[625] Eve imitates Adam by ascribing "the burden of guilt" to the serpent, just as Adam

ascribed it to her.[626] The double mimesis between the coupleturns into "violence" because, while

imitating each other, the couple also imitates each other's violence; Adam blames Eve, and Eve

blames the serpent.[627] The couple in the Eden cannot be individual but interdividual, forthey

identify themselves not based on their individual difference, but based on mimetic passions

andrivalries, which presuppose the interpersonal relationship between the couple.

The interdividual relationship in the Edencomes to an endwhen God interrogates the

couple; in response to God's interrogation, the couple reveals their own violenceagainst each

other by accusing each other,and finally, ends up to their expulsion from the Eden, from the

childhood paradise. The expulsion from the childhood paradise gives rise to "culture" because,

after being expelled from the childhood paradise, the couple multiplies in number and cultivate

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[623] Oughourlian, *The Puppet of Desire: The Psychology of Hysteria, Possession, and Hypnosis*, 25.
[624] Oughourlian, *The Puppet of Desire: The Psychology of Hysteria, Possession, and Hypnosis*, 25.
[625]Aidan Carl Mathews, "Knowledge of Good and Evil: The Work of René Girard," in *To Honor René Girard*, ed. Alphonse Juilland (Saratoga: ANMA Libri, 1986), 26.
[626]Mathews, "Knowledge of Good and Evil: The Work of René Girard," 26.
[627]Mathews, "Knowledge of Good and Evil: The Work of René Girard," 26.

the land.[628] The first culture in the Bible cannot escape its sacrificial linkas well because, before expelling the couple from the Eden, God "slaughters" an animal and makes "garments of skin" for the naked couple(Genesis 3: 21). Seemingly, there is no distinction between the secular culture and the biblical culture, for both are established at the cost of the victim. But there is still distinction between the two because, in the secular culture, the victim is murdered to control the internal violence, but, in the Bible, the animal is slaughtered to clothe the naked couple. The same logic can be applied to the biblical God as a model and the cultural model because, just as the cultural model incites human desire to imitate, so does the biblical God. However, there are still distinction between the two. For instance, the cultural model remains on the same plane with the imitator because, in culture, both the model and the imitator take each other as a model and imitate each other until they lose their individual difference and turn to violent doubles.On the contrary, the biblical model or God remains far above from the imitator and feeds the imitator with compassion because, while forbidding the tree from the couple, the biblical God distances himself from the couple and gratifies every need of the couple; at the end of the story, Godcovers up the naked couple with garments of skin. The story of the Eden makes it clear thatwe must liberate ourselves from our mimesis "at any cost" because, otherwise, we cannot but lose our childhood paradise, in which nothing lacks in our needs, and plunge into the cultural world governed by our own desires and temptations.[629]

The Girardian theory of mimesisis so broad that ithas penetrated intomany areas of social sciences because, while dealing with human desire to imitate,thetheory covers thesocialand historical phenomena, such as violence and rivalries, the sacred and gods, taboos andrituals,

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[628] Oughourlian, *The Puppet of Desire: The Psychology of Hysteria, Possession, and Hypnosis*, 26.
[629] Oughourlian, *The Puppet of Desire: The Psychology of Hysteria, Possession, and Hypnosis*, 72.

cultures, customs, sacred games,myths, the Bible, etc., which are inseparably tied tosocial

sciences. For instance, the theory has penetrated into the study of politics becausepolitics also

aims to control the social mimesis by bringing difference between the sacred and the secular.

According to Stephen L. Gardner, politics belongs not to human orders but to religious orders

because, like rituals, politics aims to control the social mimesis by bringing "distinction"

between the secular and the sacred, between the modern and the archaic, between reason and

religion, etc.[630]However, sincethe moderndemystification of religion, politics loses its religious

orders and becomes purely rationalized.[631] The rationalized politics seems to bring peace and

libertyto the communitybecause people are freed from the religiousrestrictions and exposed to

the unlimited freedom of reason. However, quite contrarily, it only intensifies violence because,

when emancipated from the religious restrictions and exposed to the unleashed freedom of

reason, individuals are so fascinated by the unleashed freedom that they mimetically pursue the

enlightened reason and result in the "unmediated reciprocity of the duel."[632] As an alternative to

the violent freedom of reason, Gardner suggests "a *religiously* motivated return to *reason*" in that

the violent freedom can be overcome not by rational disputes alone, but by taking a balance

betweenrational disputes and religious restrictions.[633]

TheGirardian theory has penetrated into the study of psychology as well becauseall the

psychological symptoms are aimedto integrateindividuals into culturethrough the model.

According to Oughourlian, individuals seized bymagic, sorcery, enchantment, etc., accept the

modelbecause, while accepting the model, individuals give up their initial identity and receive

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[630] Stephen L. Gardner, "René Girard's Apocalyptic Critique of Historical Reason," *Contagion: Journal of Violence, Mimesis, and Culture* 18 (2011): 4.
[631] Gardner, "René Girard's Apocalyptic Critique of Historical Reason," 16.
[632] Gardner, "René Girard's Apocalyptic Critique of Historical Reason," 4.
[633] Gardner, "René Girard's Apocalyptic Critique of Historical Reason," 13.

"the very being of the model" until they arepurged of the initial identity and united into "the

cultural order."[634] On the contrary, hysterics denythe model because hystericsare so proud of their

initial identity that they cannot tolerate "the other's role" as a model.[635]Hysterics appear

individual and autonomous, for they identify themselves without a model. However, in reality,

they are neither individual nor autonomous but "interdividual" because, while denying the model,

hysterics see the model as a "rival" and identify themselves in the hostile relationship to the

model.[636] As interdividual as they are, hysterics also integrate themselves into culture because,

while identifying themselves in the hostile relationship to the model, hysterics give up their

initial identity and receive the very being of the model until they are purged of the initial identity

and integrated into the cultural order. Seemingly, hysteria differs from other symptoms because,

while individuals seized by other symptoms accept the model, hysterics deny him/her. However,

there is no clear distinction between the two becauseall the psychological symptoms, including

hysteria, are aimed to integrate individualsinto culture through the model, whether the model is

friendly or hostile to the individual subjects.

The mimesis theory also has penetrated into the study of economicsbecause, in the

market, we choose particular items not based on the material values of the particular items, but

based on our imitation of others' desire for the items. According to Orlean, traditionally,

economics has been understood under the utilitarian principle that we humans chooseitems based

on the "use values" of the items.[637] The traditional or utilitarian principle, however, does not fit

to the market because, in the market, we choose items not based on the use values, but based on

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[634] Oughourlian, *The Puppet of Desire: The Psychology of Hysteria, Possession, and Hypnosis*, 24, 98.
[635] Oughourlian, *The Puppet of Desire: The Psychology of Hysteria, Possession, and Hypnosis*, 166.
[636] Oughourlian, *The Puppet of Desire: The Psychology of Hysteria, Possession, and Hypnosis*, 180.
[637] Andre Orlean, "Money and Mimetic Speculation," in *Violence and Truth: the Work of René Girard*, ed. Paul Dumouchel (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1988), 101.

our imitation of "the desire of the other."[638] To clarify the mimetic principle in the market, we

begin with the issue of how we imitate others' desire in the market. When the economic system

is stable, people distinguish themselves from one another because everybody serves as "a

concrete producer" inside thesystem that individuals choose items based on theirown desires and

opinions.[639] However, when the economic system becomes unstable, people lose their social

distinction and become "undifferentiated" because nobody knows what to choose for one's social

distinction that individuals simply imitate each other's desires and opinions.[640] In other words,

the economic crisis calls forthe social mimesis, due to the lack of human autonomy.

　　　　　The social mimesis in the market calls for "a specific desire for *wealth*" because the

mimetic crowd now try to distinguish themselves by possessing what they do not possess.[641] The

specific desire for wealth is attracted to "indeterminate" items, e.g., stocks, real estates, etc.,

because nobody knows what to desire for one's difference that everybody randomly gathers up

whatever others choose.[642] The wealth attracted to indeterminate items challenges the utilitarian

principle because we choose items not based on the use values, but based on our imitation of

others' choice. In this social mimesis, individualsnever show their desire to others, but try to

read others' desire "obliquely" because nobody knows what to desire that everybody has

toimitate others' choice.[643]The speculative mob finally lead themselves to what Girard calls a

sacrificial crisis because, the more the crowd try to distinguish themselves by imitating others'

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[638]Andrew Feenberg, "Fetishism and Form: Erotic and Economic Disorder in Literature," in *Violence and Truth: the Work of René Girard*, ed. Paul Dumouchel (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1988), 136.
[639]Orlean, "Money and Mimetic Speculation," 104.
[640]Orlean, "Money and Mimetic Speculation," 110.
[641]Orlean, "Money and Mimetic Speculation," 102.
[642]Orlean, "Money and Mimetic Speculation," 103.
[643]Orlean, "Money and Mimetic Speculation," 102.

choice, the more they polarize themselves on "a random object" and find themselves in the symmetry of reprisals.[644]

The sacrificial crisis in the market is the very moment, in which the crowd randomly choose "a third object" as a victim, because the crowd try to overcome the sacrificial crisis by breaking the symmetry of reprisals.[645] The random victim in the market is nothing other than "money" because money brings difference "in the form of a price."[646] Money, as a random victim, becomes the very foundation for the "social totality" because, thanks to the difference created in the form of a price by money, the crowd now can be purged of the violent mimesis and reconcile themselves with one another.[647] Thanks to the monetary system, the market goes smoothly becausepeople no longer polarize themselves on a random object, but distinguish themselves from one another by purchasing what is already differentiated in the form of price.

The monetary system, however, does not solve the problem of the social mimesis because, even after the social mimesis is purged through the monetary system, we still choose items not based on the use values, but based on others' desire for the items. In the monetary system, the seller serves as "a model" because, while designating his/her item in the form of a price, the seller sets up an obstacle to others and provokes others' desires for the item.[648] The seller as a model calls for "the double bind of double mediation" because a buyer pays the price for the item and sets up"once again" an obstacle to the model by designatinganother item in the form of a price to the model.[649] The relationship between the seller and the buyer appears

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[644]Orlean, "Money and Mimetic Speculation," 111.
[645]Feenberg, "Fetishism and Form: Erotic and Economic Disorder in Literature," 148.
[646]Feenberg, "Fetishism and Form: Erotic and Economic Disorder in Literature," 148.
[647]Orlean, "Money and Mimetic Speculation," 111.
[648]Feenberg, "Fetishism and Form: Erotic and Economic Disorder in Literature," 147.
[649]Feenberg, "Fetishism and Form: Erotic and Economic Disorder in Literature," 148.

"complementary" because both take each other as a model and imitate each other's desire for each other's items.[650] However, what appears complementary creates an "incompatible" gap between use values and exchange values because, as the exchange continues, items acquire more values not for their intrinsic desirability, but forothers' desire for them.[651] In other words, the monetary system does not heal the social mimesis because, even after being distinguished from one inside the monetary system, we still choose items not for the use values, but forothers' choice. In this social mimesis, victory goes to those, who hide theirdesire"behind a veil of proud self-sufficiency" and pretend to be a model, because to be the winner is to offer oneself as a model and gather up others' fascinated gaze into one's fullness of being.[652] The social mimesis in the market is so dangerous to the community that primitive societies "ritualize" exchange.[653]

B. Freud

According to Freud, there aretwo types of love, namely, self-love and object-love,because the more the one, the less the other. In other words, from the beginning, Freud follows the Saussurean structuralism, for hedefines the two types of love not based on their individual difference, butbased on the internal relationship between the two. Freud begins his theory of love with theidea of id in that the id is thevery place, from which the two types of love emerge. Herewhat Freud calls the id refers to the"oldest"sphere of the mind, which includes all kinds of innate properties, such as needs, desires, instincts, dispositions, etc.[654]As the oldest sphere of the mind, the id characterizes itself as"unknown," for it is not what grows from the

[650]Feenberg, "Fetishism and Form: Erotic and Economic Disorder in Literature," 148.
[651]Feenberg, "Fetishism and Form: Erotic and Economic Disorder in Literature," 148.
[652]Feenberg, "Fetishism and Form: Erotic and Economic Disorder in Literature," 143.
[653]Feenberg, "Fetishism and Form: Erotic and Economic Disorder in Literature," 147.
[654] Sigmund Freud, "An Outline of Psycho-Analysis," in *International Journal of Psycho-Analysis*21 (London: Routledge for the Institute of Psycho-Analysis, 1940), 28.

intellectual consciousness, but what is inherited by the bodily organs that are entirely unknown to the intellectual consciousness.[655] The bodily or unknown id belongs to the Levinasian diachrony because the only way for the id to escape the intellectual consciousness is to elapse to diachrony before it is offered to the intellectual consciousness and assimilated into human understanding. However, as many other thinkers in the West, Freud also fails to recognize the Levinasian idea of diachrony only because it is not easy to recognize what elapses to diachrony before the intellectual understanding takes place. As a result, Freud inevitably reduces the diachronic order of the id to synchrony because, for Freud who dismisses the idea of diachrony, nothing, including the bodily id, goes away to the diachronic past, but can be inherited by the bodily organs and remain "present" from the very beginning.[656]

The synchronic order of the id entails two "primal" instincts: Eros and Destruction.[657] Eros aims at "unities," for it pursues satisfaction by integrating individuals into a relationship to one another.[658] On the other hand, Destruction aims disunity, for it pursues satisfaction by disintegrating individuals into "inorganic" states.[659] Sadism, for instance, belongs to Destruction, for it pursues satisfaction by disintegrating individuals with "aggression."[660] The two primal instincts, however, should not be taken independently, for they are inseparably tied to each other. For instance, in eating, both Eros and Destruction are inseparably tied to each other because, while eating, we not only crush food with our teeth but also animate the food by "incorporating"

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[655] Freud, "An Outline of Psycho-Analysis," 28.
[656] Freud, "An Outline of Psycho-Analysis," 28.
[657] Freud, "An Outline of Psycho-Analysis," 72.
[658] Freud, "An Outline of Psycho-Analysis," 31.
[659] Freud, "An Outline of Psycho-Analysis," 31.
[660] Freud, "An Outline of Psycho-Analysis," 35.

itintoour body.[661]The same logic can be applied to sex because, in sex, the couple not only assault each otherby caressing each other violently but also establish "the most intimate union" in the midst of the violent assault.[662]

Freud attributes the erotic unities to libido, "the whole available energy of Eros" which has been built up in the id, in that it is libido, which pursues satisfaction by integrating individuals into a relationship to one another.[663] The erotic energy or libido in the id, Freud labels"'love,'" a general term,in that libido originates from the id and pursues bothself-love and object-love.[664] To clarify the Freudian theory of love or libido, we begin with the libidinal alterationbetween the id and the objectbecauselibidopursues self-love and object-loveby alternating between the two domains. At the first stage of human life, the "whole available amount" of libidoremains exclusively in the id, for it is not yet given to the object.[665]The state, in which the entire libido remains in the id, Freud labels "primary *narcissism*" in that, when the libido exclusively remains in the id, the babyremains isolated from the external world and subjects itself to narcissistic feelings.[666]In the state of primary narcissism, the baby pursuesthe "immediate"satisfaction of its instinctual demandsbecause, for the baby with its primary narcissism, the issue is not about how to respond to the external world, but about how to gratify its instinctual demands as soon as possible.[667] For example, when the baby feels thirst, it pursues the immediate satisfaction of the thirst, no matter what the external realitymay be.

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[661] Freud, "An Outline of Psycho-Analysis," 32.
[662] Freud, "An Outline of Psycho-Analysis," 32.
[663] Freud, "An Outline of Psycho-Analysis," 32.
[664] Freud, "Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego," in *The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Freud, Volume XVIII (1920-1922): Beyond the Pleasure Principle, Group Psychology and Other Works* (London: The Hogarth Press and the Institute of Psycho-Analysis, 1955), 90.
[665] Freud, "An Outline of Psycho-Analysis," 33.
[666] Freud, "An Outline of Psycho-Analysis," 33.
[667] Freud, "An Outline of Psycho-Analysis," 72.

However, by the age of three, the baby recognizes the limit of immediate satisfaction and accepts the external worldbecause the pursuit of the immediate satisfactionentails "perilous conflicts" with the external world that the baby tries to avoidthe conflicts by accepting the reality of the external world.[668]The way, in whichthe baby accepts the external world, is by differentiating its ego from the id because, once differentiated from the id, the ego plays as the "representative"tothe external world and brings reconciliation between the id and the external world.[669] The reconciliatoryego, Freud attributes to "reason"in that, while representing the external world, the ego stands against the id and makes a rational decision on whether the instinctual demands are to be gratifiedimmediately or cancelled.[670]

Freud elaborates how the baby differentiates the reconciliatory ego from the id. According to Freud, the primary narcissismgives rise to the libidinal attachment to the object because the narcissistic feelings are so vulnerable to mental disorders, e.g., melancholia, that the babytries to control the narcissistic or pathogenic feelings by attaching"part" of its libido to the object.[671]The libidinal attachment to the object, however,iscanceled soon or later because whatwas attached to the object can "leave" the object and return to its original place: the id.[672] The alteration of the libidinal energy between the id andthe object, Freud labels "'auto-erotic,'" for it is excited not bythe external object, but by the subject's own body.[673] Thumb-sucking, for instance, can be understoodin terms of the auto-erotic instinct of human body, for it is excited not

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[668] Freud, "An Outline of Psycho-Analysis,"72.
[669] Freud, "The Ego and the Id," in *Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Freud, Volume XIX (1923-1925): The Ego and the Id and Other Works* (London: The Hogarth Press and the Institute of Psychoanalysis, 1961), 35.
[670] Freud, "The Ego and the Id," 24.
[671] Freud, "The Ego and the Id," 45.
[672] Freud, "The Libido Theory and Narcissism," in *The Standard Edition of Freud* 16 (London: Vintage, 2001), 416.
[673] Freud, "Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality," in *Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Freud, Volume VII: A Case of Hysteria, Three Essays on Sexuality and Other Works,* trans. James Strachey (London: The Hogarth Press and the Institute of Psychoanalysis, 1953), 181.

by any external objects, but by the baby's "erotogenic" organs, such as lips and tongues, which belong to the baby's body.[674] The same logic can be applied to sadism becausesadismis also stimulated not by the external object, but by the "excretory" impulse of the subject's (the sadist's) own body.[675] According to Freud, the auto-erotic instinct of human body serves as the prototype of sexual behaviors in the life of adults because we adults pursue our sexual life based on our childhood experience ofauto-eroticism. For instance, thumb-suckingserves as the prototype of kissing because, based on our childhood experience of thumb-sucking, we seek others' lips that are "the corresponding part" of our lips that once sucked our thumbs.[676]

The auto-erotic instinct of human body gives rise to the differentiation of the ego from the id because, whileattaching its libido to the object, and then, withdrawing it back to itself, the id sets up "the subject'sown ego" in the very place, which has beenhollowed in the process of the libidinal alteration between the id and the object.[677]The Freudian ego cannot be spiritual but a "bodily" ego, for it is formed not by God or supernatural beings, but by the libidinal or bodilyeffort to control the instinctual demands in the id.[678]According to Freud, the auto-erotic instincts of human bodycan be identified in other creatures as well. Amoebas, for instance, exercise the auto-erotic instinctsby sticking out their pseudopodia, and then, withdrawing themback to the body in order that they may producea "little-differentiated" glob of their substancein the very place hollowed by the auto-erotic instincts of the body.[679]

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[674] Freud, "Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality," 181.
[675] Freud, "An Outline of Psycho-Analysis," 35.
[676] Freud, "Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality," 182.
[677] Freud, "The Libido Theory and Narcissism," 416.
[678] Freud, "The Ego and the Id," 25.
[679] Freud, "The Libido Theory and Narcissism," 416,

Thelibidinal alteration gives rise to not only self-love but also object-love because, whilealternating its libido between the object and the id, the baby pursues not only self-love but also object-love for the satisfaction of its instinctual demands. Put in detail, the baby pursues object-love by attaching its libido to the objectbecause, while attaching part of its libido to the object,the baby chooses the object as its love-object and pursues "satisfaction" in relation to the object.[680] Object-love includes sexual and non-sexual love because the baby pursues satisfaction by sending its libido not only to sexual objects but also to non-sexual objects, e.g., parents,friends, "humanity," "concrete objects,"even "abstract ideas," etc.[681]Object-love, which pursues satisfaction in relation to the object, inevitably takes "roundabout paths" because the baby withdrawsits libidoback to the ego in the id whenever the libidinal attachmentto the object hurts the instinctual satisfaction.[682]From the libidinalwithdrawal to the egoemerges self-love because what is withdrawn to the ego directly causes the narcissistic feelings which would be "superimposed"on the primary narcissism.[683]In other words, self-love is only secondary, for it results not directly from the ego, but from what was once attached to the object, andlater, withdrawn to the ego. Self-love as secondary must be transferred to object-lovebecause the narcissistic self-love is so pathogenic that the baby tries to avoid the pathogenic self-love by attaching part of its libido to the object.

Then the question is how the baby overcomes the pathogenic self-loveand remains healthy by transferring the pathogenic self-love to object-love. The answer is to give upthe

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[680] Freud, "The Libido Theory and Narcissism," 415.
[681] Freud, "Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego," 90.
[682] Freud, "The Libido Theory and Narcissism," 412.
[683] Freud, "On Narcissism: An Introduction," in *The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Freud, Volume XIV (1914-1916): On the History of the Psycho-Analytic Movement, Papers on Metapsychology and Other Works* (London: The Hogarth Press: The Institute of Psycho-Analysis, 1957), 75.

narcissistic choice of love-object because the narcissistic choice of love-object disturbs the libidinal shift from the egoto the object and prevents us from transferring the pathogenic self-love to object-love. According to Freud, thelibidoin the id develops differently in different sexesbecause, by the age of five, the babyattaches its libido to "one or other"of its parents, usually, the opposite sexed parent, and chooses the opposite sexed parent as its love-object.[684]In the case of the male child, the boy attaches his libido to his mother and chooses the mother as his love-object because he wants to satisfy himself based on his biological demand for "the mother's breast."[685]The boy's choice of the mother entails his identification with the father because, after choosing the mother as his love-object, the boy defines himselfby "identifying" himself with the father in relation to the mother.[686]In other words, the boy chooses the mother as his love-object first, and then, chooses the father for his identification with the father. Here the Freudian term "identification" refers to an "emotional tie,"not toan intellectual verification.[687] The boy'semotional tie or identification with the father characterizes itself as masculine, for itis inspired not by the boy's"passive or feminine" feelings toward the father, but by his masculine wish to be like the father in relation to the mother.[688]Themasculine identification with the father, however, is quite "ambivalent" because, while identifying himself with his father, the boy wishes not only to be like the father but also to usurp the father's position in relation to the mother.[689]

As ambivalent as it is, the father-identification calls for a "triangular" situation because the boy is now caught up between two emotional ties: his instinctual wish for the mother, and his

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[684] Freud, "Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego," 111.
[685] Freud, "The Ego and the Id," 30.
[686] Freud, "The Ego and the Id," 30.
[687] Freud, "Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego," 107.
[688] Freud, "Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego," 105.
[689] Freud, "Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego," 105.

masculine identification with the father.[690] The triangular situationinside the family continues until the boyreaches what Freud calls Oedipus complex because the boy's instinctual wish for the mother grows more and more powerful than his masculine identification with the father that the boy sees the father as "an obstacle" to his instinctualwish for the mother and wishes to kill the father.[691] The Oedipus complex, however, comes to an end when the boy's wish for the mother is considered unhealthy to the society and forbidden by the father with "the threat of castration."[692] The boy takes the father's threat seriously when he sees that girls have no penis and assumes that they have been castrated.[693]

The father's prohibition of the instinctual wish for the mother entails the boy's replacement of the mother with the father because the boy tries to "ward off" the unhealthy wish for the mother underthe father's authorityby shifting his libido from the mother to the father.[694] The boy's replacement of the mother with the father, Freud labels "desexualization" in that the boy gives up the mother who is his love-object, and chooses the father who is not a love-object.[695]According to Freud, the boy's choice of the father goes to two opposite directions, either to his homosexuality, or to the intensification of his masculine identification with the father.[696]On the first hand, itgoes to hisidentification with the mother because, even after replacing the mother with the father, the boycannot give upthe mother that he "identifies" himself with the mother.[697]The boy's identification with the mother isthe origin of "male homosexuality"because,

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690 Freud, "The Ego and the Id," 30.
691 Freud, "The Ego and the Id," 31.
692 Freud, "The Dissolution of the Oedipus Complex," in *The Freud Reader*, ed. Peter Gay (New York: W.W. Norton, 1989), 664.
693 Freud, "The Dissolution of the Oedipus Complex," 665.
694 Freud, "An Outline of Psycho-Analysis,"74.
695 Freud, "The Ego and the Id," 53.
696 Freud, "The Ego and the Id," 31.
697 Freud, "Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego," 108.

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while identifying himself with the mother, the boy identifies himself as a womanand chooses his love-object among men.[698]Otherwise, itgoes to the intensification of the boy's identification with the father because, while choosing the father for his identification with the father, the boy adopts the father's "properties" and strengthens his childhood identification with the father.[699]But even the intensification of the masculine identification with the fatherdoes not stop the boy's instinctual wish for the mother completely because, when the mother is replaced with the father, the boy's "object-relation" to the motheris still preservedunder the father's authorityand ignites again his patricidal wishes.[700]

The insatiable wish for the motherfinally calls for the egoideal, the so-called super-ego, because the insatiable wish for the mother is too powerful to be controlledby the ego alone that the boy tries to control the insatiable wish by differentiating his ideal for the father from the ego, and then, causing a "tension" between his insatiable wish for the mother and his ideal for the father.[701]The ego idealfor the father represents the internal world, for it aims to control the insatiablewish for the mother under the father's authority, which has beenimposed onthe boy's childhood experienceand transformed into "an integral part" of his own being.[702]The internal ideal for the father, Freud labels "*conscience*"in that the father's authorityover the childhood experienceincludes parental prohibitions, threats, corrections, punishments, or whatever appeals to the boy's conscience.[703]According toFreud,the internal ideal, which is differentiated from the ego,is "the most important" feature of human development because only after the differentiation

[698] Freud, "Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego," 108.
[699] Freud, "Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego," 113.
[700] Freud, "The Ego and the Id," 33.
[701] Freud, "The Ego and the Id," 36.
[702] Freud, "An Outline of Psycho-Analysis," 79.
[703] Freud, "An Outline of Psycho-Analysis," 79.

of the internal idealfor the father can the boy control the insatiablewish for the mother and solidify his masculine identity.[704]

The father's role as the ego ideal, however,gives way to the leader because, by the age of six, the boy gives up the ego ideal for the father and chooses the "group ideal" for the leader by shifting his libido from the father to the leader.[705] Here, the leader refers to teachers, mentors, andother substitutes, who play the role of "admired ideals" for young children.[706] The group ideal achieved at the cost of the ego ideal gives rise toemotional ties with others because, while attaching his libidinal energy to the leader, the boy overcomes his ego and begins to "equate" himself with other members of the group.[707] The emotional tiesinside the group presuppose the inhibition of sexual aims because only after being inhibited from any sexual aimsdoes the boy give uphis sexual instincts and establish "lasting ties" with others.[708]According to Freud,inhibited sexual aims have a great "advantage" overuninhibited sexual aims because, whileuninhibited sexual instincts become exhausted as soon as they aregratified, inhibited sexual instincts can be sublimed inside the subject and transformed into "permanent ties" with others, e.g.,parents, friends,neighbors, etc.[709]

The lasting ties with the group memberscan be identified in primitive families. In primitive families, the father plays as "a formidable obstacle" to his sons' sexual gratification because the father keepsall available womenonly to himself that the male members, including the sons, are inhibited from having any sexual relationship with the women who have been dearly

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[704] Freud, "The Ego and the Id," 34.
[705] Freud, "Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego," 129.
[706] Freud, "An Outline of Psycho-Analysis," 30.
[707] Freud, "Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego," 102.
[708] Freud, "Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego," 115.
[709] Freud, "Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego," 139.

beloved by the male members since their childhood.[710]The inhibition of sexual aims inside the familyturns into "emotional ties" among the sons because, thanks to the inhibition of their sexualgratification, the sons repress their sexual urges and pursue the fraternal love byequating themselves with one another.[711]The same logic can be applied to the church and the armybecause, in the church and in the army, the "love relation between men and women" is inhibited that the church and military members repress their sexual aims and sublime them into non-sexual love or friendship.[712]The group idealdepending on the lasting ties with others calls for a sexuallatency because, while pursuing the lastingtieswith the group members, individuals are deviated from sexual aims and attracted to "other ends," e.g.,studies, athletics, same-sex friendships, etc.[713]

The sexual latency in the childhood is followed by puberty because, by theage of twelve, the boy resumes his "sexual life" by attaching his libido to other women, not to the mother.[714] In this mature period, the male subject seems to give up his self-love for his object-lovebecause "a considerable amount" of his libido is attached to his love-object.[715] The male attraction to the love-object continues until "the entire self-love" is possessed by his love-object.[716] The male sexuality devoted to love-objectbecomes fascinated to the narcissistic woman because the woman's self-love exercises "the greatest fascination" over men who have given up the self-love for the love-object.[717]

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[710] Freud, *Totem and Taboo*, trans. James Strachey (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1950), 143.
[711] Freud, "Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego," 124.
[712] Freud, "Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego," 141.
[713] Freud, "Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality," 178.
[714] Freud, "An Outline of Psycho-Analysis,"35.
[715] Freud, "Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego," 112.
[716] Freud, "Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego," 113.
[717] Freud, "On Narcissism: An Introduction," 89.

The female sexuality also follows the same stages as the male counterpart, although there are some differences between the two sexes.[718]The minor difference between the two sexes is that the girl's Oedipus complex is "simpler" than the boy's because the girl barely goes to the incestuous wish to kill her mother.[719]On the other hand,the major difference is that girl's childhood self-love still remains intact because, in themale-dominant society, the "restrictions"on the female sexuality dissuadethe girl from choosing her love-object that she has little chance to transfer the childhood self-love to the love-object.[720]As mentioned above, women's self-lovemakes a great appeal to men's object-love, due the "combination" of the two.[721]From the Freudian point of view, compared with men's object-love, women's self-love remains"perverse and inferior" because, while men overcome self-love and devote themselves to object-love for family and society, womenare deviated from object-love and remain innarcissistic self-love, which is pathogenic.[722]   Freud's position against the female sexuality, however, betraysits own logic because, if we follow the Freudian logic, the female sexuality, which is restricted in the male-dominant society, neither exhausts its energy nor remains inferior to the male sexuality, but can be sublimed inside the subject and transformed into emotional ties with others, which persist longer than the uninhibited sexuality whose energy immediately fades after the satisfaction.

Based on his analysis on the libidinal alteration, Freud suggest two types of love, namely, self-love and object-love,in that, the more the libidinal energy is "employed" to the object, the less it remains in the ego, and vice versa.[723] In other words, Freudseparatesself-love andobject-

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[718] Freud, "The Dissolution of the Oedipus Complex," 664.
[719] Freud, "The Dissolution of the Oedipus Complex," 665.
[720] Freud, "On Narcissism: An Introduction," 89.
[721] Freud, "On Narcissism: An Introduction," 89.
[722] Girard, *Things Hidden Since the Foundation of the World*, 377.
[723] Freud, "On Narcissism: An Introduction," 76.

love from each other not based on theindividual difference, but based on the inverserelationship between the two. In this inverserelationship between self-love and object-love, the libidinal return to the egois not a problem because, innormal circumstances, what wasattachedto the object can be "transformed" into the ego.[724] For instance, when we sleep, both object-libido and ego-libidoare "given up"and withdrawn to the ego.[725]However,if the libido, which was withdrawn to the ego, no longer goes back to the object, it is problematicbecause too much libido in the ego is "pathogenic."[726] For instance, in the case of a male homosexual, his libido has been "fixated" on the mother until it reaches the Oedipus complex.[727] As a result,when time comes to replace his mother with "some other sexual object," e.g., with other women, the male subject cannot give up his mother that he chooses a same-sex as his love-object.[728]Similarly, those, whohave suffered from troubles in their "libidinal development," also choose a same-sexas a love-object only because they cannot give up their initial love-object.[729]This"egoistic"choice of love-object is pathogenic, for it disturbs our libidinal alteration and prevents us from being mature to move toward object-love for the sake of family and society.[730]

Girard admits his indebtedness to Freudin that histheory of mimesis, which deals with a relationship between the model and the disciple, has been inspired by the Freudian theory of libido, which deals with the relationship between the boy's identification with the father and his desire to imitate the father; "There is a clear resemblance between identification with the father

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[724] Freud, "The Libido Theory and Narcissism," 416.
[725] Freud, "The Libido Theory and Narcissism," 417.
[726] Freud, "The Libido Theory and Narcissism," 421.
[727] Freud, "Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego," 108.
[728] Freud, "Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego," 108.
[729] Freud, "On Narcissism: An Introduction," 88.
[730] Freud, "The Libido Theory and Narcissism," 417.

and mimetic desire; both involve the choice of a model."[731]In other words, Girard recognizes the

Freudian theory of libido in that the Freudian theory of libido is the prototype ofhis theoryof

mimesis. However, Girardclearly opposes the Freudianinsistence on the two types of love in that

all desires, including self-love and object-love, are the same desire to imitate. To clarify Girard's

position against Freud, we begin with the fundamental difference between the two thinkers.

In Freud,needs and desires are the same in their bodily origin because all of innate

instincts, including needs and desires,are unilaterally inherited by the bodily organs. For

instance, the boy's desire for the mother and his identification with the father are the same in

their bodily origin because both originate from the libidinal or bodily energy, which is attached

either to the mother or to the father. The bodily origin of the two, however, betrays its own logic

because,inFreud,the boy's desire for the mother appears as fetishistic,and hisidentification with

the father as mimetic. Put in detail, inFreud, the boy's desire for the mother appearsfetishistic or

object-orientedbecause the boy chooses the mother as a desirable object to possess. On the other

hand, the boy's identification with the father appears mimetic or model-oriented because the boy

identifies himself with the father not as a desirable object to possess, but as a model to "be like"

the father.[732] As mentioned above, in Freud, the boy's fetishistic desire for the motheris anterior

to hismimetic identification with the fathersbecause, at first, the boy chooses the mother as a

desirable object, and then, he chooses the father as a model to imitate.

In Girard, however,needs and desiresdiffer from each other because needs pursue

material supplies,but desires pursue something charming and mesmerizing. Therefore, it is not

an accident that, in Girard, needs appear as fetish, anddesires appear as mimetic. In Girard,

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[731] Girard, *Violence and the Sacred*, 170.
[732] Freud, "The Ego and the Id," 33.

needs appear as fetish because every need demands its object: material supplies. On the other hand, desires appear as mimeticbecause every desire demands a model to imitate. For instance,human desire forself-love is mimeticbecause, while choosing ourselves as our love-object, we already impose ourselves as a modelon others and provoke envy and jealousy inside others. So is thenarcissistic woman's self-lovebecause, while choosing herself as her love-object, thewomanprojects her magical divinity or self-sufficiency on others and provokes "an irresistible temptation" inside others.[733]According to Richard Golsan, self-love as mimetic isonly "a sham" because there is no self-love at all, but onlyhuman desire to offer the self as a model on others and gather up others' fascinated gaze into one's self-sufficiency or the fullness of being.[734]

The same logic can be applied to human desire for object-love because, while choosing others as our love-object,we already take others as a model and imitate others' desireuntil we loseourindividual difference and become the same being, the mimetic identity. For example,the boy's desire for the mother cannot be fetishistic but mimetic because the boy chooses the mother not to possess as his love-object, but to imitate the father's desire for the mother, i.e., the father's desirefor his wife. According to Girard, the boy chooses the mother only to imitate the father's desire for the mother, i.e., the father's desire his wife, because, while desiringhis wife, the father already "directs" the son's attention to his mother and incites the boy's desire for the mother.[735]The boy's identification with the father is also mimetic because, while identifying himself with the father, the boy already choose the father as a model and imitates the father's desire for the mother.According to Girard, theboy's identification with the fatheris anterior to his desire for the mother because only after heimitates the father's desire for the mother does the boy

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[733] Girard, *Things Hidden Since the Foundation of the World*, 370.
[734] Golsan, *René Girard and Myth*, 24.
[735] Girard, *Violence and the Sacred*, 172.

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choose the mother as his love-object; "the father-identification appears as "*anterior to any choice of object*."[736]If we follow the Girardian logic,it is clear that, at first, the boy gratifies his needs for the mother's breast. Once his needs are gratified, the boy chooses the father as a model to imitatebecause, while identifying himself with the father, the boy chooses the father as a model and adopts the father's properties to be like the father. After hischoice of the fatherashis identification model, the boy chooses the mother as his love-object only to be like the father in relation to the mother.

According to Girard, the boy's imitation of the father calls for another cycle of mimesis because the father also takes the son as a model and imitates the son's desire for the mother. In other words, there is a double mimesis between the father and the son because the father and the son imitate each other's desire for the mother and polarize themselves around the mother. The double mimesiscalls for a family rivalrybecause, while imitating each other as a model, the son and the father lose their individual distinction and becomethe rivals for the mother. In thisfamily rivalry, the patricidal wish goes only to the father because only the father as an "adult" can interpret the son's desire for the mother in terms of"usurpation" and the patricidal wish.[737]The sexual rivalry between the father and the son is only an anomaly because, in normal circumstances, the father serves not as a sexual rival to the son, but as a model for the son's "apprenticeship."[738]

Girard attributes all other desires to mimesisas well in that everybody pursues one's fullness of being by choosing each other as a model. Themale desire for the narcissistic woman, for instance, is mimetic because men are attracted to the narcissistic woman not because the

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[736] Girard, *Violence and the Sacred*, 171.
[737] Girard, *Violence and the Sacred*, 174.
[738] Girard, *Things Hidden Since the Foundation of the World*, 353.

woman is a desirable object to possess, but because they imitate each other's desire for the woman. Homosexualityis also "a morbid obsession" to human desire for the modelbecause homosexualschoose the same sex as a model and imitate each other until they lose all the difference and become the same being, the mimetic identity.[739] So is sadism because the sadist has been so sickened of his/her previous role as the "victim or martyr" that he/she now tries to play as a model to others.[740] So is masochism because only through his/her "inferiority'can the masochist convince of the model's magical power to save him/her from the lack of being.[741]

If all desires are mimetic, as Girard says, then the Freudian insistence on the two types of love is impossible because it turns out that both self-love and object-love are the same desire to imitate. However,according to Girard, mimetism never plays "a dominant role" in Freud because, while prioritizing fetishism over mimetism, Freud minimizesmimetism.[742]The Freudian theory of love never reaches the responsible subjectivity, for itdepends not on the bodily sensitivity, which obsess us with proximity until we gives up satisfaction and bear the weight of the fleeting other in diachrony, but onthe present libido that endlessly pursues the self-satisfaction by shifting its energy between the object and the ego.

C. Levi-Strauss

According to Levi-Strauss, natural species are adopted in two ways. First, they are adopted as totems, for they are good to "distinguish" things from one another.[743]They are also adopted as sacrifice, for they are good to create a relation of"continuity"betweenseparate

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[739] Golsan, *René Girard and Myth*, 26.
[740] Golsan, *René Girard and Myth*, 26.
[741] Girard, *Things Hidden Since the Foundation of the World*, 330.
[742] Girard, *Violence and the Sacred*, 169.
[743] Levi-Strauss, *Totemism*, 101.

terms.[744] Levi-Strauss gives a priority to totems over sacrifice in that only after distinguishing

thingsthrough totems do the primitivescreate the relation of continuity through sacrifice. Here

the word "totem" usually refers to an animal or plantas "a class," not as an individual species

separated from the class.[745]

1. Totems

Levi-Strauss begins his theory of totem with a homologybetween human groupsand

natural species in that totemism stands on "a postulation of homology" betweenthe

twooppositegroups.[746]Here the word "homology" designates not a simple affinitybut "a formal

correlation" between two opposite groups.[747]According to Levi-Strauss, humangroupsand natural

species are opposite because, while natural species remain in their "affectivity," human groups

overcome the natural affectivity and move to "intellectuality."[748]The two opposite groups,

however,still include "a relation" because, just as human groups can be divided into subgroups,

e.g., clans and moieties, so the natural species can be divided into subgroups, e.g., animals and

plants, the carnivorous and the herbivorous, etc.[749]Theformal relation or homology between

human groups and natural species gives rise to the idea of totem because, thanks to the homology,

human groups adopt naturalspecies as totems, as "symbols," in order that they may

identifythemselves in the name of the species that are adopted as their totems, as their symbols.[750]

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[744] Levi-Strauss, *The Savage Mind*, 223.
[745] Freud, *Totem and Taboo*, 103.
[746] Levi-Strauss, *The Savage Mind*, 224.
[747] Levi-Strauss, *The Savage Mind*, 224.
[748] Levi-Strauss, *Totemism*, 101.
[749] Levi-Strauss, *Totemism*, 17.
[750] Levi-Strauss, *Totemism*, 74.

For instance, in the Ojibwa myth, clans adopt five animals as their "totems,"as their symbols, in order that they may identify themselves in the name of the five animals.[751]

Natural species selected as totemsappear "sacred" because each speciestakes its own territory and plays so unique a role in the universe that, if it is pulled out from itsterritory, then the entire order of the universe would be disturbed; "being in their place is what makes them sacred."[752]In other words,species aresacred not because they are gods, but because they are unique in their respective territories. The territorial sacredness presupposes the discontinuity between the species because, if the species are not "*separated*" from one another, then, there would be neither the universal order nor the territorial sacredness of the species, but only chaos and disorders in the universe.[753] Sacred species in the universegive rise tothe structural identification of human groups because, while selecting the sacred species as totems, individual groups distinguish themselves from one another and identify themselves in relation to one another. The Ojibwa myth, for instance, introduces the structural identification because, in the myth, each clan has its own totem that clans identify themselves by "differentiating" themselves in relation to one another.[754]The totemic or structural identification has penetrated intothe family system as well. For instance,if one of its siblings is dead, the child is no longer called by its own name, but by "a necronym'"until a new sibling is born, because, in the totemic world, families are defined not by their individual identity, but by differentiating the living from the dead inside the family.[755] Likewise, when a child is born, its parents are no longer called by their own

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[751] Levi-Strauss, *Totemism*, 19.
[752] Levi-Strauss, *The Savage Mind*, 10.
[753] Levi-Strauss, *Totemism*, 26.
[754] Levi-Strauss, *The Savage Mind*, 147.
[755] Levi-Strauss, *The Savage Mind*, 192.

namesbecause, in the totemic world, parents areconsidered as "the substitution" for the child that they identify themselves by differentiating themselves from the child.[756]

From the totemic identificationemerges a kinshipdefined by one's group identity because, while identifying themselves in the name of the sacred totems, all the group memberssee themselves as one flesh, as relatives; "Members of the same clan are therefore said to be "of one flesh," and …"[757]For instance, if a group is named afterthe bear, all the group members see themselves as one fleshbecause, in the totemic world, kinship is defined notby one's biological ties, but by one's group identity named after thesacred totem: the bear. In this classificatory kinship defined by one's group identity, the word "father" designates not only the biological father but also other men,whose wife "might have married" and produced children, because, in the totemic world, a man is defined as father not byhis biological ties, but byhisgroup identity.[758]The same logic can be applied to other family members, e.g., mother, sister, brother, etc., due to the classificatory kinship inside the totemic system. The classificatory kinship is so strong that, if one of the group members is killed by someone outside the group, the "whole" group of the victimizer is guilty of the bloodshed, while the "whole" group of the victim has the right to demand the purificationof the bloodshed.[759]

Thetotemic world calls for"the union of opposites"because, while distinguishing or opposing themselves from one another,individualgroups can be put together and integrated into a systemic whole.[760]Levi-Strauss takesthe theory of Yin-Yang in China asthe most commonexample for the union of oppositionsin that, in the theory of Yin-Yang, things are

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[756] Levi-Strauss, *The Savage Mind*, 194.
[757] Levi-Strauss, *Totemism*, 42.
[758] Freud, *Totem and Taboo*, 6.
[759] Freud, *Totem and Taboo*, 105.
[760] Levi-Strauss, *Totemism*, 88.

opposed to one another in the form of binary pairs, e.g., man vs. woman, day vs. night, etc., that

they can be put together andintegrated into "an organized totality (*tao*)."[761]Theunion of

oppositions in the totemic world, Girard labels "spacing" in that, while integrating themselves

into a systemic whole, the oppositegroups lose "the arrows of time"and"spatialize" their

individual "difference."[762]Then the question is how the oppositegroupsovercome their opposition

and unite themselves into a systematic whole. According to Levi-Strauss, the answer is exogamy

because exogamy overcomes the individual oppositionand establishes "diversity and unity"

between the opposite groups.[763] To clarify Levi-Strauss'position onexogamy, we begin with the

idea of incest taboo because he insists on the coincidence of incest taboos and exogamy. Levi-

Strauss distinguishes nature from culture in that, while nature introducescontinuity, culture

introducesalliance. Nature introduces continuity, for itcan "give only what has been

received."[764]Natural continuitycalls for endogamy because, while pursuing the natural continuity,

the group members marry each other and remain in theties of"consanguinity."[765]

On the other hand, culture introduces alliance, for it goes beyondthe

naturalcontinuity and move towardthe tribal diversity, in which individual groups can give and

receive"more than" they give and receive.[766] The cultural alliance calls for"the incest prohibition"

because, while moving toward the tribal diversity, individual groupsforbid endogamy, which

disturbs the cultural alliance.[767]According to Levi-Strauss, endogamy remains so "inactive" that,

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[761] Levi-Strauss, *Totemism*, 89.
[762] Girard, *The Scapegoat*, 73; Girard, *Things Hidden Since the Foundation of the World*, 111.
[763] Levi-Strauss, *The Savage Mind*, 116.
[764] Levi-Strauss, *The Elementary Structures of Kinship*, trans. James Harle Bell, John Richard von Sturmer, and Rodney Needham (Boston: Beacon Press, 1969),30.
[765] Levi-Strauss, *The Elementary Structures of Kinship*, 30.
[766] Levi-Strauss, *The Elementary Structures of Kinship*, 30.
[767] Levi-Strauss, *The Elementary Structures of Kinship*, 30.

if individual groups stick to endogamy, they cannot but risk their own existence because, while

pursuing endogamy, individual groups isolate themselves from "the give-and-take pattern," upon

which each group survives.[768]The cultural prohibition againstincestcalls for exogamy because,

while forbidding incest marriages, individual groupshave no option other than to exchangetheir

daughters and sisters "in marriage" among the tribal groups[769] In other words, Levi-Straus

acceptsthe traditional theory that exogamy originates from incest taboos, not vice versa.

Strangely enough, however, Levi-Strauss ignores thehistorical anteriority of incest

taboosto exogamy and insists on the coincidence ofthe twoin that, as soon as the idea of incest

taboos dawns on us, so does the idea of exogamy; "A group within which marriage is prohibited

immediately conjures up the idea of another group, …"[770] In other words, Levi-Straussinsists on

the coincidence of incest taboos and exogamynot based on the historical evidence, but based on

the simultaneous appearance of the two. Furthermore, he even seems to reverse thehistorical

anteriority of incest taboosto exogamy when he arguesthat incest taboos "may have derived"

from exogamyin that incest taboos are "less" negative rules to punish incestuousmarriages "than"

positive rules to exchange women among the tribal groups.[771]

As a marriage exchange, exogamy presupposes rules of "reciprocity"because marriage

exchange takes placeunder thestrictrules of reciprocity to ensure the same duties and rights

between relevant groups.[772]The marriage rulesbring about the unity of opposite groups because,

while exchangingmarriageunder the strict rules of reciprocity, the relevantgroups establish "the

[768] Levi-Strauss, *The Elementary Structures of Kinship*, 488.
[769] Levi-Strauss, *The Elementary Structures of Kinship*, 51.
[770] Levi-Strauss, *The Elementary Structures of Kinship*, 51.
[771] Levi-Strauss, *The Elementary Structures of Kinship*, 19, 481.
[772] Levi-Strauss, *The Elementary Structures of Kinship*, 410.

artificial kinship relationship of brothers-in-law."[773]The artificial kinship built on exogamy makes it arguable that the children of a tribal group can be "potential spouses" for the children of the other group because, inthe totemic world, marriage is defined not by the couple, but by the male representatives to the two relevant groups, to which the couple belong.[774]

Levi-Straussadmits an "analogy" between incest taboos and food taboos in that both aim to establishthe cultural order of exchange.[775]According to Levi-Strauss,totemism prohibitsincest because, in the totemic world, both men and women are considered as one flesh that, if they are coupled into husbands and wives, then the couple"detaches" themselves from the cultural order of marriage exchange and returnsto the natural order of consanguinity.[776]The same logic can be applied to food taboos against animal totems because the group members and their totems are considered as one flesh that, if they are coupled into the "eater" (the group members) and the "eaten" (the animal totems), then, the group members detach themselves from the cultural order of animal exchange and returnto the natural order of consanguinity.[777]The kinshiptie between human groups and their animaltotemsoriginates from the primitive belief in the ancestral incarnation into totemic animals because, if human ancestors are "reincarnated" into totemic animals, then human descendants and the totemic animals are to be considered as one flesh.[778]The analogy between incest taboos and food taboos makes it arguable thatthe same kind should not be "mixed" with the same kind, whether it is woman or totem,because, while

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[773] Levi-Strauss, *The Elementary Structures of Kinship*, 67.
[774] Levi-Strauss, *The Elementary Structures of Kinship*, 67.
[775] Levi-Strauss, *The Savage Mind*, 130.
[776] Levi-Strauss, *The Elementary Structures of Kinship*, 488.
[777] Levi-Strauss, *The Savage Mind*, 130.
[778] Levi-Strauss, *The Savage Mind*, 88.

mixing the same kind with the same kind, the community isolates itself from the cultural order of exchange and risks its existence.[779]

Girard opposes Levi-Straus' position on taboos in that taboos are aimed not to bring the cultural order of exchange, as Levi-Strauss says, but to protect the group members fromthe internal violence and rivalries. For Girard,women are not the object of marriage exchange,butthe object ofrivalry among men, because women with their feminine beauty are so tempting to men that they provoke "rivalries" among men.[780]The male rivalryfor women calls forincest taboos because tribalgroups try to avoid the male rivalry by establishing taboos against incest marriages. Girard attributes incest taboos not to all the female members of the group, but only to"the most accessible" women, e.g., mothers and sisters, in that mothers and sisters are so intimateto the male members of the group that they provoke sexual rivalriesamong the male members.[781]In other words,incest taboos are imposed not on all the female members of the group, but onlyon those, who belong to the biological family. Incest taboos imposed on the biological familygive rise to a kinship defined by one's blood ties because, while excluding mothers and sisters from being married,tribal groups establish a kinshipdefined bythe blood ties between parents and children, between brothers and sisters, etc. The consanguineous kinship supported by Girard is anterior to the classificatory kinship supported by Levi-Strauss because we already identify ourselves based on our blood tiesbefore we see ourselves as one flesh in the name of the sacredtotem and establishthe classificatory kinship defined by our group identity.

The same logic can be applied to foodtaboosagainst totemic animalsbecause, just as women are the object of the internal rivalry, so are totemic animals.Totemic animals appear

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[779] Levi-Strauss, *Totemism*, 42.
[780] Girard, *Things Hidden Since the Foundation of the World*, 74.
[781] Girard, *Things Hidden Since the Foundation of the World*, 74.

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"more intimate" than any other animals inside a group, for they are monopolized by the members of the group thatboth the group members and the animals make "constant contact" with each other.[782]Intimate totems are often killed and eaten because, in the ceremonialoccasions, the group members try to create "a sacred bond" among themselves by eating the flesh of totems.[783]The ritual eating of totemsis the "cause" of the internal rivalrybecause, while eating the flesh of totems, the group members polarize themselves around the totems and become rivals for the totems.[784] The internal rivalry fortotemsentails taboos against totemic animalsbecause the community tries to avoid the internal rivalry by prohibiting the "possessive or aggressive" eating of the totemic animals.[785]In other words, foodtaboos against totemic animalsare aimed not to establishthe cultural order of animal exchange, as Levi-Strauss says, but to protect the group members fromthe internal rivalry for totems.

Freud is the one who makes clear the violent link to taboos. According to Freud, the primal father played as"the feared and envied model" to his sons, for he was not onlythe object of the sons' desire but also the obstacle to theirsexual gratification.[786] The patriarchal family was replaced with the "fraternal" community because, out of fear and jealousy of the father, the sons conspired to kill the father and established the fraternal community.[787]The patricide leads itself to the eating of the father's body because, after the father's death, the sons tried to obtain "a portion" of the father's "strength" by devouring the flesh and bones of the father.[788] The eating of the

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[782]Girard, *Things Hidden Since the Foundation of the World*, 75.
[783] Freud, *Totem and Taboo*, 137.
[784] See Girard, *Things Hidden Since the Foundation of the World*, 76.
[785] See Girard, *Things Hidden Since the Foundation of the World*, 74.
[786] Freud, *Totem and Taboo*, 142.
[787] Freud, *Totem and Taboo*, 146.
[788] Freud, *Totem and Taboo*, 142.

father is the origin of totem meal because the sons tried to createthe sacred bondamong themselves by sharingthe flesh of totems as "the substitute" for the father.[789]

The fraternal community gave rise to two great taboos. On the first hand, itgave rise to taboos against patricidal wishesbecause, while establishing the fraternal community at the cost of the father, the sons venerate the father into "God" and establishtaboos against patricidal wishes.[790]It alsogave rise to incest taboosbecause the incestuous wishes are the very cause ofpatricidal wishesthat the sons give up their "claim" to the women, the object of the incestuous wishes, and establish incest taboos.[791]It is indisputable thatLevi-Strauss knows the violent link to taboos when he talk about "penalties"and punishments on those who violate taboos.[792]However, heminimizesthe violentlink to taboos because, for Levi-Strauss who pursues the Saussurean structuralism,violence is onlyone ofmany binaryoppositions, e.g., violence vs. peace, violence vs. justice, etc., that he does not give any"particular significance" to it.[793]

2.   Sacrifice

Natural species areadopted as sacrifice as well, for they are good to createarelation of continuitybetween"two polar terms."[794] The sacrificial speciesare only "intermediary," for they are selected to reconcile two polar terms.[795]Then the question is whythe reconciliation demands the intermediary sacrifice. According to Levi-Strauss, this isbecause, if two polar terms are reconciled without sacrifice, they are affected by each other until they lose the initial distanceand

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[789] Freud, *Totem and Taboo*, 143.
[790] Freud, *Totem and Taboo*, 147.
[791] Freud, *Totem and Taboo*, 143.
[792] Levi-Strauss, *The Elementary Structures of Kinship*, 9.
[793] Girard, *The Scapegoat*, 73.
[794] Levi-Strauss, *The Savage Mind*, 225.
[795] Levi-Strauss, *The Savage Mind*, 225.

turn to a relation of "contiguity," a relation of "resemblance."[796]Marriage rules in Australia

reflect the fear of resemblance. In Australia, man is advised to avoid any contact with his

mother-in-law because, otherwise, his wife and his mother-in-law wouldresemble each other in

their desire forthe same man and end up to the violent "rivals" for the same man.[797]

To make the intermediary sacrifice, first, the community must secure a relation of

"continuity" between man, who makes sacrifice, and the god, who accepts the sacrifice, by

sacralizing the intermediary species.[798] And then, the relation of continuity must be destroyed by

eliminating the intermediary species because from the elimination of the intermediary species

emerges"a continuous passage"in order that man and the god, the two polar terms, may be

reconciled without the fear of resemblance.[799]For instance, funeral rites belong to the

intermediary sacrifice, for they are aimed to bring a "passage" between past and present

generations, the two polar terms.[800]The intermediary sacrifice serves to create the emotional

solidarity among the groupmembers because, while bringing the continuous passages at the cost

of the intermediary species, the group members attach their "*individual sentiments*" to the

intermediary species and create the sacred bond among themselves.[801]Sacrilegious rituals, such as

incest and bestiality, are "*intermediary* operations," for they are aimed to create the internal

solidarity at the cost of the intermediary victims.[802]

Levi-Straussputs sacrifice in opposition to totemism in that totemism restson the

discontinuity betweenthespecies, but sacrifice rests on the continuity between the species. As

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[796] Levi-Strauss, *The Savage Mind*, 225, 226.
[797] Levi-Strauss, *The Savage Mind*, 265.
[798] Levi-Strauss, *The Savage Mind*, 225.
[799] Levi-Strauss, *The Savage Mind*, 224.
[800] Levi-Strauss, *The Savage Mind*, 247.
[801] Levi-Strauss, *Totemism*, 60.
[802] Levi-Strauss, *The Savage Mind*, 225.

implied above, totemism rests on the discontinuity between the species because the species are selected as totems based on their respective roles and territoriesentirely separated from one another. Levi-Strauss defines totemism as "a quantified system" in that, in the totemic world, all species are so unique and equally sacred that they would be neither assessed by their material qualities nor successively graded in orders, but simply counted in numbers.[803]The quantified system or totemism never replaces the species for one another because, in the quantified system, if we "belong to" the bear, we cannot belong to other totems.[804]Levi-Strauss' theory of totemcannot escape human desire to imitate because, while adopting the species as our totems, we divest the species of their individual difference and make them the same being, the mimetic identity, which exists without the individual difference.

On the other hand, sacrifice rests on the continuity between the species because, in sacrifice, the species can be assessed by their material qualities andgraded into "a series of successiveidentifications;""a cucumber is worth an egg as a sacrificial victim, an egg a fish, a fish a hen, a hen a goat, a goat an ox."[805]The sacrificial species can be replaced for one another because, while grading thespecies into a series ofsuccessiveidentifications, we strip the species of their material substance and make them "false" that we can freelyreplace the false species for one another.[806] For instance, in sacrifice, a cucumber can be replaced for an ox, "if there is no ox,"due to the falseor illusory identity of the species.[807]Sacrifice cannot escape human desire to imitate, either,because, while selecting the species as sacrificial victims, we alsodivest the species of their individual differencein diachrony and reduce them to the same being, the false or

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803 Levi-Strauss, *The Savage Mind*, 224.
804 See Levi-Strauss, *The Savage Mind*, 223.
805 See Levi-Strauss, *The Savage Mind*, 224.
806 See Levi-Strauss, *The Savage Mind*, 228.
807 See Levi-Strauss, *The Savage Mind*, 224.

illusory being, the mimetic identity, which is gatherable to human essence. Then, there is no clear distinction between totemism and sacrifice because, just as totemism aims to gratifyhuman desire for being at the cost of the species, so does sacrifice.

D. Derrida

Traditionally,signs are regarded as signs of presence because signs designate the presence of what once existed in human history; "The sign is usually said to be put in the place of the thing itself, the present thing."[808] For instance, sign of God is regarded as sign of God's presence, for it designates God's presence which once existed in human history. Against the traditional theory of presence, Derridasuggests a theory of absence in that signs are not signs of presence, but signs of absence. According to Derrida, signs are signs of absence because what once existed in human history no longer exists that we recognize its absence only in various signs that designate what once existed in human history; "The sign represents the present in its absence."[809] For instance, "a letter" designates the absence of the historical event of writing because the historical event of writing no longer exists that we recognize its absence only in the letter that designates the historical event of writing.[810]

The absence of the historical event calls for the Levinasian idea of diachronybecause the historical event no longer exists that it would be neither offered to vision nor synchronizedto the present, but entirely fleet away to diachrony before the synchronization takes place. Derrida also dismisses the idea of diachrony only because it is too elusive to recognize what escapes vision and its synchronization. As a result, Derridacannot but reduce the diachronic order of the

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[808] Derrida, *Margins of Philosophy*, trans. Alan Bass (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1982), 9.
[809] Derrida, *Margins of Philosophy*, 9.
[810]Grace M. Jantzen, *Becoming Divine: Towards a Feminist Philosophy of Religion* (Bloomington and Indianapolis, 1999), 186.

historical event to synchrony because, for Derrida who dismisses the idea of diachrony, nothing, including the historical event,goes todiachrony, but can beremembered and remain in the present as a phenomenal being. The theory of absence as synchrony never reaches the intrinsic meaning of signs because the meaning of signs can beguaranteed by the absolute presence of historical event, which exists with its fleeting materials in diachrony, that the absence of the historical event signals the absence of the intrinsic meaning of signs. Lack of the intrinsic meaning, however, does not dissuade Derrida from searching forthe meaning of signsin that,while designating the absence of the historical event, signscreate "differences" among themselves and make themselves appear different from one another.[811]In other words, it turns out that Derrida pursues the Saussureanstructuralism because he defines signsnot based on their individual difference, but based on the internal difference from one another. Thestructural meaning of signs, Derridacharacterizesas deferral in that what is differentiated from one anothernever showsits presence, but always "defers" its presence in relation to one another.[812]

Derrida makes a pun on a French word "differ*a*nce" in order to illustrate how signs are deferred inside the text. According to Derrida, the French word "differ*a*nce" is a kind of "spelling mistake" because the letter *a* of the French word has substituted for the letter *e* of the word "differ*e*nce."[813] Before the spelling mistake, the word "differ*e*nce" was the noun form of the French verb "*differer,*" which means both "to differ" and "to defer" in English.[814] After the spelling mistake, however, the "differ*e*nce" becomes the noun of the verb "differ," which means not the same, whilethe "differ*a*nce" becomes the noun of the verb "defer,"which means a delay

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[811] Derrida, *Margins of Philosophy*, 11.
[812] Derrida, *Margins of Philosophy*, 9.
[813] Derrida, *Margins of Philosophy*, 3.
[814] Derrida, *Margins of Philosophy*, 7, fn. 7.

or postponement.[815] For Derrida, the spelling mistake will be never heardbecause we already lost the """early trace""" of the two letters that we recognize the absence of the two letters only in the writing.[816] The silence of the spelling mistake introduces the deferral of signs because, thanks to the absence of the trace, neither the sign "*a*" nor the sing "*e*" shows its presence, but always defers its presence in relation to the other.

The deferral of signsurges Derrida to insist that the binary system in the West should be disrupted because, in the Western binary system, nothing asserts its presence, but only defers its presence in relation to one another. In the Western binary system, one of binary pairs has "the upper hand" over the other because, when it prevails, the system becomes stable.[817] For example, in the pair of light/dark, light has the upper hand over dark because, when light prevails over dark, the binary system becomes stable.[818]   Against the Western hierarchy, Derrida insists that the rigid slash (/) between the pairs should be disrupted by the "play of absence and presence"because, inside the binary system, there is no historical event but only the binary pairs, which designate theabsence of the historical event, that no binary pair can assert its presence, but only defers it in relation to the other.[819]Here, the word play refers to "the disruption" of any presence in the text.[820] For Derrida, the binary system disrupted by the play enriches meaning because, when the rigid slash is disrupted by the play,binary pairs are neither offered to the Western hierarchy nor assert their absolute presence, but endlessly defer their presence and

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[815] Derrida, *Margins of Philosophy*, 8.
[816] Derrida, *Margins of Philosophy*, 24.
[817]Derrida, *Positions*, trans. Alan Bass (Chicago: The University of Chicago, 1982), 41.
[818] Derrida, *Margins of Philosophy*, 132.
[819] Derrida, "Structure, Sign, and Play in the Discourse of the Human Sciences," in *Writing and Difference*, Trans. Alan Bass (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978), 292.
[820]Derrida, "Structure, Sign, and Play in the Discourse of the Human Sciences," 292.

producetheir"surplus."[821] For example, when disrupted by the play, the pair of light/dark

enriches meaning because light no longer asserts its presence, but endlessly defers it in relation

to dark and produces its surplus. The method resting on the play, Derrida labels "deconstruction"

in that it does not destroy the binary system, but disturbs its hierarchy by the play.[822]

Girard opposesthe theory of absencein that the theory is nothing but a founding

murder.According to Girard, the theory of absencebegins fromthe "spirit of mimetic rivalry"

with social sciences because, just as social sciences deny the absolute presence of the inquiry, so

the theory of absence denies the absolute presence of the historical event.[823] In social sciences,

there is no absolute presence of the inquiry because all scientific outcomes appear different in

differentcircumstances that they are "equally indispensable" to one another.[824]Likewise, in the

theory of absence, there is no absolute presence of the historical event, but only different signs,

which designate the absence of the historical event, thatall signs are equally indispensable to one

another. The theory of absenceseems just and fair, for it shows no favor, no bias, to any

particular signs, but only differentiates all the signs from one another. However, what seems just

and fair is nothing but a "founding murder" because, while designatingthe absence of the

historical event, signs already assassinatethe arrows of time in historical event and efface the

"traces" of the murder.[825] The founding murder in Derrida, Girard labels "linguistic terrorism" in

that it is committed not by the violent mob, but by the play of signs.[826]The linguistic terrorism

committed by the play cannot but return to its own mimesis because what is purged ofits arrows

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[821]Derrida,"Structure, Sign, and Play in the Discourse of the Human Sciences," 289.
[822] Derrida, *Of Grammatology*, trans. Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1976), 24.
[823] Girard, "Theory and its Terror," 200.
[824] Girard, "Theory and its Terror," 200.
[825] Girard, *Things Hidden Since the Foundation of the World*, 65.
[826] Girard, "Theory and its Terror," 212.

of time and subjected to the play of signs cannot be the historical event, which already elapsed to diachrony, but its sacred that can be offered to vision and assimilated into the same being, the mimetic identity that exists without the fleeting otherness of the historical event.

IV. Biblical Diachrony

In the previous chapter, the issues were how cultural synchrony ends up to the violent mimesis, and how the violent mimesis has dominated over the structuralist theories in the West. In the present chapter, the issues will be how biblical diachrony defeats cultural synchrony, and how it teaches the ethic of self-denuding. In the Girardian reading of the Bible, time is diachrony because, in his reading of the Bible, nothing is offered to vision or assimilated into the present culture, but entirely fleets away from the present culture. Diachrony in the Bible serves as the antidote to cultural synchrony because, while fleeting away from the present culture, diachrony leaves its voice in the present and defeats the present culture. In other words, diachrony defeats cultural synchrony not by violence, but leaving its voice in the present, i.e., by revealing the limit of the present. The diachronic revelation in the Bible calls for the ethic of self-denuding because what defeats cultural synchrony without violence can be identified only when we give up cultural synchrony and denude ourselves to the voice in diachrony. The biblical ethic of self-denuding can be fulfilled in the logos of love, which corresponds to the "Here I am,"because, while denuding ourselves to the voice in diachrony, we forget our formal language and unwittingly utter the "Here I am," the logos of love. To clarify diachrony identified in the Girardian reading of the Bible, three issues will be discussed: A. diachrony in the Bible; B. the ethic of self-denuding in the Bible; and C. the logos of love.

A. Diachrony in the Bible

Girard admits "similarities" between the Bible and myths in that, just as myths are inseparable from the founding murder, so is the Bible.[827] The myth of Romulus, for instance, is inseparable from the founding murder; Romulus kills his twin brother Remus and builds the city of Rome. So is the Bible. In Genesis 4, Cain kills his twin brother and builds the Canaanite culture. In the gospels, Jesus after his death brings "a new cultural order" and becomes the founder of the Christian church.[828] However, Girard clearly separates the Bible from myths in that, while myths are aimed to cover up the founding murder on the murderer's side, the Bible is aimed for the "revelation" of the founding murder on the victim's side.[829] The myth of Romulus covers up Romulus' fratricide by blaming Remus as the cause of violence, although Remus is honored later for the cultural orders; the city of Rome was named after Remus. On the contrary, the Bible uncovers the truth of Cain's fratricide on the victim's side; "Your brother's blood cries out to me from the ground"; "When you work the ground, it will no longer yield its crops for you" (Genesis 4: 10, 12). In other words, Girard separates the Bible from myths not because the Bible is entirely free of violence, but because of its power to uncover the truth of violence that might have been covered up behind myths.

Then the question is how the Bible uncovers the truth of violence. The answer is through the victim because, in the Bible, the victim is the one who uncovers the truth of violence. In culture, the victim is offered to vision and divinized for the cultural orders. On the other hand, in the Bible, the victim is neither divinized nor assimilated into the cultural orders, but remains in his/her non-sacred identity and serves as the very witness to the truth of violence. For instance,

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[827] Girard, *The Girard Reader*, 146.
[828] Girard, *Things Hidden Since the Foundation of the World*, 221.
[829] Girard, *I See Satan Fall Like Lightning*, 135.

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as a biblical victim, Joseph is neither offered to vision nor "sanctified" for the cultural orders, but remains in his "human" or non-sacred identity and serves as the very witness to the truth of violence.[830]   Abel, Job, and Jesus are also human or non-sacred victims who unmask the truth of violence until violence reaches its limit and comes to an end.[831]

Goodhart reads Joseph's story (Genesis 37- 45) in terms of the Girardian theory of revelation. In Genesis 37, Jacob shows his "desire" for Joseph; he loves Joseph more than other sons and makes him "an ornate robe" (vs. 3).[832] Jacob's desire for Joseph gives rise to another's desire because Joseph takes his father as a model and imitates his father's desire for him. For instance, Joseph imitates his father as a model when he brings bad reports of his brothers (37: 2), just as Jacob "indirectly" brings bad reports of the brothers by favoring Joseph over the brothers.[833]Joseph's dream also serves as a "dramatic representation" of Jacob's desire for Joseph because, in his dream, Joseph imitates his father's desire for him by braggingabout his "superiority" to the brothers; "my sheaf … stood upright, while your sheaves gathered around mine and bowed down to it" (37: 7).[834]

Joseph's brothers also imitate Jacob's desire for Joseph when they interpret Joseph's dream in terms of their envy and jealousy of him (37: 11). The mimetic contagion inside the family turns into the vicious cycle of reprisals. Joseph's blooded tunic, for instance, is a "return" to Jacob's desire for Joseph.[835] Joseph's "sacrificial" activities against the brothers are also reprisals for the brothers' previous violence on him; the silver cup in Benjamin's sack reminds

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[830] Golsan, *René Girard and Myth*, 94.
[831] See Golsan, *René Girard and Myth*, 92, 96, 99.
[832] Goodhart, "I am Joseph: René Girard and the Prophetic Law," 65.
[833] Goodhart, "I am Joseph: René Girard and the Prophetic Law," 66.
[834] Goodhart, "I am Joseph: René Girard and the Prophetic Law," 64, 66.
[835] Goodhart, "I am Joseph: René Girard and the Prophetic Law," 70.

the money, for which Joseph was sold; Simeon as a hostage in Egypt reminds the sale of Joseph to the foreigners.[836] The vicious cycle, however, comes to an end when Joseph unveils his identity, "I am Joseph!" (45: 4), because, as soon as Joseph unveils his identity, the vicious cycle, which has been concealed inside the family, finally uncovers itself and comes to an end; "everything converges upon Joseph's disclosure."[837] In other words, in Joseph's story, violence ends its vicious cycle not by another reprisal, but by revealing the limit of it. Joseph's story introduces the victim's revelatory mission because, in the story, no one is sanctified for the cultural orders, but remains in one's non-sacred identity and unveils each other's violence against each other until violence comes to an end.

Then what makes it possible for the biblical victim to carry out his/herrevelatory mission. The answer is diachrony in the Bible because the only way for the biblical victim to uncover the truth of violence is to fleet away from the phenomenal divinizationbefore he/she is offered to vision and divinized to the sacred for the cultural orders. In other words, diachrony is the key to theGirardian theory of revelation because, without diachrony, there would be neither the non-sacred victim who fleets away from the phenomenal divinization nor the revelation of the phenomenal culture, but only the false sacred and the phenomenal culture founded the false sacred. Diachrony in the Bible is a burden to humanity because what fleets away from the phenomenal culture can be identified only when we give up the phenomenal culture and bear the burden of diachrony until we recognize the fission or wounds at the bottom of our being and return to our bodily sensitivity to the voice in diachrony.

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[836] Goodhart, "I am Joseph: René Girard and the Prophetic Law," 73.
[837] Goodhart, "I am Joseph: René Girard and the Prophetic Law," 73.

The diachronic revelation leads the Hebrew Bibleto the Prophets, e.g., Isaiah andHosea, because, as diachrony continues its revelation, all forms of sacrifice are condemned and replaced with "love and harmony" in the Prophets;"I desire mercy, not sacrifice" (Hosea 6: 6).[838] In other words, in the Prophets, sacrifice is replaced with love and harmonynot byour being and its intellectual reasoning, but by the diachronic revelation of the sacrificial culture. The Prophetic revelationin the Hebrew Bible, however,is inseparable from YHWH's violence completely because, in the time of the Hebrew Bible, the revelation of the founding murder is "not yet" completed that human violenceis still attributed to YHWH for the cultural ordersand assimilated into the Hebrew texts, including the Prophets.[839] In other words, the Prophetic revelation is inseparable from YHWH's violence not because people in the time of the Prophets are so wicked that they provoke YHWH's violence, but because of the incomplete revelation in the time of the Hebrew texts, including the Prophets.

The incomplete revelation in the time of the Hebrew texts forces Girard to put the Hebrew texts between sacrificial and non-sacrificial texts in that, in the time of the Hebrew texts, the revelation of the founding murder is not yet completed that YHWH is more or less affected by violence and blamed for the guilt of innocent bloodshed. For instance, Girard puts the Songs of the Suffering Servant (Isaiah 53: 1-11) between sacrificial texts and "radically non-sacrificial Gospels" in that, in the Songs, YHWHbearspart of the guilt for the death ofthe Servant.[840] According to Girard, the Songs blame humanity for the death of the Servant because, in the Songs, it is the members of the community, who "unanimously" polarize themselves against the Servant and victimize him for the cultural reconciliation; "He was despised and rejected by

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[838] Girard, *Things Hidden Since the Foundation of the World*, 199.
[839] Girard, *Things Hidden Since the Foundation of the World*, 200.
[840] Girard, *Things Hidden Since the Foundation of the World*, 227.

mankind" (vs. 3); "Surely he took up our infirmities and carried our sorrows" (vs. 4); "… by his wounds we are healed (vs.5).[841] They also blame YHWH for the innocent bloodshedbecause, in the Songs, it is YHWH,who allows the community to kill the Servant; "the Lord has laid on him the iniquity of us all" (vs. 6); "Yet it was the Lord's will to crush him and cause him to suffer" (vs.10). Human and divine guilt forcesGirard to putthe Songs between sacrificial texts and radically non-sacrificial gospels in that, in the Songs, YHWH bears "a certain responsibility" for the innocent bloodshed.[842]Girard defines the gospels as radically non-sacrificial texts in that, in the time of the gospels, violence is "fully" unmasked that God is no longer affected by violence or blamed for the guilt of innocent bloodshed, but remains purely innocent from the guilt.[843]

YHWH's violence in the time ofthe Hebrew texts finallycomes to an end in the time of the gospels because, in the time of the gospels, the diachronic revelation of the sacrificial culture reaches its "climax" that the sacrificial violence is no longer attributed to God or turns into divine violence, but reaches its limitandcomes to an end.[844] In other words, YHWH'sviolencecomes to an end in the time of the gospels not because people in the time of the gospels are so righteous that they do not provoke YHWH'sviolence, but because of the maximum revelation in the time of the gospels. The end of divine violence in the time of the gospels, however, does not meanpeace but"the crisis itself," for it compels humanity to make "an absolute and conscious choice" between twoextreme options.[845]The oneoption isthe unlimited power of "destruction" because, when divine violence comes to an end, "cultural constraints," which have been sustained with divine anger and punishment, become so loosened that people

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[841] Girard, *Things Hidden Since the Foundation of the World*, 226.
[842] Girard, *Things Hidden Since the Foundation of the World*, 227.
[843] Girard, *Things Hidden Since the Foundation of the World*, 216.
[844] Girard, *Things Hidden Since the Foundation of the World*, 268.
[845] Girard, *Things Hidden Since the Foundation of the World*, 201.

freely imitate each other's violence and end up to the unlimited power of

reciprocaldestruction.[846]The other option is "theKingdom of God" because divine violence,

which reaches its limit and comes to an end, cannot butreverse itself to the kingdom of God.[847]

Between the two extreme options, human choice goes to the kingdom of God

because, thanks to the diachronic revelation,the "vanity"of violence becomes so clear to

humanity that it is easy for humanity to give up the unlimited power of destruction and choose

the kingdom ofGod.[848]In other words, in the time of the gospels, people choose the kingdom not

based on the intellectual reasoning, but based on the diachronic revelation of the limit or vanity

of violence. The kingdom of God opened at the limit ofviolenceis far from the dreamer's

imaginary "Utopia" because what is opened at the limit of violence would be neither offered to

vision nor disclosed into the imaginaryUtopia, but entirely fleet away fromthe imaginary Utopia

before it is disclosed by the play of vision.[849]If we follow the Levinasian logic, it signals "in the

form of subjectivity" because what escapes vision and itsimaginary Utopia can be identified only

when we give up thephenomenalUtopia and listen to the voice of the other, who obsesses us with

proximity until we are cored out ofthe phenomenalUtopiaand ruptured into our responsible

subjectivity or goodnessirreducible to the phenomenal Utopia.[850]

Human choice of the kingdom, however, does not stopviolenceimmediately because,

even after choosing the kingdomof God, humanity is yet fully wakened to its responsible

subjectivity or goodness that the sacrificial violence is still attributed to the third party for the

cultural orders, although it is no longer attributed to God. The limit of the kingdomin the time of

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[846] Girard, *Things Hidden Since the Foundation of the World*, 201.
[847] Girard, *Things Hidden Since the Foundation of the World*, 201.
[848] Girard, *Things Hidden Since the Foundation of the World*, 201.
[849] Girard, *Things Hidden Since the Foundation of the World*, 199.
[850] Levinas, *Otherwise Than Being*, 52.

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the gospelscalls forthe idea of the future kingdom on earthbecause, while accepting the limit

ofthe kingdom in the time of the gospels, people begin to anticipate what will be completedon

earth in the form of the responsible subjectivity throughout the history. Girard supports the

future kingdom on earth when he insists that after the gospels, it will take "many centuries"for

humanity to give up the sacrificial culture and choose peace and harmony on earth.[851]As limited

as it is, the kingdom of God identified in the time of the gospelsis still meaningful because

violence already turns into the kingdom of God in the time of the gospels that, after the gospels,

human violence no longer turns into divine violence or returns to the previous cycle of bloody

culture, but defers its bloody cycle until it turns into peace and harmony; "From now on, it

becomes impossible to put the clock back."[852]The impossible return to the bloody culture

confirms again the diachronic foundation of Girard because, in his reading of the Bible,

violencedoes not repeat its bloody cycle, but finally comes to an end and entirely elapses to the

diachronic past; "There is an end to cyclical history..."[853]

The diachronic revelation, which gradually proceeds from the Hebrew Bible toward

the gospels, makes it clear that we must read the Bibleretrospectively because, otherwise, it is

impossible to recognizethe historical spectrum between the Hebrew Bible and the gospels. In the

Girardian reading of the Bible,revelation presents itself in a spectrum, for it begins from the time

of the Hebrewtexts and gradually reaches its climax in the time of the gospels, not vice versa.

The historical spectrum of revelation can be identified only when we read the Bible

retrospectively becauseonly when we read the Hebrew texts in light of the gospels can we clearly

recognize the historical spectrum of revelation,which evolves from the time of the Hebrew texts

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[851] Girard, *Things Hidden Since the Foundation of the World*, 252.
[852] Girard, *Things Hidden Since the Foundation of the World*, 206.
[853] Girard, *Things Hidden Since the Foundation of the World*, 206.

and completes in time of the gospels.In other words, we must read the Bibleretrospectively not because the Hebrew Bible is inferior to the gospels, but because the historical spectrum of revelation in the Bible can be identified only when we read the Hebrew Bible in light of the gospels. Girard supports the retrospective reading of the Bible when he insiststhat the New Testament should not be read "in the light" of the Old Testament.[854]

Then, the question is what kind of the role Jesus played for the revelation, if the Bible uncovers the bloody culture through the victim. The answer is that Jesus wasthe last victim because, while dying on the cross, Jesus unmasks the bloody cycle ofculture at the very foundation that, after Jesus, there would be "no more sacrifices" in the world.[855]In the Girardian reading of the gospels, Jesus died not for the blood atonement because God in the Bible is not the violent sacred that demands Jesus' blood sacrifice for the sin of the world; "the sacred plays no part in the death of Jesus."[856]Rather, he died for the revelation of the bloody culture because the biblical God ends the bloody culture by revealing the limit of the bloody culture through human or non-sacred victims, including Jesus. Girard reads the story of the Gerasene demoniac (Mark 5: 1-17) in terms of Jesus' revelatory mission in the world. According to Girard, Gerasais a city of "indifferentiation, for it has been stripped of all the social distinctions and ended up to a crisis of distinctions.[857]The crisis of distinctionsin the city finds itself in the demoniacas well. There is no distinction between his life and death, for he is a kind of "living corpse" running around the graves.[858] Nor is any distinction between his liberty and imprisonment, for he has been freed of

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[854] Girard, *Things Hidden Since the Foundation of the World*, 227.
[855] Girard, *Things Hidden Since the Foundation of the World*, 210.
[856] Girard, *Things Hidden Since the Foundation of the World*, 231.
[857] Girard, *The Scapegoat*, 175.
[858] Girard, *The Scapegoat*, 168.

all the social restrictions, but still seized by "his own madness."[859] The mimetic crisis, or the crisis of distinctions, inside the demoniac calls for violence because people in the city try to control the demoniac by binding him with chains.

The people's violence on the demoniac, however, does not heal his madness, but only reinforces his self-injuries, because, whenever the townspeople try to control him with chains, the madman breaks the chains and injures himself with stones. In other words, as Girard says, there has been a kind of "cyclical pathology" inside the community because, the more the people bind him with chains, the more the madman breaks the chains and injures himself with stones.[860] The pathological cycle inside the community changes nothing because, while confronting each other's violence with another reprisal, the people and the madman take "the precarious balance" and remain in the same cycle of reprisals.[861] According to Girard, the townspeople could put an end to the pathological cycle at once by binding him with chains "strong enough" to keep him from the self-injuries.[862] However, they deliberately keep the vicious cycle and make their violence "somewhat ritualistic" only because, while using their violence regularly on the madman, the community has been purged of its internal chaos or indifferentiation and differentiated from one another for the cultural orders.[863] In other words, as Girard says, there has been a "conspiracy" inside the community because the community has kept its cultural orders at the cost of the madman's self-injuries.[864]

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[859] Girard, *The Scapegoat*, 168.
[860] Girard, *The Scapegoat*, 168.
[861] Girard, *The Scapegoat*, 181.
[862] Girard, *The Scapegoat*, 169.
[863] Girard, *The Scapegoat*, 169.
[864] Girard, *The Scapegoat*, 171.

The city's sacrificial system, however, comes to an end when Jesus heals the madman completely because "the complete cure" of the madman corresponds to the complete collapse of the sacrificial systemthat has been maintained with the madman's self-injuries.[865] In other words, Jesus puts an end to the sacrificial system not by another reprisal, but by revealing the limit of the latter. The total collapse of the sacrificial system explains why townspeoplecannot celebrate Jesus' healing of the madman, but only beg him to stop "interfering" with them and leave the city immediately (vs. 17).[866] The selfhood depending on the victim mechanism, Girard labels "the crowd mentality" in that it is tied so closely with each other that even the minimum chance of violence disturbs the entire community and drags it into a violent mob.[867]

Girard also reads the story of the adulterous woman (John 8:3-11) in terms of Jesus' revelatory mission. In the text, Jesus is surrounded by a group of men and asked whether they may stone thewoman who has been caught at the scene of adultery. Jesus does not answer to the question, for he knows "a trap" in it (vs. 6). If he says "No," the crowd will accuse him for breaking Moses' law against adultery. Otherwise, he will violate his preaching on compassion. Between the law and his preaching, Jesus quietly bends down and starts to write on the ground. The text does not say why. According to Girard, however, Jesus bends down to the ground to avoid eye contact with the crowd because, if he directly confronts the "gaze" of angry men, they would be provoked by their own anger reflected in Jesus' eyes and immediately cast their stone on the woman.[868]In other words, Jesus bends down to the ground in order that he maynot disturb the angry crowd for the safety ofthe woman from the angry crowd.

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[865] Girard, *The Scapegoat*, 169.
[866] Girard, *The Scapegoat*, 169.
[867] Girard, *The Scapegoat*, 183.
[868] Girard, *I See Satan Fall Like Lightning*, 59.

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However, as the crowd keeps demanding his response, Jesus simply says, "If any one of you is without sin, let him be the first to throw a stone at her" (vs. 7). But nobody dares to be the first to throw his stone. The text does not say why, either. One again, Girardmakes an irrefutable comment that this is because the first stone is "the most difficult" to throw.[869] The first stone is the most difficult to throw, for it must be thrown without "*a model*."[870]Therefore, once the most difficult stone is thrown without a model, the next stones will beeasierto throw because, once a man throws his stone at first, he becomesa model to the group, then,another man will follow the model and throw his stone "more quickly" than the first and become another model, andthen,a third man will throw his stone more quickly than the second and become another model, andthe process will continue until all the group members participate in the stoning and purge themselves into peace and reconciliation for the cultural orders.[871] In other words, the first stone is what triggers the contagion of violence because, once thrown, the first stone gradually produces more models and speeds up the "rhythm" of stoning until violence reaches its climax and turns into peace and reconciliation.[872]

The first stone, as what triggers the contagion of violence, is a burden because to throw the first stone is to bear the whole responsibility for the next stones that will follow. The burden of the first stone calls foranothertype of contagion, i.e., "a contagion of nonviolence," because, when a man among the crowdgives up the stoning and goes away, the rest of the crowd take the man as "a model" and give up the stoning.[873] However, the real model for the contagion of nonviolence is none other than Jesus himself because Jesus is the one who vulnerably opens

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[869] Girard, *I See Satan Fall Like Lightning*, 56.
[870] Girard, *I See Satan Fall Like Lightning*, 56.
[871] Girard, *I See Satan Fall Like Lightning*, 57.
[872] Girard, *I See Satan Fall Like Lightning*, 57.
[873] Girard, *I See Satan Fall Like Lightning*, 57.

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himself to the suffering of the unfortunate woman and shows his compassion on the woman until

the angry crowd take Jesus as a model and give up the stoning.   According to Girard, Jesus'

compassion on the woman is self-risking because, if the crowd had pursued Moses' law and

stoned the woman, Jesus would have run "the risk" of being stoned, following the same fate as

the woman.[874]Jesus' self-risking compassion finally ends violence because, while risking himself

for the woman, Jesus has the angry crowd give up Moses' lawof stoning and saves the woman

from the angry crowd. In other words, Jesus ends violence not by another reprisal, but by

revealing the limit of the sacrificial law of stoning.

Jesus' revelatory missionfinally leads itself to his Passion because the only way for

Jesus to unmask the truth of violence without vengeance is to "expose" himself to violence until

he dies on the cross.[875]The Passion begins with the crowd's welcome to Jesus; "the great crowd"

welcomed him with palm branches (12: 12). But the crowd suddenly turned into a violent mob

against Jesus because they unwittingly took Caiaphas as a model and imitated his desire to keep

the current system at the cost of Jesus. In John's Gospel, Jesus performed so "many signs" (11:

47) that he became popular among many of the Jews; he brought Lazarus from the dead (11: 37-

43). Furthermore, he was even considered to be "the Messiah, the Son of God" (11: 27).

However, in the eyes of the Jewish leaders, the popular messiah was a threat not only to the

Temple system but also to the entire community because "the excessive popularity" of Jesus

would disturb the Roman authority and threaten the Jewish community as a nation, whose

existence depended on the Roman authority (11: 48).[876]

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[874] Girard, *I See Satan Fall Like Lightning*, 59.
[875] Girard, *Things Hidden Since the Foundation of the World*, 242.
[876] Girard, *The Scapegoat*, 112.

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To deal with the dangerous messiah, the Jewish leaders called a meeting of the Sanhedrin. In this meeting, Caiaphas the High Priest made a "political" decision on the dangerous messiah;"it is better for one man to die for the people than for the whole nation to be destroyed" (John 11:50).[877]Caiaphas' political decision was so obvious and irrefutable that the communitytook him as "their model" and imitated his desire keep the current systemat the cost of a single victim.[878] In other words, the crowd suddenly turned into a violent mob against Jesus not because they found him guilty, but because they unwittingly imitated Caiaphas' secret desire to keep the system at the cost of Jesus. Caiaphas' political decision is "the definitive revelation" of the sacrificial origin because no matter how passionately we oppose the victim mechanism in our consciousness, we cannot resist our desire for the victim mechanism in our everyday life that we unwittingly rely on it and find ourselves in the same position as Caiaphas.'[879]

Girard defines Caiaphas the High Priest as "the perfect sacrificer" in that Caiaphas knows how to turn the community into a violent mob against a single victimand keep the current system with the minimum violence, i.e., at the cost of a single victim.[880] Human desire to keep the current system at the cost of a single victim was so powerful that nobody could not resist it. Pilate, for instance, tried to save Jesus, but he could not resist the "mimetic contagion."[881]Even Peter, the first disciple, also imitates the crowd's "hostility" to Jesus and results in his denial of Jesus.[882] Therefore, if there isany "difference" between Peter and Judas, Peter repents for his

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[877] Girard, *The Scapegoat*, 113.
[878] Girard, *The Scapegoat*, 113.
[879] Girard, *The Scapegoat*, 114.
[880] Girard, *The Scapegoat*, 114.
[881] Girard, *I See Satan Fall Like Lightning*, 20.
[882] Girard, *I See Satan Fall Like Lightning*, 19.

guilt and returns to Jesus, but Judas cannot return to Jesus by killing himself.[883] Furthermore,

Judas' suicideis simply senseless because it is not God but Judas himself, who condemns himself

by killing himself; "men are never condemned by God."[884]

The killing of Jesus, however, produces nothing "beneficial" for the cultural orders,

but, quite contrarily, brings about the complete revelation of the bloody culture, because, while

dying on the cross, Jesus unmasks everybody's (including Peter's) secret desire to keep the

cultural system at the cost of the victim; "the thoughts of many hearts will be revealed (Luke 2:

35);""I will utter things hidden since the foundation of the world" (Matthew 13:35).[885]In other

words, Jesus died not for the bloody culture, but for the complete revelation of the latter. Jesus

on the cross should be the "last"victim for the revelationbecause, for the first time in history, the

origin of bloody culture is fully unmasked through Jesus that there would be no further victim for

the revelation.[886] On the other hand, the cross, on which the last victim died for the complete

revelation, should be "the supreme scandal," for it stupidly stumbles on the innocent victim and

ends up to the complete revelation of the bloody culture.[887] The complete revelation on the cross

makes it arguablethat, in the Bible, violence is its own "enemy," for it comes to an end by

revealing itself at the very foundation.[888]

So ironically, however, the last victim for the complete revelationof the bloody

culturewas resurrected from the bloody culture because the origin of the bloody culturehas

beencompletely unmasked through Jesus that there is no place for him to stay in the bloody

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[883] Girard, *Things Hidden Since the Foundation of the World*, 247.
[884] Girard, *Things Hidden Since the Foundation of the World*, 247.
[885] Girard, *Things Hidden Since the Foundation of the World*, 211.
[886] Girard, *Things Hidden Since the Foundation of the World*, 211.
[887] Girard, *Things Hidden Since the Foundation of the World*, 429.
[888] Girard, *Things Hidden Since the Foundation of the World*, 202.

culture; "the Christ can no longer continue to sojourn in a world …"[889] In other words, Jesus was resurrected from the bloody culture not based on his blood atonement for the sin, but based on his completerevelation of the bloody culture. The resurrectionof Jesus has nothing to do with the Christian messiah affected by vision because the one, who unmasks the bloody culture at the bottom, would be neither offered to vision nor exalted to the Christian messiah, but entirely fleet away from the Christian messiah before the Christian messiah is disclosed by the play of vision. Instead, it designates the non-sacred identity of Jesus because, while fleeting away from the Christian messiah affected by vision, Jesus liberates himself from the phenomenal divinization anddeclares himself as anon-sacred other who lived and died with his formlessmaterials, such as blood and flesh entirely exterior to the Christian messiah affected by vision.

Jesus' non-sacred identity serves as the antidote to the Christian messiah because the non-sacred Jesus in diachrony leaves his voice in the present and defeats all the present data, including the Christian messiah affected by vision, until we give up the Christianmessiah and listen to the voice of the non-sacred Jesus in diachrony. In other words, Jesus puts an end to the Christian messiah not by violence, but by revealing the limit of the latter. The non-sacred identity in the Bible is not limited to Jesus but available to other biblical victims because, in the Bible, no one is offered to vision or divinized to the sacred, but remains as a non-sacred other who lived and died with his formlessmaterialsirreducible to the phenomenal sacred. Girard also supports the non-sacred identity of other biblical victims when he talks about the "innocence" of all victims because for the biblical victims to remain innocent from the guilt of bloody culture is

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[889] Girard, *Things Hidden Since the Foundation of the World*, 206.

to escape vision and its phenomenal sacred and remain with their materialor formless properties, such as blood and fleshirreducible to the phenomenal sacred.[890]

The Girardian theory of revelation has servedto free some of the Hebrew textsfrom the traditional or sacrificial reading. Deuteronomy, for instance, has been read sacrificially, due to the sacrificial laws in it. However, according to Charles Mabee, Deuteronomy must be read non-sacrificially, for it has been establishednot by the cultural sacred, but by the non-sacred other in diachrony. In Deuteronomy, Moses' tombis neither marked with gravestones nor remembered by the community, but entirely forgotten to the community; "nobody knows Moses' tomb these days" (34: 6). Moses' tombas forgotten introduces Moses as a non-sacred other in diachrony because Moses, the "heroic founder," is neither divinized to the sacred nor assimilated into the cultural orders, but entirely fleets away from thecultural sacred and remains in his non-sacred identity.[891]The non-sacred identity of Moses serves as the antidote to the cultural sacred because the one, who fleets away from the culturalsacred, can be identified only when we give up the cultural sacred and return to our sensitivity to the voice of the non-sacred other in diachrony. In other words, in Deuteronomy, Moses defeats the cultural sacred not by violence, but byrevealing the limit of the latter. Moses'revelatory mission in Deuteronomy encourages Mabee to define Deuteronomyas a non-sacrificial text in thatDeuteronomy has been established not by the "primitive" sacred, but by the non-sacred other in diachrony.[892]

The book of Joshua also has been read sacrificially, due to the sacrificial laws in it. However, according to Gordon H. Matties, Joshua must be read non-sacrificially, for it does not blindly obeyMoses'sacrificial law, but rathermodifies it and listens to the prophetic voice in

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[890] Girard, *The Girard Reader*, 206.
[891] Mabee, "Text as Peacemaker: Deuteronomic Innovations in Violence Detoxification," 75.
[892] Mabee, "Text as Peacemaker: Deuteronomic Innovations in Violence Detoxification," 75.

diachrony. In Joshua, the Israelites make some treaties with outsiders, e.g., Rahab the foreign

prostitute (Joshua 2) and the people of Gibeon (Joshua 9). The coalition between the Israelites

and outsidersbrings "a crisis of distinctions" to the Israelite community, for it strips the

Israelitesoftheirethnic distinctionsand makes themundifferentiated.[893] The crisis of distinctions,

however, does not threat the Israelites' non-sacred identity, but rather reinforces it, because,

while integrating some outsiders with treaties, the Israelites escape unnecessary warfare and

protect themselves from "the threat of reciprocal vengeance."[894]Then the question is how to

validate the coalition because Moses' law strictly prohibits the Israelites from any treaties with

foreigners. The answer is diachrony in the Bible because, as diachrony continues to reveal the

limit of the sacrificial culture, the Israelites inevitably modify Moses' sacrificiallaw and listen to

the prophetic voice in diachrony. In other words, the treaties are valid, for theyare aimed not to

keep the cultural harmony at the cost of Moses' law, but to listen to the prophetic voice in

diachrony. The prophetic voice in Joshua encourages Matties to definethe book of Joshuaas a

non-sacrificial text in that Joshua does not blindly obeyMoses' sacrificial law, but "calls into

question" the sacrificial law and listens to the prophetic voice in diachrony.[895]

B. The Ethic of Self-denuding in the Bible

Girard never talks about the ethic of self-denuding in the Bible, for he is the one who

fails to see diachrony in the Bible, upon which the ethic of self-denuding stands. Yet, he still

providesa clue to the biblical ethic because, in his theory of revelation, Jesus is presented as a

modelfor the biblical ethic of self-denuding. To clarify the Girardian Jesus as a model for the

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[893] Gordon H. Matties, "Can Girard Help Us to Read Joshua?," in *Violence Renounced*, ed. Willard M. Swartley
(Telford, Pa.: Pandora Press; Scottdale, Pa.: Herald Press, c2000), 96.
[894] Matties, "Can Girard Help Us to Read Joshua?," 92.
[895] Matties, "Can Girard Help Us to Read Joshua?," 91.

biblical ethic, we begin with the controversial debatebetween Girard and Raymund Schwager on the Hebrews. According to Girard,there is huge "difference" between Jesus' bloodshedand the previous sacrifices in the Hebrew Bible because, while the previous or Hebrew sacrificesaim to purge the sin of the community, Jesus' bloodshedaims to unmask the sacrificial culture.[896]The revelatory mission of Jesus, however, has been wiped out in the Hebrews because the Hebrews fails to seethe radical difference between Jesus' bloodshedand the previous sacrifices and only tracks down "structural analogies"between the two.[897]

Inthe Hebrews, Jesus is described as the one who offers himself to God (Hebrews 7: 27, 9:14; 10: 12). Jesus' self-offering to God encourages the Hebrews to interpret Jesus' death in terms of his blood atonement inthat Jesus' blood, which is offered to Godat the bottom of his hear, is so pure and "unblemished" (9:14) that it can cleanse"our consciences" "once for all," (9: 12, 14). According to the Hebrews, Jesus' blood atonement can "accomplish"the previous or Jewish sacrifices because, while cleansing us from the guilty conscience at once, Jesus brings us to the "eternal salvation" (5: 9), which is impossible through the Jewish sacrifices.[898]The Jewish sacrifices cannot guarantee the eternal salvation because the blood of animals, which is offered "once a year"for the sin of the community (9: 7), is so limited that it can neither cleanse the guilty conscience at once nor provide the eternal salvation, but simply serves as "an annual reminder" of the sin (10: 3).

Girard opposes the Hebrews'sacrificial view on Jesus in that, while interpreting Jesus' death in terms of "the Old Law" of blood atonement, the Hebrewsfails to see the difference between Jesus' death and the Jewish sacrifices and tracesstructural analogies between the

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[896] Girard, *Things Hidden Since the Foundation of the World*, 228.
[897] Girard, *Things Hidden Since the Foundation of the World*, 229.
[898] Girard, *Things Hidden Since the Foundation of the World*, 228.

two.[899]Another problem in the Hebrews is that it blames "God"for Jesus'bloodshedbecause, while tracing structural analogies between the two types of sacrifice, the Hebrews strips Jesus' death of its revelatory mission and reduces it toone of the Jewish sacrifices that demand the blood sacrificefor God's wrath.[900]If the Hebrews blames only Godfor Jesus'bloodshed, it would be defined as a purely sacrificial text because, while blaming God for Jesus' bloodshed, the Hebrews strips God of his/her diachronicotherness and reduces God to the violent sacred that must be appeased by another sacrifice. However, the issue is notsimple because, according to Girard, the Hebrews blames not only God but also humanity for Jesus' bloodshed. According to Girard, the Hebrewsrecognizes "human responsibility" for Jesus'bloodshedbecause, in the Hebrews, it is the community that puts Jesus on the cross (6:6).[901] Divine and human guilt in the Hebrewsforces Girard to situate itbetween sacrificial and non-sacrificial texts in that, in the Hebrews, God remains half-guilty and half-innocent in relation to Jesus' bloodshed.

Schwager, on the other hand, defines the Hebrews as a purely non-sacrificial text in that, in the Hebrews, God appears purely innocent in relation to Jesus' bloodshed. To clarify his non-sacrificial view onthe Hebrews,Schwager beginswith the biblical teaching on mercy; God wishes not sacrifice, but "mercy" (Micah 6: 8). The biblical teaching on mercy is a burden to humanity because the only way for humanity to obey the biblicalteaching on mercy is to give up vengeanceand bear the burden of "persecution."[902]According to Schwager, theburden of the biblical teachingcompels the Hebrews to read Jesus'deathin terms of his self-offering to God because, while dying on the cross, Jesus voluntarily offers himself to Godand sheds his blood in

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[899] Girard, *Things Hidden Since the Foundation of the World*, 227.
[900] Girard, *Things Hidden Since the Foundation of the World*, 231.
[901] Girard, *Things Hidden Since the Foundation of the World*, 230.
[902]James G. Williams, "Dialogue on Sacrifice and Orthodoxy: Reflections on the Schwager-Girard Correspondence," *Contagion: Journal of Violence, Mimesis, and Culture*21 (2014): 50.

order that he maygive up vengeance and "takeuponhimself" the burden of persecution.[903] In

other words, in the Hebrew, Jesus offers himself to God not to immolate himself to God, but to

bear the burden of persecution on himself.

If we follow Schwager's position on the Hebrews, God remains purely innocent from

the guilt of Jesus'innocent bloodshed because, in the Hebrews, Jesus diednot to appease God's

wrath, but to bear the burden of persecution in order that he may obey God's teaching on

mercyand put an end to the culture of persecution. God's innocence in the Hebrews encourages

Schwager to define the Hebrews as a purely non-sacrificial text in that, in the Hebrews, God

remains purely innocent from the guilt of Jesus'innocent bloodshed. In sum, from Schwager's

point of view, the Hebrews is not a half-sacrificial text, as Girard says, but a non-sacrificial text,

due to the divine innocence from the guilt. The non-sacrificial viewon Jesus' death leads the

New Testament to renounce the "cultic" language of *thuo* (to immolate) and choose the ordinary

word "*phero*" (to carry or bear) in reference toJesus'death in that Jesus died not to immolate

himself to God, but to put an end to the sacrificial culture.[904]

Between the two different positions on the Hebrews, we do not need to judge who is

right or wrong because both Girard and Schwager readthe Hebrews either half-sacrificially or

purely non-sacrificially, based on the Hebrews' various themes and subsequent arguments. What

we need to do is to make a claim that Schwager's non-sacrificial view on the Hebrews offers a

clue to the biblical ethic of self-denuding because, while interpreting the Hebrew's idea of Jesus'

self-offering in terms of the biblical teaching on mercy, Schwager overcomes the sacrificialview

on Jesus'bloodshed and supports a non-sacrificialview on it. Furthermore, Schwager's non-

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[903]Williams, "Dialogue on Sacrifice and Orthodoxy: Reflections on the Schwager-Girard Correspondence," 50.
[904] Marlin E. Miller, "Girardian Perspectives and Christian Atonement," in *Violence Renounced*, ed. Willard M. Swartley (Telford, Pa.: Pandora Press; Scottdale, Pa.: Herald Press, c2000), 39.

sacrificial view on Jesus'bloodshed goes hand in hand with Girardbecause, just as Schwager

interprets Jesus' death in terms of the biblical teaching on mercy and justice, so does Girard. In

the Girardian reading of the Bible, Jesus ends violence by revealing the limit ofviolence. The

revelatory Jesus presupposesthe deathlike passivity of the self because violence is revealed only

when one puts up the deathlike passivity and bears the burden of violence without vengeance.

The deathlike passivity of Jesus presupposeshis self-offering to God because, without offering

the self to God in terms of one's absolute obedience, it is impossible to put up the deathlike

passivityand bear the burden of violence without vengeance.

Girard distinguishes the self-offering to God from the self-sacrifice to gods. The self-

sacrifice to godstakes placenot for gods but for the self because, while sacrificing the selfto gods,

we already divinize the selfand make it "godlike."[905]On the other hand, the self-offering to God

occurs not for the self but for the other in diachrony because, while offering the self to God in the

form of the deathlike passivity to God, in the form of the absolute obedience to God, we forget

our being and bear the burden of violence for the other in diachrony. Jesus, who is offeredto

God for the other in diachrony, introduces himself as a model for the biblical ethic of self-

denuding because to be offered to God in the form of the deathlike passivity is to be expelled

from being andvulnerably opened or denuded to the other, who obsesses us with proximity until

we are cored out of our being and ruptured into our sensitivity to the obsessive otherin

diachrony.Jesus as the model for the biblical ethic can be exalted to Godbecause the one, who is

vulnerably denudedto the obsessive other and ruptured intohis sensitivity, almost reaches his

death, his non-being, that he cannot but offerhis material substance to theobsessive other until he

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[905] Girard, *Things Hidden Since the Foundation of the World*, 236.

is substituted for the other or God and identified as the-one-for-the other. In other words, Jesus is exalted to God not based on his charming images affected by vision, but based on his maternal substitution for the other in diachrony. Jesus'divinityas a maternal substitutte for the other cannot be unique, but available to anybody, because whoever denuded to theother and substituted for the other cannot be the same being, but the other or God, the more in the less, or the infinite in the finite, who is identified in the same being, but entirely irreducible to the same being. The Hebrew Bibleintroduces the maternal or substituted divinity available to anybody; "I said, 'You are "gods"'; you are all sons of the Most High'" (Psalm 82: 6). So do the gospels; "it not written in your Law, 'I have said you are "gods"'?"(John 10: 34).

Girard admitsthe maternal or substituted divinity available to anybody when he compares Jesus with the woman who turns out to be the real mother in the story of Solomon's judgment (1 Kings 3:16-28). In the story of Solomon's judgment, two women are presented as "doubles" because no difference can be identified between the two; both are harlots; they are living in the same house; each woman has her own child.[906] The doubles come to Solomon and claim their ownership to the living baby in the same words; "The living one is my son, the dead one is yours;" "No! …, the living one is mine" (vs. 22, 23). To solve "the mimetic crisis and the rivalry" between the doubles, the king orders to cut the baby in two and give half to the one and half to the other.[907] From the theoretical logic, the king's order has no problem, for it shows no prejudice, no discrimination, but fully satisfies reason and its formal justice; "There is an element

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[906] Girard, *Things Hidden Since the Foundation of the World*, 238.
[907] Girard, *Things Hidden Since the Foundation of the World*, 238.

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of logic and justice ...."[908] However, from the maternal point of view, it still hides "a terrible injustice" since the baby is a living one that cannot be divided in two.[909]

In the crisis of sacrifice, a woman accepts the king's order because what matters to the woman is to keep "the symmetry of the doubles" by depriving the other woman of her child, just as she was deprived of her child by accident.[910]This woman cannot be the sensible other or God in diachrony, but the same being, because, while accepting the king's order, she "reveals" her secret desire to keep the symmetry of the doubles at the cost of the baby.[911] On the contrary, the real mother renounces her previous claim to the living baby and begs the king to giveitto the other woman because, for the real mother, nothing is more urgent than to save the baby from the sword. According to Girard, when the real mother renounces her previous claim to the baby, she "risks" her own life because, while renouncing the previous claim, the woman confesses to have liedto the king, which may provoke the king's anger and threaten her life itself.[912] Fortunately, the king recognizes her as the real mother and gives her the baby because, when the king orders to cut the baby in two, he intends not to sacrifice the baby but only to break the symmetry of the doubles and bring difference between the fake mother, who aims to keep the symmetry of the doubles at the cost of the baby, and the real mother, who risks herself for the baby.

The real mother cannot be the same being, but the sensible other or God in diachrony, because, while risking her life for the baby, the real mother is already denuded to the obsessive other to the point of her non-being and willing to "substitute" herself for the baby.[913] Girard

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908 Girard, *Things Hidden Since the Foundation of the World*, 238.
909 Girard, *Things Hidden Since the Foundation of the World*, 238.
910 Girard, *Things Hidden Since the Foundation of the World*, 238.
911 Girard, *Things Hidden Since the Foundation of the World*, 238.
912 Girard, *Things Hidden Since the Foundation of the World*, 240.
913 Girard, *Things Hidden Since the Foundation of the World*, 242.

compares the real mother with Jesus in that, just as Jesus substitutes his being for "mankind," so does the real mother for the baby.[914] Girard's comparison of the real mother with Jesus makes it clear that Girard admits the substituted divinity available to anybody because, while comparing the real mother with Jesus, Girard sees her as the other or Godas Jesus. Unfortunately, Girard fails to clarify the substituted divinity available to anybody because Girard is so anxious to defend Jesus' non-sacred divinity from the traditional or sacrificial view that he has no time to clarify the substituted or non-sacred divinity available to anybody.

Human divinity as a substitute for the other tells us that desire isnot necessarily evilbecause, if mediated bythe one who is substituted for the other in diachrony, desire can be cored out of its violent mimesis and turn into the other or God, who is identified in the same being, but entirely irreducible to the same being. In other words, desire is either good or bad, depending on the model who mediates it. Girard presentsJesus and Satan as two great models in that both Jesus and Satannot only imitate God as a model but also teaches us "imitation" as a model.[915]Therefore, if there is difference between the two,Satan imitates God out of his "rivalry," but Jesus does out of his "childlike and innocent obedience" prior to the satanic rivalry.[916] Satan as God's imitator remains internal to the community because, while imitating God out of its rivalry, Satan incites "rival desires" insidecommunityand formsasubject-object correlation with the imitatorsuntil it loses its godly distance and remains undifferentiated from theimitators.[917]

As the internal mediator, Satan is the cause of"the violent contagion" because, while remaining undifferentiated from the imitators, Satan knows how to bring false accusations

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[914] Girard, *Things Hidden Since the Foundation of the World*, 241.
[915] Girard, *The Girard Reader*, 215.
[916] Girard, *The Girard Reader*, 197.
[917] Girard, *Deceit, Desire, and the Novel*, 107.

against a single victim and drags the entire community into "a hysterical mass" against the single victim.[918] Herodias Salome's mother and Caiaphas the High Priest can be identified as Satan since they know how to bring false accusations against the single victim and stir up the entire community into a violent mob. So powerful in its violent contagion, Satan brings about"the self-organizing system" of culture because, while dragging the entire community against the single victim, Satan purges the community of its violent mimesis and organizes it into a calm and harmonious system for the cultural orders.[919]Thenpeople are nothing but the children of Satan, for they are mimetically deceived by Satan and become the "playthings" of their own mimesis.[920] The satanic culturecannot but give way to the kingdom of God in the Bible because, as the Bible continues its revelation, people gradually accept the limit of the satanic culture and choose the kingdom of Godin the Bible.

On the other hand,Jesus remains external to the community because, while imitating God out of his childlike sensitivity, Jesus neither incites rival desiresinside the communitynor reduces himself to the self-organizing system of culture, but keeps his distance from the imitatorsand remainsin his "closed" plane entirely independent of the self-organizing system of culture.[921]Jesus'external mediation can be identifiedamong historical figures as well because historical figures, such as heroes, have been "long-dead" that theycan neither enterthe mimetic rivalry with present generations nor assimilated into culture, but always remain "far above" the sacrificialculture.[922]According to Girard, the distance between the mediator and the imitatorscannot be necessarily "physical"because, no matter how closely the mediator and the

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[918] Girard, *I See Satan Fall Like Lightning*, 35.
[919] Girard, "Is There Anti-Semitism in the Gospels?," 349.
[920] Girard, *I See Satan Fall Like Lightning*, 40.
[921] Girard, *Deceit, Desire, and the Novel*, 107.
[922] Girard, "Innovation and Repetition," *SubStance* 19 (1990): 15.

imitators stay in a physical space, the spiritual or intellectualdistance between the two parties

separates the one from the other that they remain in each other'sclosed planet and enjoy each

other's own "happiness" without the danger ofassimilation.[923] For instance, in *Don Quixote*, "the

social and intellectual distance" between Don Quixote and Sancho separates them from each

other that they remainin each other's closed planet and enjoy each other's happiness in each

other's planet.[924]

The two great models, namely, Jesus and Satan,introduce human freedom to choose since

they present themselves as a model and encourage us to imitate. Girard recommendsus to choose

Jesus as the only model in that Jesus is "the only being"who stands above the acquisitive

desire,upon which we imitate each otherand end up to the symmetry ofviolent doubles.[925]

However, it is not extremely difficult to choose Jesus as a model because to imitate Jesusas a

model is to be torn up from our being, in which we feel at home, and exiled to what is entirely

foreign to our carefree being, in whichwe arevulnerably denuded to the obsessive other in

diachrony until we are cored out of the carefreebeing and substituted for the obsessive other in

diachrony. On the contrary, to choose Satan as a model is easy and simple because to imitate

Satanis to pursue the same desire for being at the cost of the obsessive other in diachrony. The

difficulty in imitating Jesus makes it arguable that we must deliberately imitate Jesus because,

otherwise, we cannot but imitate Satan and remain as "the puppets" of our own mimesis.[926]

<div align="center">C. The Logos of Love</div>

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[923] Girard, *Deceit, Desire, and the Novel*, 9, 107.
[924] Girard, *Deceit, Desire, and the Novel*, 9.
[925] Girard, *Things Hidden Since the Foundation of the World*, 219.
[926] Webb, *Philosophers of Consciousness* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1988), 219.

Girard begins his theory of logos with a critique of Heidegger. According to Heidegger, the world is governed by two Greek principles: *phusis* and logos. As mentioned above, *phusis*is Being itself because whatever emerges from the concealed graduallycomes into Being. P*husis*asBeing is so uncertain that it cannot guarantee its identitybecause Being is not yet completed that it is always there as becoming, but still nowhere. The uncertainty of the Greek Being is not an accidentbecause, in the Greek philosophy, Beingis identified not based on beings' formless materials, such as flesh and tissues, which remain day and night independently of vision, but based on the play of vision, in which beings are divested of the formless materials and disclosed into image-like datathat require vision to be seen.

Just as phusis is Being itself, so is logos. According to Heidegger, the Greek word "logos"designatesa"gathering" event, in which beings are put together and organized into the Being of beings.[927] Thegathering event or logospresupposes"revealing" because, while gathering beings intothe Being of beings, we project our vision on beings and reveal beings, which have been concealedmuntil beings are purged of theirconcealment and disclosed into the Being of beings.[928] The Greek revealing is the origin of "Being-human" because our being, as it is, is sofragile and uncertain that we must gather up our Being by revealing beings from the concealed, and then, absorbingwhat is known by the play of revealing.[929] In other words, in the Greek philosophy,we become Being-human not based on ourresponsibility for the obsessive other in diachrony, but based on our knowledge on others or beings, which isgathered by the play of revealing. The Greek revelation differs from the biblical revelation because, while the biblical

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[927] Heidegger, *Introduction to Metaphysics*, 135.
[928] Heidegger, *Introduction to Metaphysics*, 181.
[929] Heidegger, *Introduction to Metaphysics*, 186.

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revelation aims to unmask the truth of violenceon the side of the victim, the Greek revelation

aims to gather up our Being-human at the cost of beings.

TheGreeklogos calls for violence because, while gathering our Being-human at the cost

of beings, we already exercises violence by "de-ciding" or cutting off part of beings, which does

not fit to our Being-human.[930] In other words, for the Greeks, violence is not necessarily physical,

for it is done by logos, the gathering event. Heidegger attributes the Greek or gathering violence

to "the strong" in thatbeingsas the concealedappear so overwhelming that only those, who know

"no kindness" "no appeasement," can exerciseviolence on the overwhelming beings and gather

up the Being of beings, which is re-absorbable to Being-human.[931]As violent as it is, the Greek

logos is Being itself because what is gathered into Being-human by violence is nothing but the

Being of beings as a whole, which includes not only human beingsbut also non-humanbeings,

such as mysteries and gods. According to Heidegger, theGreek logos as Beinghas been

misinterpreted in the New testament, especially in the Prologue to John's Gospel, wherelogos

designates notthe Being of beings as a whole, but"*one* particular being," Jesus the Son of God,

who plays the role of "the mediator" between God and humanity.[932] Heidegger attributes John's

logos as the mediator to the Greek translation of the Hebrew Bible (200s BC), where logos is

translated into "a commandment," and thus, plays the role of "themessenger" to conveyGod's

commandmentsor words to humanity.[933]

Girard opposes the Heideggerian theory of logos as Being in that the Greek Logos

designates not Being itself affected by vision, but "the actual object"irreducible to the

[930] Heidegger, *Introduction to Metaphysics*, 185.
[931] Heidegger, *Introduction to Metaphysics*, 142, 174.
[932] Heidegger, *Introduction to Metaphysics*, 143.
[933] Heidegger, *Introduction to Metaphysics*, 143.

phenomenal Being.[934]The Girardian or actual Logos, of course,belongs to diachrony because

what exists as the actual object would neither offered to vision nor assimilated into Being, but

entirely elapse to diachronybefore the assimilation takes place forBeing. The diachronic order of

the actual Logos can be identified as the mediator between God and humanity because, while

elapsing to diachrony, the actual Logos leaves its voice or message in the world and plays the

role of the mediator between humanity, who remainsas being in the world, and God who lives as

a fleeting voice in diachrony. The Gospel of John introduces Jesus as the intermediary Logos

between God and humanity in that, from the beginning, Jesus was "with God," who was "the

Word,"and came to the world to transmit God's Word or Logos to humanity (1: 1, 2). Jesus,

who came as the intermediary Logos, has nothing to do with violence, for he came to the world

not as a triumphant warrior to subjugate humanity by force, but as God's voice, as God's Word

in diachrony irreducible to the triumphant warrior as being in the world.

TheJohannine Logosas God's Worddefeats the logos of violence affected by vision

because the one, who came as God's Word in diachrony, would be neither offered to vision nor

gathered by thelogos of violence, but entirely fleet away from the logos of violence that

wecannot but give up the logos ofviolenceand listen to the voice of the JohannineLogos. In other

words, the Johannine Logos defeats the logos of violencenot by violence, but by revealing the

limit of the latter. The way, in which the Johannine Logos reveals the logos of violence, is by

"having itself expelled" by violence,because the only way for the Johannine Logos to reveal the

limit of the logos of violence is to give up the self-defense and put up the deathlike passivity by

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[934] Girard, *Things Hidden Since the Foundation of the World*, 263.

having itself expelled by violence.[935]The Johannine Logos expelled by violence,Girard labels the Logos of lovein that only lovecan overcome "the spirit of revenge" and put up the deathlike passivity by having itself expelled by violence.[936]The Logos of love is far from"ignorance" because what escapes the spirit of revenge also escapeswhatever involved in irrational passions.[937] Quite contrarily, it signals truth itself because, having itself expelled by violence,the Logos of love unmasks the "real knowledge" of violence,which might have been covered up behind the false sacred.[938]

Of course, the Logos of love cannot be unique to the Johannine Gospel, for itcan be identified in the Hebrew Bible as well. The Suffering Servant in Isaiah 53, for instance, serves as the Logos of love because, just as Jesus gives up the self-defense and has himself expelled by violence, so does the Servant until he is "cut off from the land of the living" (vs. 8). Therefore, if there isdifference between the Logos of love in John's Gospel andthe Logos of love in Isaiah,the Logos of love in John's Gospel completes the revelation of the scapegoat mechanism, whichthe Logos of love in Isaiah cannot. The Logos of love in Isaiah cannot complete the revelation of the scapegoat mechanism because, although the Logos of love in Isaiah unmasks the mimetic violence inside the community, humanity in the time of Isaiah are not yet fully awakened to its responsibility for the victim that it still attributes part of its responsibility to God. On the other hand, the Logos of love in John's Gospel completes the revelation because, having itself expelled by violence, the Johannine Logos or Jesus unmasks everybody's (including Peter's) secret desire for the scapegoat mechanism, upon which every human culture stands.The Logos of love in the

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[935] Girard, *Things Hidden Since the Foundation of the World*, 271.
[936] Girard, *Things Hidden Since the Foundation of the World*, 277.
[937] Girard, *Things Hidden Since the Foundation of the World*, 277.
[938] Girard, *Things Hidden Since the Foundation of the World*, 277.

Bible corresponds to the "Here I am" because, just as the "Here I am" is uttered in the deathlike passivity of the subject, so is the Logos of love.

Not surprisingly, according to Girard, the expulsion of the Johannine Logos is clearly expressed when the text insists that, when Jesus came to the world, the world did neither "recognize" nor "receive" him (John 1: 10-11). Nevertheless,most of exegetes in the Westfail to see the expelled Logosin the Biblebecause what is expelled from the world would be neither offered to vision nor disclosed to be seen, but entirely fleets away from vision that it is extremely difficult to recognize. The Westernignorance of the expelled Logos calls for the sacrificial viewon the Bible because, without knowing the expelled Logos and its revelatory power, we cannot but confuse the expelled Logos and the logos of violence and assimilate the expelledLogos into logos of violence. Girard attributes the sacrificial view on the Bible to the medieval philosophy, in whichthe Logos of love in the Bible and the logos of violence in the Greek philosophy are assimilated into the symmetry of violent doubles. In the earlystage of Christianity, the church isso suspicious of "Greek thought" that it allowsChristianity to be interpretedinto the Greek philosophy only in limited proportions.[939]During the Middle Age, however, the limited proportions are gradually reversed "in favor of" the Greek philosophy.[940] The medieval philosophy becomes the core of the Western philosophy because, since the medieval philosophy, the Logos of love in the Bible and the logos of violence in the Greek philosophy are assimilated to each other and find themselves in the symmetry of "warring doubles," upon which the Western philosophy has been installed.[941]

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[939] Girard, *Things Hidden Since the Foundation of the World*, 263.
[940] Girard, *Things Hidden Since the Foundation of the World*, 263.
[941] Girard, *Things Hidden Since the Foundation of the World*, 266.

The Westernphilosophy cannot escape the sacrificial view on the Bible because, while assimilating the two types of logos into the symmetry of warring doubles, the Western philosophy begins to "obscure" the biblical texts and reads them in terms of the sacrificial effect.[942] The sacrificial view on the Bible has been inherited to Heidegger because, while differentiatingtwo types of logos, namely, violence in the Greek logos and violence in the Johannine Logos, Heidegger assimilates the Johannine or non-violent love into the logos of violenceand results in the sacrificial view on the Bible. According to Girard, when Heidegger mentions the Greek translation of the Hebrew Bible, in whichlogos meansa commandment, he already interprets the Hebrew Bible in terms of "divine authoritarianism" because, while mentioning the Greek translation of the Hebrew Bible and itslogos as a "commandment, Heidegger definesthe Ten Commandments asthe "interiorized form of tyranny," and YHWH as "an oriental despot."[943]Heideggerextends divine authoritarianism in the Hebrew Bible to John's Gospel in that, in John's Gospel, God's commandments, such as 'Love the enemies,'are too much for humanityto bearthat they correspond to "a tyrannical command" to humanity.[944]

The divine authoritarianism identified in John's Gospel forces Heidegger to suggest two types of violence, namely, violence in the Greek logos andviolence in the Johannine Logos, in that violence in the Greek philosophy is done by "free men" on beings, but violence in the Johannine logos is done by God on "slaves."[945]The two types of violencecalls for the sacrificial view on the Bible because what have been differentiated can be assimilated to each other and find themselves in the symmetry of warring doubles. In other world, the Heideggerian theory of

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[942] Girard, *Things Hidden Since the Foundation of the World*, 266.
[943] Girard, *Things Hidden Since the Foundation of the World*, 265, 266.
[944] Girard, *Things Hidden Since the Foundation of the World*, 269.
[945] Girard, *Things Hidden Since the Foundation of the World*, 266.

logos is nothing but another version of the Western philosophybecause, just as theWestern philosophy pursues the relationship of "mutual tolerance" between the two types of Logos and results in the sacrificial view on the Bible, so does Heidegger pursue the relationship of mutual"antagonism" between the two types of violence and result in the sacrificial view on the Bible.[946]So ironically, the Heideggerian theory on the two types of violence can be overcome by the expelled Logos because what is expelled from the world would be neither differentiated from the logos of violence nor assimilated into the symmetry of warring doubles, but reveals the limit ofthe Heideggerian theory on thetwo types of violence until we give up the two types of violence and listen to the voice of the expelled Logos.

The Logos of love in the Bibleseems to justify violence because, while having itself expelled by violence, the Logos of love provokes its own bloodshed. The sacrificial view on the Logos of logos, however,is invalid because, the more the Logos of love isexpelled by violence, the more it reveals the truth of violence until violence comes to an end. Then, it is also true that the more violence covers up itself by expelling the Logos of love, the more it reveals its bloody cycle, because violence also exists by "expelling" the Logos of love.[947]The coexistence between the logosof violence and the Logosof love makes it difficult to distinguish the one from the other because only when the Logos of love bears the logos of violence without vengeance does the logos of violence end its bloody cycle and come to an end. This difficulty leads Heidegger to his sacrificial view on the Bible because, without knowing the "genuine difference" between the two

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[946] Girard, *Things Hidden Since the Foundation of the World*, 266.
[947] Girard, *Things Hidden Since the Foundation of the World*, 274.

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types of logos, Heidegger reads the Bible in terms of divine authoritarianism and reduces it to a sacrificial text.[948]

Then the question is how to interpret divine violence in the Bible, if the biblical Word or Logos serves as the antidote to the Greek or literal violence. If we follow the Girardian theory of revelation, it should be understood in terms of the prophetic warning against human wickedness because divine violence in the Bible is exactly human violence, which has been unjustly ascribed to God that it finally returns to humanity as a divine warning against human wickedness. For instance, YHWH's violence should be understood in terms of the prophetic warning against human wickedness since it is exactly human violence unjustly attributed to YHWH that it never goes to YHWH, but finally returns to humanity as a warning against human wickedness. In the Girardian reading of the Bible, YHWH has nothing to do with violence, for he is the one, who ends violence by revealing the limit of violence. Nevertheless, in the early stage of the Hebrew Bible, YHWH is presented as the one who wishes to destroy all the enemies of the Israelites. In Deuteronomy 20: 16-18, YHWH orders the Israelites to destroy all the residents in the land of Canaan when they arrive in the land. In 1 Samuel 15: 3, YHWH orders Samuel to kill the Amalekites, including infants and children. Following YHWH's orders, in Joshua 6, the Israelites destroy every living creature in Jericho. In Joshua 8, the same massacre is carried out in the city of Ai.

YHWH's violence against outsiders should not be read literally because YHWH has nothing to do with violence. Then it must be read in terms of human responsibility because, while waging wars against outsiders in the name of YHWH, the Israelites ascribe their violence

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[948] Girard, *Things Hidden Since the Foundation of the World*, 267.

to YHWH andjustify their violencefor the cultural orders. In other words, it is not YHWH but only humans, who are responsible for YHWH's violence,because YHWH's violence is exactly human violence that has been unjustly attributed to YHWH and turned into YHWH' violence. Human responsibility forYHWH' violence calls for YHWH's punishment because the one, who is affected by human violence, never goes to diachrony, but always returns to humanity and "punish" humanity for its wickedness to each other.[949]The way, in which YHWH punishes humanity, is not by violence, but by "abandoning" humanity to destroy each other, because YHWH, who ends violence without violence, cannot directly punish humanity that he abandons humanity to destroy each other for its wickedness to each other.[950]

YHWH's abandonment of humanity serves as aprophetic warning against the mutual destruction of humanity because, while destroying each other under the divine abandonment, humanity is so shocked by each other's violence against each other that it gives up themutual destruction and listens to the warning against the mutual destruction. YHWH's warning against the mutual destruction tells us that YHWH'sviolence in the Hebrew Bible is not necessarily negative because human violence, which is falsely attributed to YHWH, never goes to YHWH, but finally returns to humanity andserves as aprophetic warning against the mutual destruction of humanity.The prophetic warning behind YHWH's violence encourages the Hebrew Bible to introduce YHWH's violence with honestybecause, while introducing YHWH's violenceas it is, the Hebrew Bible tries to"bring to light" the truth of human violence, which has been unfairly attributed to YHWH, and warn humanity to give up the reciprocal violence and choose the

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[949] Girard, *Things Hidden Since the Foundation of the World*, 422.
[950] Girard, *Things Hidden Since the Foundation of the World*, 422.

kingdom of God.[951]   In other words,the Hebrew Bible introduces YHWH's violencenot to disgrace YHWH to the violent sacred, but to illuminate or revealthe truth of violence as it is and lead us to the kingdom of God.

The revelatory powerin the Hebrew Biblegraduallyturns YHWH into a loving God because, while bringing to light the truth of violence behind YHWH's violence, the Hebrew Bible liberates YHWH from the grip of human violence little by little and presents him more gracious than before. The loving God in the Hebrew Bible, however,cannot separate himself from violence "completely"because, in the time of the Hebrew Bible, revelation is not yet completed that violence is still attributed to YHWH on certain levels.[952]YHWH'violence lingeringin the Hebrew Bible explains why the Day of YHWH is declared with two opposite incidents: "the paroxysm of God's anger" and "God-given reconciliation."[953]

Girard also reads the apocalyptic violence predicted in the gospelsin terms of the prophetic warning in that thegospels predict the apocalyptic violence not to put an end to the world, but to bringa warning against human wickedness to each other. According to Girard, God does not directly cause the apocalypse, but only "permits" it.[954]The way, in which God permits the apocalypse, is not by violence, but by abandoning humanity to destroy each other because God, who ends violence without violence, cannot directly interfere with the world that he/she abandons humanity to destroy each other until the world comes to an end. Then,natural disasters,

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[951] Girard, *Things Hidden Since the Foundation of the World*, 268.
[952] Girard, *Things Hidden Since the Foundation of the World*, 200.
[953] Girard, *Things Hidden Since the Foundation of the World*, 200.
[954]MackStirlingand Scott Burton, "Scandals, Scapegoats, and the Cross: An Interview with René Girard," 130.

such as hurricanes and tsunamis, have nothing to do with God, for they are caused not byGod not by human behaviors against the cosmic world; "Human culture affects nature."[955]

Human responsibility for the apocalypse forces Girard to insistthat, if Jesus' first audience had accepted his preaching on the kingdom "unreservedly," there would have been neither the Passion nor the apocalyptic predictions, e.g., the tribulation of heavenly bodies (Luke 21: 26), because the gospels' negative messages, such as the Passion and the apocalyptic predictions, were issued not by "divine terror"against the world, but by human rejection ofJesus'preaching on the kingdom.[956]In other words, only humans are responsible for the gospels'negative messages since the negative messages are nothing but the consequences of human rejection of Jesus' preaching on the kingdom. According to Girard, theapocalyptic predictions in the gospels are aimed not to threaten the world with apocalyptic disasters, but to bring theprophetic warning against human wickedness to each other, because, in a society devoid of violence-outlets, only "the permanent threat" of the apocalyptic predictions in the gospels can prevent us from the reciprocal violence and help us choose the kingdom of God.[957]In other words, Girard reads theapocalyptic predictions in the gospels as positive as YHWH's violence in the Hebrew Bible in that both are aimed neither to disgrace YHWH nor to threaten the world with apocalyptic disasters, but to teach human responsibility not only for YHWH's violence but also for the apocalyptic disasters in order that humanity may give up violence and listen to the biblical teaching or warning against violence.

Girard also interpretstoday's threat of nuclear wars in terms of human responsibility in that the threat is caused not by divine anger against humanity, but by human obsession with

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[955]Stirling and Burton, "Scandals, Scapegoats, and the Cross: An Interview with René Girard," 131.
[956] Girard, *Things Hidden Since the Foundation of the World*, 195, 202.
[957] Girard, *Things Hidden Since the Foundation of the World*, 255.

arms rivalry.The nuclear threat, for which humans are responsible, therefore, never signals the

"end" of the world because what is caused byarms rivalry can be overcome as far as we give

upthe rivalry and listen to the prophetic warning in the gospels.[958]Rather,it designates today's

capability to destorythe whole world, which was "unimaginable" in the previous centuries,

because, while pursuing the arms rivalry, the modern society has built up weapons of mass

destruction, such as ICBM, deadly enough to annihilate the entire world at once.[959] Girard

compares today's apocalyptic situation with that of the "most primitive" society in that, just as

the most primitive people imitate each other's violence and end up to the threat of reciprocal

destruction, sothe contemporary people imitate each other's desire for the deadly weapons and

end up the same threat.[960] Therefore, if there is difference between the two, while the primitive

society overcame the threat of reciprocal destruction through "sacrificial resources," such as

rituals and taboos, the modern society has already lost all the sacrificial resources that it must

overcome the threat through non-sacrificial resources, such as intellectual dialogues amongthe

rival groups.[961] Based on his non-sacrificial view on the apocalypse,Girard opposes Rudolf

Bultmann who reads the Christian apocalypse in terms of "the vengeance of God" in that, while

reading the Christian apocalypse in terms ofdivine vengeance, Bultmann strips the Christian

apocalypse of its propheticwarning and reduces it to "an old superstition."[962]

In this chapter, we have introduced diachrony as the key to the Girardian theory of

revelation in that, without diachrony, there would be neither revelation nor the kingdom of God,

but only violence and the sacred. As the key to the revelation theory, diachrony serves as the

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[958] Girard, *Things Hidden Since the Foundation of the World*, 260.
[959] Girard, *Things Hidden Since the Foundation of the World*, 260.
[960] Girard, *Things Hidden Since the Foundation of the World*, 261.
[961] Girard, *Things Hidden Since the Foundation of the World*, 261.
[962] Girard, *Things Hidden Since the Foundation of the World*, 259, 260.

antidote to the sacrificial or anti-Semitic view on the theory because diachrony unmasks the limit of our sacrificial oranti-Semiticreading ofthe theory untilwegive up the sacrificial or anti-Semitic view on the theory and listen to the voice in diachrony. In the Girardian reading of the Bible, revelationintroduces the "difference" between the Hebrew and Christian texts because, while the Hebrewtexts remain in the incomplete revelation of the scapegoat mechanism, the Christian texts find themselves in the complete revelation of it.[963]The revelatory difference in the Bible calls for the outward difference between Judaism and Christianity because, thanks to the revelatory difference in the Bible, Judaism appearscruel and Christianity appears righteous.

In the Girardian reading of the Bible, Judaism appearscruel because, in the time of the Hebrew texts, revelation is not yet completed that violence is still attributed to YHWH and assimilated into Judaism. On the other hand, Christianity appears righteous because, in the time of the Christian texts, revelation is completed that violence is no longer attributed to God or assimilated into Christianity, butreaches its limit and turns into the kingdom of God. Girard makes countless lists of the outward difference between Judaism and Christianity: The word "sacrifice" has evolved from the "influence" of the Hebrew Bible, but the kingdom of God has evolved from the gospels.[964] The Hebrew Bible inseparable from thefalse sacrednever reaches "the complete rationality," but the Christian gospels find themselves in the full revelation of "the universal truth," the truth of founding murder.[965] YHWH is inseparable from "vestiges" of sacred violence, but Jesus remains above the sacred violence.[966] The Hebrew Bible only "moves

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[963] Girard, *Things Hidden Since the Foundation of the World*, 227.
[964] Girard, *Things Hidden Since the Foundation of the World*, 236.
[965] Girard, *Things Hidden Since the Foundation of the World*, 200, 252.
[966] Girard, *Things Hidden Since the Foundation of the World*, 423.

away" from violence, but the gospels break violence into the kingdom of God.[967] The Hebrew Bible is the very text to produce "most features" of divine violence, but the gospelsput an end to divine violence that has originated from the Hebrew Bible.[968] Jesus is "the first man" who disrupts the sacrificial culture at the bottom, and thus, "the most innocent" of all victims, but YHWH remains vengeful on certain levels.[969]And the list goes on and on.

The outward difference between Judaism and Christianity calls for the allegation of anti-Semitism because, while defining Judaism andChristianitybased on the outward difference, we comparethe two types of biblical religion in terms of the internal rivalry and despise Judaism as something inferior to Christianity, and vice versa. In other words, in the Girardian reading of the Bible, the allegation of anti-Semitism results not fromthe unbearable hatred of Jews, but fromthe intellectual comparison between the two types of biblical religion. The anti-Semitic allegation againstGirard, however, can be overcome by diachrony because, in the Girardian reading of the Bible, diachrony reveals the limit of our intellectual comparison with proximity that neither Judaism nor Christianity would be compared or subjected to the allegation, but entirely fleets away from the allegation and remain in each other's fleeting otherness. In other words, diachrony puts an end to the allegation not by violence, but by revealing the limit of it.

To clarify our position, we will show how diachrony defeats the allegation againstGirard. According to Girard,Jesus is"the only Mediator" between the kingdom of violence and the kingdom of God because, while unmasking the bloody culture without vengeance, Jesus eliminates "the barriers" betweenthe kingdom of violence governed by human desire for being

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[967] Girard, *Things Hidden Since the Foundation of the World*, 268.
[968] Girard, *Things Hidden Since the Foundation of the World*, 186.
[969] Girard, *The Girard Reader*, 201.

and the kingdom of God governed bydiachrony and its revelation.[970]Jesus' intermediary mission gives us a possibility to be the children of Godbecause, thanks to Jesus' intermediary mission, we cangive up the kingdom of violence and choosethe kingdom of God by behaving as God wishes and identifying ourselves as the "sons of God," as the children of God.[971]In other words, we become the children of God not based on our responsibility for the other or God in diachrony, but based on Jesus' intermediary mission between the kingdom of violence and the kingdom of God. Imaginably enough, human filialness to God gained by Jesus' intermediary mission entails the allegation of sacrificial or anti-Semitic view on the Bible because, while pursuing our filialness to God gained by Jesus' intermediary mission, we compare Jesus the Christian God with YHWH the Jewish God and exalt the Christian God over the Jewish God. The allegation againstGirard, however, can be overcome bydiachrony because, in the Girardian reading of the Bible, diachrony reveals the limit of our sacrificial or anti-Semitic view on the Bible with proximity that we inevitably give up the sacrificial or anti-Semitic view on the Bible and listen to the fleeting voice in diachrony.

The diachronic antidote to the anti-Semitic allegation makes it clear that, if Judaism appears cruel and barbaric, this is not because Jews are more brutal than others, but because, in the time of the Hebrew Bible, diachrony is not yet mature for the full revelation that violence is still attributed to YHWH and assimilated into Judaism. For instance, the Israelites' massacre has nothing to do with Jewish wickedness, but designates the immaturity of diachrony in the Hebrew Bible, because, in the time of the Hebrew Bible, diachrony is not yet mature for the full revelation that people still identify themselves by gatheringthe phenomenal identityat the cost of

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[970] Girard, *Things Hidden Since the Foundation of the World*, 215, 216.
[971] Girard, *Things Hidden Since the Foundation of the World*, 215.

outsiders. By the same token,if Christianity appears righteous, this is not because Christians are more righteous than others, but because, in the time of the Christian texts, diachrony is mature enough for the full revelation that violence is no longer attributed to God orassimilated into Christianity, but turns into the kingdom of God. For instance, human choice of the kingdom in the time of the gospels has nothing to do with Christian righteousness, but simply means the maturity of diachrony in the time of the gospels, because, in the time of the gospels, diachrony is mature enough for the full revelation that people inevitably give up the violent gathering of the phenomenal identity and choose the kingdom of God for others.

Then the question is why the Girardian theory of revelation has been stripped of the diachronic antidote to the allegation of anti-Semitism and blamed for the anti-Semitic view on the Bible. The answer is the literal reading of the revelation theory because, while reading the theory literally, we strip the theory of its diachronic antidote to the allegation and compare the two biblical religions in terms of the internal rivalry and end up to the anti-Semitic view on the Bible. Diachrony in the Bible requires the ethic of self-denuding because diachrony fleets away so urgently that it can be identified only when we give up our being and vulnerably denude ourselves to the fleeting voice in diachrony until we are cored out at the bottom and ruptured into our sensitivity to the fleeting voice in diachrony. Unfortunately, nobody, including Girard, has ever recognized the ethical demand for diachrony because the idea of diachrony is so elusive that it would be neither perceived by consciousness nor assimilated into understanding, but entirely fleets away from the intellectual understanding. As a result, the revelation theory has been read literally and subjected into the allegation of anti-Semitism because, without knowing the ethical demand for diachrony, we cannot but read the theory literally and interpret it based on ourintellectual understanding, in which Judaism and Christianity can be freely compared in terms

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of the internal rivalry and assimilated into the anti-Semitic view on the Bible. In other words, the Girardian theory of revelation has been blamed to be anti-Semitic not because it really stands against Judaism, but because it has been read literally, due to the ignorance of the ethical demand for diachrony, which serves as the antidote to the allegation.

For instance, Weingrad reads the Girardian theory literally and accuses it to be anti-Semitic. Weingrad recognizes the merit of the Girardian reading of the Bible in that, in his reading of the Bible, violence is neither covered up nor divinized behind myths, but gradually comes to an end through "the sociological demystification."[972]However, Weingrad still accusesGirard to be anti-Semitic in that, while defining Jesus as the only being above violence, Girard blamesthe Jewish rejection of Jesusand despises Judaism as something that"prefigures" Christianity foundedby Jesus the only non-violent being; "In Girard's view, anti-Semitism arises..."[973] A similar accusationcomes from Leon Zitzer. According to Zitzer, Girard's favoritism toward the gospels already includes the anti-Semitic view on the Bible because, while defining the gospels as purely non-sacrificial texts, Girard judges the Hebrew texts to be inferior to the gospels and depises Judaism asa mere "preparation" for Christianity.[974] In other words, the Girardian theory has been subjected to the anti-Semitic allegation not because it really stands against Judaism, but because of the literal reading of it.

The revelation theory seems to change nothing in the traditional theory because, just as the traditional theorysees Judaism as something inferior to Christianity, so does the revelation theory. However, there is still difference between the two because, while the revelation theory

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[972] Michael Weingrad, "Jews (in Theory): Representations of Judaism, Anti-Semitism, and the *Shoah* in Postmodern French Thought," 92.
[973] Weingrad, "Jews (in Theory): Representations of Judaism, Anti-semitism, and the *Shoah* in Postmodern French Thought," 93, 95.
[974] Leon Zitzer, "Jewish Violence," Accessed October 28, 2012, http://www.historicaljesusghost.com.

can overcome the allegationbydiachrony, the traditional theory has no defensive mechanism against the allegation. In the traditional theory,the Bible has been read literally because, without knowing diachrony and its revelation in the Bible, the traditional theologyinevitably reads the Bibleliterally and interprets it based on the literal meaning. The traditional theory calls for the intellectualcomparison between the biblicaltextsbecause, while interpreting the biblical texts based on the literal meaning, we already distinguish the biblical texts from one another and compare them based on the outward difference.

The intellectual comparison between the biblicaltexts leads itself to the anti-Semiticallegation because, while comparing the biblical texts based on the outward difference, we already judge the Hebrew texts as inferior to the Christiantexts, and vice versa, due to YHWH's violence in the Hebrew texts and Jesus' non-violent preaching in the Christian texts. In other words, it turns out that, in the traditionaltheory, as in the revelation theory, theanti-Semitic allegationarises not from the unbearable hatred of the Jews, but from the intellectual comparison between the two biblical texts. For instance, in the Pauline theology, the anti-Semiticallegation results from theintellectual comparison between the two biblical texts because, according to the Pauline theology, the Christian texts bring "righteousness" through the Spirit of Christ, but the Hebrew texts bring "condemnation" through the written laws (2 Corinthians 3: 9). Unfortunately, the traditional theory has no defensive mechanism against the anti-Semitic allegation because, in the traditional theory, there is neither diachrony nor its revelation, which serve as the antidote to the allegation, but only being and its intellectual understanding, in which the biblical texts can be freely compared in terms of the internal rivalry andassimilated into the anti-Semitic view on the Bible. Lack of defensive mechanism in the traditional theory marks the radical difference between the revelation theory and the traditional theory because, while the

anti-Semitic allegationagainst the revelation theory can be overcome by diachrony, the same allegation against the traditional theory is impossible to overcome, due to the lack of diachronic antidote to the allegation in the traditional theory.

V. Girard the Pro-Jewish

In the previous two chapters, Girard was defended from the allegation of anti-Semitism in that, in his reading of the Bible, diachrony reveals the limit of the allegation so urgently that we give up the allegation and pursue diachrony and its fleeting voice in the Bible. In the present chapter, Girard will be declared to be pro-Jewish in that, in his reading of the gospels, Jesus plays not as the Christian messiah, but as a historical Jew in diachrony. In the Girardian anthropology, human culture cannot escape idolatry because, while gathering the cultural orders at the cost of the victim, we already project our vision on the victim and make him/her an idol, the phenomenal sacred to worship. The cultural idolatry, however, can be cured by God in the Bible because the biblical God in diachrony defeats the cultural idolatry by revealing the limit of the latter until we give up the culturalidolatry and listen to the voice of God in diachrony.

The anti-idolatry teaching in the Bible calls into question the Christian doctrine of Jesus'messiahship because the one, who died and rose again as the Christianmessiah, cannot be Jesus himself who lived and died as a Palestine Jew in the first century, but his idol. The Christian idolatry can be curedby the historical Jesus in diachrony as well because the one, who lived and died as a historical Jew, neither falls to vision nor turns into the Christian idol, but defeats the Christian idol by revealing the limit of the latter. The Girardian or iconoclastic Jesus confirms our thesis that Girard is pro-Jewish because, in his reading of the gospels, Jesus plays not as the Christian messiah as an idol, but as a historical Jew who defeats the Christian idol by revealing the limit of the latter. To clarify our thesis that Girard is pro-Jewish, three issues will be discussed: A. idolatry in the cultural system; B. the anti-idolatry teaching in the Bible; C. the Christian messiah as an idol; and D. Girard the pro-Jewish.

A. Idolatry in the Cultural System

In a cultural system, desire is a desire for others' difference because everybody tries to fill the lack of one's being by taking each other as a model and consuming each other's difference into one's own. Human desire for others' difference calls for idol worship because, while appropriating others'difference into our own, we already project our fascinated gaze on othersand worship them as idols. Idol worship turns to be the worship of the self because, while worshiping idols, we also worship ourselves as the creator of idols. In other words, behind idol worship, there is the worship of the self. The self-worship behind idol worship tells us that we humans are not only the subject but also the object of idolatry because we worship not only idols but also ourselves as the inventor of idols.

Human desire for the self-worship is so powerful that even modern society cannot resist it because, while pursuing modern science, we already project our vision on science and worship

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not only science but also ourselves as the inventor of science. According to Girard, the scientific

mind is "a by-product" of the gospels' revelation because only after the gospels demystify or

reveal the sacrificial culture did humanity give up the ancient mythsand pursueits scientific

mind.[975] In other words, revelation is anterior to our scientific mind because we become

scientific only after the gospels demystify the sacrificial culture, not vice versa. However, we

humans are so "forgetful" of revelation that we pursue only the by-product of revelation because

revelation, in its fleeting otherness, is so subtle and elusive that it is not easy to recognize.[976] The

oblivion or forgetfulness of revelation calls for the mythof "progress" because, while forgetting

revelation, we also forger our responsibility for scientific usages and become arrogant to the

point in which we replace the ancient myths with the myth of progress, with the myth of "a

strictly unlimited modern superiority" that we humans have liberated ourselves from the ancient

practices, e.g., magic and witch hunting, and elevated ourselves to "an autonomous scientific

mind."[977] In other words, the myth of progress, or the myth of modern superiority, results not

from our lack of understanding, but from our forgetfulness of revelation and its subsequent result

of arrogance.

Modern society seems to be a liberator from "the circle of violence" because, while

replacing the ancient mythswith the myth of progress, we already abandon the ancient sacred,

upon which violence runs its vicious cycle.[978] In reality, however, it turns out to be"a persecutor"

because, even after the abandonment of the ancient sacred and its cyclic violence, we identify

ourselves not by returning to our sensitivity or goodness for the miserable other in diachrony, but

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[975] Girard, "History and the Paraclete," *The Ecumenical Review* 35 (1983): 9.
[976] Girard, "History and the Paraclete," 9.
[977] Girard, "History and the Paraclete," 9.
[978] Girard, "History and the Paraclete," 9.

by exploiting the scientific advantages to create the mass production of deadly "weapons," such as ICBM.[979] The modern or persecutory society calls for idol worship because, while exploiting the scientific advantages for the deadly weapons, we already project our fascinated gaze on science and worship it as "an idol."[980] The modern idolatry cannot resist the worship of the selfbecause, while worshiping science as an idol, we also "worship" ourselves as the inventor of science.[981] Human desire for the self-worship, Girard compares to the black holesin that, just as the black holes are so "dense" that they devour everything around them, human desire for the self-worship is so powerful that it devours everything, including our modern scientific spirit.[982]

The worship of the self, however, never honours the self, but only degrades it, because, while worshiping ourselves behind idols, we lose our bodily sensitivity or goodness for the miserable other in diachrony and degrade ourselves to senseless idols. In other words, we degrade ourselves not by doing something wrong to ourselves, but by worshiping ourselves behind idols. No matter how seriously it dishonors the self, the self-worship is indispensable to everybody because, while worshiping the self behind idols, we overcome the threat of non-being and achieve the fullness of our being. In other words, the self-worship is indispensable, for it is our strategy to gather up the fullness of our being. As a humanstrategy for the fullness of being, the self-worship calls for vision and its violence because we can gather up the fullness of our being only when we open a space by vision and consume everything projected in the illuminated space until weovercome the threat of non-being and achieve the fullness of our being. School bullying, for instance, is the same strategy for the fullness of being because even children try to

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[979] Girard, "History and the Paraclete," 9.
[980] Girard, "History and the Paraclete," 9.
[981] Girard, "History and the Paraclete," 9.
[982] Girard, *Things Hidden Since the Foundation of the World*, 415.

survive the threat of non-being at the cost of the victim;we cannot deny certain connections between school bullying and peer pressure, in which a group members target a single victim and mimetically polarize themselves against the single victim.

Serial killing is the same strategy for the fullness of being, for it also aims to survive the threat of non-being at the cost of the victim. According to Christopher Bollas, in normal states of a child, when it is traumatized, the "soul" of the child temporarily leaves its body and returns to the body.[983] In other words, there is a psycho-somatic disunion and reunion inside a chid because the child tries to overcome the trauma by disuniting the soul from the body, and later, reuniting it to the body. The psycho-somatic reunion in the childhood is very important for human development, for it gives the child the "confidence" that everything will be okay eventually.[984] However, when the trauma is unbearably painful, there is no psycho-somatic reunion because the soul never returns to the body. For the child, the psycho-somatic disunion can be identified with "the murder of being" because, in the state of psycho-somatic disunion, the child loses "contact" with its true self and undergoes the murder of its being.[985] The murder of being or the psycho-somatic disunionin the child is the breeding ground of serial killing because the child grows into a serial killer in order that he/she may overcome the murder of being by consuming others' lively being into his/her dead being and transforming the dead being into "a new being."[986] In other words, serial killing is not an unquenchable appetite for killing, but the same strategy for the fullness of being, for it aims to survive the murder of being at the cost of others' lively being.

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[983]Christopher Bollas, *Cracking Up: the Work of Unconscious Experience*(London: Routledge, 1995), 215.
[984]Bollas, *Cracking Up: the Work of Unconscious Experience*, 215.
[985]Bollas, *Cracking Up: the Work of Unconscious Experience*, 212, 217.
[986]Bollas, *Cracking Up : the Work of Unconscious Experience*, 189.

Religious violence also aims for the fullness of being because every religion, either biblical or non-biblical, tends to survive the threat of non-being at the cost of the victim; "the secret heart of the sacred is violence."[987] In the Bible, the Jews are blamed for the death of Jesus (Matthew. 21: 33-46, John 11:50). It is also argued that, after the destruction of the Jerusalem Temple (70 AD), the Jews were so shocked that they blamed the Christian sin of idolatry for the destruction of the Temple and "scapegoated" the Christians; Christians were accused of heretics and expelled from the synagogue.[988]John's gospel describes the expulsion of Jewish Christians from the synagogue (9: 22). The Jewish brutality against Christians is the same strategy for the fullness of beingbecausethe Jews try to survive the national disaster and its subsequent threat of non-being by imposing themselves as a model on Christians.

The same strategy can be identified in the Christian anti-Semitismbecause the gentile church tried to gather up the fullness of being at the cost of the prophetic voice in Judaism. Christianity was born as "Jewish messianic sectarianism" in the first century.[989] Therefore, like many other Jewish sectarians, such as the Pharisees and the Essenes, Christians pursued the Judaic ideal of messianic kingdom in the Torah and declared "negative" judgments on the cultural practices, e.g., magic and idolatry.[990] However, as the gentiles replaced the Jewish Christians, the church gave up the Judaic ideal of messianic kingdom and created Jesus' messiahship because, for the gentile Christians who did not know Jesus in the flesh, the crucial point of Jesus' mission was not his life devoted to the messianic ideal in the Torah, but his

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[987]Tobin Siebers, "Language, Violence, and the Sacred," in *To Honor René Girard,* ed. Alphonse Juilland (Saratoga: ANMA Libri, 1986), 215.

[988] Charles Freeman, *A New History of Early Christianity* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2009), 72.

[989] Rosemary Ruether, *Faith and Fratricide: The Theological Roots of Anti-Semitism* (New York: New York: Seabury Press, c 1974), 47.

[990] Ruether, *Faith and Fratricide: The Theological Roots of Anti-Semitism*, 29.

"crucifixion" for the sin.[991] In other words, the church created Jesus' messiahship not based on his Jewish life for the kingdom, but based on his crucifixion for the sin.

For the Jews, however, the Christians doctrine of Jesus' messiahship was unacceptable because it did not fit to the messianic kingdom in the Torah. In the Jewish tradition, kings were anointed "with oil," not crowned (1 Samuel 10: 1).[992] From the Jewish tradition originates the Hebrew word, "Messiah," i.e., the anointed king.[993] The messiah or the anointed king was expected to live a double life because, as a political sovereignty, the messiah was supposed to bring justice and freedom to his kingdom. The double life expected for the messianic king leads Judaism to anticipate the messiah among the "family tree" of David because David was acknowledged as a man who lived his double life for the reign of justice in his kingdom; he took care of political affairsduring the daytime, but, at night, he devoted himself to the study of laws.[994] As a descendant of David, therefore, the messiah was expected to rebuild the Kingdom of David in Palestine (Jeremiah 23: 5) in order that he might liberate the Jews from the "foreign" power and bring the reign of justice and freedom to the Jews.[995] From the Jewish anticipation of the messianic kingdom, Jesus could not be the messiah because, after Jesus, there was no restoration of the Davidic kingdom nor the reign of justice and freedom for the Jews, but only the suffering of the Jewish people under "the power of Rome."[996] In other words, the Jews did not accept Jesus' messiahship not because Jesus lacked something to be the messiah, but he did not bring what was anticipated by the Jews.

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[991] Freeman, *A New History of Early Christianity*, 29
[992] Samuel Sandmel, *We Jews and Jesus* (London: Victor Gollancz Ltd, 1965), 21.
[993] Sandmel, *We Jews and Jesus*, 21.
[994] Levinas, *Beyond the Verse*, 180.
[995] Sandmel, *We Jews and Jesus*, 21.
[996] Sandmel, *We Jews and Jesus*, 33.

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The Jewish rejection of Jesus' messiahship called for the crisis of the messiahship because the Jewish authority condemned Christianity as "heresy" and expelled those whoaccepted the Christian doctrine of Jesus' messiahship.[997] The crisis of Jesus' messiahship turned into Christian antagonism against the Jews because, in the crisis of Jesus' messiahship, the gentile church identified itself as "the people of the final messianic covenant" and tried to replace Judaism (1 Corinthians 11:25).[998] The Christian antagonism against the Jews continued throughout the Christian era. In the early fourth century, when Christianity became the official religion of the Roman Empire, the church established anti-Jewish laws in that the Jewish rejection of Jesus' messiahship was so "contagious" to the Christian society that the Christians had to protect themselves from the contagious Jews by preventing themselves from any personal or social contact with the Jews.[999] The legal oppression against Jews became more and more severe that, by the fourth Lateran council (1215), Jews were excluded from any "civil and military" positions and finally forced to live in the ghetto.[1000] The anti-Jewish laws were followed by the "expulsion" of the Jews all over the Europe; England (1290), France (1390), Germany, and other European countries.[1001] The largest expulsion of Jews was in 1492, when the entire Jewish community, about 200,000 Jews, was expelled from Spain. The Jewish-Christian antagonism,Rosemary Ruether compares to the sibling rivalry between Jacob and Esau in that they were born of the same womb, but the younger brother holds on to the heel of his elder brother and claims to be the legitimate heir of the biblical heritage.

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[997] Ruether, *Faith and Fratricide: The Theological Roots of Anti-Semitism*, 165.
[998] Ruether, *Faith and Fratricide: The Theological Roots of Anti-Semitism*, 252.
[999] Ruether, *Faith and Fratricide: The Theological Roots of Anti-Semitism*, 209.
[1000] Ruether, *Faith and Fratricide: The Theological Roots of Anti-Semitism*, 189.
[1001] Ruether, *Faith and Fratricide: The Theological Roots of Anti-Semitism*, 212.

The persecution of the Jews in Europe lasted until the twentieth century and became "the ancestor" of the *Shoah*, Hitler's massacre of one-third of the Jews.[1002] The *Shoah* under the Nazis, Levinas calls "the Holocaust Passion" in that it can be compared to the Passion of Jesus who suffered under the Roman tyranny.[1003] According to Laura Bernstein, the Christian anti-Semitism in Europe tells us that the gentile church learned nothing from its experience as "victims" because, once it came into power, the church committed some of the worst crimes in history, e.g., the Crusade, the Inquisition, etc.[1004] According to Ruether, the gentile church persecuted Judaism not because Judaism was wrong, but because, while rejecting Jesus' messiahship, Judaism asserted the unfulfilled messiahship and presented itself as "a viable alternative" to the Christian doctrine of Jesus' fulfilled messiahship.[1005] The Christian anti-Semitism is the same strategy against the threat of non-being because the gentile church tried to survive the crisis of Jesus' messiahshipat the cost of the prophetic voice in Judaism.

The Muslim fundamentalism is another strategy for the fullness of being, for it also aims to survivethe crisis ofIslam by blaming those who oppose Islam. According to Sudhir Kakar, the Indian Muslims are so proud of Islam that they cannot give it upbecause Islamis a religion to give "every human being," male and female, young and old, the same right and the same dignity.[1006]The religious identity of the Indian Muslims, however, has been threatened by Hinduism, the mainstream culture, because, surrounded by Hinduism, the Indian Muslims inevitably undergo the persecutory anxieties and result in the collapse of their "collective

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[1002] Ruether, *Faith and Fratricide: The Theological Roots of Anti-Semitism*, 203.
[1003] Levinas, *Is It Righteous to Be*, 137.
[1004] Ron Miller and Laura Bernstein, *Healing the Jewish-Christian Rift* (Woodstock: Skylight Paths Publisher, 2006), 150.
[1005] Ruether, *Faith and Fratricide: The Theological Roots of Anti-Semitism*, 63.
[1006]Sudhir Kakar, *The Colors of Violence* (Chicago Ill.: The University of Chicago Press, 1996), 183.

identity."[1007] To overcome the threat of religious identity, the Indian Muslims have been attracted

to Muslim fundamentalists because the fundamentalists try to overcome the threat of religious

identity by exalting the Muslim's "self-esteem" and gathering the exalted self-esteem into the

Muslims' collective identity.[1008] The Indian Muslims' collective identity calls for violence

against the Hindus because, while gathering their collective identity, the Indian Muslims try to

appeal the Islamic"superiority"over Hinduism by blaming the Hindus for contaminating the

Muslims and provoking anger and hatred against the Hindus.[1009]In other words, the Hindus are

blamed by the Indian Muslims not because they do something wrong to the Indian Muslims, but

because the Indian Muslims impose themselves as a model on the Hindus and provoke hostility

against the Hindus. The Muslim fundamentalism is another strategy for the fullness of being, for

it also aims to overcome the crisis of Islam by blaming Hinduism.

So is the *Shoah*, the unprecedented massacre in human history, because the Nazis

tried to survive the crisis of their totalitarian identity by provoking hatred and resentments

against the Jews. Hannah Arendt characterizesthe Nazis as "Nobody"in that, inside the Nazis,

everybody was guilty of the massacre that no onewas responsible for it.[1010]The massacre

committed by "Nobody" is "the most tyrannical" because one-third of the Jews were annihilated,

but no one is responsible for the heinous crime.[1011]The terror of Auschwitz, Jean-Francois

Lyotard compares to "an earthquake" in that, just as the earthquake destroys the very instruments

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[1007]Kakar, *The Colors of Violence*, 179.
[1008]Kakar, *The Colors of Violence*, 181.
[1009]Kakar, *The Colors of Violence*, 183.
[1010] Arendt, *On Violence* (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1970), 38.
[1011] Arendt, *On Violence*, 38.

to measure the earthquake itself, so does the massacre destroy all the moral standards to measure the collapse of the moral standards.[1012]

The total collapse of moral standards in Nazism is not an accident because the leveling down of various values and standards into the same being isexactly the identity of Nazis. Adolf Eichmann, for instance, was not an evil but the same being, the mimetic identity, or non-being, because, while collaborating with the Nazis, Eichmann forgot all the moral standards and subjected himself to the totalitarian identity of the same being. The totalitarian identity of the Nazis, Arendt compares to "a fungus" in that, just as a fungus existswithout root, without substance,so dothe Nazis without substance, without identity.[1013]The *Shoah*, committed by the totalitarian identity of the Nazis, is the same strategy against the threat of non-being because the Nazis tried to overcome the totalitarian identity of the same being or non-being by provoking hatred and resentments against the Jews who were "socially" or "intellectually" superior to the Nazis themselves.[1014]

B. The Anti-idolatry Teaching in the Bible

In the Bible, idolatry is impossiblebecause diachrony in the Bible reveals the limit of vision and its idolatry so urgently that nothing is offered to vision or disclosed into alifeless idol. In other words, in the Bible, idolatry is impossible, due to diachrony and its power to reveal the limit of the phenomenal idolatry. The diachronic revelation in the Bible serves as the antidote to the phenomenal idolatry because, as diachrony continues its revelation, we cannot but give up the phenomenal idolatry and listen to the voice in the Bible. The biblical solution to the phenomenal idolatry makes it clearthat the worship of God includes not only the prohibition of

[1012]Neiman, "Mass Murders: Why Auschwitz?," 251.
[1013] Richard J. Bernstein, *HannahArendt and the Jewish Question* (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1996), 139.
[1014]Bernstein, *HannahArendt and the Jewish Question*, 142.

idols but also the prohibition of ideological thinking because the biblical other in diachrony is the one who defeats all the phenomenalbeings, whether they are visible data, such as images, idols, statues, etc., or invisible data, such as, ideas, thoughts, knowledge, ideologies, etc.

To clarify the biblical solution to the phenomenal idolatry, it would be enough to take into consideration some of Goodhart's exegeses on the Hebrew Bible becauseGoodhart reads the Hebrew Bible based on the anti-idolatry teaching in Judaism. Then let us take up his exegesis on the Ten Commandments (Exodus 20). In Exodus 20, God declares the Ten Commandments concerning three "primary" areas of human relationship: God (one to three), family (four to five), and the community (six to ten).[1015]The First Commandment concerns the "names" of God, such as YHWH, God, and the almighty: "I am YHWH thy God who brought thee out of the land of Egypt" (v. 2).[1016] The names of God in the First indicate the "radical externality" of God because God introduces him/herself with various names that he/she would be neither reduced to a single name nor interpreted as such, but entirely remain exterior to human interpretation as such.[1017] The external God in the First presupposes the idea of diachrony because the only way for God to remain external to human interpretation is to fleet away to diachrony and its sheer darkness before he/she is reduced to a single name and interpreted as such.

The Second Commandment concerns "the law of anti-idolatry:" "You are not to worship idols" (v. 3).[1018]According to Goodhart, the First can be "enriched" by the Second because, while declaring the anti-idolatry law in the Second, God makes it clear that the First, in

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[1015] Goodhart, *Sacrificing Commentary*, (Baltimore and London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996), 126.
[1016] Goodhart, *Sacrificing Commentary*, 127.
[1017] Goodhart, *Sacrificing Commentary*, 130.
[1018] Goodhart, *Sacrificing Commentary*, 128.

which God declares him/herself as the liberator of his/her people out of Egypt, aims toteach the anti-idolatry law in order that his/her people may give up the Egyptian idols and worship the external God.[1019] In other words, there is continuity between the First and the Second sinceboth are involved in the anti-idolatry teaching in Judaism. Goodhart introduces a midrash on Abraham's father who was a dealer of idols. In the midrash, Terah, Abraham's father, ran an idol shop.[1020] One day, when Terah was absent from the shop, Abraham took a hammer, smashed all the idols in his father's shop except for the largest one, and placed the hammer in the lap of the largest idol. When Terah asked about the situation, Abraham says, "The largest idol smashed the smaller ones out of its jealousy of their rivalry with it." Terah asked again, "The idol is made of stone that it cannot do that." Then, Abraham said, "Why do you serve it!" This midrash tells us that, before Abraham, there was the anti-idolatry law in Judaism because Terah, Abraham's father, was not a worshiper but "a dealer" of idols.[1021] Here, midrash refers to a literary genre, which engages stories of prophets, heroes, and other mystical figures, regardless of their historical validity, not to divinize those figures, but only to fill "the gaps" between words and lines in the scripture.[1022]

The Third Commandment concerns the prohibition against the misuse of God's name: "Do not use the Lord's name in vain" (vs. 7). The Third also teaches the law of anti-idolatry because the reason why God prohibits the misuse of God's name is that, while abusing God's name, we already obtain "access" to God's name and make it an idol.[1023] The close tie between idolatry and the misuse of God's name explains why Judaism carries "a death penalty" for the

[1019] Goodhart, *Sacrificing Commentary*, 132.
[1020] Goodhart, *Sacrificing Commentary*, 128-129.
[1021] Goodhart, *Sacrificing Commentary*, 129.
[1022] Miller and Bernstein, *Healing the Jewish-Christian Rift*, 15.
[1023] Goodhart, *Sacrificing Commentary*, 132.

misuse of God's name.[1024] According to Goodhart, the Second again can be "enriched" by the Third because, just as the Second teaches the anti-idolatry law in Judaism, so does the Third.[1025]

The three anti-idolatry laws call for the seven other Commandments concerning human relationship to the family and community because the anti-idolatry laws can be fulfilled only when we give up our being and take up our responsibility for the members of family and community. To clarify the ethical link between the three anti-idolatry laws and the seven others, Goodhart leads us to God's epiphany in Exodus 3. In Exodus 3, Moses tries to "trap"God into revealing God's name because he wants to know God's name as a proof to God's epiphany for the people, to whom he is going to be sent.[1026] However, the Hebrew God, in his radical externality, cannot reduce himself to a single name that he introduces himself as אֶהְיֶה אֲשֶׁר אֶהְיֶה, which means "I AM WHO I AM" (v.14). God's name, "I AM WHO I AM," turns into its "future" tensebecause the name promises that it will be with Moses as long as Moses obeys God by bringing the Israelites out of Egypt; "I will be with you" (v. 12).[1027]

The future tense of God's name turns out to be the third party because God's name in its future tense cannot enter the '*I-Thou*'meeting with Moses that it remains asymmetrical to the symmetry of '*I-Thou*' meeting and finally substitutes itselffor "the third-person form" of God's name, i.e., יְהוָה or YHWH, which means "He will be with you," or "God will be with you," irreducible to the symmetry of '*I-Thou*'meeting.[1028] God's name as the third party or YHWH calls for human responsibility for the name because to "know"God's name is to obey Godand

[1024] Gibbs, "Enigmatic Authority: Levinas and the Phenomenal Effacement," 329.
[1025] Goodhart, *Sacrificing Commentary*, 132.
[1026] Goodhart, "I am Joseph: René Girard and the Prophetic Law," 58.
[1027] Goodhart, "I am Joseph: René Girard and the Prophetic Law," 59.
[1028] Goodhart, *Sacrificing Commentary*, 134; Goodhart, "I am Joseph: René Girard and the Prophetic Law," 59.

listen to God's voice in order that God's namemay be with us and proclaimed in the world.[1029]According to Goodhart, the Judaic God or YHWH, whopromises us the future, is the "prophetic" God because, while promising us the future, the Judaic God escapes the symmetry of '*I-Thou*' meeting and teaches us theethical responsibility for God's name.[1030]

Human responsibility for God's name leads itself to the seven other Commandments concerning human relationship to "others" because the name of God, as the third party or YHWH, will be with us only when we give up our being and takes care of the members of the family (four to five) and community (six to ten).[1031] The seven other Commandments are also anti-idolatry laws because only after we give up vision and its idolatry can we return to our sensitivity or goodness for the other in diachrony and take care of the members of the family and community. In other words, there is also continuity between the first three and the seven others because all of the ten concern the anti-idolatry teaching in Judaism.

Goodhart's exegesis on Jonah's story also concerns the anti-idolatry teaching in Judaism. According to Goodhart, inJonah's story, it is not Jonah but pagans who "repent;" the sailors give up their pagan gods and offer the sacrifice to the Lord (1: 16); the city of Nineveh declares a fast and puts on sackcloth (3: 5-9).[1032] As a response to Nineveh's repentance, Jonah pleads with God for his death not because he really wants to die, but because he prefers to die rather than to see Nineveh's salvation; "It would be better for me to die than to live" (4: 8). Jonah's plea for his death already echoes his hostility to the city of Nineveh because it is a "judgment" not only

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[1029] Goodhart, "I am Joseph: René Girard and the Prophetic Law," 59.
[1030] Goodhart, "I am Joseph: René Girard and the Prophetic Law," 60.
[1031] Goodhart, *Sacrificing Commentary*, 135.
[1032] Goodhart, *Sacrificing Commentary*, 144.

against his own life but also against the life of Nineveh.[1033] Jonah's hostility to Nineveh calls

into question his repentance inside the fish because, even after his repentance inside the fish,

Jonah still wants to keep the divine "salvation" only to Israel.[1034] Jonah's attitude toward

Nineveh is inseparable from his ideological thinking because Jonah is so angry with Nineveh that

he shows no compassion on the doomed city and prefers to die than to see the salvation of the

city.

As a response to Jonah's ideological thinking, God prepares a vine to grow over his

head. Johan is pleased with the vine since it cools him down from the heat. On the next day,

however, God sends a worm to the vine that it fades. Jonah pleads again for his death with God

because, as the vine fades, Jonah gets exhausted by the heat. Jonah's interest in the vine still

echoes his ideological thinking because Jonah was so pleased with the vine that, when it fades,

he pours out too much "energies"on the plant to the point in which he pleads for his death.[1035]

This time, God summons Jonah into his ideological thinking and rebukes or "chastises" his

hostility to Nineveh by arguing that, ifJonah pours out much energies on the vine, then, God

pours out much more energies on the city, due to the gravity of the city incomparable with the

vine; "You have been concerned about this vine… Should I not be concerned about that great

city?" (4: 10:11).[1036]

Jonah's ideological thinking calls for his idolatry because, while concerningthe dying

plantbased on his ideological thinking, Jonah already projects his fascinated gaze on the plant

[1033] Goodhart, *Sacrificing Commentary*, 157.
[1034] Goodhart, *Sacrificing Commentary*, 155.
[1035] Goodhart, *Sacrificing Commentary*, 154.
[1036] Goodhart, *Sacrificing Commentary*, 160.

and makes it "a kind of divinity."[1037] Jonah's idolatry turns into the worship of the self because, while divinizing the plant under his gaze, Jonah also divinizes himself as the inventor of the divinity. In other words, as Goodhart says, behind the vine, there is Jonah himself, "the real object" of Johan's fascinated gaze and his idolatry.[1038] According to Goodhart, Jonah's idolatry is more dangerous than the pagans' idolatry since it takes place "in the wake of the revelation," i.e., in the wake of anti-idolatry teaching in Judaism.[1039] As idolatrous as he is, Jonah is "anti-Jewish" since he gives up the anti-idolatry teaching in Judaism and pursues his ideological thinking inseparable from idolatry.[1040] On the other hand, the pagans are "the new Jews" since they give up idolatry and worship the true God who teaches the anti-idolatry laws in Judaism.[1041] Jonah's story makes it clear that idolatry is not necessarily fetish, for it takes place in the intellectual or non-fetish realm of ideological thinking.

Goodhart's exegesis on Job's story also concerns the law of anti-idolatry in Judaism. According to Goodhart, when it comes to the issue of suffering, the question is not about why we are suffering because we never know why we are suffering. Rather it is about how to respond to the question of suffering because, as unknowable as it is, suffering is everywhere in the world that we must accept the reality of suffering and try our best for "the victim."[1042] Therefore, if we keep asking why we are suffering, we cannot but end up to idolatry because, while asking why we are suffering, we forget the limit of our knowledge and judge the victim based on our limited knowledge, making him/her an idol, the phenomenal sacred, gatherable to the fullness of our

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[1037] Goodhart, *Sacrificing Commentary*, 154.
[1038] Goodhart, *Sacrificing Commentary*, 157.
[1039] Goodhart, *Sacrificing Commentary*, 156.
[1040] Goodhart, *Sacrificing Commentary*, 155.
[1041] Goodhart, *Sacrificing Commentary*, 155.
[1042] Goodhart, *Sacrificing Commentary*, 181.

being. The idolatrous view on suffering is Job's view because Job also forgets the limit of his knowledge and tries to understand why he is suffering, asserting his innocence, for the fullness of his idolatrous being; "I am innocent, but God denies me justice" (34: 5).

As a response to Job's idolatrous view, God speaks to Job in the storm because the biblical other in diachrony cannot present himself to be seen that he/she speaks "behind a veil," behind the veil of storm.[1043] The biblical God behind the veil is the God of "suffering" because to speak behind the veil is to speak without essence, without being, suffering from the threat of non-being.[1044] The suffering God without being summons Job into "the creative order" of the universe and calls into question Job's limited knowledge on the universe; "Where were you when I laid the earth's foundation?;" "Tell me, if you understand. Who marked off its dimensions? … Who stretched a measuring line across it?" (38 1-5).[1045] The creative order of the universe, to which God summons Jonah, cannot be the same being, but the other in diachrony, because the universe, which exists with its material creativity, never subjects itself to vision nor turns into the same being, but entirely fleets away from the phenomenal being.

The diachronic or creative order of the universe calls for the question of suffering because for the universe to live with its material creativity is to live with its bodilysuffering toward life and death, the suffering of growing, laboring, ailing, dying, and finally elapsing to the diachronic darkness without being, without essence, suffering from the threat of non-being. In other words, in Job's story, suffering is not about vision and its understanding, but about the reality of bodily sufferingirreducible to the phenomenal understanding. The bodily suffering in the universe changes Job's idolatrous view on suffering because, while listening to the voice of

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[1043] Goodhart, *Sacrificing Commentary*, 179.
[1044] Goodhart, *Sacrificing Commentary*, 181.
[1045] Goodhart, *Sacrificing Commentary*, 181.

God in the storm, Job gives up his idolatrous question about why he is suffering and tries to respond to the reality of suffering in the universe. The reality of suffering in the universemakes Judaism see suffering and the universe as "two sides of the same Judaic coin" in that bothare so closely tied to each other that it is impossible to separate the one from the other.[1046]

According to Goodhart, Job's question about the "existential" questionof suffering is very important because, while wrestling with the existential qeustion of suffering, Job overcomes his idolatrous view and becomes more blessed than before (42: 7-12).[1047] On the other hand, Job's friends never wrestle with the issue of suffering but simply attribute it to God's "punishments" (8: 20).[1048] As a result, the friends inevitably end up to the "abstract" view on God and provoke God's judgment in favor of Job's existential question because, while ascribing theissue of suffering to God's punishments, the friends forget their responsibility for the victim, including God who speaks in the storm, and reduce God to something abstract and intangible; "You have not spoken of me what is right, as my servant Job has" (42:8).[1049] Job's story makes it clear that, like Job, we must struggle with the question of suffering because, otherwise, we cannot but attribute it to God's punishments and result in the abstract view on God, as Job's friends did.

C. The Christian Messiah as an Idol

Jesus' messiahship was born from Paul's vision on Jesus. In Acts, Saul is introduced as the one who persecuted the church out of his extreme zeal for Judaism; "Saul was still breathing out murderous threats to the disciples" (9: 1). However, after his personal encounter with the

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[1046] Goodhart, *Sacrificing Commentary*, 196.
[1047] Goodhart, *Sacrificing Commentary*, 208.
[1048] Goodhart, *Sacrificing Commentary*, 179.
[1049] Goodhart, *Sacrificing Commentary*, 180.

risen Jesus, Saul's hostility to the church radically changed to the point that he became the

Apostle Paul, the most powerful defender of the church in the Christian history. According to

Acts 9: 4, on his way to Damascus, Saul was struck by a light and listened to a voice from

heaven, "Saul, Saul, why do you persecute me!" Acts attributes the heavenly voiceto Jesus (v. 5).

Many scholars, however, doubt the historical accuracy of Acts in that there is no tension between

Paul the Apostle and the Corinthians, which plays "a major part" in Paul's letters.[1050]

Furthermore, according to Gary Greenberg, Paul's message on the risen Jesus is only "an

anomaly" because there is no "post-crucifixion appearance" of Jesus in the gospels.[1051]

No matter whether the Damascus event really happened or not, we cannot deny

Paul's conversion to Christianity, due to his great passion for the church. Charles Freeman

attributes Paul's conversion to his guilty conscience. According to Freeman, Paul was a man

with a guilty conscience; he was "a loner" and extremely negative to the issues of sexuality,

suffering from the "paranoia" about the temptations of women and the wickedness of

homosexuality.[1052] Another version of the Damascus event (Acts 26: 12-18) confirms Paul's

guilty conscience; "It is hard for you to kick against the goads" (vs. 14). It is likely that Paul's

guilty conscience played the crucial role in his conversion to Christianity because he would be

attracted to the Christian message on the "salvation" from the guilt, which was desperately

needed to Paul himself.[1053]

The psychological impact on Paul's conversion introduces the idea of diachrony

because only diachrony reveals the limit of Paul's being and its hostility to the church until he

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[1050] Freeman, *A New History of Early Christianity*, 48.
[1051] Gary Greenberg, *The Judas Brief* (New York: Continuum, 2007), 136.
[1052] Freeman, *A New History of Early Christianity*, 49, 65.
[1053] Freeman, *A New History of Early Christianity*, 50.

gives up his hostility to the church and listens to diachrony and its fleeting voice proclaimed by the church. The diachronic order of Paul's conversion leads us to characterize theheavenly voice, which Saul heard on his way to Damascus, as an ideatum, as the other's voice inside Paul, because the voice was nothing but atrace of the other in diachrony, which had been engraved at the bottom of Paul's consciousness and served as a witness to the fission in his being. Then the question is why Acts attributes the voiceto Jesus, if it was engraved inside Paul. This is because, when Paul persecuted the church, Jesus' lifetime message may have been transmitted to Paul through the members of the church and engraved as the other's voice inside Paul.

Jesus' lifetime message, which was engraved as the other's voice inside Paul, gives rise to Paul's conversion to Christianity because, while remaining as theother's voice inside Paul, Jesus' lifetime message obsessed Paul by revealing the limit of Paul's being and its hostility to the church until Paul gave up his hostility to the church and devoted himself to Jesus' lifetime message in diachrony. In other words, Paul converted to Christianity not based on his reason, but based on Jesus' lifetime message in diachrony irreducible to the intellectual reason. The diachronic view on the Damascus event makes it clear that the way, in which the text presents Jesus as a voice from heaven, is very important for the anti-idolatry teaching in the Bible because, while presenting Jesus as a voice from heaven, the text protects Jesus from vision and its idolatry and keeps him in his fleeting otherness irreducible to the phenomenal idolatry. Unfortunately, Paul's conversion to Christianity makes "little impact" on his personal life because, in Paul's writings, there is not so much Jesus' lifetime teaching in diachrony as the "apparent vision of Jesus," which can be offered to human understanding and assimilated into the same being.[1054]

[1054] Freeman, *A New History of Early Christianity*, 50.

According to Freeman, in Paul's writings, the only reference to "Jesus' teachings"is his prohibition of divorce.[1055]

Paul's vision on the risen Jesus is the birth place of Jesus' messiahship because, based on his vision on Jesus, Paul interprets Jesus' bloodshed in terms of the messianic fulfilment in the Torah. In Paul's theory, Jesus must suffer because, while suffering on the cross, Jesus paid the price for the sin of the world and brought the world to be "reconciled with God."[1056] Jesus' blood atonementturns into his messiahship because, while reconciling the world with God, Jesushas opened the messianic kingdom in the Torahandfulfilled the "Jewish history."[1057] In other words, Jesus'messiahship was born not from Jesus himself in diachrony, but from the Pauline theory of Jesus' blood atonement.

However, from the Girardian or revelatory perspectives, the sacrificialmessiahship of Jesus is invalid because Jesus, who lived and died as a Palestine Jew in the first century, neither rises again for his messiahship nor plays with "life and death," but defeats the playing messiah by revealing the limit of the latter.[1058]In other words, Girard opposes the sacrificialmessiahship simply because it does not fit to Jesus the historical Jew in diachrony. The invalidmessiahship should not be interpreted literally, forit is not a historical record on Jesus the historical Jew who lived and died in the first century Palestine, but "a later theological interpretation" affected by Paul's vision on the risen Jesus.[1059]   Unfortunately, it has been read literally and dominated not only the early Christianity but alsothe mainstream of the Western theology because the Christian

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[1055] Freeman, *A New History of Early Christianity*, 50.
[1056] Freeman, *A New History of Early Christianity*, 29.
[1057] Freeman, *A New History of Early Christianity*, 50.
[1058] Girard, *Things Hidden Since the Foundation of the World*, 232.
[1059] Freeman, *A New History of Early Christianity*, 29.

theologians, such as "Augustine and Luther," were unfamiliar to Jesus the historical Jew in

diachrony that they blindly accepted the Pauline theory of Jesus' sacrificialmessiahship.[1060]

Since then, the cross became "the symbol of victory" because, for the traditional

Christians, the cross was the only means, through which the world could be purged and

reconciled with God (Galatians 1: 4).[1061] As the symbol of victory, the cross called for the theory

of original sinbecause, without the theory of original sin, nobody would require Jesus' blood

atonement that the churchhad to establish the theory of original sin in order that people might

feel guilty of original sin and required Jesus' blood sacrifice for the purification of the original

sin. In other words, the church established the theory of original sin not to take care of the other

in diachrony, but to keep the sacrificial messiahship by provoking the guilt of original sin. The

Christian doctrine of the sacrificial messiahship, however, can be overcome by Jesus the

historical Jew in diachrony because the one, who lived and died as a Palestine Jew, never comes

alive as the sacrificial messiah, but entirely fleets away to diachrony and defeats the sacrificial

messiahby revealing the limit of the latter.

D. Girard the Pro-Jewish

Girard admits the existence of anti-Semitism in the gospels. In John's Gospel, the

Jews are condemned for their evil desires against the prophets and cursed as "the devil" (8:44).

The parable of the tenants also blames the Jews for killing not only Jesus but also other prophets

(Matthew 21: 33-46, Mark 12: 1-12, Luke 20: 9-19). According to Girard, the gospels' anti-

Semitism is wrong because the Jewish crime against the prophets is not such a heinous crime to

be condemned as in the gospels. The Jewish crime is not a specific crime, for it is one of many

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[1060] Freeman, *A New History of Early Christianity*, 65.
[1061] Freeman, *A New History of Early Christianity*, 112.

crimes committed by "mob violence."[1062]In other words, there is no difference between the Jewish crime and other crimes since all the crimes are the same crime of mob violence.

Therefore, if the Jewish crime against Jesus and other prophets is such a heinous crime as to be condemned as in the gospels, then, all other crimes in the world should be condemned as the same manner as the Jewish crime because the Jewish crime cannot be a specific crime, but the same crime of mob violence, which takes place everywhere in the world. Mob violence takes place everywhere in the world, due to humandesire to keep the system at the cost of a single victim. For instance, John the Baptist was put to death by Herod and his guests, who were mimetically possessed by Salome's dance and mobilized against the Baptist in order that they might deflect the violent appetites on the single victim and kept the system in harmony. Similarly, in the myth of Orpheus, Orpheus was torn to pieces by a group of women who tried to keep the family systemby blaming Orpheus for seducing men with his music. The same crime of mob violence was committed by the gentile Christians who mobilized themselves against the Jews and persecuted them until they culminate in the *Shoah*, the unprecedented massacre in history. Jesus also knew that his death would happen in "a most ancient and world-wide pattern" of mob violence;"the Son of Man must suffer many things and be rejected by the elders, the chief priests and the teachers of the law" (Mark 8: 31).[1063]

The universal phenomenon of mob violence tells us that the Jewish crime should not be singled out, for it is the same crime of mob violence. Nevertheless, in the gospels, the Jewish crime is singled out and exaggerated, as if the Jewswere "a uniquely bloodthirsty" people who

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[1062] Girard, "Is There Anti-Semitism in the Gospels?," 341.
[1063] Girard, "Is There Anti-Semitism in the Gospels?," 341.

murdered every righteous person inside the community.[1064] For instance, in Luke's Gospel, the Jewish crime is singled out and exaggerated when the Gospel blames the Jews for the bloodshed of Abel because there were "no Jews" in the time of Abel; "Therefore this generation will be held responsible for the blood of all the prophets that has been shed since the beginning of the world, from the blood of Abel to the blood of Zechariah…" (11:50- 51).[1065] The gospels' exaggeration of the Jewish crime calls for the idea of anti-Semitism because, while exaggerating the Jewish crime against the prophets, the gospels define the Jews as heinous criminals who could not tolerate every righteous person inside the community. The gospels' anti-Semitism, however, has nothing to do with Jesus and his fellow Jews because, in the time of Jesus, there was no conflict between Judaism and Christianity. In the time of Jesus, there was no conflict between Judaism and Christianity because, in his time, Christians shared the messianic ideal with other Jewish sects, such as the Pharisees and the Essenes, as mentioned above. The Christian collaboration with Judaism in the time of Jesus tells us that the gospels' anti-Semitism has nothing to do with Jesus and his fellow Jews because, in their time, there was no conflict but the collaboration between the two groups. The absence of antisemitism in the time of Jesus makes it arguable that, in the gospels, the issue is not about the accusation against the gospels' antisemitism, but about a criticism against "the narrowly antiJewish reading" of the gospels, because the gospels' original message preached by Jesus was "not anti-Jewish."[1066]

Then the question is who is responsible for the gospels' anti-Semitism. Of course, it is the gentile Christians because, for the gentile Christians affected by the Pauline theory of Jesus' sacrificial messiahship, Jesus' Passion was so unique that they condemned the Jews for shedding

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[1064] Girard, "Is There Anti-Semitism in the Gospels?," 339.
[1065] Girard, "Is There Anti-Semitism in the Gospels?," 340.
[1066] Girard, "Is There Anti-Semitism in the Gospels?," 352.

the blood of Jesusand emphasized "the exceptional ferocity" of the Jewish people.[1067] In other words, the Jews were condemned by the gentile Christians not because they were extremely ferocious, but because they shed the blood of Jesus the messiah or God. The Christians' blame of the Jews for the bloodshed of Jesus can be identified in the parable of the tenants, where the killing of the son is "singled out" and exaggerated because the son is Jesus the Christian God or messiah.[1068]The Christian antisemitism in the gospels is wrong because the murder of Jesus was not such a ferociouscrime to be condemned, but the same crime of mob violence. The invalid antisemitism in the gospels tells us that we should not read the gospels literallybecause, while reading the gospels literally, we lose the gospels' original message preached by Jesus and blindly accept the invalid antisemitism created by the gentile Christians. Instead, we must read them based ona criticism against the anti-Semitic view on the gospels, as Girard does, because, otherwise, we cannot but single out the Jewish crime against Jesus and result in the anti-Semitic view on the gospels.

Based on the Girardian or historical view on the gospels, we declare Girard as the pro-Jewish, a lover of Judaism, in thatGirard opposes the gospels' antisemitism affected by the Pauline or Christian doctrine of Jesus' messiahship and listens to the gospels' original message preached by Jesus the Palestine Jew. In other words, despites his favoritism toward the gospels over the Hebrew Bible, Girard isstill pro-Semitic since he reads the gospels not based on the Christian doctrine of Jesus' messiahship, but based on Jesus the Palestine Jewand his original message.Goodhart also characterizes the Girardian reading of the gospels as "a Jewish reading" in that, in his reading of the gospels, Jesus plays not as the Christian founder, but as a Jew who

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[1067] Girard, "Is There Anti-Semitism in the Gospels?," 345.
[1068] Girard, "Is There Anti-Semitism in the Gospels?," 345.

anticipated the messianic kingdom in the Torah.[1069] According to Goodhart, the Girardian or

Jewish reading of the gospels makes possible the Jewish-Christian collaboration against violence

and wars because Christianity, which listens to the original message of Jesus the Palestine Jew,

cannot be a new religion, but a "continuous" movement toward the messianic kingdom in the

Torah.[1070]

Ruether also talks about the Jewish-Christian collaboration against violence and

wars. According to Ruether, there is distinction between the fulfilled and unfulfilled messianism.

The fulfilled messianism originates from the Pauline theory of Jesus' blood atonement because,

in Paul's theory, Jesus shed his blood in order that he may liberate humanity from the guilt of

sins and open the messianic kingdom promised in the Torah. The fulfilled messianism is the

source of religious imperialism because, while pursuing the fulfilled messianism, the church

identified itself as "the one true way" for everybody and tried to rule over the whole world.[1071]

On the other hand, the unfulfilled messianism originates from the Jewish interest in social justice

because, for the Jews, the messianic kingdom can be fulfilled not by the spiritual salvation from

the guilt, but by social justice and freedom, which gradually grows from the past and moves

toward "a messianic future."[1072]

The Jewish interest in social justice makes it clear that Jesus did not bring the

messianic age on earth because, after Jesus, times are still "unredeemed" for the messianic

kingdom that people are suffering from wars and violence.[1073] According to Ruether, the Jewish

claim on the unfulfilled messianism plays a positive role for the Christian self-understanding

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[1069] Goodhart, *Sacrificing Commentary*, 138.
[1070] Goodhart, *Sacrificing Commentary*, 137.
[1071] Ruether, *Faith and Fratricide: The Theological Roots of Anti-Semitism*, 253.
[1072] Ruether, *Faith and Fratricide: The Theological Roots of Anti-Semitism*, 39.
[1073] Ruether, *Faith and Fratricide: The Theological Roots of Anti-Semitism*, 245.

because, while claiming the unfulfilled messianism, Judaism already calls into the religious imperialism at the church and introduces "the prophetic tradition of self-criticism" in the Torah in order that the church may give up its religious imperialism and identify itself based on the Jewish tradition of self-criticism.[1074] The Christian self-understanding established on the Jewish tradition of self-criticism leads itself to the Jewish-Christian collaboration for the messianic age because, while identifying itself based on the Jewish tradition of self-criticism, the church will finally give up Jesus' sacrificial messiahship and return to the Jewish identity of Jesus, whose life was devoted to "the coming of the kingdom," making possible the Jewish-Christian collaboration to put an end to wars and injustice on earth.[1075]

Unsurprisingly, the Girardian or Jewish reading of the gospels has been attacked by those who read the gospels based on the Christian doctrine of Jesus' sacrificial messiahship for the sin.Lucien Scubla, for instance, accuses Girard for overlooking sacrifice in the Bible in that, while reading the gospels based on Jesus' revelatory mission, Girard fails to see the biblical theme of sacrifice indispensable for the Christian salvation from the sin. On the other hand,Robert M. Priceaccuses Girard for overlooking the scapegoat mechanism in the gospels in that Girard recognizes the similarity between the gospels and myths, but still singles out the gospels as revelatory texts. However, neither Scubla nor Price makes sense because, as many other scholars in the West, both scholars fail to see the diachronic foundation of Girard and end up to their groundless accusations against Girard.

Scubla is the one, who blames Girard for overlooking the biblical theme of sacrifice. According to Scubla, Girard is wrong when he singles out the Bible as revelatory texts because

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[1074] Ruether, *Faith and Fratricide: The Theological Roots of Anti-Semitism*, 131.
[1075] Ruether, *Faith and Fratricide: The Theological Roots of Anti-Semitism*, 249.

there are non-biblical texts as revelatory as the biblical texts. For instance, the Orphic literatures are revelatory texts which illuminate the truth of violence by blaming all forms of blood sacrifice and human culture built on the "murder" of innocent victims, such as Dionysus and Orpheus.[1076] Furthermore, Jesus' bloodshed does not reveal violence, as Girard says, but "*takes away*" the sin, because every religion, including Christianity, requires the blood sacrifice for the cleaning of the sin.[1077] For instance, in John's Gospel, Jesus is compared to the bread of life, meaning that Jesus died in order that he may offer his flesh and blood for us to "consume" and save ourselves from the sin inseparable from death (6: 48-59).[1078] The "Lamb of God," which is adopted for Jesus in John's Gospel (1:29, 36), also signals Jesus' vicarious death for the sin because the Lamb of God in John's Gospel "evokes" sacrificial events, such as the Paschal lamb in the Hebrew Bible (Exodus 12: 1-28).[1079] Paul also sees Christ as "the Passover lamb," suggesting Jesus' vicarious death for the sin (1 Corinthians 5: 7).[1080] In other words, from Scubla's point of view, Jesus died not as a revelatory victim for the kingdom, as Girard says, but as a sacrificial victim for the sin.

Another problem in Girard is that he chooses biblical texts only favorable to his revelatory view on the Bible. According to Scubla, in the parable of the tenants (Matthew 21: 33-46), it is not God but "they," that is, "Jesus' audience," who provokes God to take "reprisals" against the murderers of Jesus and other prophets (vs. 41).[1081] Girard chooses "a brief passage" of the parable only because, in the parable of the tenants, violence against the murderers is stirred up not by God but by Jesus' audience that God entirely remains innocent from the guilt of

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[1076] Lucien Scubla, "The Christianity of René Girard and the Nature of Religion," in *Violence and Truth: on the Work of* René *Girard*, ed. by Paul Dumouchel (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1988), 161.
[1077] Scubla, "The Christianity of René Girard and the Nature of Religion," 169.
[1078] Scubla, "The Christianity of René Girard and the Nature of Religion," 169.
[1079] Scubla, "The Christianity of René Girard and the Nature of Religion," 169.
[1080] Scubla, "The Christianity of René Girard and the Nature of Religion," 169.
[1081] Scubla, "The Christianity of René Girard and the Nature of Religion," 167.

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violence.[1082] On the other hand, in the parable of the wedding banquet, it is the king, that is,

"God" who exercises violence against the murderers (vs. 8) and against the guest who violates

the dress code for the banquet (vs. 12).[1083] Girard keeps "silent" on the parable of wedding

banquet, although it is closely tied to the parable of the tenants, simply because, in the parable of

wedding banquet, violence is exercised by God that God cannot escape the guilt of violence.[1084]

In other words, Girard chooses or discards the biblical texts not based on the textual relationships

and structures, but based on whether or not God remains innocent from the guilt in the biblical

texts.

        According to Scubla, the way, in which Girard deals with the gospels, is unfair

because, while choosing only favourable texts to his revelatory view on the Bible, Girard fails to

see "sacrifice," the most fundamental theme in the Bible.[1085] The Girardian divinity depending

on the revelatory view on the gospels cannot but reduce itself to the "Epicurean" or non-

sacrificial divinity because, while neglecting the biblical theme of sacrifice, Girard already strips

the Christian God or Christ of his sacrificial role and reduces him to a non-violence deity.[1086] The

Girardian Christianity cannot be the gospels'Christianity because, in his reading of the gospels,

the Christian God or Christ no longer requires sacrifice that Christianity is divested of its sacred

identity and reduced to a religion of "ethics."[1087] In sum, Scubla opposes Girard's revelatory

view on the gospels and suggests his sacrificial view in that, without Jesus' blood sacrifice in the

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[1082]Scubla, "The Christianity of René Girard and the Nature of Religion," 167.
[1083]Scubla, "The Christianity of René Girard and the Nature of Religion," 167.
[1084] Scubla, "The Christianity of René Girard and the Nature of Religion," 167.
[1085] Scubla, "The Christianity of René Girard and the Nature of Religion," 169.
[1086] Scubla, "The Christianity of René Girard and the Nature of Religion," 171.
[1087] Scubla, "The Christianity of René Girard and the Nature of Religion," 171.

gospels, there would be neither the salvation from the sin nor Christianity which depends on Jesus' blood atonement.

Here is ourresponse to Scubla's accusations against Girard. First, Girard does not exclude the existence of revelatory texts outside the Bible when he affirms the rehabilitation of the innocent victim outside the Bible. In myths, the victim is blamed as the cause of violence and chaos inside the community because myths are aimed to cover up the internal violence by blaming the innocent victim as the cause of violence. On the contrary, in the Bible, the victim is never blamed as the cause of violence, but rehabilitated from the guilt and declared innocent, because the Bible pursues the revelation of violence by blaming the murderers as the cause of violence, and thus, rehabilitating the victim from the guilt. The rehabilitation of the victim in the Bible calls for the "reversals" of the mythical scheme because, while rehabilitating the victim from the guilt, the Bible reveals the limit of the mythical scheme against the innocent victim until the mythical scheme loses its deceptive power against the innocent victim and finally reverses itself.[1088] In other words, the Bible reverses the mythical scheme not by violence, but by rehabilitating the innocent victim from the guilt. The reversals of the mythical scheme in the Bible make it clear thatthere is no problem for Girard to choose some favourable texts in the gospels because, in his reading of the gospels, no text subjects itself to the mythical scheme, but reverses the mythical scheme by revealing what myths hide, by revealing the victim's innocence and the murderers' guilt; "There is not a single essential passage in the Gospels that does not reveal the founding victim or serve that revelation…."[1089]On the other hand, God's violence in the parable of the wedding banquet should not be read literally because, in the gospels, God's

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[1088]Girard, "Violence and Religion: Cause or Effect?," 14.
[1089] Girard, *Things Hidden Since the Foundation of the World*, 272.

violence is exactly human violenceunfairly attributed to God. In the Girardian or non-sacrificial theology, God's violence is exactly human violenceunfairly attributed to God because we humans try to justify ourselves by ascribing our violence to God.

According to Girard, the rehabilitation of the innocent victim can be identified outside the Bible as well. For instance, the Greek victims, e.g., "Socrates and Antigone," are neither blamed as the cause of violence nor assimilated into the cultural orders, but rehabilitated from the guilt and declared innocent.[1090] In other words, Girard affirms the rehabilitation of the innocent victim not only inside the Bible but also outside the Bible. The rehabilitation outside the Bible, however, never reverses the mythical scheme because, outside the biblical texts, the cases of rehabilitation areso "exceptional" that they cannot affect the entire society or liberate the society from the grip of the mythical scheme.[1091] As limited as it is, the rehabilitation outside the Bible confirms our position that Girard does not exclude the existence of revelatory texts outside the Bible because, in his theory, some of non-biblical victims, such asSocrates and Antigone, are neither blamed nor exalted to the sacred later, but rehabilitated from the guilt and remain as the non-sacred or human victim, who unmasks the truth of violence.

Another problem inScubla is that the title, "the Lamb of God," upon which he passionately upholds Jesus' vicarious death for the sin, has nothing to do with the ritual bloodshed for the sin because John's Gospel adopts the title for Jesus not based on Jesus' ritual bloodshed for the sin, but based on his non-ritual bloodshed for the cultural orders. According to Girard, when John's Gospeladopts the title, the Lamb of God, for Jesus,it never means that Jesus was "the ritual sense" of scapegoat because he died not to cleanse the sin of the community, as

[1090] Girard, "History and the Paraclete," 4.
[1091] Girard, "History and the Paraclete," 4.

the scapegoat did in the Leviticus rituals.[1092]   Rather, it means that Jesus was "the everyday modern sense" of innocent victim because he was unjustly murdered by the community for the cultural peace and harmony.[1093]In other words, John's Gospel adopts the Lamb of God for Jesus not based on his ritual bloodshed for the sin, but based on his non-ritualbloodshedfor the cultural reconciliation.

The "innocent sheep" adopted for the Suffering Servant in Isaiah is the same victim as the Lamb of God adopted for Jesus in John's Gospel because, just as Jesus was murdered as a non-ritualor innocent victim for the cultural orders, so was the Servant; "as a sheep before its shearers is silent, so he did not open his mouth" (Isaiah 53:7).[1094] Other biblical victims, such as Abel and Joseph, are also the everydayor non-ritual sense of innocent victims, for they died not for the blood atonement, but for the peaceful resolution of the internal chaos. According to Girard, these innocent victims are "martyrs," regardless of their religious or ethnic identity, because, while dying for the peaceful resolution of the internal chaos, the innocent victims play as the "witnesses" to the "appalling" tendency of mankind to spill the innocent blood.[1095]Then, the question is how to interpret the vicarious death of the Servant in Isaiah;"Surely he took up our painand bore our suffering"(53:4). According to the Jewish tradition, the idea of vicarious death in Isaiah is only "an anomaly" because there is no vicarious role of the victim in the Hebrew Bible and other Jewish literatures.[1096]The Girardian Jesus as a non-ritual victim tells us that it is not Girard but Scubla, who reads the gospels unfairly because, while Girard reads the gospels based on Jesus the non-ritual victim and his revelatory mission, which belongs to

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[1092] Girard, *The Girard Reader*, 201.
[1093] Girard, *The Girard Reader*, 201.
[1094] Girard, "History and the Paraclete," 7.
[1095] Girard, "History and the Paraclete," 14.
[1096] Miller and Bernstein, *Healing the Jewish-Christian Rift*, 119.

diachrony in the Bible, Scubla reads the gospels based on Jesus' vicarious death, which is only an anomaly in the Bible.

Another problem in Scubla is that he cannot explain the biblical movement toward the kingdombecause, in his reading of the Bible, sacrifice is so crucial forthe salvation that violence never turns into the kingdom, but always remains undisturbed and plays the pivotal role for the sacrificial salvation. Furthermore, Scubla's sacrificial view on the Bible is inseparable from idolatrybecause, while reading the Bible based on the blood atonement, Scubla already strips not only YHWH but also Jesus of their prophetic voice in diachrony and makes them voiceless idols. Therefore, if Christianity is a religion that pursues the prophetic voice of Jesus, Scubla's Christianity cannot be a Christianity since it gives up the prophetic voice of Jesus and makes him a voiceless idol.

As an alternative to Scubla's sacrificial view on the gospels, we suggest Girard's revelatory view in that, as revelation continues in history, people finally recognize the limit of Scubla's sacrificial view and accept Girard's revelatory view. In the Girardian theory of revelation, the Bible gradually moves toward the kingdombecause, thanks to the fleeing revelation in the Bible, violence in the time of the Hebrew Bible gradually turns into the kingdom of non-violence in the time of the gospels. The biblical movement toward the kingdom, however, is not yet completed because, even after the full revelation of the founding murder in the time of the gospels, violence still exercises its sacrificial effect, due to human desire to keep the system at the cost of the victim. In other words, time has yet to come for the completion of the non-violent kingdom, due to the lingering violence and its sacrificial effect. The uncompleted kingdom calls for the historical continuation of revelation after gospels because

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only when revelation continues after gospels can violence and its sacrificial effect be put to an end for the completion of the kingdom.

Then the question is what makes possible the historical continuation of revelation after gospels. Of course, the answer is diachrony in the Bible because only diachrony defeats violence and its sacrificial effect by revealing the limit of the latter until violence loses its sacrificial effect and turns to the kingdom of peace and justice. However, Girard fails to recognize the idea of diachrony in the Bible, which is the very agent to continue revelation after the gospels, due to the fleeting otherness of diachrony itself. As a result, Girard finds the solution in John's Gospel, where Jesus introduces another Paraclete who will continue his revelatory mission after his death (14: 16-17). According to Girard, Jesus was "the first Paraclete," or the first Advocate, who stands for innocent victims, because, while disturbing the cultural foundation through revelation, Jesus also disturbs the false accusation against innocent victims, upon which every human culture has been founded.[1097]Jesus' mission as the first Paraclete turns into his "victory" over Satan because to disturb the false accusation against innocent victims corresponds to disturb Satan that plays as the deceptive accuser of innocent victims.[1098] Jesus' victory over Satan, however, is not yet proved to "the majority of human beings" because, after Jesus, Satan still exercises its evil scheme against innocent victims.[1099]In other words, time has yet to come to convince the world of Jesus' victory over Satan, due to the persistence of Satan and its evil scheme against innocent victims.

The unproved victory over Satan calls for the historical continuation of revelation after Jesus because Jesus' victory over Satan will be concretely proved to everybody only when

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[1097] Girard, "History and the Paraclete," 13.
[1098] Girard, "History and the Paraclete," 11.
[1099] Girard, "History and the Paraclete," 12.

revelation continues after Jesus until it completes the total destruction of Satan and its evil scheme against innocent victims. According to John's Gospel, after Jesus died and returned to the heavenly God, God sent the second Paraclete in the name of Jesus to serve as "the Spirit of truth" (John 4: 17) and continue to reveal what Jesus had already revealed in his life time. The revelatory mission of the second Paraclete will prove Jesus' victory over Satan because, while continuing the revelatory mission after Jesus, the second Paraclete will complete"the defeat and condemnation" of Satan and its evil scheme and convince the world of Jesus' victory over.[1100]

The revelatory mission attributed to the second Paraclete after Jesus seems to appeal to the Christian anti-Semitism because, while attributing Jesus' revelatory mission to the Paraclete, we compare Jesus the Christian deity with YHWH the Judaic deity and identify Jesus to be superior to YHWH. However, the anti-Semitic suspicion against the Paraclete is invalid because the Paraclete, as the Spirit of truth which continues Jesus' revelatory mission, neither subjects itself to the intellectual comparison nor plunges into the anti-Semitic view on the Bible, but defeats the anti-Semitic view on the Bible by revealing the limit of the latter. Furthermore, as revelatory as it is, the Paraclete serves as the antidote to the Christian messiah as an idol because, while taking up Jesus' revelatory mission in history, the Paraclete defeats all the phenomenal idols, including the Christian messiah as an idol. Nevertheless, the Girardian idea that the second Paraclete will continue Jesus' revelatory mission after his death, does not fit to the diachronic otherness of revelation because revelation belongs not only to Jesus and his Paraclete but also to everybody who gives up one's being for the other in diachrony. As limited as it is, the Girardian revelatory view depending on the second Paraclete serves as an alternative

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[1100] Girard, "History and the Paraclete," 12.

to Scubla's sacrificial view because, as the second Paraclete continues Jesus' revelatory mission after his death, people will convince of Jesus' victory over Satan and its sacrificial system and recognize the limit of Jesus' sacrificial messiahship supported by Scubla, and listen to the prophetic voice of Jesus and his Paraclete supported by Girard.

Price is the one who accuses Girard for overlooking the scapegoat mechanism in the gospels. According to Price, Jesus was a scapegoat who died for the sin, andlater, rose again for peace and harmony created by his vicarious death for the sin. To clarify his sacrificial view onJesus, Price takes Girard as a rival and reads the gospels based on his imitation of Girard in that, while reading the gospels based on his imitation of Girard, Price comes to a conclusion thatthe Girardian Jesus was a scapegoat who died and rose again for the internal peace and harmony. As the first step for his imitation of Girard, Price characterizes Jesus and his disciples as twins, as monstrous doubles, in that the disciples are named among Jesus' brothers. In Mark's Gospel, Jesus' four brothers are named; James, Joseph, Judas, and Simon (6: 3). The names of Jesus' brothers in Mark's Gospel leads Price to characterize Simon Peter as "a double" of Jesus in that one of Jesus' brothers is named Simon.[1101] Peter's role as a doubleof Jesus can be clarified when Jesus curses Peter by calling him Satan. In Matthew 16: 21-28,when Jesus predicts his upcoming death, Peter dissuades Jesus' upcoming death. Inresponse to Peter's dissuasion, Jesus curses Peter by calling him Satan becauseJesus himself has the same "temptation" to avoid his upcoming death that he tries to resist the temptation.[1102]In other words, Jesus curses Peter not because Peter misinterprets Jesus'prediction of his upcoming death, but because he tries to resist Peter's dissuasion of his imminent death by calling him Satan. Jesus' curse on Peterclarifies

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[1101] Price, *Deconstructing Jesus* (Amherst: Prometheus Books, 2000), 186.
[1102] Price, *Deconstructing Jesus*, 187.

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Peter's role as a double of Jesus because, while dissuading Jesus from his upcoming death, Peter plays as "the externalized voice" of Jesus.[1103]Judas Iscariot is "another" double of Jesus because one of Jesus' brothers is named Judas.[1104] Judas' role as the twin of Jesus can be identified in the gospels; Judas is "vilified" as a thief (1 John 2: 6), so is Jesus (Mark 14: 48); Judas is vilified "demon-possessed" (John 13: 27, Luke 22: 3), so is Jesus (John 8: 48).[1105]

Among these twin brothers, Jesus plays as a model because the brothers follow Jesus as a model and become the "imitators" of Jesus.[1106] Jesus' role as the model gives rise to rivalries among the disciples or brothers because, while imitating Jesus as the model, the disciples begin to argue about who is "the greatest" among themselves (Matthew 18: 1) and become "rivals" to one another.[1107] The internal rivalries turn into the model's hostility to the disciples because, as the disciples get closer to the model through rivalries, Jesus puts "some obstacle" before the disciples in order that he may distance himself from the disciples and keep his godly position as the model; "…it is enough for a disciple to be like his teacher" (Matthew 10: 24-25).[1108] In other words, imitation turns into the subject-object contagion because, as imitationcontinues, Jesus loses his godly position as a model andbecomes the same rival or obstacle to the disciples. So frustrated by the model, the disciples give up the "adoration" of the model and enter "a love-hate relationship" with the model; some of the disciples openly rebuke Jesus for overlooking the waste of perfume (Mark 14: 4).[1109] As Jesus continues to frustrate them, the disciples "conspired" against Jesus and killed him; "they jointly devour the flesh and blood of their erstwhile master,

[1103] Price, *Deconstructing Jesus*, 187.
[1104] Price, *Deconstructing Jesus*, 186.
[1105] Price, *Deconstructing Jesus*, 190, 191.
[1106] Price, *Deconstructing Jesus*, 192.
[1107] Price, *Deconstructing Jesus*, 192.
[1108] Price, *Deconstructing Jesus*, 192.
[1109] Price, *Deconstructing Jesus*, 192.

their scapegoat" (Mark 14: 64).[1110]In other words, Jesus was murdered neither by the Romans nor by the Jewish authority, but by his own disciples. The reason why Price attributes Jesus' bloodshed to the disciples is that, in the time of Jesus,there was no "plausible reason"for the Romans and the Jewish authority to kill Jesus.[1111] In this mob violence against Jesus, Caiaphas plays as Peter's twin brother because Caiaphas condemns Jesus "inside," while Peter condemns Jesus "outside" (Matthew 26: 69-75).[1112] Here, it is notable that the Greek names, both Cephas and Peter, have the same meaning of Rock in English.

If Jesus was murdered by his own disciples, as Price says, then the question is how to interpret the gospels' blame of the Romans and the Jewish authority for the bloodshed of Jesus. In the gospels, the Romans are blamed for the bloodshed of Jesus. For instance, in Matthew27, it is reported that Pilate, the Roman governor, flogged Jesus and handed him over to be executed (vs. 26). Following the governor's command, the Roman soldiers stripped Jesus, put a scarlet robe on him, and a crown of thorns on his head, mocked him by calling him king of the Jews, and crucified him (vs. 27-31).According to Price, the gospels' blame ofthe Romans for the bloodshed of Jesuscould be a kind ofeditorial "surgery" because the disciples lifted up the guilt of Jesus' bloodshed from themselves and imposed it on the Romans.[1113] However, the blame was shifted again from the Romans to "the Jews" because, when the gentile Christians came to power under the Roman Empire, the Romans were exempted from the guilt and replaced with the Jews.[1114] In other words,there was another editorial surgery because the blame was lifted up from the Romans and imposed on the Jews. The editorial surgery by the gentile Christians can be

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[1110] Price, *Deconstructing Jesus*, 193.
[1111] Price, *Deconstructing Jesus*, 203.
[1112] Price, *Deconstructing Jesus*, 201.
[1113] Price, *Deconstructing Jesus*, 203.
[1114] Price, *Deconstructing Jesus*, 203.

identified in Matthew 27, where the Jews are depicted as an insensitive mob crying for the crucifixion of Jesus, the crucifixion of one of their fellow Jews (vs. 21-22), because the gentile Christians could not tolerate or "brook" the scene of the Jews requesting the release of Jesus.[1115] On the other hand, Pilate, the Roman governor, is depicted as a man of generosity, who tries to save Jesus from the Jewish mob (vs. 24), because, while exempting the Romans from the guilt, the gentile church needed to change the cruel image of the Roman governor.

After the crucifixion of Jesus, the disciples shared the Eucharist in memory of Jesus and exalted him to Christ because, after his crucifixion, the disciples "*retrospectively*"acknowledgedthat Jesus was a scapegoat who died for the guilt of hatred inside the community and brought back peace and harmony to the community.[1116] In other words, Jesus was exalted to Christ not based on his revelatory mission, but based on his vicarious death for the sin. According to Price, the exalted Jesus was "the primary scapegoat" since he died for the internal harmony.[1117] After exalting Jesus, the disciples choose a secondary scapegoat as a "monstrous double" of the primary scapegoat because the bloodshed of the primary scapegoat must be purged by another's bloodshed.[1118] In other words, the disciples choose a secondary scapegoat not to create another God or Christ, but to purge the bloodshed of Jesus who died as the primary scapegoat. The origin of the secondary victim goes back to the Leviticus rituals, in which two goats are selected by lot; one for YHWH and the other for the scapegoat.

According to Price, it is likely that the "early Christians" shifted the guilt of Jesus' bloodshed from themselves to the Romans and selected them as a secondary scapegoat for the

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[1115] Price, *Deconstructing Jesus*, 204.
[1116] Price, *Deconstructing Jesus*, 197.
[1117] Price, *Deconstructing Jesus*, 191.
[1118] Price, *Deconstructing Jesus*, 186.

cleansing of Jesus' bloodshed.[1119] However, during the gentile Christian era, the Romans' role as the secondary scapegoat was replaced with Judas because the gentile Christians under the Roman Empire lifted up the guilt from "the shoulders" of the Roman community and imposed it on Judas.[1120] In other words, there was another editorial surgery because the secondary scapegoat was shifted from the Romans to Judas. Price also suspects that Judas was "a tertiary scapegoat" because Judas and Peter are mimetic doubles that Peter could be selected as a secondary scapegoat, and later, replaced with Judas.[1121] According to Price, Judas and Peter are "the most obvious case" of mimetic doubles because, just as Judas is one of Jesus' twin brothers, so is Peter; just as Judas betrayed Jesus by handing him over to the priests and later repented for his betrayal, so did Peter by denying Jesus and later wept for his denial.[1122] It is not clear whether Peter was selected as a secondary scapegoat to cleanse Jesus' bloodshed, as Price suspects, because the gospels show no evidence that Peter was scapegoated for the bloodshed of Jesus. However, it is arguable that Judas would be "a later addition" in the gospels because it is unlikely that the Jewish or early Christians blamed Judas, one of their fellow Jews, for the bloodshed of Jesus and sacrifice him as a secondary scapegoat to cleanse Jesus' bloodshed.[1123]

After his imitation of Girard,Price characterizes the Passion of Jesus as "a Girardian scapegoat myth" in that, while imitating Girard as a rival, Price comes to a conclusion that the Girardian Jesus died and rose again as the same scapegoat in myths.[1124] In myths, the victim is a scapegoat because he/she is murdered for the "guilt and paranoia" inside the community, and

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[1119] Price, *Deconstructing Jesus*, 203.
[1120] Price, *Deconstructing Jesus*, 200.
[1121] Price, *Deconstructing Jesus*, 191.
[1122] Price, *Deconstructing Jesus*, 191.
[1123] Price, *Deconstructing Jesus*, 200.
[1124] Price, *Deconstructing Jesus*, 180.

later, exonerated from the guilt and sanctified to "a savior" for peace and harmony created by his/her vicarious death.[1125] For instance, Dionysus is a scapegoat, a victim of "the collective slaughter," who was dismembered by the Titans, and later, resurrected by Zeus and exalted to the god of wine and festivals for the cultural harmony.[1126] Attis is the same scapegoat who dies in winter and rises again in spring in order that he may "fertilize" the soil for the cultural sustenance.[1127] So is Jesus since he also died for the sin of the community, and later, rose again for the cultural reconciliation. In other words, from Price's point of view, the Girardian Jesus was not a revelatory victim, but the same scapegoat in myths. According to Price, the mockery of Jesus by the Roman soldiers makes it clear that Jesus was "a ritual scapegoat" because Jesus played the same role as "the mock king" in Saturnalia, the Roman festival.[1128]

Price also characterizes Girard's theory as "the Christ-Myth theory" in that, in Girard's theory, there is neither revelation nor the historical Jesus who reveals the limit of violence, but only the exalted deity or Christ, who died and rose again as the same scapegoat as mythical deities, such as Dionysus and Attis.[1129] In other words, from Price's point of view, Girard's theory is not a theory of revelation but a theory of Christ-Myth because the Girardian Jesus plays not as a revelatory victim for the kingdom, but as the same scapegoat in myths. Therefore, Girard is wrong when he singles out the gospels as revelatory texts because the Girardian gospels neither reveal violence nor separate themselves from the scapegoat myths, but support the scapegoat myths "whole-heartedly."[1130] In other words, Price opposes Girard not

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[1125] Price, *Deconstructing Jesus*, 186.
[1126] Price, *Deconstructing Jesus*, 176.
[1127] Price, *Deconstructing Jesus*, 189.
[1128] Price, *Deconstructing Jesus*, 205.
[1129] Price, *Deconstructing Jesus*, 208.
[1130] Price, *Deconstructing Jesus*, 197.

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because Girard fails to see the similarity between the gospels and myths, but because, even after he accepts the similarity between the two, Girard still singles outthe gospels as revelatory texts.

Here is ourresponse toPrice's accusations against Girard. First, Price is wrong when he excludes the Romans and the Jewish authority from the guilt of Jesus' bloodshed because they are the ones responsible for the bloodshed of Jesus. According to Daniel Matt, in the time of Jesus, not only the Romans but also the Jewish authority were suspicious of all the Galileans because Galilee was renowned as the "hotbed" of rebellion against Rome.[1131] As a Galilean, Jesus also stirred up the suspicion of the Romans and Jewish authority and resulted in his crucifixion because, while preaching the kingdom of peace and justice for everybody, male and female, slaves and freemen, Jesus was targeted as a "potential" threat to Rome.[1132]Second, justas Scubla fails to explain the biblical movement toward the kingdom, so does Price because, in Price's mythical view on the gospels, Jesus never goes to diachrony nor reveals the limit of the scapegoat mechanism, but always remains as the primary scapegoat and demands another bloodshed to cleanse his own bloodshed. Price's sacrificial view on Jesus cannot escape idolatry, either, because the one, who died as the primary scapegoat, cannot be the historical Jesus who lived and died as a Palestine Jew, but his idol. Therefore, it is not Girard but Price himself, who is wrong because, while Girard listens to the prophetic voice of Jesus the historical Jew, Price gives up the prophetic voice of Jesus and makes him a senseless idol.

All these groundless accusations against Girardconfirm again how difficult it is to detect the idea of diachrony in Girard because all the critics, not only Jewish scholars, such as Weingrad and Zitzer, but also non-Jewish scholars, such as Scubla and Price, fail to recognize it

[1131]Daniel Matt, "Yeshua the Hasid," in *Jesus through Jewish Eyes*, ed. Beatrice Bruteau (New York: Orbis Books, 2001), 75.
[1132] Matt, "Yeshua the Hasid," 75.

and result in their groundless accusations against Girard. This difficulty calls for the ethical

burden for diachrony because diachrony, in its fleetingotherness, can be identified only when we

give up our being and listen to the fleeting voice in diachrony. The ethical burden for the

diachronic otherness explains why Girard characterizes his theory as "meta-anthropology,"

which means the study of what is irreducible to *Anthropos* as being.[1133] Unsurprisingly, Levinas

also defines his theory of ethics as "metaphysics" (meta-physics), which means the study of what

is irreducible to being.[1134] The Girardian theory characterized as meta-anthropology verifies our

thesis that Girard is pro-Jewish because, while characterizing his theory as meta-anthropology, as

what is irreducible to being, Girard dismissesevery form of being, including the Christian

messiah, and listens to the fleeting voice in diachrony, which comes from the Jewish Bible and

serves as the antidote to the Christian messiah.

[1133] Girard, *Things Hidden Since the Foundation of the World*, 267.
[1134] Levinas, *Totality and Infinity*, 43.

VI. A Diachronic Reunion

In the previous chapter, Girard was declared to be pro-Jewish in that, in his reading of the gospels, Jesus plays not as the Christian messiah, but as a Jew who lived and died for the messianic kingdom in the Torah. In the present chapter, we will predict a Jewish-Christian reunion in that, thanks to the Jewish identity of Jesus, Christianity has no option other than to give up the Pauline theory of Jesus' messiahship and return to Judaism, upon which Jesus the Jew devoted himself to the messianic kingdom in the Torah and found himself to be the founder of Christianity. According to recent studies, Jesus was a Jew, for he did not bring something new to Judaism, but put into practice the Judaic ideal of messianic kingdom in the Torah. Jesus the Jew introduces the Christian root in Judaism because, after Jesus' death, his Jewish followers preached his message within Judaism and became the members of the early church. However, as the gentiles replaced the early or Jewish Christians, the Christian root in Judaism has been wiped out because the gentile church gave up Jesus' message on the messianic kingdom and adopted the Pauline theory of Jesus' messiahship unacceptable to Judaism.

Fortunately, some scholars have succeed in uncovering the Christian root in Judaism because, while reading the Christian writings based on the Hebrew and Aramaic literatures, the scholars recognize that the lifestyle of Jesus and his followers described in the gospels well fits to the first-century Jewish lifestyle described in the Jewish literatures. The success of uncovering the Christian root in Judaism encourages us to predict a Jewish-Christian reunion because the Christian root in Judaism is now uncovered that Christianity has no option other than to give up the Pauline theory of Jesus' messiahship and return to Judaism, upon which Jesus the Jew devoted himself to the messianic kingdom in the Torah and found himself to be the founder of Christianity. To clarify the Jewish-Christian reunion, three issues will be discussed: A. Jesus the Jew; B. the Christian root in Judaism; C. the Christian split from Judaism; and D. a diachronic reunion.

A. Jesus the Jew

Jesus (4 BC? - 30 AD) was a Jew who lived and died in the first-century Palestine. Here is the historical background of Palestine, in which Jesus lived and died as a Jew.[1135] After King Solomon died around 928 BC, the kingdom of David was split into two countries: Israel and Judah. Both Israel and Judah lasted together until Israel was conquered by the Assyrians in 722 BC. In 587 BC, Judah was also conquered by the Babylonians; Solomon's temple was destroyed and many Jews were exiled to Babylon. The Judean exiles in Babylon, however, gave rise to their "intellectual creativity."[1136] They compiled oral laws into "the scriptures" because, after the temple destruction, there was a sudden increase of legal issues, which could not be

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[1135] This part is outlined mostly based on Freeman, *A New History of Early Christianity*, 4-9.
[1136] Freeman, *A New History of Early Christianity*, 9.

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solved by the old system of oral laws.[1137]They built synagogues as a substitute for the temple in order to deal with "the indefinite reality" of the exiles.[1138]The Babylon captivity finally came to an end in the 530s BC when Cyrus, the Persian king, conquered Babylon and allowed the Judean exiles to return to Palestine. After the return to Palestine, the Jews rebuilt Solomon's Temple. This Second Temple was dedicated in 515 BC (the book of Ezra) and lasted about six hundred years until it was destroyed by the Romans in 70 AD.

Around 330 BC, Alexander the Great, the Greek emperor, conquered the Persian Empire and imposed the Greek culture on the Eastern areas, such as Syria, Egypt, Mesopotamia, etc. Although the Alexandrian Empire disappeared soon after Alexander died, the Greek impact on the East lasted for centuries because the Seleucid Empire, which succeeded the Alexandrian Empire, continued to impose the Greek culture on the East. When the Greek culture arrived to Palestine, the Jews rejected it under the rebellion of the Maccabees and established the Hasmonean kingdom in 140 BC.   The Hasmonean kingdom lasted until Pompey, the Roman general, destroyed it in 63 BC and submitted Palestine to Rome.

By the third century BC, the Parthian Empire (247 BC–228 AD) conquered the Seleucid Empire and most of the Middle East. In the 40 BC, when the Parthian army marched into Jerusalem and threatened the Roman control of Palestine, the Jews joined the Parthians and Herod joined the Romans. After defeating the Parthians, the Romans appointed Herod to be the king of Judea (37 BC). Herod (73/74BCE- 4 BCE), also known as Herod the Great, was born between the Jewish father and the Egyptian mother. His father, Antipater, came from Idumea, the southern part of Judea, which had been conquered by the Maccabees around 140–130 BC.

[1137] Freeman, *A New History of Early Christianity*, 9.
[1138] Ruether, *Faith and Fratricide: The Theological Roots of Anti-Semitism*, 58.

The Idumeans were so unfamiliar with the traditional Jewish customs that they were considered to be outsiders to the mainstream Jews. Furthermore, Herodwas not counted among the Jews because, in the Jewish tradition, to be a Jew is to be born from a Jewish mother. As an outsider to the mainstream Jews, Herod was so "insensitive" to the traditional Judaism that he provoked angers among the Jews.[1139] He was also notorious for his cruelty; he was guilty of killing his wife and two of his sons. Herod's kingdom included Judea, Samaria, Galilee, Idumea, etc., a similar size to the kingdom of David and Solomon. After Herod's death, the Romans split the kingdom of Judea among his three sons; Archelaus (Judea and Samaria), Antipas (Galilee and Peraea), and Philip (Golan, part of the Jordan). The Herodian kingdom under the Roman control was the historical background, in which Jesus lived and died as a Jew.

Jesus lived in Galilee, a "rich agricultural" area with "fishing industry" around the Lake of Gennesaret.[1140] During the lifetime of Jesus, Galilee was ruled by Herod Antipas, a son of Herod the Great. Joseph Caiaphas was the high priest and the head of the Jerusalem Sanhedrin, the Jewish Supreme Court made of 71 members. Hillel and Shammai, the founders of "the most influential" Pharisaic schools, also lived in Jesus' time.[1141] Hillel was succeeded by "Gamaliel the Elder" in Jesus' lifetime.[1142] Philo, the Greek Jew in Alexandria, pursued a harmony between "the Jewish life-style" and the Greek philosophy.[1143] In Jesus' time,

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[1139] Freeman, *A New History of Early Christianity*, 4.
[1140] Geza Vermes, "Jesus the Jew," in *Renewing the Jewish-Christian Wellsprings*, ed. Val Ambrose Mclnnes (New York: Crossroad, 1987), 126; Freeman, *A New History of Early Christianity*, 19.
[1141] Vermes, "Jesus the Jew," 125.
[1142] Vermes, "Jesus the Jew," 125.
[1143] Vermes, "Jesus the Jew," 125.

Alexandria was one of major cities, to which Jews had "migrated" from Judea after the Babylonian conquest of Judah in 586 BC.[1144]

Compared with the historical knowledge about the first-century Palestine, there are not many reliable resources on Jesus' life story because Jesus did not write down his ministry, and most of his followers were "illiterate."[1145] The main resources on Jesus' life story are the four canonical gospels attributed to Matthew, Mar, Luke, and John. But even the four canonical gospels barely provide Jesus' life story, for they were written not by Jesus and his immediate followers, but by the "educated Greeks" around 70-100 AD, about forty to seventy years after Jesus' death.[1146] Furthermore, the four gospels are only "survivors" among twenty gospels, such as the gospel of Peter, implying that there were many different views outside the four canonical gospels.[1147] Within the limited resources, though, we can assume that Jesus "knew" the Hebrew Bible; in Luke's Gospel (4: 16-21), Jesus took part in the public service and read part of Isaiah 61.[1148] The title of rabbi attached to Jesus also confirms that he was a man with "some learning."[1149] However, there are still unsolved questions about Jesus' life story; e.g., when he was born and died; where he was during the eighteen-year "interval" between his twelfth year and the beginning of his ministry around his thirties; etc.[1150]

Another problem in the gospels is that they include omissions and distortions caused by the Greek translations of Jesus' story. Jesus and his disciples spoke in "Aramaic."[1151]

[1144] Freeman, *A New History of Early Christianity*, 16.
[1145] Freeman, *A New History of Early Christianity*, 19.
[1146] Freeman, *A New History of Early Christianity*, 20.
[1147] Freeman, *A New History of Early Christianity*, 20.
[1148] Freeman, *A New History of Early Christianity*, 25.
[1149] Freeman, *A New History of Early Christianity*, 25.
[1150] Vermes, "Jesus the Jew," 125.
[1151] Freeman, *A New History of Early Christianity*, 21.

Therefore, the Greek writers had to translate into Greek Jesus' life story which had been orally transmitted in Aramaic. Luke's Gospel provides the evidence for the "heavily" oral tradition of the gospels; "they were handed down to us by the eyewitnesses" (Luke 1: 2).[1152] The Greek translations of Jesus' story call for "omissions" and distortions, for they inevitably include not only language barriers between Aramaic and Greek but also lack of eye witnesses to the story.[1153] These distortions in the gospels remained unknown until "the early nineteenth century" because most of Christian scholars were so unfamiliar to the Aramaic literature that they could not detect them in the gospels.[1154] Fortunately, thanks to the Jewish reading of the gospels, the distortions have been uncovered. During the Christian era, Jews were so tightly isolated behind ghettos that they did not know even "the extraordinary formative developments" in modern history, such as the discovery of the New World, the Renaissance, the Protestant Reformation, etc.[1155]

However, in the early nineteenth century when Napoleon conquered Europe, the Jews were liberated from their isolation and directly exposed to the "Christian Europe."[1156] These Jews began to recognize their "misconception" of Jesus and tried to read the story of Jesus in light of the first-century Palestine, where Jesus and his immediate followers lived and died.[1157] In this process, some scholars succeed in uncovering Jesus' Jewish identity because, while reading the Christian writings through the lens of the Hebrew and Aramaic literatures, with which "most Christian scholars" are unfamiliar, the scholars recognize that Jesus' lifestyle described in the

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[1152] Freeman, *A New History of Early Christianity*, 20.
[1153] Freeman, *A New History of Early Christianity*, 21.
[1154] Michael J. Cook, "Evolving Jewish Views of Jesus," in *Jesus through Jewish Eyes*, ed. Beatrice Bruteau (New York: Orbis Books, 2001), 19.
[1155] Cook, "Evolving Jewish Views of Jesus," 19
[1156] Cook, "Evolving Jewish Views of Jesus," 19
[1157] Cook, "Evolving Jewish Views of Jesus," 19

synoptic gospels is similar to the first-century Jewish lifestyle described in Josephus and other Jewish literature.[1158]

According to the Jewish reading of the gospels, Jesus accepted the Torah and the Jewish customs. In the gospels, Jesus regularly attended his local synagogues, "the centers of worship and teaching" (Matthew 9: 35), as his fellow Jews did.[1159] The gospels "explicitly" name two synagogues, where Jesus regularly attended and devoted himself to worship and teaching: Capernaum (Mark 1: 21), and Nazareth (Luke 4: 16-21).[1160] Jesus recognized the Jewish priesthood as well; in Luke's Gospel (5: 12-14), Jesus healed a leper and ordered him to go to a priest for the "examination" of his leprosy.[1161] Dead Sea Scrolls provide the evidence for "the priestly monopoly" on the management of leprosy in Jesus' time (CD 13: 3-7).[1162] Jesus' travel to Jerusalem also confirms that he celebrated "the pilgrim festival" of the Passover with his fellow Jews (Matthew 26: 17-19; Mark 14: 12-16).[1163]

Jesus accepted Moses' laws as well. According to Matthew's Gospel (3: 13-17), Jesus came to Jordan and received John's baptism. In John's days, there was a ritual cleansing that required the full "immersion" in natural waters, such as lakes and rivers.[1164] The ritual cleansing was carried out for several occasions, e.g., for married women's purification of their menstrual bleeding, for Hasidic men's preparation for the Sabbath and Jewish holidays, for the gentiles' conversion to Judaism, etc.[1165] John freely offered the ritual cleansing as "a substitute"

[1158] Cook, "Evolving Jewish Views of Jesus," 19
[1159] Vermes, *The Religion of Jesus the Jew* (Minneapolis: Fortress press, 1993), 13.
[1160] Vermes, *The Religion of Jesus the Jew*, 13.
[1161] Vermes, *The Religion of Jesus the Jew*, 18.
[1162] Vermes, *The Religion of Jesus the Jew*, 18.
[1163] Vermes, *The Religion of Jesus the Jew*, 14.
[1164] Miller and Bernstein, *Healing the Jewish-Christian Rift*, 30.
[1165] Miller and Bernstein, *Healing the Jewish-Christian Rift*, 30.

for sin offerings because, in his days, making a sin offering costed too much to the poor.[1166] In

other words, John offered a free baptism to the Jews not to bring a new religion, but to replace

the sin offering, which was demanded by Moses' laws. Jesus received John's free baptism.

Jesus' reception of John's baptism makes it clear that Jesus accepted Moses' laws because, while

receiving John's baptism, Jesus counted himself among his fellow Jews who had to fulfill the sin

offering demanded by Moses' laws (Matthew 3: 13-17).

Jesus was a "charismatic" teacher, who knew how to draw large audience, and how

to present complicated issues through parables and other literary genres.[1167] Jesus' main theme

was the kingdom of God, which was "the common theme" in his time.[1168] In Jesus' time, the idea

of the kingdom had "a lengthy history," which had developed throughout the Hebrew Bible and

other Jewish literatures, such as intertestamental texts.[1169] Here is the lengthy history of the

kingdom in Judaism. In the early stage of Israel, there was an "anti-royalist" tradition, a tradition

which stood against kingship and anticipated the kingdom of God (1 Samuel 8: 7; 12: 12).[1170]

According to the anti-royalists, Israel represented the kingdom of God because God alone is "the

ruler of Israel."[1171] On the other hand, kingship represented "an automatic repudiation "of God's

reign because to follow kingship corresponds to reject God's reign over Israel; "they have

rejected me from being king over them" (1 Samuel 8: 7).[1172] The anti-royalists anticipated the

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[1166] Miller and Bernstein, *Healing the Jewish-Christian Rift*, 30. In John's days, to make sin offering cost much because the Jews had to pay not only for the animal to sacrifice, but also for converting roman coins into shekels to buy the animal.
[1167] Freeman, *A New History of Early Christianity*, 25.
[1168] Vermes, *The Religion of Jesus the Jew*, 137.
[1169] Vermes, *The Religion of Jesus the Jew*, 121.
[1170] Vermes, *The Religion of Jesus the Jew*, 121.
[1171] Vermes, *The Religion of Jesus the Jew*, 122.
[1172] Vermes, *The Religion of Jesus the Jew*, 121.

kingdom of God in that since Israel represented the kingdom of God that it would finally rule

over the world and submit the world to God, "the true Master of the universe."[1173]

However, in the sixth century BC when Judah was exiled to Babylon, the Jews

anticipated a "royal" messiah, who would deliver them from the Babylonian exile and restore the

kingdom of David in Palestine.[1174] In other words, in the absence of the national sovereignty, a

royal messiahship emerged. The royal messiahship included "a battle" against foreigners

because the messianic king would have to expel the foreigners from the land of Palestine in order

that he may restore the kingdom of David in the land.[1175] The Psalms of Solomon reflect the

royal messiahship appealing to "the victorious Jewish savior-king" over the foreigners; "Behold,

O Lord, and raise up …, the son of David…. He may shatter unrighteous rulers" (17: 21).[1176]

At the end of the sixth century BC, the Jewish anticipation of redemption came true

because, in the 530s BC when Babylon was defeated by the Persian King Cyrus, the Jews were

set free from the Babylon exile and allowed to return to Judea. The unexpected redemption from

Babylon gave rise to a transcendental framework of the kingdom because, while experiencing the

"unforeseeable" redemption brought by the Persian King, the Jews began to anticipate the

kingdom of God not only among the Jews themselves but also among the gentiles.[1177] Isaiah 45

reflects the transcendental framework; the Persian King Cyrus was exalted to the messiah in that

God used him as a divine instrument for the redemption of the Jews; "This is what the LORD says

to his anointed, to Cyrus" (vs. 1). The transcendental kingdom includes a "mystery" because

God's redemption of Israel appeared so enigmatic that it would attract the gentiles and result in

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[1173] Vermes, *The Religion of Jesus the Jew*, 122.
[1174] Vermes, *The Religion of Jesus the Jew*, 125.
[1175] Vermes, *The Religion of Jesus the Jew*, 123.
[1176] Vermes, *The Religion of Jesus the Jew*, 125.
[1177] Vermes, *The Religion of Jesus the Jew*, 123.

their obedience to God's reign.[1178] Isaiah 49-66, which is dated to "the second half of the sixth century BC," reflects the mystery of the transcendental kingdom.[1179]

In the second century BC, while the transcendental framework was still surviving, the eschatological framework emerged because, at that time, the Jews were suffering under the Roman tyranny that they anticipated a messiah, who would put an end to the Roman tyranny "at the end of time."[1180] The eschatological framework justified "the terror" of God because the Roman tyranny must be put to an end by God at the end of time to ensure the final victory of the Jews.[1181] The Apocalypse of Weeks in 1 Enoch (93:1–10; 91:11–17), which is dated to the second century BC, reflects "a similar idea" that God would pass the final judgment on the wicked.[1182] The eschatological kingdom survived until the time of Jesus and his disciples. In the parable of weeds (Matthew 13: 24-30), the kingdom and the evil power "coexist" until the kingdom of God is fulfilled at the end of the world when the evil power is put to an end by God, just as the wheat and weeds coexist until the wheat is gathered at the end of harvest when the weeds are put on the fire by the harvesters.[1183]

The lengthy history of the kingdom makes it arguable that, in Jesus' time, the kingdom ideal was not simple because there had been so many divisions on it. Among those divisions, there were the Sadducees, a small group of priests, who read the Torah literally and rejected "the resurrection of the body"in that the resurrection was not written in the Torah.[1184] The priestly group were privileged to rule over not only religious issues, such as the temple

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[1178] Vermes, *The Religion of Jesus the Jew*, 124.
[1179] Vermes, *The Religion of Jesus the Jew*, 123.
[1180] Vermes, *The Religion of Jesus the Jew*, 131.
[1181] Vermes, *The Religion of Jesus the Jew*, 129.
[1182] Vermes, *The Religion of Jesus the Jew*, 129.
[1183] Vermes, *The Religion of Jesus the Jew*, 138.
[1184] Freeman, *A New History of Early Christianity*, 10.

sacrifice, rituals, tithes, etc., but also civil issues, such as taxes and legal disputes. The small but privileged group of the Sadducees were"highly unpopular" among the Jews because they concerned not so much the Jewish people as the Roman authority, upon which the Sadducees themselves survived as a privileged group.[1185] These Sadducees disappeared with the destruction of the Second Temple because the absence of the Temple corresponded to the absence of temple sacrifice, for which the Sadducees existed.

There were also the Pharisees, a scholarly group, who read the Torah in terms of its prophetic teaching and anticipated the messianic kingdom in the Torah. The Pharisees accepted "a future resurrection of the body" in that, after death, good people would be rewarded with resurrection, and wicked ones would be punished.[1186]They also accepted "the oral law" in that written laws originated from the oral laws.[1187] The scholarly group of the Pharisees became the "rivals" of the Sadducees because, while reading the Torah in terms of its prophetic teaching, the Pharisees substituted the study of the Torah for the temple sacrifice, for which the priestly group of the Sadducees existed.[1188] These Pharisees survived the destruction the Second Temple and became "the founders" ofthe Rabbinic Judaism, which represents today's Judaism.[1189]

The Essenes, also known as the Qumran community, were another group which survived in Jesus' time. They read the Torah in terms of its spiritual meaning and voluntarily chose ascetic lifestyles, such as poverty and celibacy, in that the true sacrifice was not the external observation of the law, but the sacrifice of "every wrong desire" inside; "Circumcise

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[1185] Greenberg, *The Judas Brief*, 165.
[1186] Freeman, *A New History of Early Christianity*, 12.
[1187] Alan Watson, *Jesus and the Jews* (Athens: The University of Georgia Press, 1995), 97.
[1188] Greenberg, *The Judas Brief*, 155.
[1189] Miller and Bernstein, *Healing the Jewish-Christian Rift*, 177.

your hearts" (Deuteronomy 10: 16).[1190]The spiritual group of the Essenes anticipated "an imminent coming" of the kingdom in that both the Sadducees and the Pharisees were so corrupted that the Essenes considered themselves to be "the last era of the world history."[1191]The Dead Sea Scrolls, the "preserved library" of the Qumran community, reflect the Jewish anticipation of the imminent kingdom.[1192] These Essenes were also conflicted with the Sadducees because, while anticipating the imminent kingdom, the Essenes replaced the Sadducees' temple sacrifice with the study of the Torah. There were also the Zealots who jealously desired to retrieve Palestine from the Romans.The Zealots were so zealous for the restoration of the Palestine that they not only justified the use of violence but also tried to stir up the Jews into a rebellion against the Romans.

Just as the Pharisees and the Essenes read the Torah in terms of its prophetic teaching and anticipated the messianic kingdom in the Torah, so did Jesus. In other words, Jesus did not bring something new to the Jews, but anticipated what was anticipated by the majority of his fellow Jews. In the parable of the mustard seed (Matthew 13: 31-32), the kingdom appears as what secretly grows into its "full revelation," just as the seed under the ground secretly grows into a large tree.[1193] Similarly, in the parable of leaven (Matthew 13: 33), the kingdom appears as what secretly changes the world, just as a small piece of leaven secretly changes the dough into "life-giving" bread.[1194] The kingdom of God, which secretly grows into its final form, calls for "the time factor" because, just as the seed and the flour require time to grow, so does the

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[1190] Ruether, *Faith and Fratricide: The Theological Roots of Anti-Semitism*, 37.
[1191] Freeman, *A New History of Early Christianity*, 14; Ruether, *Faith and Fratricide: The Theological Roots of Anti-Semitism*, 74.
[1192] Freeman, *A New History of Early Christianity*, 13.
[1193] Vermes, *The Religion of Jesus the Jew*, 137.
[1194] Vermes, *The Religion of Jesus the Jew*, 137.

kingdom of God.[1195] The time reference to the kingdom makes it arguable that Jesus anticipated "the imminent coming" of the kingdom because, in his eyes, time may have been mature enough for the kingdom to appear.[1196] Mark's Gospel reflects Jesus' anticipation of the imminent kingdom; "The kingdom of God is near. Repent and believe the good news!" (1: 15). Jesus' anticipation of the imminent kingdom makes it arguable that, in his lifetime, Jesus "fiercely clashed" with the Sadducees because, while anticipating the imminent kingdom, Jesus replaced the Sadducees' temple sacrifice with the study of the Torah; "Jesus … drove out all who sold and bought in the temple, and he overturned the tables of the money-changer" (Matthew 21: 12).[1197]

In his teaching on the kingdom, Jesus used not only parables but also other Jewish literary genres, such as "exaggeration" or hyperbolic expressions; "it is easier for a camel to go through the eye of a needle than a rich man to enter the kingdom of God" (Matthew 19: 24).[1198] The hyperbolic expressions should not be read literally because Jesus uses them not to convey the literal meaning, but to teach "moral" obligation for others.[1199] For instance, Jesus' hyperbolic expression, "the fire of hell," (Matthew 5: 22) should not be read literally, for it aims not to convey its literal meaning, but to teach us that, when we insult someone by calling him/her a fool, his/her face turns "pale," causing his/her death, which will finally bring us to the fire of hell.[1200] The same logic must be applied to Jesus' expressions, such as "gouge out your eye" and "cut off your hand" (Matthew 5: 29, 30), because Jesus uses them not to convey the literal meaning, but to keep us away from evil desires until we are gorged out of, or cut off, our evil desires and

[1195] Vermes, *The Religion of Jesus the Jew*, 137, 138.
[1196] Freeman, *A New History of Early Christianity*, 24.
[1197] Miller and Bernstein, *Healing the Jewish-Christian Rift*, 173.
[1198] Herbert Bronstein, "Talking Torah with Jesus," in *Jesus through Jewish Eyes*, ed. Beatrice Bruteau (New York: Orbis Books, 2001), 57.
[1199] Bronstein, "Talking Torah with Jesus," 57.
[1200] Bronstein, "Talking Torah with Jesus," 57.

ruptured into our "spiritual senses" to others' needs and suffering.[1201] Jesus' teaching on hand-

washing should not be read literally, either, for it aims not to convey the literal meaning, but to

keep us away from evil thoughts until we are purged of the evil thoughts and ruptured into our

sensitivity to others, just as our hands are purged of the dirt and restored to the "ritual" cleanness

required by God; "For out of the heart comes evil thoughts, murder, adultery,…" (Matthew 15:

20).[1202] Jesus' teaching about Moses' sanction of divorce also aims not to justify divorce, but to

teach human obligation for women who could be divorced for some "frivolous reasons."[1203]

Jesus' teaching on the kingdom tells us that, in Jesus' lifetime, the Pharisees were not

Jesus' adversaries but his "dialogue partners" because both parties shared the same ideal of the

messianic kingdom in the Torah and replaced the Sadducees' temple sacrifice with the study of

the Torah.[1204] The intimacy between Jesus and the Pharisees can be detected in Luke's Gospel,

where Jesus is invited to a Pharisee's house (7: 36), and the Jews ask Jesus to heal a centurion's

servant (7: 3). This Jesus, who shared the same ideal of the messianic kingdom with his fellow

Jews, cannot be the Christian founder, but "a Galilean *hasid*," whose life was deeply devoted to

God and fellow humans.[1205] Jesus' Jewish identity in the gospels tells us that Judaism rejected

Jesus only retrospectively, only after his death, because, in Jesus' lifetime, there was no conflict

between Jesus and Judaism.

B. The Christian Root in Judaism

Jesus was a young man about thirty years old when he was crucified. To the

disciples, Jesus' crucifixion was "an intolerable shock" because they considered him to be the

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[1201] Miller and Bernstein, *Healing the Jewish-Christian Rift*, 68.
[1202] Miller and Bernstein, *Healing the Jewish-Christian Rift*, 186.
[1203] Miller and Bernstein, *Healing the Jewish-Christian Rift*, 69.
[1204] Miller and Bernstein, *Healing the Jewish-Christian Rift*, 173.
[1205] Matt, "Yeshua the Hasid," 74.

long waited messiah and risked everything on his message.[1206] To these traumatized disciples,

something "extraordinary" happened; three days after Jesus' crucifixion, they encountered the

risen Jesus.[1207] Then the question is whether the resurrection really happened, or it was only "a

collective wishful thinking" among the disciples.[1208] Freeman interprets this dilemma in terms of

human strategy to survive the trauma of crucifixion. According to Freeman, when Jesus entered

Jerusalem, Caiaphas the High Priest was "shaken" because Jesus was the alleged messiah who

might disturb not only his priesthood but also the traditional temple system, upon which the

Jewish community had survived.[1209] Caiaphas had to punish the alleged messiah in "some public

way" in order that he might teach the public that any messianic claim would provoke the Roman

suspicion and put the entire community in danger.[1210] He fabricated "a political charge" that

Jesus claimed to be the king of the Jews and persuaded Pilate to put him on the cross.[1211] The

political charge against Jesus was so "seditious" to the Romans that Pilate, the Roman governor,

had no other option than to execute Jesus the alleged messiah.[1212] In other words, Jesus was

executed not for his religious rebellion against God, but for his political rebellion against Rome.

The political charge against Jesus makes it arguable that Jesus was so "overconfident" of the

coming of the kingdom that he failed to see Caiaphas' conspiracy and ended up to his

crucifixion.[1213] In other words, Jesus' extreme zeal for the kingdom stirred up Caiaphas'

suspicion and called for his crucifixion.

[1206] Ruether, *Faith and Fratricide: The Theological Roots of Anti-Semitism*, 69.
[1207] Ruether, *Faith and Fratricide: The Theological Roots of Anti-Semitism*, 69.
[1208] Ruether, *Faith and Fratricide: The Theological Roots of Anti-Semitism*, 69.
[1209] Freeman, *A New History of Early Christianity*, 6.
[1210] Freeman, *A New History of Early Christianity*, 6.
[1211] Freeman, *A New History of Early Christianity*, 7.
[1212] Freeman, *A New History of Early Christianity*, 7.
[1213] Freeman, *A New History of Early Christianity*, 29.

After the crucifixion of Jesus, Caiaphas removed "the body" of Jesus from the tomb and left in the tomb a young man with a message that Jesus had risen and would appear in Galilee (Mark 16: 5).[1214] In other words, the gospels' story on the risen Jesus was not a historical fact, but a fake story, which Caiaphas made up. Then the question is why Caiaphas made up the fake story on the risen Jesus. According to Freeman, this is because Caiaphas might send back the disciples to Galilee without bloodshed. After Jesus' death, there was a possibility of "any emerging movement in memory of Jesus" because the disciples may have "dreamed" of throwing away the traditional priesthood based on Jesus' message against it.[1215] This possibility of rebellion against the priesthood forced Caiaphas to make up the story on the risen Jesus because, by declaring that Jesus had risen and would appear in Galilee, Caiaphas could expel from Jerusalem, which was "his sphere of authority," and send them back to Galilee, which belonged to Herod Antipas' authority, without bloodshed.[1216]   In other words, Caiaphas made up the story on the risen Jesus not to divinize Jesus, but to send them back to Galilee without bloodshed.

Peter's Gospel reflects the fake story; according to Peter's Gospel, people were gathering around Jesus' tomb, and two men entered the tomb and later came out with "a third man," that is, the risen Jesus.[1217] The same Gospel casts a serious doubt on the physical resurrection of Jesus by arguing that Jesus' legs were broken, which was an "obstacle" to his physical resurrection.[1218] The "original version" of Mark's Gospel offers no detail on the miraculous event, either, but

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[1214] Freeman, *A New History of Early Christianity*, 92.
[1215] Freeman, *A New History of Early Christianity*, 31, 32.
[1216] Freeman, *A New History of Early Christianity*, 32.
[1217] Freeman, *A New History of Early Christianity*, 33.
[1218] Watson, *Jesus and the Jews*, 92.

simply reports that Jesus rose again and went to Galilee (15: 6-7).[1219] The synoptic gospels,

which keep silent to the miracle of Lazarus' resurrection (John 11), also confirm the Jewish

doubt on the physical resurrection because, if the resurrection had really happened, it would have

been reported in "all four gospels;" but it is reported only in John's Gospel.[1220] All these

canonical or non-canonical doubts on the resurrection make it clear that, in Judaism, the physical

resurrection is impossible, due to the lack of historical evidence for it.

 The Jewish doubts on the risen Jesus, however, do not mean that the story on the

risen Jesus was something new to the Jews because they already knew "similar" stories in the

Hebrew Bible; e.g., Elijah and Elisha brought back the dead to life (1 Kings 17; 2 Kings 4).[1221]

Besides, around that time, there were rumors that Lazarus was back to life (Mark 16: 14-16), and

that John the Baptist was "reincarnated" after his death (Matthew 14: 1-2).[1222] In other words, the

Jews accepted the story on the risen Jesus not based on the historical evidence for it, but within

the Jewish mysticism. Especially, to the traumatized disciples, the fake story may have been

accepted literally and interpreted with "unshakable conviction" because they had to cope with

the trauma of crucifixion by adopting positive ideas or wishful thinking, which operates

independently of the historical evidence.[1223]In other words, the disciples accepted the fake story

with unwavering conviction not to divinize Jesus, but to cope with the trauma of his crucifixion.

Matthew's Gospel reflects the psychological impact on the trauma of crucifixion; in Matthew 28:

1-7, Jesus is exalted a little "higher" than other prophets in the Hebrew Bible not to divinize

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[1219] Freeman, *A New History of Early Christianity*, 77.
[1220] Watson, *Jesus and the Jews*, 45.
[1221] Freeman, *A New History of Early Christianity*, 34.
[1222] Freeman, *A New History of Early Christianity*, 34.
[1223] Freeman, *A New History of Early Christianity*, 39.

Jesus, but to overcome the trauma of Jesus' crucifixion.[1224] The psychological impact on the trauma of crucifixion tells us that Matthew's exaltation of Jesus should not be read in terms of Jesus' messiahship because Matthew exalts Jesus a little higher than other prophets in the Hebrew Bible not to justify Jesus' messiahship, but to manage the trauma of crucifixion by honoring Jesus within the Jewish mysticism.

After their encounter with the risen Jesus in Galilee, the disciples returned to Jerusalem and devoted themselves to worship and prayers at the temple. According to Acts 2-3, while celebrating the Jewish Passover, the disciples were inspired by the Spirit and began to preach Jesus to the Jews. This small group of the Jewish followers became the members of the early church. In other words, the church was born not as a new religion, but as one of Judaism. These Jewish Christians were "suspicious" of Paul's preaching to the gentiles in that Jesus had preached exclusively to the Jews; "I was sent only to the lost sheep of Israel" (Matthew 15: 24).[1225] The Christian root in Judaism can be identified in the early Christian writings. In Acts 2-3, the disciples visited the Temple "at the hour of prayer," which was required for the Jews.[1226] The "golden rule" in Matthew also reflects the Jewish responsibility for others; "…do to others what you would have them do to you…" (7: 12).[1227] Jesus' saying, "Let tomorrow worry about tomorrow" (Matthew 6: 34), recalls "a Yiddish proverb" on human suffering and troubles.[1228]Jesus' teachings on treasures in heaven (Matthew 6: 19-21) also "evoke" Hillel's teaching on the spiritual wisdom.[1229]

[1224] Freeman, *A New History of Early Christianity*, 78.
[1225] Matt, "Yeshua the Hasid," 76.
[1226] Vermes, *The Religion of Jesus the Jew*, 15.
[1227] Vermes, *The Religion of Jesus the Jew*, 39.
[1228] Miller and Bernstein, *Healing the Jewish-Christian Rift*, 97.
[1229] Miller and Bernstein, *Healing the Jewish-Christian Rift*, 92.

While preaching Jesus' message to the Jews, the early church tried to interpret Jesus' birth within the Jewish messianism. Matthew's virgin-birth story (1: 18-25) reflects the tie between Jesus' birth and the Jewish messianism influenced by Isaiah's virgin-birth story; "The virgin will conceive and give birth to a son, and will call him Immanuel" (Isaiah 7: 14). According to recent studies, in Isaiah 7: 14, the Hebrew word "*almah*," which is translated into a virgin, does not necessarily mean an unmarried woman, but "a young girl" or "a young woman."[1230] On the other hand, the Hebrew name "Immanuel," which means God with us, is adopted for the son of the young girl or woman (*almah*) not to predict a baby, who would be born of a virgin "seven hundred years" later and grow to be the messiah.[1231] Instead, it is adopted to convince Ahaz, the King of Judah, that his kingdom would be delivered from its enemy under the "divine protection" as shortly as a son in the womb of the young girl or woman grew enough to know "right" and "wrong" (Isaiah 7:15).[1232] In other words, there was a serious mistranslation of Isaiah 7: 14 because Isaiah adopted the Hebrew words, *almah* and Immanuel, not to prophesy the virgin birth of Jesus seven hundred years later, but to predict the imminent rescue of Judea as shortly as a son, which would be born of a young woman or girl, told right from wrong.

According to Freeman, Matthew knew the literal meaning of the Hebrew word "*almah*," but intentionally mistranslated it into a virgin concerning Jesus' birth not to divinize Jesus' birth, but to create "a link" between Jesus' birth and the Jewish messianism.[1233] Matthew's virgin-birth story should not be read literally, either, because Matthew creates the virgin-birth story not to divinize Jesus' birth, but to interpret it within the Jewish messianism. Unfortunately,

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[1230] Arnold Fruchtenbaum, *Jesus was a Jew* (Nashville: Broadman Press, 1974), 51; Miller and Bernstein, *Healing the Jewish-Christian Rift*, 16; Freeman, *A New History of Early Christianity*, 80.
[1231] Miller and Bernstein, *Healing the Jewish-Christian Rift*, 16.
[1232] Miller and Bernstein, *Healing the Jewish-Christian Rift*, 17.
[1233] Freeman, *A New History of Early Christianity*, 80.

as the Jewish Christians were replaced with the gentiles, Matthew's story was stripped of its

Jewish context and assimilated into the Christian doctrine of virgin-birth because what had been

created within the Jewish messianism was interpreted literally and accepted as a historical fact.

According to Bernstein, the Christian doctrine of virgin-birth is totally opposite to the Judaic

understanding on sexuality because, in Judaism, "healthy sexuality" is considered to be "a

blessing." (Deuteronomy 7: 14).[1234]

      While preaching Jesus within Judaism, the Jewish Christians honored Jesus with

messianic titles, such as son of man (Matthew 8: 20), Lord (Matthew8: 21), the Son of God

(Mark 15: 39), Christ (John 9: 22), etc. These messianic titles should not be read literally

because, in the Jewish context, they are only "honorific" terms adopted by the Jewish Christians

not to divinize Jesus, but to honor his extreme zeal for the kingdom.[1235] For instance, the Lord

(*adonay* in Greek) should not be read literally, for it was adopted not to divinize Jesus, but to

honor him as "a secular dignitary" or as "an authoritative teacher."[1236] The same logic can be

applied to the Son of Man, for it is adopted for Jesus not to venerate him to the messiah, but to

see him as a man who was "uniquely favored by God."[1237] Especially, the title of Christ or the

messiah adopted for Jesus is simply "vapid" because, in the Greek context, to be anointed as the

messiah or Christ is to be smeared with "cosmetics" and other materials.[1238] The secular

reference to the messianic titles makes it clear that Jesus' authority over diseases and evil spirits

should not be taken as an excuse for his messiahship because the authority over the evil powers

is not "peculiar" to Jesus, but available to "all" whose life was unreservedly devoted to God and

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[1234] Miller and Bernstein, *Healing the Jewish-Christian Rift*, 16
[1235] Anthony J. Tomasino, *Judaism Before Jesus* (Downers Grove, Ill.: InterVarsity Press, c2003), 299.
[1236] Freeman, *A New History of Early Christianity*, 26.
[1237] Freeman, *A New History of Early Christianity*, 76.
[1238] Sandmel, *We Jews and Jesus*, 36.

fellow humans.[1239] Jesus also recognized the spiritual authority available to all when he gave the

same "authority" to his disciples (Matthew 10: 1).[1240]

More importantly, Jesus "rarely" claimed his messiahship.[1241]   Rather, he humbled

himself as human as he is; "Why do you call me good? … No one is good—except God alone"

(Mark 10: 18); "the Son of Man has nowhere to lay his head" (Matthew 8: 20). Then, the

question is how to interpret Jesus' saying that seems to claim his messiahship; "the sign of the

Son of Man will appear in the sky" (Matthew 24: 30). According to Tomasino, when Jesus

called himself the Son of Man, he barely meant his divinity but simply designated his "humility"

before God.[1242] Freeman suggests a couple of reasons why it is unlikely that Jesus claimed his

messiahship. Firstly, there is no remark on Jesus' messiahship in "the Q sayings," the so-called

Jesus' original sayings.[1243]   Secondly, the word "Christian," which comes from Christos in Greek,

or Christ in English, was recorded for the first time not from Jerusalem, where the Jewish

Christians preached Jesus the Jew and his prophetic message, but from "Antioch," where the

gentile Christians gave up the original message of Jesus and adopted the Pauline theory of Jesus'

sacrificial messiahship.[1244]   Finally, as far as the word "messiah" was involved in "military or

political triumph," it is unlikely that Jesus claimed himself to be the messiah because he never

held up whatever involved in military or political achievements.[1245] Therefore, if the Jewish

Christians honored Jesus with the title of Christ or the messiah in a military context, they never

meant to venerate him as the triumphal deity, but only to cope with the trauma of his crucifixion,

[1239] Miller and Bernstein, *Healing the Jewish-Christian Rift*, 141.
[1240] Miller and Bernstein, *Healing the Jewish-Christian Rift*, 141.
[1241] Tomasino, *Judaism Before Jesus*, 301.
[1242] Tomasino, *Judaism Before Jesus*, 300.
[1243] Freeman, *A New History of Early Christianity*, 30.
[1244] Freeman, *A New History of Early Christianity*, 30.
[1245] Freeman, *A New History of Early Christianity*, 30.

because the title of Christ or the messiah was adopted not to impose Jesus as a triumphal deity on other deities, but to deal with his "apparent defeat" on the cross.[1246]

The early Christianity, which preached Jesus within the Jewish messianism, cannot be a new religion, but one of Judaism, for it did not divinize Jesus to the Christian founder, but tried to honor him within the Jewish messianism. In the same way, the gospels and other Christian writings attributable to the early Christianity cannot be new writings, but "a noble effort" to honor Jesus within the Jewish messianism.[1247] The early Christianity as Judaism challenges the traditional reading of the Hebrews. Traditionally, the Hebrews has been regarded as an anti-Semitic text on the suspicion that it was written to "dissuade" the Jewish Christians from returning to Judaism.[1248] However, according to recent studies, the Hebrews is not anti-Semitic, but, quite contrarily, deeply "sympathetic" and "loyal" to Judaism.[1249] For instance, in the Hebrews, the church is defined as a "επισυναγωγη," i.e., as something that emerged from the synagogue (10: 25); Jewish heroes, such as Abraham and Moses, are highly honored (11); etc.[1250] The Hebrews' loyalty to Judaism makes it assumable that the Hebrews was written before the Temple destruction in 70 AD because, before the Temple destruction, the church and Judaism were so intimate that there was no conflict between the two groups.

C. The Christian Split from Judaism

[1246] Freeman, *A New History of Early Christianity*, 112.
[1247] Sandmel, *We Jews and Jesus*, 133.
[1248] Gene R. Smillie, "Contrast or Continuity in Hebrews 1.1–2?," *New Testament Studies* 51 (2005): 556.
[1249] Smillie, "Contrast or Continuity in Hebrews 1.1–2?,"557.
[1250] Smillie, "Contrast or Continuity in Hebrews 1.1–2?,"557.

In its early period, Christianity was targeted not only by "conservative Jews" but also by "the Roman authorities," for it had "no legal status" in the Roman Empire.[1251] In the early 30s, Stephen was murdered by the Jews (Acts 7: 54-60); in 60s, James and Peter were also murdered by the Jews and the Romans; in 64, Christians were sacrificed by Nero for the great fire in Rome. The persecution of Christianity, however, did not undermine the spread of Christianity, for it gave a "cohesion" to the church and made it solid in the Roman Empire.[1252] As solid as it was, Christianity survived the Temple destruction in 70 AD and became "a rival" to the Rabbinic Judaism.[1253] In this rivalry, the Rabbinic Judaism had "the upper hand" and persecuted the church.[1254] Jesus was caricatured as "a sorcerer" enticing the Jews into idolatry.[1255] Christians were flagged and expelled from the synagogue. John's Gospel, dated to the 90s, reflects the expulsion of the Christian community from "Jerusalem;" "you will worship the Father neither on this mountain nor in Jerusalem" (4: 21).[1256]

Matthew's story on the baby Jesus (2: 1-23) also reflects the Christian hostility toward Judaism. Miller and Bernstein suggest parallels between the story of the baby Jesus in Matthew and the story of the baby Moses in Exodus. Just as the baby Moses was "threatened" by Pharaoh, so was the baby Jesus by Herod, the King of the Jews; just as Pharaoh "pretended" that he would let the Israelites go, so did the King of the Jews pretend that he would honor the baby Jesus; just as the Israelites were "led" by the pillars of cloud and fire, so the Magi was led by a star.[1257]

[1251] Miller and Bernstein, *A New History of Early Christianity*, 150; Freeman, *A New History of Early Christianity*, 113.
[1252] Freeman, *A New History of Early Christianity*, 114.
[1253] Miller and Bernstein, *Healing the Jewish-Christian Rift*, 177.
[1254] Miller and Bernstein, *Healing the Jewish-Christian Rift*, 242.
[1255] Cook, "Evolving Jewish Views of Jesus," 20
[1256] Freeman, *A New History of Early Christianity*, 87.
[1257] Miller and Bernstein, *Healing the Jewish-Christian Rift*, 25.

These parallels between the two biblical stories make it clear that Matthew's story on the baby should not be read literally because Matthew creates the story of the baby Jesus not based on the historical evidence for it, but based on his imitation of the story on the baby Moses in Exodus. Rather it must be read in terms of the Christian hostility toward Judaism because Matthew imitates the story on the baby Moses not to divinize Jesus, but to express the Christian hostility toward the "Jewish leadership" in his time.[1258] The Jewish-Christian conflict in Matthew's Gospel makes it assumable that Matthew created the story on the baby Jesus not in Jesus' lifetime, but around "the 80s," in which Matthew's community and the Rabbinic Judaism were rivaled against each other, because, in Jesus' lifetime, there was no conflict between the two groups.[1259]

The Jewish-Christian conflict gave rise to a sudden increase of gentile population at the church because, thanks to the Jewish-Christian conflict, the Jewish Christians were persuaded to return to Judaism and replaced with the gentiles. Since then, Jesus has been no longer identified as the Galilean Hasid who anticipated the messianic kingdom in the Torah, but as the sacrificial messiah who died and rose again for the sin, because the gentile Christians were so unfamiliar to Jesus the Galilean Hasid that they blindly accepted the Pauline theory of Jesus' messiahship. For the Jews, on the other hand, to accept Jesus' messiahship was to "betray" Jesus because to accept Jesus as the messiah was to idolize him and choose idolatry.[1260] In other words, the Jews rejected not Jesus the Galilean Hasid preached by the Jewish Christians, but the Pauline theory of Jesus' messiahship preached by the gentile Christians, which did not know Jesus the Galilean Hasid. Since then, Christianity has been no longer considered to be one of Judaism, but a new religion,

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[1258] Miller and Bernstein, *Healing the Jewish-Christian Rift*, 26.
[1259] Miller and Bernstein, *Healing the Jewish-Christian Rift*, 26.
[1260] Matt, "Yeshua the Hasid," 80.

for it gave up Jesus' message on the messianic kingdom in the Torah and adopted the Pauline

theory of Jesus' messiahship, which was unacceptable to Judaism. In other words, Christianity

was split from Judaism not in the time of Jesus, but around 80s- 90s when the gentile church

gave up Jesus the Galilean Hasid and adopted the Pauline theory of Jesus' messiahship.

To justify the Pauline theory of Jesus' messiahship, the gentile church identified Jesus

with the suffering Servant (Isaiah 53) in that, just as the Suffering Servant died for the sin and

rose again to enjoy the "results" of his suffering, so did Jesus.[1261] However, according to recent

studies, the Jewish theme of the Suffering Servant has nothing to do with Jesus' blood atonement

because, in the Jewish tradition, the Suffering Servant designates not the vicarious victim, who

died for the sin, but either "the faithful remnant" of Israel, who survived the Babylonian exile, or

"individual" Jews who were afflicted by violence and injustice.[1262] In other words, the gentile

church misunderstood the Jewish theme of Suffering Servant because, in the Jewish tradition, the

Suffering Servant represents not Jesus the vicarious victim, but the Jewish victims affected by

internal and external violence. Nevertheless, Jesus has been honored as a "son of Joseph," the

preliminary messiah, on the assumption that Jesus may have come as a preliminary messiah in

his time.[1263] In the Jewish tradition, it is supposed that each generation has its own messiah, son

of Joseph or the preliminary messiah, who comes to pave the way of the Son of David, the final

messiah, for "the final redemption" of the Jews.[1264] According to some Jewish historians, the

idea of son of Joseph was created in the middle age in order to give Jesus "a place" in

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[1261] Fruchtenbaum, *Jesus was a Jew*, 46.

[1262] Fruchtenbaum, *Jesus was a Jew*, 46; Miller and Bernstein, *Healing the Jewish-Christian Rift*, 119. .

[1263] Byron L. Sherwin, "Who Do You Say That I Am?," in *Jesus through Jewish Eyes*, ed. Beatrice Bruteau (New York: Orbis Books, 2001), 39.

[1264] Sherwin, "Who Do You Say That I Am?" 40.

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Judaism.[1265] In other words, even in the middle age, that is, even in the Christian era, there was a Jewish effort to interpret Jesus within Judaism and honor him as one of the preliminary messiahs.

Jesus' messiahship at the church gave rise to the Second Coming theory because the church tried to justify the delay of the kingdom by anticipating the Second Coming of Jesus. The early church pursued the imminent kingdom, just as Jesus did. However, as the coming of the kingdom was delayed, the early church gave up the imminent kingdom and looked for "its survival on earth;" "Therefore go and make disciples of all nations" (Matthew 28: 19).[1266] However, as the kingdom was further delayed, the gentile church gave up the messianic kingdom on earth and created the Second Coming theory on the assumption that Jesus now vanished to "an infinitely remote end of time," and thus, would come again to bring his followers to the kingdom in heaven (Matthew 19: 28-29).[1267] In other words, the Second Coming theory was created not to listen to Jesus the Jew and his prophetic teaching, but to justify the delay of the kingdom in the time of the gentile church. According to Vermes, in the creation of the Second Coming theory, the supernatural figure in Daniel 7 played "the significant role" because, in his Second Coming, Jesus would have to come as supernatural deity in order that he may lift up his followers to the heavenly kingdom; "like a son of man, coming with clouds of heaven" (Daniel 7: 13).[1268] The glorious image of Jesus in his Second Coming is totally "contrast to" Jesus' original teaching because, while anticipating the Second Coming of Jesus the glorious messiah, the

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[1265] Sherwin, "Who Do You Say That I Am?" 39.
[1266] Freeman, *A New History of Early Christianity*, 79.
[1267] Vermes, *The Religion of Jesus the Jew*, 146.
[1268] Vermes, *The Religion of Jesus the Jew*, 126.

church already strips Jesus of his prophetic voice in diachrony and assimilates his glorious image into being and its sacrificial culture.[1269]

From the Second Coming theory emerged "ritual ceremonies," such as baptism and the Eucharist, because, while anticipating the Second Coming of Jesus, the church had to survive on earth by gathering itself within the ritual framework.[1270] The Christian baptism differs from the ritual cleaning in Judaism because, while the ritual cleaning in Judaism had to be repeated on the regular basis, the Christian baptism provided "a once and for all initiation" for the church members.[1271] The Christian Eucharist or the "thanksgiving" meal also differs from the Jewish Passover meal because, while the Jewish Passover meal aims to commemorate the story on the Exodus by sharing the unleavened bread, the Christian Eucharist aims to participate in Jesus' death by sharing bread and wine as the symbol of his flesh and blood (1 Corinthians10: 16; 11: 17-34).[1272] According to Freeman, the miracle of the loaves and the fishes (John 6) can be interpreted in terms of the thanksgiving meal or the Eucharist, which was common in "the ancient world."[1273] After the Eucharist, the Christians shared "memories of Jesus," just as the Jews shared the story on the Exodus over the Passover meal.[1274] However, some scholars doubt the Jewish link to the Christian Eucharist because the image of sharing human body and blood was so unfamiliar to Judaism that it might have provoked "nausea" among the Jewish Christians; "do not eat the blood, because the blood is the life" (Deuteronomy 13: 23).[1275]

[1269] Vermes, *The Religion of Jesus the Jew*, 126.
[1270] Freeman, *A New History of Early Christianity*, 42.
[1271] Freeman, *A New History of Early Christianity*, 42.
[1272] Freeman, *A New History of Early Christianity*, 43.
[1273] Freeman, *A New History of Early Christianity*, 43.
[1274] Freeman, *A New History of Early Christianity*, 43.
[1275] Vermes, *The Religion of Jesus the Jew*, 16.

Following its own theories and rituals, the gentile church blamed the Jews for killing Jesus the messiah. As a result, the Jews were despised on the excuse that they observe the "external minutiae" of the law, but neglect justice and righteousness for Jesus the glorious messiah (Matthew 23: 23-26).[1276] However, to see the Jews as the external observant of the law is unjust because the Jewish law includes not only religious matters, but also "the entire sphere" of Jewish life, which covers agriculture, commerce, civil and criminal justice, etc.[1277] Therefore, for the Jews, if the fall of the Temple was a punishment, it was not a punishment for rejecting Jesus, but a punishment for "not being obedient" to the law.[1278] Nevertheless, all over the gospels,Judaism is described as somewhat inferior to Christianity; Jesus' baptism with "the Holy Spirit" is better than John's baptism with water (Mark 1: 8); the least in the kingdom is "greater than" John the Baptist (Luke 7: 28); etc.

As the Jews were despised, so was the name of Judah, the Jewish name. In Judaism, Judah is "an important figure" who received his father's deathbed blessing; "The scepter will not depart from Judah" (Genesis 49: 10).[1279] Mark's Gospel introduces Judas Iscariot as a righteous person, who concerned the poor so deeply that he "would openly" rebuke Jesus for overlooking the waste of the perfume (14: 4).[1280] In his letter to the Corinthians, Paul insists that, after his crucifixion, Jesus made himself appear to "the original twelve disciples," including Judas; "he appeared to Peter, and then to the Twelve" (1 Corinthians 15: 5).[1281] If Jesus made himself appear to the original twelve disciples, including Judas, as Paul says, then, it is likely that Judas

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[1276] Sandmel, *We Jews and Jesus*, 137.
[1277] Vermes, *The Religion of Jesus the Jew*, 11.
[1278] Ruether, *Faith and Fratricide: The Theological Roots of Anti-Semitism*, 167.
[1279] Miller and Bernstein, *Healing the Jewish-Christian Rift*, 142.
[1280] Greenberg, *The Judas Brief*, 147.
[1281] Greenberg, *The Judas Brief*, 135.

was still alive after Jesus' crucifixion and remained "in good standing" among the original group of the twelve disciples, a different group of the twelve, where Matthias replaces Judas after his suicide (Acts 1: 26).[1282] The Gospel of Peter also counts Judas among the original twelve offers and offers no sign of "a negative reputation" on him.[1283] According to William Klassen, in the Greek translation of the Hebrew Bible, there is no negative reference to the Greek word παραδώμινι (to hand over in English), such as "betrayal" or "treachery."[1284] However, once the Greek word was translated as betrayal or treachery in relation to Judas (Matthew 10: 4), the "only Jewish-sounding" name among the twelve disciples became the symbol of Jewish blasphemy; except for Judas, other eleven disciples were called by their "Hellenized" names.[1285] From the blasphemous name emerged the religious "fanaticism" against the Jews because the name itself already justified the Christian anti-Semitism and gave rise to a belief that anyone who killed a Jew would be purged of the sin.[1286]

While demonizing the Jews for killing Jesus, the church shifted the blame from the Romans to the Jews. In the gospels, Jesus is portrayed as a religious criminal who was executed under the Jewish law of blasphemy (Matthew 26: 65; Mark 2: 7). However, according to recent studies, Jesus died not for his religious crime of blasphemy, but for his political rebellion against Rome. In Jesus' time, the Galileans were regarded as the "people of the earth" or "illiterate peasants" because they were ignorant not only of the Sadducees' temple system but also of the Pharisees' scholarly tradition.[1287] These Galileans were targeted by the Romans because many

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[1282] Greenberg, *The Judas Brief*, 136.
[1283] Greenberg, *The Judas Brief*, 141.
[1284] William Klassen, *Judas: Betrayer or friend of Jesus?* (Minneapolis: Fortress, 1996), 48
[1285] Miller and Bernstein, *Healing the Jewish-Christian Rift*, 141.
[1286] Ruether, *Faith and Fratricide: The Theological Roots of Anti-Semitism*, 206.
[1287] Matt, "Yeshua the Hasid," 75.

political revolutionaries, e.g., Ezekias, Judas and his sons, etc., began their "rebellion" against Rome from Galilee[1288] Pontius Pilate killed several Galileans for their rebellion against Rome and mixed their blood to sacrifice (Luke 13: 1).

As a Galilean, Jesus was "at odds with" the laws that he broke laws.[1289] He broke the Sabbath law by healing diseases on the Sabbath (Luke 6: 6-11). In a wedding festival at Cana (John 2: 1-11), he broke the law of purification by changing water into wine; in the Jewish law, a wedding was a "religious" ceremony that it required the ritual purification by water.[1290] The strong personality of Jesus attracted the Roman suspicion and resulted in his crucifixion because, for the Romans, anyone from Galilee was suspected as a "potential" threat to Rome.[1291] In other words, Jesus died not for his religious crime of blasphemy, but for his political rebellion against Rome. John the Baptist was the same victim because John's "eloquence" stirred up Herod's suspicion of rebellion and resulted in his decapitation.[1292] According to Greenberg, the religious crime attributed to Jesus was historically "improbable" because, in the Jewish law, a simple sacrifice of a couple of pigeons was enough for the transgression of the Sabbath law and the purification law.[1293]

Nevertheless, all over the gospels, Jesus is portrayed as a religious criminal who was executed under the Jewish law of blasphemy (Matthew 26: 65; Mark 2: 7; 14: 64). As a result, the Jews are portrayed as a violent mob crying for the crucifixion of Jesus, "one of their own

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[1288]Vermes, "Jesus the Jew," 126.
[1289] Watson, *Jesus and the Jews*, 97.
[1290] Watson, *Jesus and the Jews*, 24.
[1291] Matt, "Yeshua the Hasid," 75.
[1292] Vermes, "Jesus the Jew," 133.
[1293] Greenberg, *The Judas Brief*, 166.

people" (Matthew 27: 22).[1294] In the parable of the tenants (Matthew 21: 33-46), the Jews play the role of the wicked tenants, who killed not only "the prophets" (the servants) but also "Jesus" (the son) and resulted in their destruction by "God" (the owner).[1295] On the other hand, Pontius Pilate the Roman governor is portrayed as the one who tried to save Jesus from the Jewish mob (Matthew 27: 21-24). In Mel Gibson's film, *The Passion of the Christ* (2004), Pilate presents himself as a man who offers Jesus "a cup of water."[1296] The gospels' position on Pilate is entirely out of context because, historically, he was notorious for his cruelty and greed. He killed Jewish leaders on the suspicion of rebellion and insulted the Jews by "appropriating" the temple funds for the construction of an aqueduct.[1297]

However, recent studies suggest that not the majority of the Jews, but only few members of the Sadducees were responsible for the crucifixion of Jesus. In Jesus' days, it was not the Pharisees, but the Sadducees who were conflicted with Jesus, because Jesus replaced the Sadducees' temple sacrifice with the study of the Torah. These Sadducees were suspicious of Jesus because any messianic claim, in its affinity to rebellion, would provoke the Roman suspicion and put in danger not only their political survival but also the entire Jewish community. Especially, for Caiaphas, it was better to sacrifice Jesus than to risk the entire community. Caiaphas mobilized some crowd and brought political charges against Jesus. He persuaded Pilate to put Jesus on the cross and silently removed his body from the tomb in order that he might send back the disciples to Galilee without bloodshed. These few members of the

[1294] Miller and Bernstein, *Healing the Jewish-Christian Rift*, 224.
[1295] Ruether, *Faith and Fratricide: The Theological Roots of Anti-Semitism*, 92.
[1296] Miller and Bernstein, *Healing the Jewish-Christian Rift*, 224.
[1297] Tomasino, *Judaism Before Jesus*, 308.

Sadducees, who were involved in the Roman authority, were responsible for the crucifixion of Jesus, while the majority of the Jews were innocent from the guilt.

However, strangely enough, all over the gospels, the blame is lifted up from the small group of Sadducees and imposed on the Pharisees. In Jesus' days, only the Sadducees had the right to "summon" the Sanhedrin, the Jewish Supreme Court made of 71 members.[1298] However, according to John's Gospel, not only the Sadducees but also "the Pharisees" called the Sanhedrin in order that they might make a decision on the guilt of Jesus' blasphemy; "priests and the Pharisees call a meeting of the Sanhedrin" (11: 47).[1299] Furthermore, all the four gospels "omit" the fact that Caiaphas was a Sadducee.[1300] These distortions and omissions in the gospels cannot avoid a suspicion that the gospels tried to accuse the majority of the Jews for the crucifixion of Jesus because they deliberately lift up the guilt from the small group of the Sadducees, who were unpopular among the Jews, and imposed it on the Pharisees who were "largely respected" by the majority of the Jews.[1301] In other words, there was a kind of conspiracy against the Pharisees because the gospels tried to blame the majority of the Jews for Jesus' death by shifting the guilt from the small group of the Sadducees to the Pharisees supported by the majority of the Jews.

The shift of the guilt from the Sadducees to the Pharisees, however, was entirely out of the historical context because, in his lifetime, Jesus was conflicted not with the Pharisees, but with the Sadducees. The gospels' blame of the Pharisees, therefore, has nothing to do with the early church because, in the time of the early church, the Christians and the Pharisees shared the

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[1298] Watson, *Jesus and the Jews*, 46.
[1299] Watson, *Jesus and the Jews*, 46.
[1300] Greenberg, *The Judas Brief*, 165.
[1301] Miller and Bernstein, *Healing the Jewish-Christian Rift*, 31.

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same ideal of messianic kingdom and became dialogue partners. Then, it must be attributed to the gentile church because, in the time the gentile church, the Sadducees already vanished with the Temple destruction that the only possible object to blame for the guilt of killing Jesus were the Pharisees, who survived the Temple destruction and became rivals to the gentile Christians. From the blame of the Pharisees emerged the English word "pharisaical," which means hypocritical; "Woe to you, teachers of the law and Pharisees, you hypocrites!" (Matthew 23, Mark 12, Luke 20, John 8).[1302]

If Jesus died for his political rebellion against Rome, then the question is why the gospels portray Jesus as a religious criminal who was executed under the Jewish law of blasphemy. Ruether helps us answer this question. According to Ruether, when the Jewish authority rejected Jesus' messiahship, there were "the exigencies" at the church to change its mission from Jews to gentiles.[1303] Paul's dream (Acts 16: 6-10) reflects the church's urgent mission toward gentiles; in his dream, Paul was forbidden from entering Bithynia, which might be "Jewish Christian territory," and forced to Macedonia that was the gentile territory.[1304] Paul also insists that Jesus rejected Moses' laws (Galatians 2: 16; Romans 7: 1-6) that the church had to change "the focus" of its mission from Jews to gentiles (Galatians 1: 15).[1305] The Christian mission toward gentiles forced the church to change the story of Jesus in favor of the Romans because, while taking up its mission toward the gentile or Roman world, the church would be uncomfortable to tell the story of Jesus who had been executed by the Romans that it had to change the story of Jesus in favor of the Romans. In other words, the church changed the story

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[1302] Miller and Bernstein, *Healing the Jewish-Christian Rift*, 177.
[1303] Ruether, *Faith and Fratricide: The Theological Roots of Anti-Semitism*, 88.
[1304] Freeman, *A New History of Early Christianity*, 55.
[1305] Cook, "Evolving Jewish Views of Jesus," 22.

of Jesus in favor of the Romans not based on the historical evidence, but based on its urgent mission toward the Roman world. The way, in which the church changed the story of Jesus in favor of the Romans, is by shifting Jesus' crime from his "political" rebellion against Rome to his "*religious*" crime of blasphemy because it would be comfortable for the church to tell the story of Jesus who had been executed under the Jewish law of blasphemy.[1306] In other words, the church shifted the crime of Jesus from his political crime to his religious crime not because Jesus really violated the Jewish law of blasphemy, but because they had to change the story of Jesus in favor of the Romans, due to its urgent mission toward the Roman world.   The shift of Jesus' crime from political to religious at the church explains why the gospels portray Jesus as a religious criminal who was executed under the Jewish law of blasphemy.

The Jewish reading of the gospels has served to demystify or reveal the Christian misconception on Jesus because, thanks to the Jewish reading of the gospels, Jesus is no longer misunderstood as the Christian messiah, but finally finds himself at his Jewish home. Jesus at his Jewish home, Daniel Matt calls "a flower of Judaism" in that Jesus with his unconditional love for God showed the core of Judaism.[1307] The Christian misconception on Jesus makes it arguable that, if Jesus were alive today, he would be "weeping and gnashing" his teeth at the gentile church because, while pursuing the Pauline theory of Jesus' messiahship, the gentile church not only misunderstood Jesus but also demonized his fellow Jews by blaming them for the crucifixion of Jesus.[1308]

D. A Diachronic Reunion

[1306] Ruether, *Faith and Fratricide: The Theological Roots of Anti-Semitism*, 88.
[1307] Matt, "Yeshua the Hasid," 80.
[1308] Miller and Bernstein, *Healing the Jewish-Christian Rift*, 163.

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Jesus the Jew gives rise to a possibility of Jewish-Christian reunion because, thanks to Jesus' Jewish identity, Christianity must give up the Pauline theory of Jesus' messiahship and return to Judaism, upon which Jesus the Jew devoted himself to the messianic kingdom in the Torah and finally found himself venerated to the founder of Christianity. In other words, Jewish-Christian reunion will be possible not based on the mutual tolerance between Jews and Christians, but based on the Christian return to Judaism. To clarify the possibility of Jewish-Christian reunion, we will focus on the Jewish position that both Judaism and Christianity are necessary to the world because Judaism with its faithfulness to God brings Christianity to the world, and Christianity with its cultural expansion brings the Judaic ideal of monotheism to the world and liberates the world from the pagan idolatry. According to the Christian theory of redemption, we humans are naturally sinful that we have to redeem ourselves from the sin by accepting Jesus Christ, who died for the sin of the world. So ironically, however, the Christian redemption never separates itself from the sinful nature because, while accepting Jesus Christ as the savior, we are neither cored out of our sinful nature nor ruptured into our bodily sensitivity to the other, but only suppress our sinful nature by "superimposing" the Christian theory of redemption on the sinful nature that we always remain under the pressure of the sinful nature.[1309] In other words, the Christian redemption is inseparable from the sinful nature, for it is nothing but a superimposition of the Christian theory on the sinful nature.

The Christian struggling with the sinful nature calls for baptismal cleansing because, even after being redeemed from the sinful nature, we are still struggling with it that we must

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[1309] Levinas, *Difficult Freedom: Essays on Judaism*, 193.

continue to cleanse the sinful nature with "the baptismal waters."[1310]It also calls for the mediation"

of arts because what remains under the pressure of the sinful nature, are so unrest that it must be

soothed with tranquilizing arts, e.g., paintings, sculptures, architectures, melodies, songs, films,

crafts, etc.[1311] Forever struggling with the sinful nature, the Christian redemption already

includes violence because what is liberated from the guilt of the sin may forget its moral duties

for the other and choose the freedom of violence, due to "the possibility of immorality" within

the freedom of humanity.[1312] In other words, the Christian redemption includes violence not

because it basically supports violence, but because it pursues human freedom, which already

includes the possibility of immorality. The freedom of violence identified in the Christian

redemption, however, is not an accident because, without diachrony and its revelation, nothing,

including Christianity, would be identified based on its fleeting otherness in diachrony, but based

on the violent freedom to gather up the phenomenal essence at the cost of the other in diachrony.

The violent freedom in Christianity calls for "a mission" toward the world because, while

pursuing the freedom of violence, Christians never stay put in themselves, but ceaselessly march

toward the world and superimpose Christianity on the gentile world in order that the gentile

world may be redeemed from the sinful nature and integrated into "Christian society."[1313] In

other words, Christianity marches toward the world not to respond to the miserable world in

diachrony, but to integrate it into Christianity. The Christian mission toward the world gives rise

to a sedentary culture because, while marching for the redemption of the world, Christians

establish sedentary objects, e.g., cathedrals, schools, museums, street, cities, etc., in order that

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[1310] Levinas, *Outside the Subject*, 61.
[1311] Levinas, *Outside the Subject*, 61.
[1312] Levinas, *Difficult Freedom: Essays on Judaism*, 77.
[1313] Levinas, *Difficult Freedom: Essays on Judaism*, 193.

they may facilitate their mission toward the world and evangelize the world into Christianity. The Christian culture spreads quickly because what is built on the sedentary objects appears so charming and desirable that it attracts the fascinated gaze of the world and spreads quickly to the world. The quick spread of the Christian culture is not an accident because, since its split from Judaism around 80s- 90s, Christianity freed itself from the burden of Jesus' prophetic voice in diachrony and exalted him to the glorious messiah, the dazzling image of Jesus, which can be offered to vision and easily accepted to everybody at no cost.

On the other hand, Judaism neither goes out to the world nor spreads its culture, but isolates itself from the world and remains in its faithfulness to God. According to Levinas, every Jew is "*born* a Jew" because Jews become Jews based on their "blood ties" with the ancestors and descendants; "He has also set eternity in the hearts of men (Ecclesiastes 3: 11).[1314] The Jewish community depending on the blood ties bears eternity within "its very *nature*" because, while remaining on the blood ties, the Jewish people identify themselves within their own being and ensure eternity within themselves.[1315] The Jewish eternity leads itself to moral obligation for all because those, who ensure eternity within the blood ties, have no choice other than to give up the self-interest and bear "the suffering of all" inside the fraternal community.[1316] For the Jews, the moral obligation for all is not a burden but a freedom of judgment because to bear the moral obligation for all is to remain free from history and "judge history" outside history.[1317] In other words, the Jewish freedom is not a subjective freedom to gather up the phenomenal essence, but a moral freedom to remain free from history and judge history out of history. For Levinas,

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[1314] Levinas, *Difficult Freedom: Essays on Judaism*, 193.
[1315] Levinas, *Difficult Freedom: Essays on Judaism*, 193.
[1316] Levinas, *Difficult Freedom: Essays on Judaism*, 90.
[1317] Levinas, *Difficult Freedom: Essays on Judaism*, 199.

history must be judged outside history because, otherwise, history would be judged by "conscience" and end up to "a subjective illusion."[1318]The Hebrew Bible describes the Jewish freedom to judge history outside; "God will call the past to account;" "there will be a time for every activity, a time for every deed" (Ecclesiastes 3: 15. 17).

The Jewish or moral freedom is extremely "difficult" to exercise because to remain free from history and judge history outside history is to get out of one's historical origin established on one's native land, language, dogmas, etc., and maintain one's freedom to "death" in resistance to the subjective illusion on history.[1319] In other words, the Jewish freedom is extremely difficult to exercise, for it demands one's freedom to death in resistance to the subjective illusion on history. For instance, the divine election of Israel is not a privilege but a difficult freedom because to be elected by God is to get out of one's historical origin and take the freedom to death in resistance to "the verdict of blind forces"on history.[1320] Similarly, the Jewish obsession to the letters of the Hebrew Bible is not a pride but a difficult freedom because, while stubbornly attaching themselves to the letters of the Hebrew Bible, the Jewish people risk their life in resistance to the Christian or easy spiritualism affected by the subjective passions and declare the "privilege of the living word" in the Hebrew Bible, which can be heard and teach justice and responsibility for all.[1321]For the Jews, the difficult freedomis so tough, tougher than "persecution or temptation" that nothing, even persecution, can stop it because to give up the freedom of judgment is to give up justice and give way to violence and injustice.[1322]The freedom of judgment is unavailable to Christianity, though, because Christianity with its mission to the world never

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[1318] Levinas, *Difficult Freedom: Essays on Judaism*, 199.
[1319] Levinas, *Collected Philosophical Papers*, 15.
[1320] Levinas, *Outside the Subject*, 65.
[1321] Levinas, *Outside the Subject*, 149.
[1322] Levinas, *Difficult Freedom: Essays on Judaism*, 99.

isolates itself from history, but always remains within history that it cannot judge history outside history.

The difficult freedom introduces monotheism, the idea of the One God, because, while practicing the freedom to death for the right judgment on history, the Jewish people see themselves as a fraternal community and elevate themselves to the "sons" or daughters of the One God.[1323] In other words, the Jewish people pursues monotheism or the idea of the One God not based on the exaltation of the phenomenal sacred, but based on the freedom to death, upon which they see themselves as brothers or sisters and elevate themselves to the children of the One God. Here, the One God, whom the Jewish people serve as the Father, demands justice because, in Judaism, the idea of the One God "comes to mind" only when humanity gives up the phenomenal essence and practices the freedom to death for the right judgment on history.[1324]

The Jewish God introduces his/her "humility" because the one, who demands justice, cannot be a glorious deity, who directly judges or interferes with human history, but a humble deity, who abandons the glorious divinity andcomes down to the "servile" condition of humans.[1325] The humble God in Judaism can be detected in the Hebrew Bible, where God bents downto look at his/her children and takes care of them (Psalm 113: 6; Deuteronomy 5: 4; Exodus 33: 11). The Jewish idea of the One God includes atheism because to be an atheist is to recognize the absence of God and demand "justice," just as the Jewish idea of the One God demands justice.[1326] In other words, the Jewish monotheism includes atheism because, while demanding justice in the absence of God, atheism still affirms the Jewish idea of the One God

[1323] Levinas, *Is It Righteous to Be*, 109.
[1324] Levinas, *Is It Righteous to Be*, 48.
[1325] Levinas, *In the Time of the Nations*, 114.
[1326] Levinas, *Difficult Freedom: Essays on Judaism*, 45.

who demands justice. The moral ground of atheism makes it arguable that the enemy of Judaism is not atheism but myth because, even when God "hides" him/herself from the world, atheism still affirms the Jewish idea of the One God, but myth appeals to violence and the sacred, against which Judaism stands.[1327]

The Jewish monotheism leads itself to universalism because, while pursuing the idea of the One God, the Jewish people exist "for all," make contact "with all," and bring "the union of all."[1328] The Jewish universalism, of course, is only a "particularism," for it is established not on universal rules and principles, to which everybody agrees, but on the Jewish idea of the One God.[1329] The Jewish particularism, however, is still universal because, while bringing the union of all based on the idea of the One God, Judaism appoints the third party as "a sovereign judge" amongintimate equals and breaks up the homogeneous society of intimate equals into a universal or heterogeneous society of singular individuals, who are so unique, and thus, entirely irreducible to the homogeneous unity.[1330]The universal society depending on the third party makes it arguable that what leads religion to a crisis is not one's isolation from God, but one's intimate love with God, because, while attaching oneself to God in terms of intimate love with God, one already does "wrong" to the third party and forgets one's obligation for the universal society depending on the third man.[1331]

The Jewish universalism strictly prohibits "the expansion of culture by colonization" because to expand one's particular culture by colonization is to superimpose the particular culture on others and put it in a rivalry with others until the rival cultures destroy each other and

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[1327] Levinas, *Difficult Freedom: Essays on Judaism*, 143.
[1328] Levinas, *Outside the Subject*, 61.
[1329] Levinas, *Difficult Freedom: Essays on Judaism*, 83.
[1330] Levinas, *Unforeseen History*, 131.
[1331] Levinas, *Collected Philosophical Papers*, 32.

end up to the threat of reciprocal destruction.[1332] In other words, the Jewish

universalismprohibits the cultural expansion, due to the threat of reciprocal destruction, which

the cultural expansion entails. For instance, the Christian expansion entails the threat of

reciprocal destruction because, while expanding its culture to the world, Christianity already

impose itself on the world and provokes its rivalry with other cultures until the rival cultures end

up to the threat of reciprocal destruction. From the Jewish point of view, however, the violent

expansion of the Christian culture does not hurt the validity of Christianity because, while

expanding its culture to the world, Christianity liberates the world from the senseless idols and

brings the Judaic ideal of "monotheism" to the gentile world.[1333] In other words,despite its violent

expansion, Christianity is still valid, due to its power to spread the Judaic ideal of monotheism,

which is impossible in Judaism.

The Christian redemption of the world makes it arguable that Christianity is "necessary"

to the world because, without Christianity, there would be neither the spread of the Judaic ideal

of monotheism to the world nor the redemption of the world from the senseless idols, but only

pagan idolatry.[1334] Then, so is Judaism because, without Judaism and its faithfulness to the One

God, Christianity would be "incomprehensible" that there would be neither Christianity nor the

redemption of the world from the idol worship, but only pagan idolatry in the world.[1335]In other

words, from the Jewish point of view, both Judaism and Christianity are necessary to the world

because Judaism with its faithfulness to the One God brings Christianity to the world, and

Christianity with its cultural expansion liberate the world from the pagan idolatry.

[1332] Levinas, *Basic Philosophical Writings*, 58.
[1333] Levinas, *Difficult Freedom: Essays on Judaism*, 202.
[1334] Levinas, *Outside the Subject*, 52.
[1335] Levinas, *Outside the Subject*, 62.

The Jewish-Christian collaboration for the world makes possible the Jewish-Christian reunion because, while recognizing the Jewish-Christian collaboration, Judaism and Christianity take each other as a dialogue partner and work together to make the whole world one humanity. The Jewish-Christian reunion, however, has nothing to do with the mutual tolerance between Judaism and Christianity because Judaism founded on the blood ties of the Jewish community can exist without Christianity, but Christianity cannot exist without Judaism, due to its origin in Judaism. Rather, it will be possible through the Christian return to Judaism because Judaism is indispensable to Christianity that Christianity has no option other than to give up the Pauline doctrine of Jesus' messiahship and return to Judaism, upon which Jesus the Jews devoted himself to the messianic kingdom in the Torah and finally found himself venerated to the founder of Christianity. In other words, the Jewish-Christian reunion will be possible not based on the mutual tolerance between Judaism and Christianity, but based on the Christian return to Judaism, due to the Christian origin in Judaism.

Conclusion

So far, we have read Girard in light of Levinas and succeeded in reversing the anti-Semitic allegations against Girard in that Girard reads the Bible based upon Judaic idea of diachrony which serves as the antidote to the anti-Semitic knowledge of the Bible, but fails to recognize it and attracts the anti-Semitic allegations. While doing this study, we have come to recognize that the revelation theory is so rich and self-evident that it has many potentials to bring many issues into light. At the same time, we have also recognized some limitations in the theory. For instance, Girard's argument that Jesus is the only mediator between humanity and God is invalid because, from the diachronic point of view, Jesus is only one of many saints or heroes, who overcome violence without violence and help us give up violence and choose ethics for the other in diachrony. Similarly, Girard's argument that Jesus serves as the Spirit of revelation after his death is invalid as well because diachrony is the very agent for revelation that it is not valid to see Jesus as the Spirit of revelation after his death. Based on our study, we carefully predict that this study will serve to stimulate academic interests in the theory because, while reading the theory based on the Judaic idea of diachrony, we have clarified enough its merits and limitations that there would be no further controversies against it.

This study that illuminates Girard in light of Levinas does not damage the uniqueness of Girard because Girard, in his turn, frees the Levinasian philosophy from its boundaries. The Levinasian philosophy is not easy to understand in itself since it deals with the idea of diachrony, which entirely overflows the sphere of our understanding. However, when paraphrased into the Girardian theory of revelation, the Levinasian discourse on philosophy becomes easier to understand because the Girardian theory depending on the social mimesis and the biblical revelation gives metaphors and examples to illustrate the Levinasian ideas that escape our

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understanding. In other words, Girard'ssocial and biblical approach liberates Levinas from his philosophical boundaries.

For instance, the Girardian idea of dazzling illusion on the model represents the Levinasian idea of showing of the self to itself, for it illustrates how we project our vision on others and gather up what is known by sight to fill our desire for being. The Girardian idea of the black holes represents the Levinasian idea of the "*there is*," for it serves as a metaphor for the insatiable desire that devours everything, including light. The Girardian theory of revelation represents the Levinasian idea of proximity, for it illustrates how our desire for being is revealed or witnessed to the other before we gather up the phenomenal knowledge of the other under our vision. The Girardian idea of the kingdom identified inside the subject is another metaphor for the Levinasian idea of the other inside the subject, for it shows how we reach our limit and replace ourselves with what is more than our being in the world. Finally, the Girardian idea of childlike innocence represents the Levinasian idea of *ipseity*, for it illustrates how we are cored out of our desire for being and return to our pre-original or childhood sensitivity to others' needs. The Levinasian philosophy illuminated from the Girardian theory leads itself to a broader context because what is paraphrased into social or biblical discoursesmakes it easier to access to other areas. In short, if Levinas frees Girard from anti-Semitic controversies, Girard frees Levinas from his philosophical boundaries.

At this point, I sincerely honour Levinas for his work on diachrony in that, without the Levinasian work, this study would have been either impossible, or simply ended up to the Western misunderstanding of Girard. At the same time, I would not reserve any more my regret for the Girardian failure to recognize the Levinasian work on diachrony. Girard barely mentions Levinas, although both are contemporaries who share the same idea of diachrony in Judaism and

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in the Bible. However, there is clear evidence that Girard fails to recognize the Levinasian work on diachrony. In his brief discuss on Levinas and Jean-LucMarion, Girard reduces Levinas' theory to the Heideggerian being; "Both Levinas and Marion are too unconditionally Heideggerian in their concept of being."[1336]

Such a response is regrettable since the Levinasian work on diachrony is so closely tied to his theory of revelation that Girard should have responded more carefully to it. However, the Girardian failure confirms again how difficult it is to detect the idea of diachrony in Girard because even Girard himself fails to recognize it, let alone his critics. Otherwise, Girard would have been so overconfident in his theory that he never imagined any possibility that the Levnasian work on diachrony would be the very guideline to defend his theory from the Western misunderstanding. And now is the time because, thanks to the Levnasian work on diachrony, we have succeeded in overcoming the Western misunderstanding of Girard and reversed the general allegation of Girardian anti-Semitism. Therefore, from now on, my best wish is that Girard will be freed from all the Western misunderstandings and spread the voice in the Bible until the world is cored out of the violent desire for being and reversed to what is greater than the lost paradise in the Eden.

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
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An Outline of the Thesis:
"Reading René Girard in Light of Emmanuel Levinas"

This thesis presupposes a parallelism between Girard and Levinas because both scholars

establish their theories in opposition to the Heideggerian being. Girard opposes the

Heideggerian being in that, while pursuing the Heideggerian being, we already project our vision on each other and take each other as a model in order that we may imitate each other and absorb what is imitated into our being. The social mimesis calls for the victim mechanism because, while imitating each other as a model, we also imitate each other's violence and drag ourselves to the vicious cycle of violence that we have to break the vicious cycle by choosing a victim to deflect our violent impulses. As a solution to the victim mechanism, Girard suggests the biblical revelation of violence in that the Bible ends violence not with violence, but by revealing violence until violence is reversed to the kingdom of God in the gospels.

Levinas also opposes the Heideggerian being in that, while pursuing the Heideggerian being in the world, we already divest the world of its material qualities, e.g., heats and colds, and synchronize the material world into what is being there. The synchronization of the material world has prevailed all over the Western traditions because, in the West, nothing remains as it is, but can be stripped of its material qualities and synchronized into what is being there. As a solution to the Western synchrony, Levinas suggests the Judaic diachrony in that, in Judaism, diachrony reveals the limit of the Western synchrony with its proximity until we give up the Western synchrony and listen to the voice in diachrony.

The parallelism between Girard and Levinas, however, does not go well because the Girardian theory of revelation has been blamed not only for being anti-Semitic but also for being sacrificial because, in the revelation theory, the kingdom of God is opened not in the Hebrew Bible but in the Christian gospels, and because Jesus in the Christian gospels plays as the same victim in the Leviticus rituals. To defend Girard from these allegations, we propose to read Girard in light of Levinas because, thanks to the parallelism between two scholars, the Levinasian theory of diachrony serves as the key to the Girardian theory of revelation. The Levinasian

theory of diachrony serves as the key to the Girardian theory of revelation because, without diachrony in the Bible, which fleets away from vision before we project our vision on each other and drag ourselves into the violent imitation, there would neither revelation nor the kingdom of God, but only violence and its victim mechanism. Diachrony in the Bible identified in our thesis serves to defendGirard from the allegations above because the biblicaldiachrony reveals the limit of our being with its proximity until we give up our being and its anti-Semitic and sacrificial view on the Girardian theory and listen to the voice in the biblical diachrony.

To developour thesis, we first clarify the Levinasian time-framework: the Western synchrony vs. the Judaic diachrony. Then, in light of the Levinasian time-framework, we will read the Girardian time-framework: the cultural synchrony vs. the biblical diachrony, which is already signaled in our thesis. In our thesis, the cultural synchrony is signaled in the Girardian theory of mimesis because, while imitating each other as a model inside the culture, we already divest the other of his/her physical qualities, e.g., heats and colds, and synchronize the physical other into our being. The biblical diachrony is also signaled in the Girardian theory of revelation because diachrony in the Bible is the key to the revelation theory.

"Una lectura de René Girard a la luz de Emmanuel Levinas"

Resumen

Esta tesis presupone un paralelismo entre Girard y Levinas en la medida en que ambos autores establecen sus teorías en contraposición con la concepción del ser de Heidegger. Girard

se contrapone al ser de Heidegger en la medida en la búsqueda del ser heideggeriano, nosotros proyectamos previamente nuestra visión sobre todo otro y absorbemos lo que es así imitado en nuestro propio ser. La mimesis social apela al mecanismo de la víctima, porque, al imitar a todo otro como un modelo, al mismo tiempo imitamos la violencia de todo otro, y nos arrastramos nosotros mismos en el círculo vicioso que tenemos que romper eligiendo a una víctima para desviar los impulsos violentos. Como solución al mecanismo victimario, Girard sugiere la revelación bíblica en la medida en que la Biblia termina con la violencia, no con violencia, sino revelando la violencia hasta que la violencia se gira hacia el reino de Dios en el sentido de los Evangelios.

También Levinas se contrapone al ser en el sentido de Heidegger, en cuanto que cuando nos orientamos al "ser en el mundo", despojamos el mundo de sus cualidades materiales, como por ejemplo el calor y el frío, y sincronizamos el mundo material con lo que está dado ahí. La sincronización del mundo material ha prevalecido sobre todas las tradiciones occidentales porque en Occidente nada permanece como lo que es, sino que queda despojado de sus cualidades materiales y sincronizado con lo que está dado ahí. Como una salida de la sincronía occidental, Levinas sugiere la diacronía judía, ya que en el Judaísmo la diacronía revela el límite de la sincronía occidental: con el sentido de la "proximidad", renunciamos a la sincronía occidental y oímos la voz de la diacronía.

Sin embargo, el paralelismo entre Girard y Levinas no puede prolongarse, porque la teorización girardiana de la revelación ha sido criticada no sólo por ser antisemítica, sino también por ser sacrificial: en esta teoría de la revelación el reino de Dios no quedaría abierto en la Biblia hebrea sino en los Evangelios cristianos, y Jesús, en los Evangelios cristianos aparece como víctima en los rituales levíticos. Para defender a Girard de esas alegaciones, proponemos

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una lectura de Girard a la luz de Levinas, porque, gracias al paralelismo entre estos dos autores, la teoría levinasiana de la diacronía sirve como clave para la teoría girardiana de la revelación. La teoría levinasiana sirve como clave de la teoría girardiana de la revelación puesto que, sin la diacronía en la Biblia, que escapa de la visión antes de que proyectemos nuestra visión sobre cualquier otro, y seamos arrastrados en la imitación violenta, de manera que no habría ni revelación ni reino de Dios, sino sólo violencia sacrificial y el mecanismo victimario. Frente a esa proyección y esa imitación violenta, en la diacronía bíblica oímos la voz.

Para desarrollar nuestra tesis clarificamos primeramente el marco temporal de Levinas: la sincronía occiodental vs. La diacronía judía. Así, a la luz del marco temporal levinasiano, leeremos el marco temporal girardiano, como ha sido ya señalado en la teoría girardina de la mimesis, en la medida en que imitemos a todo otro como un modelo en el interior de la cultura, despojamos ya al otro de sus (de él o de ella) cualidades físicas, y sincronizamos al otro físico con nuestro ser. La diacronía bíblica así señalizada en la teoría girardiana de la revelación, ya que la diacronía en la Biblia es la llave para la teoría de la revelación.

RESUMEN

"Una lectura de René Girard a la luz de Emmanuel Levinas"

René Girard puede resumirse con dos grandes teorías: mimesis y revelación. La teoría de la mimesis ha sido bien reconocida, ya que trata del deseo humano de ser, que cubre todas las áreas de la sociedad humana, por ejemplo, culturas, rituales, política, psicología, economía, etc. Por el contrario, la teoría de la revelación ha sido acusada de ser -Semita, porque no reconoce la diacronía en la Biblia, la cual puede servir como mecanismo defensivo contra la visión antisemita de la Biblia. Aquí, la diacronía, que proviene de la palabra compuesta "dia-cronía" (*dia*+*chromos*)", designa el tiempo transcurrido, o el tiempo perdido. El tiempo diacrónico o qque transcurre abarca toda realidad en el mundo, porque todo lo que existe en el mundo pertenece a la diacronía. Una roca, por ejemplo, pertenece a la diacronía, porque existe con sus cualidades materiales, por ejemplo, sus frialdades y sus calores, su dureza y su suavidad, etc., que nunca podrían ofrecerse, a la visión ni se absorberían en nuestro ser, sino que transcurrirían completamente en diacronía, antes de ofrecerse a la visión y quedar absorbidas por nuestro ser. Incluso las polvaredas y el aire, en la medida en que existen con sus cualidades materials, como la humedad y los gases, que ya han trascurrido en la diacronía, antes de ser afectados por la visión y asimilados en nuestro ser.

Para aclarar nuestra posición, comenzamos con la teoría de Emmanuel Levinas basada en la diacronía del judaísmo. En el judaísmo, el tiempo es diacronía porque, en el pensamiento judío, los momentos no se recuerdan ni se recuperan, sino que se pierden por completo en la diacronía antes de que tenga lugar la recuperación. La diacronía judaica exige la ética de autodesnudarse en la medida en que, gracias al transcurrir del tiempo en la susodicha diacronía, ya no podemos reunir nuestro ser, e inevitablemente debemos aceptar el límite de nuestro ser, y nuestra desnudez vulnerable, en suma el abrirnos nosotros mismos a la diacronía hasta el punto de que salgamos de nuestro ser y volvamos a nuestra sensibilidad a la voz, que ya transcurrió en diacronía antes de quedar afectada por la vision, y quede asimilada en nuestro ser. La ética judaica del autodesnudarse en diacronía puede cumplirse o confirmarse en el dicho ético "Aquí estoy" (Éxodo 3: 4) porque, al desnudarnos nosostros mismos en diacronía en el límite de nuestro ser, olvidamos nuestro lenguaje literal, y sin saberlo, proferimos ese dicho, ese pronunciamiento ético: "Aquí estoy". Aquí, el "Aquí estoy" designa en el judaísmo la forma en que el sujeto humano, "Yo", acepta el límite de su ser y muestra su pasividad absoluta en la diacronía. El "Aquí estoy" en el judaísmo es irreductible a lo "dicho" griego, al texto escrito, porque lo que se pronuncia involuntariamente en el límite de nuestro lenguaje literal, no puede ser algo "dado" como inteligible y que se ofrece como algo capturable en lo "dicho" griego. Ese "Aquí estoy" es algo intrínseacmente vocal, incluye sonidos y vibraciones, que ya habrá trascurrido en diacronía, antes de ser interpretado exhaustivamente mediante lo "dicho" griego. El "decir" judaico

irreducible al "dicho" griego, sin embargo, no socava la validez de lo "dicho" griego, en la medida en que el "decir" solo deja su huella en lo "dicho".

Lo "dicho", como la única huella del "decir", no debe leerse literalmente porque la huella en lo dicho aún sostiene la resonancia histórica del decir: aquello dicho no se agotaría en las letras, ni se asimilaría sin más a lo dicho, sino que transcurriría completamente en la diacronía, antes de que la reducción literal tenga lugar en (o se reduzca a) lo dicho. Así, pues, debe leerse en términos de nuestro autodesnudarnos en la diacronía, porque lo que escapa a la reducción literal puede identificarse tan sólo cuando renunciamos al significado literal en lo dicho, y desnudamos nuestra vulnerabilidad, o abrimos nuestro ser a la diacronía, hasta el punto de que nos liberemos de nuestro ser, y volvamos a nuestra sensibilidad, a la voz en lo dicho, la cual vive en diacronía. En otras palabras, en el judaísmo, leer el texto es una carga, ya que para él no se trata del significado literal del texto, sino de la voz en el texto, lo cual exige la ética del mentado autodesnudarse en la diacronía. La carga o el peso ético en el texto en el judaísmo es muy importante, porque, sin escuchar la voz en el texto, no tenemos otra opción que seguir fenómenos falsos afectados por la visión, esto es, magia y hechicería, y esclavizarnos bajo nuestra propia visión.

La diacronía levinasiana puede identificarse también en la lectura girardiana de la Biblia. En la lectura girardiana de la Biblia, la víctima es la que revela la violencia, porque Dios en la Biblia no puede interferir directamente con la violencia, sino que termina con la violencia al revelarla a través de la víctima. La víctima reveladora en la Biblia pertenece a la diacronía, porque la única forma en que la víctima bíblica puede revelar la violencia es pasar a la diacronía antes de ser despojado de sus propiedades corporales, por ejemplo, calor y frío, y recuperarse en la imagen como sagrado, esto es, algo tan delgado y frágil, por tanto, que resulta fácilmente absorbible por nuestro ser. La diacronía en la Biblia es la clave para comprender la teoría de la revelación de Girard porque, sin dicha diacronía, no habría ni la caída de la víctima ni la revelación de la violencia a través de la víctima en su caer o su transcurrir, sino tan sólo lo falso sagrado, absorbible por (o asimilable a) nuestro ser .

Si seguimos la lógica levinasiana, la diacronía en la Biblia exige la ética del autodesnudarse, porque, gracias al "transcurrir" de la víctima en la diacronía, ya no podemos reunir nuestro ser a costa de la victima, y aceptamos el límite de nuestro ser, y nos desnudamos, vulnerados, hasta que seamos liberados de nuestro ser y revertidos a nuestra sensibilidad para con la voz en la Biblia. Girard nunca menciona la ética bíblica del autodesnudarse en diacronía: no conoce la mentada diacronía de la que se desprende, como venimos diciendo, la ética del autodesnudarse. Sin embargo, sí proporciona una pista de la ética bíblica porque, en la lectura girardiana de los Evangelios, Jesús se presenta como un modelo para ello. En la lectura girardiana de los Evangelios, Jesús murió, no para sacrificarse por el pecado, sino para revelar el fondo de la cultura del sacrificio. El Jesús girardiano sirve como modelo para la ética bíblica porque la única manera de que Jesús pudiese revelar, poner de relieve, el fondo de la cultura del sacrificio, tuvo que ser la renuncia a la venganza, y el mostrar su vulnerabilidad, o desniudarse a sí mismo ante

Dios, hasta liberarse de su ser y reorientar su sensibilidad. a la voz de Dios. Que vive en diacronía.

Esta ética bíblica exige un lenguaje ético irreductible al lenguaje literal, porque, al desnudarnos a nosotros mismos hasta en el límite de nuestro ser, olvidamos nuestro lenguaje literal, y sin saberlo pronunciamos el decir ético, el "Aquí estoy". Girard también admite el lenguaje ético irreducible al lenguaje literal. Girard considera lenguaje ético el Logos del amor en la Biblia, y encuentra que el Logos de la violencia en la filosofía griega es lenguaje literal. El Logos del amor en la Biblia corresponde al "Aquí estoy" en el judaísmo porque, así como el "Aquí estoy" en el judaísmo exige la pasividad absoluta del sujeto, también lo hace el Logos de amor en la Biblia. Girard adopta la palabra "Logos" del Evangelio de Juan en la Biblia, donde Logos designa a Dios que se ha manifestado, él o ella, en Jesucristo (1: 1-18). El Logos bíblico pone fin a la violencia no con violencia, sino al revelarla, porque Dios, como el Logos o la Palabra, no puede interferir directamente en la violencia. Y así, termina con la violencia al revelarla a través de la víctima.

La forma en que el Logos no violento revela violencia es siendo expulsado por la violencia, porque la única forma en que el Logos no violento revela violencia sin violencia es soportar la carga de la violencia hasta que sea expulsado por la violencia: el único modo para el Logos no violento de reveler la violencia, es soportar la carga de la violencia hasta que sea expulsada por la violencia. El Logos del amor expulsado por la violencia exige la pasividad absoluta del sujeto porque solo aquellos que soportan la pasividad quasi-mortal (*deathlike*) pueden renunciar a la venganza y ser expulsados por la violencia. En la medida en que es pasivo, el Logos del amor en la Biblia corresponde al "Aquí estoy" en el judaísmo, porque, así como el "Aquí estoy" exige la pasividad absoluta del sujeto, también lo hace el Logos del amor.

El Logos del amor en la Biblia es irreductible al logos de la violencia en la filosofía griega porque, cuanto más resulta expulsado el Logos del amor por la violencia, más revela la verdad de la violencia hasta que la violencia alcanza su límite y se convierte en el Reino. El logos bíblico, irreductible al logos griego, deja en claro que la Biblia como texto escrito no debe leerse literalmente, porque el Logos del amor en la Biblia todavía tiene la resonancia histórica de que las letras bíblicas no se podrían reducirse a un conocimiento literal de la Biblia. pero transcurre por completo a la diacronía y permanece inaccesible al conocimiento literal. Así, pues, la Biblia debe leerse en términos de la ética del desnudarse a sí mismo, la abnegación, hasta alcanzar la voz de la Biblia, porque lo que escapa al conocimiento literal solo puede identificarse cuando renunciamos al conocimiento literal de la Biblia y escuchamos la voz en la Biblia hasta que estemos fuera de nuestro ser y rotos, desgarrados, en nuestra sensibilidad, a la escucha de la voz en la Biblia. Por ejemplo, la Biblia hebrea afectada por la violencia de YHWH debe leerse en términos de la ética del autodesnudarse y del oír la voz. En efecto, la (supuesta) violencia de YHWH en la Biblia hebrea es exactamente la violencia humana, injustamente atribuida a YHWH, de que debemos soportar la carga de responsabilidad por la violencia de YHWH, y la carga de resposibilidad de escuchar la voz en la Biblia hebrea. Esa violencia de

YHWH en la Biblia hebrea es exactamente violencia humana injustamente atribuida a YHWH porque, mientras libran guerras contra forasteros en nombre de YHWH, los israelitas atribuyen su violencia a YHWH, y justifican su violencia por los órdenes culturales.

La visión diacrónica de la Biblia sirve como un mecanismo defensivo contra la acusación antisemita contra Girard porque, mientras transcurre antes de que sea absorbida por nuestro ser, la diacronía ya revela el límite de nuestro ser, a saber, que no tenemos otra opción más que renunciar, no solo a nuestro ser, sino también a nuestra visión literal o antisemita de la Biblia, y escuchar, cabe insistir en conclusión, la voz en la Biblia, incluida la voz en la Biblia hebrea, para lo cual Girard presenta su teoría de la revelación. Desafortunadamente, Girard no reconoce la idea de la diacronía en la Biblia, aunque es la clave de su teoría de la revelación, porque lo que escapa a la visión no es fácil de reconocer. Como resultado, la teoría de Girard ha sido con frecuencia despojada de su poder de revelación, y sujeta a la acusación antisemita porque, en última instancia, sin conocer la diacronía en la Biblia, es imposible reconocer la voz en la Biblia, Esa voz vive en diacronía. O bien leemos la Biblia en términos de la ética del abnegarse a sí mismos, orientados a la voz en la Biblia, o bien, inevitablemente, leemos la Biblia literalmente y así nos vemos llevados juzgar que la Biblia hebrea está saturada con la violencia de YHWH, y así, en consecuencia, como algo inferior a la predicación de los Evangelios cristianos sobre el Reino.

Sin embargo, gracias al trabajo levinasiano sobre la diacronía, la acusación antisemita contra Girard ya no es posible : el trabajo levinasiano sobre la diacronía nos llevará a volver a iluminar la diacronía en la propia Biblia, como se señala o se apunta en el pensamiento de Girard. En otras palabras, proponemos el trabajo levinasiano sobre la diacronía como una guía para el trabajo interpretative girardiano con la Biblia. Debe haber quedado establecido que el trabajo girardiano se basa igualmente en este motive diacrónico, aunque, es cierto, Girar no lo reconoce expresamente, y atrae, así, controversias antisemitas. Basado en la argumentación de nuestro trabajo, argumentos anteriores, este studio habrá podido justificar su título, inicialmente una especie de reto: leer la obra de René Girard justamente "a la luz de Emmanuel Levinas".