



UNIVERSIDAD DE MURCIA

FACULTAD DE FILOSOFÍA

The Civil-Military Cooperation in Post-Conflict Operations
as an Anthropological Space:
The Case of the Italian Multinacional CIMIC Team in the
Space of Virtual Peace of Lebanon

La Cooperación Civil-Militar en las Operaciones
Post-Conflicto como Espacio Antropológico:
El Caso del Equipo Italiano Multinacional CIMIC en el
Espacio de la Paz Virtual del Líbano

D. Giovanni Ercolani
2017



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Área de Antropología Social

Tesis Doctoral

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Doctorando:
Giovanni Ercolani

Dirigida por:
D.ra Josefa Maria Antón Hurtado

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Abstract

This thesis is about the production of security knowledge and adopts an anthropological approach. Therefore, it is about the capacity to produce security knowledge by a military team belonging to the Multinational CIMIC group (Motta di Livenza, Treviso, Italy) who operated in a UNIFIL mission in Lebanon.

This work takes as subject of its research the 'The Civil-Military Cooperation in Post-Conflict Operations as an Anthropological Space: The Case of the Italian Multinational CIMIC Team in the Space of Virtual Peace of Lebanon' and focuses on the CIMIC activity which is a specific military tool which is employed in order to acquire consensus from the local populations in whom territory a military operation is deployed.

The members of this team (six military personnel) received six month training before their deployment; it was military and cultural awareness training. The cultural awareness training (1) had the aim to provide to the members of the team the cultural knowledge on the 'other' (Lebanese population); and (2) these acquired knowledge represented a capability to employ with the local population in order to conquest their trust and to collect information. Ideally the members of the team were able to produce security knowledge about their theater of operations.

However, at the beginning of my research my analysis was only concentrated on the MNCG CIMIC team, but the personal experiences lived in this work made me aware of the attitude and behaviors of other structures: the Italian Ministry of Defence (IMoD), the Italian Defence Staff, Army General Staff, and the MNCG HQ in relation to my academic interest. As a result, the anthropological places in which I operated were (1) the official contacts with the IMoD, the Italian Defence Staff, the Army General Staff, and MNCG HQ; and (2) my physical presence inside the MNCG barracks, and inside the UNIFIL bases in Lebanon.

As a result, the objectives of this thesis became multiples.

The first one was to enter in the official structure that provides security and to describe the experience. This structure, which is the Multinational CIMIC Group (Motta di Livenza, Treviso, Italy) is an Italian battalion which, is part of the Italian Armed Forces (under the control and order of the IMoD), and performs CIMIC operations in NATO and UN missions. These missions are based on the political official security knowledge which is produced by the Italian Ministry of Defence (Italian Defence Staff, and Army General Staff). The same structure provides the CIMIC, and cultural awareness training which is necessary to its military personnel to operate in non-NATO territories. This cultural training, according to the NATO's CIMIC doctrine represents a 'capability' in order to operate in a CIMIC theater of operation (defined in this thesis as the 'space of virtual peace'). Therefore, with my fieldwork I experienced the reality to perform this kind of research in contact and inside a military structure.

The second objective was to verify the quality of the cultural awareness training, and to collect the experiences of my main informants in the pre-deployment phase, in deployment (UNIFIL Mission, Lebanon) and in the post-deployment phase. In this thesis I do consider the experience matured by the informants as extremely relevant for the production of legitimate security knowledge due to the fact that it is based on first hand experiences made by the military personnel with their boots on the ground.

The thesis considers the work made by an Italian military team who has a NATO training and mentality, and operates in a UN mission. The fact that the team was deployed in a UN mission and not in a NATO mission is not important and relevant. What is important is that the NATO's approach to crisis management operations and the employment of CIMIC operations is becoming a wide practice and a protocol of action.

However, the thesis considers the relation that the anthropologist had with the main structure (Italian Defence Staff) which (1) has legitimate power to produce security knowledge; (2) has power on the informants of this work; and (3) had power on the very practicability of this thesis.

Therefore, in order to sustain my anthropological approach the production of legitimate security knowledge this thesis is organized in four chapters.

The first chapter, 'Conceptualising Security, NATO, and the Anthropological Turn', explains and develops the concept of security. Here security is approached as a myth, a language, and as a symbol. The process of securitization becomes a ritual. Then, it considers the evolution of NATO's security discourse, and the transformation of attitude of the Alliance toward the importance of cultural and religious factors in security operations. NATO CIMIC doctrine is explained and the emergence of conflict ethnography is studied.

The second chapter, 'Theoretical Framework, Methodology and Methods: the Space of Virtual Peace', establishes the methodology and the method of the thesis which will be applied to the fieldwork experience. Here an anthropological approach is developed and the anthropological space of the 'Space of Virtual Peace' is created. This space can be considered a critical framework to the formal narrative on peace operations and/or CIMIC operations.

The third chapter, 'The Italian Multinational CIMIC Team in the Space of Virtual Peace of Lebanon' represents the fieldwork experience which lasted from the 24th July 2012, until the 7th May 2014. It covers and records the personal experiences of the author of this thesis, and the semi-structured interviews which were carried out in the pre-deployment phase (MNCG HQ, Italy), in Lebanon (UNIFIL mission), and in the post-deployment phase (MNCG HQ, Italy).

The fourth chapter, 'Results and conclusion', presents the conclusion of the thesis and develops the idea and the need of an engaged anthropology in the field of security studies.

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Para mi segunda madre:

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List of abbreviations

CAST: Cultural Awareness Scenario Training.

CCS: Critical Security Studies/

CIMIC: Civil-Military Cooperation.

COI-DIFESA: Comando Operativo di vertice Interforze (Roma, Italy).

IMoD: Italian Ministry of Defence.

IW: Inside the wire.

MNCG: Multinational CIMIC Group (Motta di Livenza, Treviso, Italy).

NCO: Non-commissioned officer.

OT: Outside the wire.

PKSTI: Power-knowledge-security-total institution.

SVP: Space of Virtual Peace.

TO: Theater of operations.

UNIFIL: United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon.

WO: Warrant-Officer.

Introduction

1. Anthropology and the production of Legitimate Security Knowledge

For the Spanish anthropologist Luis Álvarez Munárriz 'security is a universal aspiration of human beings that is present in all times and in all cultures. This exhaustive contention can be understood and accepted if we reflect upon the meaning and the role it plays in life of any person. In essence, every human being wants to live in peace, in a sociologically and ecologically friendly environment, and avoid all the threats and risks that endanger him or her at any cost. Security is a state of wellbeing that enables one to exercise one's freedom to develop the project of life that every human being seeks to put in practice. In our society, being defined as the risk society, security is regarded as the most precious factor. However, a considerable part of the population lives in greater insecurity due to the fear of losing the high degree of economic and social development, that is to say, the fear of having to change one's lifestyle. (...) Thus, security is understood as the feeling that people have when they are able to live in peace and harmony with other members of the social group, to which they belong, and enjoy the goods offered by the inhabited territory. It is a state of wellbeing that advances the achievement of the life project every human being wants to execute in order to give a true meaning to her or his life. In a negative sense it can be described as the absence or exclusion of any contingency, threat or danger that could destroy that sense of calmness and tranquility. To do this end it is necessary to avoid all those factors that may generate uncertainty, uneasiness, fear or pain in people's daily life. Anthropology is a knowledge that must inevitably address this topic insofar as it examines those issues related to people's concerns and interests. Its contribution is important since it provides a vision of the human being that constitutes a solid basis for constructing a comprehensive security model' (Álvarez Munárriz 2013: 5-6).

However, as this thesis will unfold the argument in the following pages, security is a contested and political concept in which the struggle for power is always present. Most of the time, the academic literature covering security issues has been produced and developed inside the departments of International Relations and Political Science. This is because security expertise opens the door to the palaces of power. Everyone who has first hand experiences inside the academic world and the necessity to find funds for research is aware of that. At the end the money for security researches comes from the State, and a critical vision on an issue that the political elites have considered a 'security' problem which needs to be investigate, in order to support political decisions, can result in 'no money'. Therefore critical security analyses are difficult to be produced, published, and divulgated, and their 'impact' can be very low. In some countries critical security analyses can create serious legal problems to their authors too. The relation between structures of power and security is extremely evident in the history of the human race. And the same can be said for the production of knowledge that focuses on security issues. This security knowledge, when officially recognized and accepted, has been used for political purposes, to support power, to start wars, conflicts, genocides, repressions, tortures, social-cultural-racial exclusions. It is a knowledge which has always been based on the construction and enforcement of a 'we' identity against the 'other' identity. The 'we' party and its representatives, always reclaim a moral and ethical authority (if not

sacred) against the ‘others’ who are always described as impure, enemies, sinners, heretical, socially-culturally-racially inferiors. In short the other is not like us, and he/she cannot become like us. The other can carry a stigma (Goffman 2012) of social-cultural-political-economical and sexual and racial exclusion.

Therefore, the problem faced by anyone involved with a text, political discourse-program-propaganda, news etc. which deal with insecurity and security issues is: ‘is this true? And how I can know if this is true or not?’

Adopting an International Relations-Political Science approach, I think these kinds of questions are very comprehensible. We only need to look at the recent ‘evidences’ (which later resulted fake) assembled by Western countries (NATO) to initiate wars (in order to establish democracy and security) in Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, and Syria. All of them were exercise of post-truth, which according the Oxford Dictionary of English ‘relate to or denote circumstances in which objective facts are less influential in shaping public opinion than appeals to emotion and personal belief’.

These ‘security evidences’, which I consider as post-truths, provided the intellectual base for the assemblage of the securitization process and the construction of the security dilemma (both concepts will be explained in the first chapter), which represent the pillars of the security policy of a State.

Therefore, the above military interventions were based on ‘post-truth security knowledge’, meaning on a bunch of orchestrated lies which were playing with the emotions of NATO’s target audience. Due to the fact that the majority of military interventions since 2001 were made by post-modern states in modern and pre-modern states¹ in this work I adopt a NATO-centric approach, which means a post-modern-state-centric approach. Here NATO is considered as the military instrument of the post-modern states, and a military alliance among post-modern states. Therefore, the post-truth security knowledge, like ‘a theory is always for someone and for some purpose. Perspectives derive from a position in time and space, specifically social and political time and space. The world is seen from a standpoint definable in terms of nation, or social class, of dominance or subordination, of rising or declining power, of a sense of immobility or of present crisis, of past experience, and of hopes and expectations for the future’ (Cox 1986: 126).

However, here we are still dealing with a concept of security attached to a military interpretation-perspective, and the same can be said to the securitization process and security dilemma where two opposite fears confront each other. And this is a vision

¹ Cooper Robert, *Post Modern States and the World Order*, Demos, London, 1996. Cooper suggests the emergence of three types of states, pre-modern, modern and post-modern. The first group of states are those like Bangladesh that are barely able to provide their citizens with the basic social and political necessities such as a functioning infrastructure, social peace, and the civil order that must exist if people are to rise above subsistence level. The second group of states are those like Brazil, or India, or China, that place national interest and territorial sovereignty above all other considerations in their relations with other states. They are disturbingly like those nation-states of early twentieth century Europe that precipitated the First World War. The third group of states - the post-moderns - are nations like Canada, or the members of the EU, who have accepted definite limits on unfettered sovereignty and territorial integrity in that they have re-defined their national sovereignty to allow the intrusion of extra-national authority in a variety of guises. They are almost all democracies and they almost all eschew war as an instrument of national policy. Cooper warns them to be exceedingly cautious of the second group.

that I call here orthodox security (this concept will be developed in chapter one). This approach-paradigm to security is too narrow to be used in our globalized world, and if security is about survival, it doesn't mean that the only tool to be employed in order to survive is to utilize military means.

'Security is about survival. It is when an issue is presented as posing an existential threat to a designed referent object (traditionally, but not necessarily, the state, incorporating government, territory and society). The special nature of security threats justifies the use of extraordinary measures to handle them. The invocation of security has been the key to legitimizing the use of force, but more generally it has opened the way for the state to mobilize, or to take special powers, to handle existential threats. (...) (However) when we consider the wider agenda, what do the terms *existential threat* and *emergency measures* mean? How, in practice, can the analyst draw the line between process of politicization and process of securitization on this basis? Existential threat can only be understood in relation to the particular character of the referent object in question. (...) In the military sector, the referent object is usually the state; (...) in the political sector, existential threats are traditionally defined in terms of the constituting principle – sovereignty, but sometimes also ideology – of the state; (...) in the economic sector, the referent objects and existential threats are more difficult to pin down; (...) in the societal sector (...) the referent object is large-scale collective identities that can function independent of the state, such as nations and religions; (...) In the environmental sector, the range of possible referent objects is very large, ranging from relatively concrete things, such as the survival of the individual species (tiger, whales, humankind) or types of habitat (rain forests, lakes), to much fuzzier, larger-scale issues, such as maintenance of the planetary climate and biosphere within the narrow band human beings have come to consider to be normal during their few thousand years of civilization' (Buzan, Waever, and de Wilde 1998: 21-23).

This multi-sectoral approach to security which identifies five sectors (military, political, economic, societal, and environmental), overlaps perfectly with the four dimensions of security developed by Álvarez Munárriz (2013: 5-14). For the Spanish anthropologist security has (1) individual dimension: human security, which can be described as protection of individuals from risks to their physical or psychological safety as well as the dignity and quality of life which all persons have the right lead; (2) social dimension: public security, which acknowledges the fact that tensions, struggles and the use of force constitute an element being constantly presents throughout the history of human kind, however, due to the fact that security must be present in the basic structure of society, at the same time it must consider that the greater the degree of security, the lesser the degree of freedom; (3) symbolic dimension: cultural security. 'Through the so-called mass culture it has imposed upon the rest of the societies its ways of thinking and living: Western man determines "the man"(...) the sense of cultural roots and defence of cultural identity have pushed the boundaries of what was considered to be personal to become a problem of national and international security. (...) The feeling of belonging is a vital need of people. (...) Presence of tensions or cultural clashes generates pressing social problems, which threaten harmony among the members of our increasingly multicultural societies, on a national level. They affect specific political issues such as immigration legislation, rules of conduct of everyday life, by-laws of an orthodoxy and legitimization of violence and/or insurrection. (...) People are not miniature

reproductions of their own society. The experience of their relationship with members of their social group generates a self-conception that is resolved in a constant symbolization of what one thinks one is and should do. Sociocultural factors are a *condicio sine qua non* i.e. an essential condition; and (4) territorial dimension: geopolitical dimension. 'Western culture supports the idea and the conviction that we are moving towards the ability to finally build a global society. In this future scenario nation-states will have to disappear for various reasons. One of the main reasons offered here is the obvious fact that alone they cannot deal with security threats that might emerge from anywhere on the globe. The instrumental power of nation-state is really insufficient to resolve problems arising from globalization. Yet, the harsh reality is that states do not cede their power, and we are walking towards an increasingly nationalized society.'

What emerges from the above reasoning and the overlapping of the sectoral approach to security (Buzan, Waever, and de Wilde 1998), and the four dimensions of security (Álvarez Munárriz 2013) is that security is a universal aspiration of all human beings, and must carry a meaning of emancipation. For Booth (1991: 321) 'emancipation, theoretically, is security', and emancipation 'is the theory and practice of inventing humanity, with a view of freeing people, as individuals and collectivities, from contingent and structural oppressions. It is a discourse of human self-creation and the politics of trying to bring it about. Security and community are guiding principles, and at this stage of history the growth of a universal human rights culture is central to emancipatory politics. The concept of emancipation shapes the strategies and tactics of resistance, offers a theory of progress for society, and gives a politics of hope for common humanity' (Booth 1999: 46). Then emancipation provides (1) a philosophical anchorage; (2) a strategic process; and (3) a guide for tactical goal setting. As philosophical anchorage, 'emancipation can serve as a basis or test for saying whether something is true; in other words, whether particular claims to knowledge should be taken seriously. An anchorage is not a neutral foundation but rather a historically contingent yet powerful position from which people can begin to discuss what to do next in their political projects'. As a strategic process 'is a dynamic process with changing targets. It is strategic in the sense that it is concerned with bringing about practical results, but it is a process in the sense that it is a project that can never be completed. Its practicality lies in its being based in immanent critique'. As a guide for tactical goal setting: 'as a result of engaging in immanent critique emancipatory ideas can develop that in turn can be translated into tactical action. Praxis is the coming together of one's theoretical commitment to critique and political orientation to emancipation in projects of reconstruction' (Booth: 2005: 182). At the end, and this is the position that this paper sustains, emancipation is the 'freeing of people (as individuals and groups) from physical and human constraints which stop them carrying out what they would freely choose to do. War and the threat of war is one of those constraints, together with poverty, poor education, political oppression and so on. Security and emancipation are two sides of the same coin. Emancipation, not power or order, produces true security. Emancipation, theoretically, is security' (Booth 1991: 321).

Consequently, assuming a critical and sceptical investigative position, I consider here the official security knowledge, meaning the one accepted and adopted by a state, a military alliance, a multinational organization as 'images of security knowledge'. According to Elkana (1981) 'images of knowledge' are socially determined views on

knowledge supported and tied to a specific spatial-temporal cultural, political, and power context. To this 'images of security knowledge' I oppose the 'legitimate security knowledge' which 'refers to security knowledge which one can profess as a security expert with a degree of seriousness and without being labeled an idealist or a fool' (Huysmans 2006: 18). And (1) I do consider 'legitimate security knowledge' as reliable knowledge²; and (2) I embrace, like Elkana (1981), the 'thick description' as a scientific methods which permits to discern what is reliable knowledge from 'images of knowledge'.

The aim of this thesis is to support the idea that an anthropological approach (engaged anthropology) to security studies can really contribute to the production of legitimate security knowledge (Antón Hurtado & Ercolani 2013, 2015; Ercolani 2012b, 2012c, 2013, 2014, 2016a, 2016b, 2016c). This is because the majority of security knowledge considers and analyzes macro realities, whilst micro insecurity-security events are completely excluded from the wide pictures. And these micro-realities are becoming the security concerns of post-modern states, in which they think to operate (crisis management operations). Therefore, this thesis carries a constant research question 'how can I know?', where for knowing I refers to the reality-truth which should support any legitimate security knowledge.

The scenario we are living is completely different from the one of the Cold-War in which a kind of 'order' was pretended to be present. As Pope Francis recently said, we are living in a time of 'a third war, one fought piecemeal, with crimes, massacres, destruction'³, and this is confirmed by the NATO's map of 'multiple stress zones' which is presented in this thesis in the first chapter, in which 'critical security threats' (water stress, demographic stress, crop decline, hunger, coastal risk, and recent history of conflict) are concrete elements which will influence the security of particular geographical areas and will create insecurity to neighbours countries too. But the stressors can be of cultural-identity nature as recent conflicts (Rwanda, Former Yugoslavia, Iraq, Syria, etc) have testified. The concept of war too is changed; we talk about new wars vs. old wars (Kaldor 2006), of war amongst people (Smith 2005), large

² Reliable knowledge is knowledge that has a high probability of being true because its veracity has been justified by a reliable method. Reliable knowledge is sometimes called justified true belief, to distinguish reliable knowledge from belief that is false and unjustified or even true but unjustified. Every person has knowledge or beliefs, but not all of each person's knowledge is reliably true and justified. In fact, most individuals believe in things that are untrue or unjustified or both: most people possess a lot of unreliable knowledge and, what's worse, they act on that knowledge! Other ways of knowing, and there are many in addition to science, are not reliable because their discovered knowledge is not justified. Science is a method that allows a person to possess, with the highest degree of certainty possible, reliable knowledge (justified true belief) about nature. The method used to justify scientific knowledge, and thus make it reliable, is called the scientific method. Due to the fact this work deals with social science and qualitative data, I have based my approach on the work on anthropology of knowledge developed by Yehuda Elkana (*A Programmatic Attempt at an Anthropology of Knowledge* in Mendelsohn, Everett; Elkana, Yehuda, *Sciences and Cultures: anthropological and historical studies of the sciences*, Volume 5, Dordrecht: Reidel Publishing Company, 1981) who sees the 'thick description' as a scientific methods which permits to discern what is reliable knowledge from 'images of knowledge' which are socially determined views on knowledge supported and tied to a specific spatial-temporal cultural, political, and power context.

³ BBC News: Pope Francis warns on 'piecemeal World War III', 13 September 2014, at: <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-29190890>.

group identity-conflict (Volkan 2004), hybrid conflicts (McCuen 2008); fourth generations wars (Knight 2008), and war on terror. But social unrest, mass immigration from poor countries to rich countries, can produce act of terrorism, ethnic riots, and the resurgence of radical nationalism sentiments. Already in the major European cities we see the emergence of ethnic defined areas. All these explosive scenarios need both a macro level analysis (International Relations, Political Science approach) and a micro level study (Anthropology approach), and only in this way could be possible to have a more real picture on specific security problems.

Moreover, the political framework which best explains the context in which all the above is happening is that 'today's predominant mode of politics is *post-political bio-politic* – an awesome example of theoretical jargon which, however, can easily be unpacked: "post-political" is a politics which claims to leave behind old ideological struggles and, instead focus on expert management and administration, while "bio politics" designates the regulation of the security and welfare of human lives as its primary goal. It is clear how these two dimensions overlap: once one renounces big ideological causes, what remains is only the efficient administration of life...almost only that. That is to say, with the depoliticized, socially objective, expert administration and coordination of interests as the zero level of politics, the only way to introduce passion into this field, to actively mobilize people, is through fear, a basic constituent of today's subjectivity. For this reason, bio politics is ultimately a politics of fear, it focuses on defence from potential victimization of harassment. (...) It resorts to fear as its ultimate mobilizing principle: fear of immigrations, fear of crime, fear of godless sexual depravity, fear of the excessive state itself, with its burden of high taxation, fear of ecological catastrophe, fear of harassment. (...) Post-political bio politics also has two aspects which cannot but appear to belong to two opposite ideological spaces: that of the reduction of humans to "bare life", to Homo sacer, that so-called sacred being who is the object of expert caretaking knowledge, but is excluded, like prisoners at Guantanamo or Holocaust victims, from all rights; and that of respect for the vulnerable Other brought to an extreme through an attitude of narcissistic subjectivity which experiences the self as vulnerable, constantly exposed to a multitude of potential "harassments" (Zizek 2009: 34-36).

Therefore, in order to know and to be able to produce legitimate security knowledge any security investigation should be able to answer the following questions (which I call the seven security methodological questions):

1. What is reality?
2. What is reliable knowledge?
3. What is security?
4. What is being secured?
5. What is being secured against?
6. Who provides security?
7. What methods can be undertaken to provide it?

But, before defining 'security' we have to focus on the reality we are analyzing (ontological problem) and on the production of knowledge on this reality (epistemological problem). These two problems are at the root of any legitimate security

knowledge. The post-truth security knowledge (images of security knowledge) fabricated inside a post-political bio-politic framework, produces a reality and a knowledge which is needed to justify political-military policies. And this knowledge is dangerous for the people who lives in those areas (because they become victims) and for the soldiers who are called to operate there. The military personnel (NATO, or UN) once in these territories will experience a reality which is completely different from the one which was presented to him, and to the general audience. And this thesis has drawn extensively from the empirical work of the former Italian Army General Fabio Mini (2003, 2008, 2012) who served in various military missions outside NATO's territories.

Therefore, the anthropologist who is interested to produce legitimate security knowledge must enter in this territory of insecurity, and in the territories of military operations (as the case of this work). But these territories exist only as a description, as an image of security knowledge, therefore, they exist only as a map, which most of the time is a map of 'non-places' (Auge' 2009a), because the analysis of the human description which is present there is omitted, or completely manipulated. This means that the map is not the territory, and the territory is inhabited by human beings who react toward fear and anxiety following cultural scheme. And this is the anthropological place where he/she has to perform his/her thick description. For Elkana (1981) the 'thick description' is a scientific methods which permits to discern what is reliable knowledge from 'images of knowledge' a methodology to know, to unveil the truth behind the curtain of pre-interpretation represented by official security narratives

The anthropologist must enter in these territories because the power-knowledge structure which produce security knowledge manipulates what the target audience (NATO, post-modern-state) must see and feel (1) it imposes a 'specialized visualizing' which requires the explanation of specialized technicians (defined only by the power-knowledge structure) because the image proposed are sometimes hard to understand for the average people (Mirzoeff 2015: 115-116); (2) it practices 'distribution of the sensible' which, according to Ranciere, is the law governing the sensible order that parcels out places and forms of participation in a common world by first establishing the modes of perception within which these are inscribed. It produces a system of self-evident facts of perception based on a set horizons and modalities of what is visible and audible as well as what can be said, thought, made, or done. The 'distribution' refers both to forms of inclusion and to form of exclusion. The 'sensible' refers to what is '*aistheton*' (sensible) or capable of being apprehended by the senses (Ranciere 2014: 89); and (3) force the audience to perform a narrow and rapid 'clinical glance' (Foucault 2005: 149) which is concentrated on 'aesthetic' details that prevent us from having a wider, clearer and deeper picture of the totality of the elements involved in the staging of the securitization speech act. Basically, the basic problem is one of seeing and meaning. This is a fabric of political conformism (Mucchi Farina 1998; Mucchi Farina, Pacilli, Pagliaro 2012).

Therefore, the anthropologist must adopt a different way of seeing, not the glance, but a clinical gaze.

Foucault, in his work on the birth of the clinic, compares the clinical glance which has been imposed in the medical environment to the clinical gaze which, according to the author, is an epistemological-diagnostic tool (Foucault 2005: 147-150). Through the employment of the clinical glance a chemical signification is constructed,

and not a signification which is interested in the life-body of the patient. The whole dimension of analysis is deployed only at the level of an aesthetic; it is a sensory knowledge which is reduced to praise of the immediate sensibility; 'this aesthetic non only defines the original form of truth, it also prescribes rules of exercise, and it becomes, at a secondary level, aesthetic in that it prescribes the norms of an art. (...) The whole complex structure of the clinic is summarized and fulfilled in the prestigious rapidity of an art : since everything, or nearly everything, in medicine is dependent on a glance or a happy instinct, certainties are to be found in the sensations of the artist himself rather than in the principles of art'. On the contrary the structures of the clinical gaze are based on great skills, what is required is great sagacity, great attention, great precision, and great patience. However, the clinical glance replaces the clinical gaze. 'The clinical gaze implies an open field, and its essential activity is of the successive order of reading; it records and totalizes; it gradually reconstitutes immanent organization; it spreads out over the world that is already the world of language; and that is why it is spontaneously related to hearing and speech; it forms, as it were, the privileged articulation of two fundamental aspects of saying (what is said and what one says)' (Foucault 2005: 149).

The clinical gaze is based on the question 'What is the matter with you?' (Foucault 2005: xxi) which sees and includes the patient in a whole of relations. On the contrary the glance 'does not scan the field: it strikes at one point, which is central; the gaze is endlessly and modulated, the glance goes straight to its object. The glance chooses a line that instantly distinguishes the essential; it therefore goes beyond what it sees; it is not misled by the immediate forms of the sensible, for it knows how to traverse them; it is essentially demystifying. If it strikes in its violent rectitude, it is in order to shatter, to lift, to release appearance. It is not burdened with all the abuses of language' (Foucault 2005: 149-150). Therefore, the clinical glance's question is "where does it hurt?" in which we recognize the operation of the clinic and the principle of its entire discourse. From then on, the whole relationship of signifier and signified, at every level of medical experience, is redistributed: between the symptoms that signify and the disease that is signified, between the description and what is described, between the event and what is prognosticates, between the lesion and the pain that it indicates, etc.' (Foucault 2005: xxi). Thus, 'the glance is silent, like a finger pointing, denouncing. There is not statement in this denunciation. The glance is of non-verbal order of *contact*, a purely ideal contact perhaps, but in fact a more *striking* contact, since it traverses more easily, and goes further beneath things. The clinical eye discovers a kinship with a new sense that prescribes its norm and epistemological structure; this is no longer the ear straining to catch a language, but the index finger palpating the depths. Hence that metaphor of "touch" (*le tact*) by which doctors will ceaselessly define their glance' (Foucault 2005: 150).

Then, I argue that the anthropological gaze (1) touches the patient, and his/her environment, it listens to him/her; (2) it is interested to emancipate the patients from his/her condition which make him/her sick; and (3) is engaged with the human condition of the patient. The mobilized audience can be seen as the patients who suffer of anxiety-fear. On the contrary the clinical glance looks only at the sickness, it is a restricted-narrow look, its purpose is not to emancipate or to be engaged with the human condition of the patient (mobilized audience), but only to cure his/her sickness.

But the anthropologist has to pay attention to the symbolic environment in which the security-insecurity discourse-narrative-paradigm is assembled, because, in this thesis I do consider security as a cultural system. For Geertz the response to an insecurity threat is cultural because, 'like a frightened animal, a frightened man may run, hide, bluster, dissemble, placate, or, desperate with panic, attack; but in his case the precise patterning of such overt acts is guided predominantly by cultural rather than genetic templates (Geertz 1973: 75). Therefore, local-native culture becomes a system of reference and a protocol of action which manages and administers fear-anxiety which the individual observes in threatening situation. In this system (1) culture 'denotes an historically transmitted pattern of meanings embodied in symbols, a system of inherited conceptions expressed in symbolic forms by means of which men communicate, perpetuate, and develop their knowledge about and attitudes toward life' (Geertz 1973: 89); and (2) it makes use of culture patterns (religious, philosophical, aesthetic, scientific, ideological) which are 'programs' that 'provide a template or blueprint for the organization of social and psychological processes, much as genetic system provide such a template for the organization of organic processes' (Geertz 1973: 216).

In order to understand what insecurity and security is, the anthropologist must enter in the cultural system of the 'other', of the 'multiple stress zones', in the periphery of our Western world to, in the territories of the wretched of the Earth (Fanon 2001). Only in this way he/she can contribute to answer the ontological and epistemological questions which are the base of any security investigation. Only entering in the cultural territory of the 'other' he/she will be able to collect that data which will help to define what security and insecurity is for the 'other' and not only for ourselves (post-modern state).

In addition, when analyzing the cultural system of reference of the 'other', the topic of power and the concept of globalization must be taken in consideration.

'The description of the deeds of power in non-western cultures not only help us to think the political process in a different referential system which is different from ours, but it helps us to reflect, using a comparative approach, on the coherence of our own conceptions' (Abélès, 2008: 144).

This is because 'what defines the contemporary world is the circulation, more than the structures and the stable organizations (...) From an anthropological point of view, we can define globalization as an acceleration of the flux of capitals, of human beings, products, images, and ideas. This intensification of interaction and interconnection produces relations which transcend the traditional geographical and political borders' (Abélès, 2008: 40). So, due to the fact of this 'circulation', we should concentrate our attention on what circulates, what becomes liquid (and not concentrate our vision inside the geographical border of a security national concept), because fear, according to Zygmunt Bauman, is liquid too: 'On a globalized planet, populated by the forcibly "opened" societies, security cannot be gained, let alone reliably assured, in one country or in a selected group of countries: not by their own means, and not independently of the state of affairs in the rest of the world' (Bauman, 2006: 97).

Then, if 'social anthropology, conceptually, is primarily about social relationships; only derivatively, and not necessarily, about places (Hannerz, 2010: 67) then 'the overall agenda of anthropology involves the mapping of a continuously

changing human diversity' (Hannerz, 2010: 60). Therefore we have to concentrate our efforts on the faceless 'homo sacer', on his migration, his efforts to survive and live (his fear, honour, and interest), his need to belong and to have a recognized identity. And only after that, as a result of our analysis, will we be able to move away from the various ethnocentric concepts of security (which recognize us as the only legitimate locus of fear, honour, and interest) and see security as a human value from which to restart a wider human discourse. For this reason the local work of anthropology 'becomes about large issues, set in (relatively) small place, rather than detailed description of a small place for its own sake. (...) (Where) by place, we mean not only geographical locale, but also other types of "place" – within political, economic, religious, or other social system' (Hannerz, 2010: vii). And most of the time all these places can be simultaneously both outside, and inside the 'we' geographical border.

As a result security becomes an anthropological space in its broad meaning, because it is a cultural concept (as a text and as a space-territory), and it is in this environment that the anthropologist of security should place himself in order not only to translate a reality, but to transpose it. It is not only the participant observation, and the thick description of the ethnographer in this space which will make the difference, but his 'emic' approach (how local people think), his knowledge of the local social, cultural, linguistic, and metaphorical aspects of the local reality.

At the same time the anthropologist of security will be an area specialist and have a multicultural mind. As an area specialist he/she must have a global vision typical of International Relations scholars, because a macro and micro vision are needed and 'a good interpretation of anything – a poem, a person, a history, a ritual, an institution – takes us into the heart of that of which it is the interpretation' (Geertz, 1973: 18). Whilst, a multicultural mind will provide the researcher a mind capable to think, feel, believe, and behave differently inside various cultures (Anolli 2010, 2011).

Due to the fact that security is profoundly political, the anthropological analysis should look at the political and/or power structure in order to deconstruct its apparently solid form and to isolate its single components. 'Analysis, then, is sorting out the structures of signification' (Geertz, 1973: 9), and in this process of deconstruction where the structures of signification of leadership, hierarchy, clientelism, and political violence are spotted and sorted out, there is one which plays an especially important role for the social anthropologist. This is the element of 'memory' which is attached to the roles of culture, myth, and symbols. Orwell in his 'Nineteen Eighty-Four' (1990 [1949]) invented the structure of the Ministry of Truth. The Ministry of Truth's function was to make sure that language, art, books, and the mass media echoed the approved narrative offered by the State. This involved the invention of language (Newspeak) and a rewriting of history to serve some present need. Among the various slogans of INGSOC political ideology there was one in particular which serves to our reasoning and it is the following: : who controls the past controls the future; who controls the present controls the past. At the same time the political action of the INGSOC was accompanied by continuous political rituals and celebrations.

Every form of power has its rituals, celebrations, myths, symbols, and memory. Then, if security, in its national dimension, is an ambiguous symbol, the symbol itself suggests protection through power (Wolfers, 1991: 149). As a result of this relation, we can construct another dimension in which the security concept constructs its own space of

signification where its narrative, through a symbolic and ritualistic activity, is experienced by the 'homo ritualis' (Lisón Tolosana, 2012) and linked to power. This argument is unfolded in the first chapter of this thesis.

To sum up, all the above visions can be deployed to revalidate the three levels of investigation depicted by Claude Lévi-Strauss: ethnography, ethnology, and anthropology. And if in recent years we have seen the emergence of an ethnography of conflict whose aim is to study the 'other' in order to win battles, and war, the purpose of an anthropology of security is to study a common human value in order to help both ourselves and the other to be free from anxiety. This is all the more significant because if 'liquid modern life is lived on a battlefield', we have to accept the fact that 'all liquid modern victories are (...) temporary. The security they offer won't outlast the current balance of power, which is expected to be as short-lived as all balances: just as momentary snapshots of things on the move are known to be' (Bauman: 2006: 49). The message here is that security is not just a strategy, but a need that results in a feeling from which people give meaning to each one of the actions that takes place both in the private and in the public fields, both individually and collectively. Then, despite the fact that security structures want to legitimate their position on the bases that their activities reduce risks, what it is certain is that at the end what people feel and experience is a disturbing sentiment generated by their own perception of insecurity. As Deleuze and Parnet (1997: 71) wrote 'powers most need to distress us than to repress us'. So, it emerges that is necessary to study security as a sentiment which is culturally built in the close relationship between the individual and his community. Because we can not speak of institutional security without analyzing the social perception of it (or the no perception), the sensation of vulnerability, insecurity and distrust that crystallizes in the feeling of fear.

Consequently, due to the fact that 'security framing is not simply a macro-level but first a micro level practice (Huysmans 2006: 151-152), and following the above reasoning I do consider that the anthropologist, with his/her methodology (Gusterson 2009; Neumann 2009), can really contribute to the production of legitimate security knowledge.

2. Aims and objectives of the thesis

This thesis is not on Human Terrain System and on its critics (Gonzalez 2009, 2012, 2015a, 2015b; Hopkins 2016; Julardzija 2011; Price 2012; Ramazzotti 2013), it is not on the differences between NATO CIMIC and UN CIMIC doctrines (De Coning & Holshek 2012); it is not on conflict ethnography (Kilcullen 2009); and it is not on the UNIFIL Mission in Lebanon.

This thesis is about the capacity to produce security knowledge by a military team belonging to the Multinational CIMIC group (Motta di Livenza, Treviso, Italy) who operated in a UNIFIL mission in Lebanon. As the title of the thesis suggests: 'The Civil-Military Cooperation in Post-Conflict Operations as an Anthropological Space: The Case of the Italian Multinational CIMIC Team in the Space of Virtual Peace of Lebanon' the focus of this study is on the CIMIC activity which is a specific military tool which is employed in order to acquire consensus from the local populations in whom territory a military operation is deployed.

The members of this team (six military personnel) have received six month training before their deployment; it was military and cultural awareness training. The cultural awareness training (1) had the aim to provide to the members of the team the cultural knowledge on the 'other' (Lebanese population); and (2) these acquired knowledge represented a capability to employ with the local population in order to conquest their trust and to collect information. Ideally the members of the team were able to produce security knowledge about their theater of operations.

However, at the beginning of my research my analysis was only concentrated on the MNCG CIMIC team, but the personal experiences lived in this work made me aware of the attitude and behaviors of other structures: the Italian Ministry of Defence (IMoD), the Italian Defence Staff, Army General Staff, and the MNCG HQ in relation to my academic interest. As a result, the anthropological places in which I operated where (1) the official contacts with the IMoD, the Italian Defence Staff, the Army General Staff, and MNCG HQ; and (2) my physical presence inside the MNCG barracks, and inside the UNIFIL bases in Lebanon.

As a result, the objectives of this thesis became multiples.

The first one was to enter in the official structure that provides security and to describe the experience. This structure, which is the Multinational CIMIC Group (Motta di Livenza, Treviso, Italy) is an Italian battalion which, is part of the Italian Armed Forces (under the control and order of the IMoD), and performs CIMIC operations in NATO and UN missions. These missions are based on the political official security knowledge which is produced by the Italian Ministry of Defence (Armed Forces General Staff, and Army General Staff). The same structure provides the CIMIC, and cultural awareness training which is necessary to its military personnel to operate in non-NATO territories. This cultural training, according the NATO's CIMIC doctrine represents a 'capability' in order to operate in a CIMIC theater of operation (defined in this thesis as the 'space of virtual peace'). Therefore, with my fieldwork I experienced the reality to perform this kind of research in contact and inside a military structure.

The second objective was to verify the quality of the cultural awareness training, and to collect the experiences of my main informants in the pre-deployment phase, in deployment (UNIFIL Mission, Lebanon) and in the post-deployment phase. In this thesis I do consider the experience maturated by the informants as extremely relevant for the production of legitimate security knowledge due to the fact that is based on first hand experiences made by the military personnel with their booths on the ground.

The thesis considers the work made by an Italian military team who has a NATO training and mentality, and operates in a UN mission. The fact that the team was deployed in a UN mission and not in a NATO mission is not important and relevant. What is important is that the NATO's approach to crisis management operations and the employment of CIMIC operations is becoming a wide practice and a protocol of action.

Therefore, in order to sustain my anthropological approach the production of legitimate security knowledge this thesis is organized in four chapters.

The first chapter, 'Conceptualising Security, NATO, and the Anthropological Turn', explains and develops the concept of security. Here security is approached as a myth, a language, and as a symbol. The process of securitization becomes a ritual. Then, it considers the evolution of NATO's security discourse, and the transformation of attitude of the Alliance toward the importance of cultural and religious factors in security

operations. NATO CIMIC doctrine is explained and the emergence of conflict ethnography is studied.

The second chapter, 'Theoretical Framework, Methodology and Methods: the Space of Virtual Peace', establishes the methodology and the method of the thesis which will be applied to the fieldwork experience. Here an anthropological approach is developed and the anthropological space of the 'Space of Virtual Peace' is created. This space can be considered a critical framework to the formal narrative on peace operations and/or CIMIC operations.

The third chapter, 'The Italian Multinational CIMIC Team in the Space of Virtual Peace of Lebanon' represents the fieldwork experience which lasted from the 24th July 2012, until the 7th May 2014. It covers and records the personal experiences of the author of this thesis, and the semi-structured interviews which were carried out in the pre-deployment phase (MNCG HQ, Italy), in Lebanon (UNIFIL mission), and in the post-deployment phase (MNCG HQ, Italy).

The fourth chapter, 'Results and conclusion', presents the conclusion of the thesis and develops the idea of an engaged anthropology in the field of security studies.

Chapter 1

Conceptualising Security, NATO, and the Anthropological Turn

1. Introduction

This chapter unfolds and illustrates the meaning, the use, the practices, and the evolution of the concept of security, and focuses on the development of NATO's security discourse: NATO's notion of crisis management, Civil-Military Cooperation operations, and the Alliance's adoption of an anthropological approach. Following this logic this chapter is divided into four parts.

The first part presents an approach to the definition of 'security', and shows that despite the fact that this term has a fixed etymological meaning, the significance, and concept of security are subjective, tied to competing power relations, and subordinated on its use.

Therefore, based on this direct relation between legitimate power-knowledge structures and the production of the meaning of 'security', it is developed the argument that, through the process of securitization (1) subjective manufacturing of security's significance and practices have been produced together with their own myths, languages, and symbols, (2) that the securitization process must be examined inside the concepts of the sacralisation of politics (Gentile 2007), and of 'sacral' (Chan 2000); and (3) it must be considered as a political ritual, with its specific myth, language, and symbol.

Through this ritual the power-knowledge structure aims (1) to provoke a social regression and a 'blind trust' reaction⁴ (according to which we tend to follow leaders'

⁴ According to Vamik Volkan (Turkish Emeritus Professor of Psychiatry at the University of Virginia, Charlottesville, Virginia) the concept of large-group regression describes an emotional situation in which 'the individuals within the group lose their individuality to one degree or another, follow the leader(s) blindly, and become prone to taking in (internalizing) political propaganda without really questioning its validity' (Volkan 2006: 84). Regression is a response to anxiety and is one of the key concepts in the mental health field. 'Anxiety is an internal signal that something dangerous is about to happen, and is thus distinguishable from fear. Fear is what one experiences when one faces an actual danger; for instance a person will experience fear if, while visiting a zoo, he or she sees an escaped lion approaching. By contrast, if that person experiences uncomfortable sensations, racing heart, or sweaty palms while visiting a zoo where all the dangerous animals are safely contained, he or she is feeling anxiety – because the lions locked in their cages symbolize some psychological danger for that individual, not because they actually pose a threat to life and limb; one need not be in real peril in order to experience anxiety. Since anxiety is an unpleasant feeling, people develop various mental mechanisms for avoiding it, one of which is regression (Volkan 2004: 56). This anxiety can be shared by large-group like tribes, nations, states. 'In general terms, regression in an individual involves a return to some of the political expectations, wishes, fears, and associated mental defense mechanisms of an early stage of the human development. (...) Large groups also regress. Activities such rallying around the leader, exhibiting flags, attempting to "purify" the group from those whose names or skin colors suggest that they may be affiliated with the enemy, and dividing the world into clashing civilizations may be related to concepts as patriotism and national security. (...) Thus, a group's realistic efforts to feel secure merge with expressions of human nature under stress, and, in certain areas, reality and fantasy become blurred. Regression itself is not good or bad; it is a human condition that appears in individuals and large groups. But regression in large groups is subject to manipulation by political leaders. The relationship between a political leader and his or her followers is rather like a busy street. In normal times, the traffic – information and political decision-making as well as other means of influence – flows smoothly in both directions between the leader's influence and the public's awareness. Naturally, the flow is sometimes greater in one direction and sometimes in the other, as at rush hour on a busy highway. At other times, however, for one reason or another, the street is officially declared "one-

views and directions blindly, whether they are reparative or destructive) from its audience; and (2) to affirm its 'true knowledge' (security knowledge), and its capacity to provide a remedy to the insecurity situation (restore security).

The second part reviews the different meanings that the concept of security has received; here two interpretative dimensions are created and defined as the orthodox and the liquid dimension of the security concept. Then, it introduces the idea of the adoption of a critical security studies perspective to security.

The third part describes the evolution of the recent NATO strategic concepts (1999, and 2010) and shows the Alliance's adaptation and the adoption of critical security studies conceptions of security threat which has moved from conventional war to crisis management.

Finally, the fourth part considers NATO's CIMIC Doctrine (2013) in which CIMIC operations are military tools in which an anthropological-ethnographic approach is adopted. This part looks at the emergence of conflict ethnography (Kilcullen 2009).

2. Defining 'Security'

The definition of the meaning and concept of security, like its various theories, are subjective and not tied to any specific and fixed meaning. Accordingly, security is described to be 'profoundly political' (Dalby 1997: 22), an 'underdeveloped concept' (Buzan 1991: 3), an 'ambiguous symbol' (Wolfers 1962: 147), an 'essentially contested concept' (Buzan 1991: 14), a 'derivative concept' (Booth 1997: 111), and 'a symbol' (Balzacq 2011: 15). As a result security has different meanings for different people, regions and States, and its interpretation moves between semiological extremes.

This is even more visible nowadays in which the problem and meaning of security (1) is not tied any more only to an external military threat; (2) the referent object to security is not only the state; and (3) the sectorial approach to security has showed that the source of insecurity can have military, environmental, economic, societal, and political nature (Buzan 1991; Buzan, Waever, and de Wilde 1998); and all these points will be developed further in this chapter.

way" from leader to public: this is seen in the political propaganda of totalitarian regimes. Even in democratic countries, during times of crisis and terror, there is more focus on the "traffic" traveling from the leader/government to the public, since the public seeks a "savior" to protect them and their personal and large-group identities. Leaders and government can exaggerate people's need to have enemies and allies. Some leaders may help people differentiate where the reality of threat ends and where the fantasy of threat begins. This lessens anxiety. Other leaders, due not only to what is called "national interests", but also to their own personality characteristics, may magnify the dangers, increase anxiety, and help the group to remain in regression, which itself will have further societal and political consequences. In times of crisis and terror, leaders can heal or poison their followers. Large-group regression disturbs what the late psychoanalyst Erik Erikson called basic trust, a concept that describes how a child learns to feel comfortable putting his or her own safety in the caretaker's hands; by developing basic trust, a child discovers, in turn, how to trust him or herself. In normal circumstances, adults also depend on trusting themselves and others to remain functioning citizens. Without basic trust, for example, I would not be able to board an airplane without extreme anxiety because I could not feel comfortable putting my life in the hands of the designers, builders, and pilots of the plane. Basic trust is so fundamental that those who have functional basic trust are even aware of using it. Once the basic trust of members of a group is shaken, it gets perverted and is replaced by blind trust. In such a societal regression, we tend to follow leaders' views and directions, whether they are reparative or destructive' (Volkan 2004: 12-14).

Therefore, here we face an ontological problem, because, despite the fact that the term ‘security’ has assumed different meanings through human history (the classical example is provided by the Cold War image according to which the security meaning and problem faced by Western Countries was represented by the Soviet enemy; security = external military threat) its real and historically constant meaning is strongly anchored to its etymological Latin origin (‘*securitas*’: ‘*sine*’= without+ ‘*cura*’= anxiety, worry)⁵ which refers to the specific emotion of anxiety. However, have been the political practices of (1) the securitization process⁶; and (2) the formulation of the security dilemma⁷, which have participated in the subjective fabrication of its meaning and attributes.

⁵ ‘First of all we note that the term “*securitas*”, like all feminine nouns in “*tas*”, belongs to the category of abstract nouns, such as “*libertas*”, “*humanitas*”, “*civitas*”, and so on. It is, therefore, a purely theoretical concept, which did not correspond to any real objectivity in the eyes of most ordinary citizens or Roman soldiers. Even if we stop to consider the etymological root of the noun or adjective, we see that it is derived from “*sine*” (= without) + “*cura*” (= anxiety, worry). The “*secura*” person was thus at the origin of the “*sine cure*” individual, that is without anxieties, without worries, and then free from thoughts or anxieties. The safety condition, therefore, is conceived as the absence of something: it is a condition that could be called “of default”. Davide Campacci, *Il concetto di sicurezza nel mondo romano: spunti di riflessione*, paper not published, 2009, p. 1.

⁶ For Buzan, Waever, and de Wilde security ‘is the move that takes politics beyond the conventional rules of the game and frames the issue either as a special kind of politics or as above politics. Securitization can thus be seen as a more extreme version of politicization. In theory, any public issue can be located on the spectrum ranging from non-politicized (meaning the state does not deal with it and it is not in any other way made an issue of public debate and decision) through politicized (meaning the issue is part of public policy, requiring government decision and resource allocations or, more rarely, some other form of communal governance) to securitized (meaning the issue is presented as an existential threat, requiring emergency measures and justifying action outside the normal bounds of political procedure)’ (Buzan, Waever, and de Wilde 1998: 23-24). In this way, the process of securitization is more than a speech act (Buzan, Waever, and de Wilde 1998: 24-26; Balzacq 2011) through which an issue is presented as an existential threat, requiring emergency measures, and justifying actions outside the bounds of the political procedure (Buzan, Waever, and de Wilde 1998: 23-24). It is rather ‘an articulated assemblage of practices whereby heuristic artefacts (metaphors, policy tools, image repertoires, analogies, stereotypes, emotions, etc.) are contextually mobilized by a securitizing actor, who works to prompt an audience to build a coherent network of implications (feelings, sensations, thought, and intuitions) about the critical vulnerability of a referent object that concurs with the securitizing actor’s reasons for choices and actions, by investing the referent object with such an aura of unprecedented threatening complexion that a customized policy must be undertaken immediately to block its development’ (Balzacq 2011: 3).

⁷ For Booth and Wheeler the security dilemma is a complex relationship of both psychological and material dimensions, and ‘is a two-level predicament in relations between states and other actors, with each level consisting of two related lemmas (or propositions that can be assumed to be valid) which force decision makers to choose between them. The first and basic level consists of a dilemma of interpretation about the motives, intentions and capabilities of the others; the second and derivative level consists of a dilemma of response about the most rational way of responding. First level: a dilemma of interpretation is the predicament facing decision-makers when they are confronted, on matters affecting security, with a choice between two significant and usually (but not always) undesirable alternatives about the military policies and political postures of other entities. This dilemma of interpretation is the result of the perceived need to make a decision in the existential condition of unresolvable uncertainty about the motives, intentions and capabilities of the others. Those responsible have to decide whether perceived military developments are for defensive or self-protection purposes only (to enhance security in an uncertain world) or whether they are for offensive purposes (to seek to change the status quo to their advantage). Second level: a dilemma of response logically begins when the dilemma of interpretation has been settled. Decision-makers then need to determine how to react. Should they signal, by words and deeds, that they will react in kind, for deterrent

Moreover, (1) the securitization process highlights the recognised position of the power structure to perform the speech act and its interest to maintain its status quo power position jeopardized by the emergence of an existential threat; and (2) the security dilemma points to the importance that psychological and material dimension have on the interpretation of the same event.

In addition, looking around for a common definition of security we encounter that any state, Multinational Organizations, military alliance (NATO is a clear example), any nation, all of them power-knowledge structures, (1) have never defined the meaning of security-insecurity; (2) have always presented their own significance of security-insecurity; and (3) have produced their own system of communication-language-symbols: the meaning that the term security has assumed has not been the one of its etymological meaning, but through its use, in specific cultural, political, historical context, a new sense has been shaped.

It should be added, however, that it could be more logical to employ here the term 'insecurity' (what make us feel anxiety and worry) and to look at how its discourse and meaning are fabricated through use. This is because the 'security' situation always refers to the ante political-social state of affairs (status quo) which was present before the emergence of the existential threat.

The above suggests that in the quest for the meaning of the term security it is necessary to look at its use. This advocates an anthropological approach to security (as a term and as a language too), because its meaning is constructed through its use in a specific social and cultural context. As Wittgenstein asks 'when someone says the word "cube" to me, for example, I know what it means. But can the whole *use* of the word come before my mind when I *understand* it in this way? Yes; but on the other hand, isn't the meaning of the word also determined by this use? And can these ways of determining meaning conflict? Can what we grasp *at a stroke* agree with a use, fit or fail to fit it? And how can what is present to us in an instant, what comes before our mind in an instant, fit a *use*?' (Wittgenstein 2009: 59). For him, and it is the approach used in this work, 'it's not the word that counts, but its meaning, thinking of the meaning as a thing of the same kind as the word, even though different from the word (Wittgenstein 2009: 54). For this reason he asks again 'but what is the meaning of the word "five"? – No such thing was in question here, only how the word "five" is used' (Wittgenstein 2009: 6). For Wittgenstein, therefore, 'meaning does not consist in the relation between words and things on in a picturing relation between proposition and facts; rather, the meaning of an expression is its use in its multiplicity of practices which go to make up the language. Moreover, language is not something complete and autonomous which can be investigated independently of other considerations, for language is woven into all human activities and behaviour, and accordingly our many different uses of it are given content and significance by our practical affairs, our work, our dealing with one another and the

purposes? Or should they seek to signal reassurance? If the dilemma of response is based on misplaced suspicion regarding the motives and intentions of others actors, and decision-makers react in a militarily confrontational manner, then they risk creating a significant level of mutual hostility when none was originally intended by either party; if the response is based on misplaced trust, there is a risk they will be exposed to coercion by those with hostile intentions. When leaders resolve their dilemma of response in a manner that creates a spiral of mutual hostility, when neither wanted it, a situation has developed which we call the security paradox' (Booth and Wheeler 2008: 4-5).

world we inhabit – a language, in short, is part of the fabric of an inclusive “form of life” (Grayling 2001: 79). To know a language is more than simply knowing a language as a ‘dictionary’, language lives inside a society, and ‘the limits of my language mean the limits of my world’ (Ludwig Wittgenstein).

Thus, the same reasoning can be applied to the term insecurity, which for Huysmans ‘a domain of insecurity is then not simply constructed through policy reactions to the threat but first of all by discourses of danger (Campbell 1992, 1998a; Weldes 1996), speech acts of security (Buzan et al. 1998; Waever 1995), or language games of insecurity (Fierke 1998) that reframe an event into a condition of insecurity. In a sense it means that insecurity is not a fact of nature but always requires that is written and talked into existence’ (Huysmans 2006: 7).

However, power is another element which does play an important role in the definition of insecurity and security. Conceptualizing insecurity in terms of practices more than threat definition introduces the idea of competition and coordination between vision and agencies of insecurity. Competing security knowledge is central part in the politics of insecurity and ‘vision of insecurity and their institutionalization do not only frame a functionally defined policy domain of security that is institutionally and conceptually differentiated from other policy domains, such as welfare distribution, health care, education, etc. They also imply visions of the nature of politics, i.e. of political organization of social relations’ (Huysmans 2006: 11).

Therefore, I consider the above ‘security knowledge’ as a ‘field’ (Bourdieu 2005; Williams 2007): which, like a political space or a religious space is (1) a ‘an autonomous universe, a kind of arena in which people play a game which has certain rules’ (Bourdieu 2005: 215); and (2) a ‘site of struggles in which individuals seek to maintain or alter the distribution of the forms of capital specific of it. The individuals who participates in these struggles will have differing aims – some will seek to preserve the status quo, others to change it – and differing chances of winning or losing, depending on where they are located in the structured space of positions’ (Bourdieu 2005: 15).

In this field the power-knowledge structures that wants to create and impose a meaning for security and insecurity compete and struggle each other, and use a ‘capital’ which ‘comprises the resources that agents can draw upon to act in a given field, and their ability to move in these fields is related to their habitus⁸ and their capital within a given field and between fields. Each field is characterized and constituted by specific forms of capital, of what is valued and what provides power within the field. A field is therefore a “structured space of positions in which the positions and their interrelations are determined by the distribution of different kinds of resources or “capital”’ (Williams 2007:31).

For Bourdieu, who borrows terms from the language of economics, there are different forms of capital: not only ‘economic capital’ in the strict cense (i.e. material wealth in the form of money, stocks and shares, property, etc.), but also ‘cultural capital’ (i.e. knowledge, skills and other cultural acquisitions, are exemplified by educational or

⁸ On the concept of habitus: ‘The habitus is a set of dispositions which incline agents to act and react in certain ways. The dispositions generate practices, perceptions and attitudes which are “regular” without being consciously co-ordinated or governed by any “rule”. The dispositions which constitute the habitus are inculcated, structured, durable, generative and transposable’ (Bourdieu 2005: 12); and Williams 2007: 25-26.

technical qualifications), ‘symbolic capital’ (i.e. accumulated prestige or honour), and so on. One of the most important properties of fields is the way in which they allow one form of capital to be converted into another (Bourdieu 2005: 14). Therefore, economic or material capital is not the only form of capital, and that its position, power and impact depends upon its relationship to specific field of practices. According to Bourdieu cultural and symbolic forms of capital are linked to forms of power and more specifically cultural and symbolic capital is a power that is recognized. For him ‘a power or capital becomes symbolic, and exerts a specific effect of domination, which I call symbolic power or symbolic violence, when it is known and recognized, that is, when it is the object of an act of knowledge and recognition’ (Bourdieu 1987: 111).

Following Williams (2007) who, based extensively on the work of Bourdieu, has studied the relation between culture and security and considers the concept of symbolic power as central in his work, ‘cultural capital takes many forms but it can broadly be understood as “legitimate” status or authority, whether deriving from personal charisma or social background (itself constituted within a habitus and a field), or conferred by institutional membership or organizational leadership. Symbolic power is grounded in symbolic systems, pre-eminently language. But it also arise from abstract symbolic forms such as knowledge system and the capital generated by possession. As Bourdieu is at pains to stress, however, the two forms of capital and capital are often related in practice. This is particularly the case in his analysis of language, for while recognizing the power of linguistic systems, he argues that is vital to understand that this form of power cannot be understood at the level of language alone’ (William 2007: 33). Indeed for Bourdieu ‘symbolic power – as a power of constituting the given through utterances, of making people see and believe, of confirming or transforming the vision of the world and, thereby, action on the world and thus the world itself, an almost magical power which enables one to obtain the equivalent of is obtained through force (whether physical or economic), by virtue of the specific effect of mobilization – is a power that can be exercised only if it is *recognized*, that is misrecognized as arbitrary. This means that symbolic power does not reside in “symbolic systems” in the form of an “illocutionary force” but that it is defined in and through a given relation between those who exercise power and those who submit to it, i.e. in the very structure of the field in which *belief* is produced and reproduced. What creates the power of words and slogans, a power capable in maintaining or subverting a social order, is the belief in the legitimacy of words and those who utter them. And words alone cannot create this belief’ (Bourdieu 2005: 170).

As result, the power-knowledge that wins the struggle (using its economic, cultural, and symbolic capitals, as capabilities) inside the field of the ‘security knowledge’ is the one that at the end is recognized to manufacture that ‘security belief’ which is produced and reproduced.

This ‘security belief’, as the following pages will unfold, is presented by the power-knowledge structure to its audience as ‘the’ (only) security knowledge through the assembly and employment of myths, language and simple words-slogans, formulas, and images (Gentile 2016: 153). Through this process (1) security is converted in a myth; (2) is considered sacral (Chan 2000); (3) the securitization process becomes a political ritual in which the symbolic power of the power-knowledge structure is transformed in an almost magic power; and (4) in this ritual language and symbols are perceived as ‘real’ by the psychology of the crowd (Gentile 2016: 153).

However, security, and this is the main point of this thesis, for its particular intellectual (definitions, concepts, theories, and use) and physical (space, and territory) nature has to be considered as whole anthropological place-space (intellectual and physical) because 'is a place intensely symbolized, lived by individuals in which they found their spatial, temporal, individual and collective benchmarks' (Auge' 2011: 158). Only considering security as an anthropological place-space it is possible to identifies and deconstructs all those intellectual and physical elements which to play a role in fabricating its meaning and its space. The following pages will consider the use of security as a myth, a ritual, a language, and a symbol.

2.1. 'Security' as a myth and the securitization process as a ritual

The above reasoning demonstrates the strong and direct relation which exists between the term 'security', its use, its social-cultural context, its cognitive identity formation, and any power-knowledge structure in relation to the fabrication of its meaning and usage. In this manufacturing of the meaning of security and insecurity the power-knowledge structure wants to demonstrate that (1) it is in possession of 'the' truth (it advocates an ontological and epistemological authority on what constitute security and insecurity reality and knowledge); and (2) it is in power and command-control position, and has the capacity to provide the remedy, the 'pharmakon'⁹, to restore security. In order to attain these objectives the power-knowledge structure must create its own meaning of security which represents the fabrication of a myth (of security), and stage and perform a ritual (securitization process) in order to have its security myth accepted.

2.1.a. 'Security' as a myth


According to Roland Barthes (2000) the myth is a system of communication defined as a 'second order semiological system' in which a power-knowledge structure plays a fundamental role.

For Barthes, the 'first order semiological system' is formed by the '1.Signifier' (acoustic image), '2.Signified' (concept) and '3.Sign' (relation between concept and image). This first order represents a linguistic system in which, once applied to the term 'security', it produces that: (1) '1.Signifier' is the written word 'security'; '2.Signified' is represented by the etymological meaning of security: '*securitas*' (without anxiety); (3) '3. Sign' is what I call 'security-securitas', which represent the 'referent' in this thesis.

However, the myth is a peculiar system because it is constructed from a semiological chain which existed before it: it is a second order semiological system. What is a sign (the associative total of a concept and an image) in the first system, becomes a mere signifier in the second. The material of mythical speech, however different at the start, are reduced to a pure signifying function as soon as they are caught

⁹ For Girard (2005: 100) 'it is not surprising that the world pharmakon in classical Greek means both poison and the antidote for poison, both sickness and cure – in short any substance capable of perpetrating a very good or very bad action, according to the circumstances and the dosage. The pharmakon is thus a magic drug or volatile elixir, whose administration had best be left by ordinary men in the hands of those who enjoy special knowledge and exceptional powers – priest, magicians, shamans, doctors, and so on'.

by myth. Whatever it deals only with alphabetical or pictorial writing, myth wants to see in them only a sum of signs, a global sign, the final term of a first semiological chain. And it is precisely this final term which will become the first term of a greater system.



Source: Barthes, R. (2000), *Mythologies*, London: Vintage Books, 115.

This lateral shift is essential for the analysis of myth. In the myth there are two semiological systems, one of which is staggered in relation to the other: a linguistic system, the language, which Barthes calls language-object, because it is the language which myth gets hold of in order to build its own system; and myth itself, which Barthes calls 'metalanguage', because it is a second language in which one speaks about the first. When he reflects on a metalanguage, the semiologist no longer needs to ask himself questions about the composition of the language-object, he no longer has to take into account the details of the linguistic schema; he will only need to know its total term, or global sign, and only as this term lends itself to myth. This is why the semiologist is entitled to treat in the same way writing and pictures: what he retains from them is the fact that they are both signs and they constitute a language-object.

Thus, the 'metalanguage' is a product of the cultural context. Every cultural context creates and fabricates its own 'metalanguage' which (1) is based on the symbolic interpretation of reality; and (2) it is expressed through the use of myths. The symbols that integrate into the myths do not have a literary-linguistic meaning but their significance have their roots into the cultural context, and are conveyed through the employment of the 'metalanguage'.

Therefore the 'second order semiological system' of the myth of security is made up of: 'I SIGNIFIER' is provided by '3. Sign' (security-securitas); 'II SIGNIFIED' is the result of the political, intellectual, elaboration of 'security-securitas' by an epistemological community-power-knowledge structure (in the case of this thesis this is represented by the Alliance technocratic apparatus), which transforms and recreates the meaning and practices of what constitute anxiety-existential threat; 'III SIGN' is the characteristic and peculiar image/picture that the sign will assume which changes in time and space.

The epistemological community-power-knowledge structure produces its narrative-discourse employing a specific terminology whose meaning is not shared with the 'lay' community. And, with the purpose to have this terminology accepted by the 'lay' community, the power-knowledge structure recreates intelligible words equipped with a new meaning. In this operation to create a new meaning is reflected (1) the interest of the power-knowledge structure to deactivate any possibility of resistance from the 'lay' community; and (2) its interest to maintain a status quo hegemonic position.

As a result, while in the linguistic system the word 'security' has only one referent represented by its etymological meaning 'securitas, in the metalanguage system (the myth of security) the term 'security' is the result of a linguistic-narrative fabrication, operated by a power-knowledge structure, and therefore change with time and space. It is around this 'myth' of security which is constructed (1) the authorized, the authoritative language (Bourdieu 2005: 107-116) of the 'security knowledge'; and (2) its meaning (how to use the term security from now on). This proves the strong and direct relation which exists between the metalanguage and the use of the term security.

In this specific context the step from the first to the second semiological order, which represents the very fabrication of the myth security and its use, is possible through the securitization process (Buzan, Waever, and de Wilde 1998; Balzacq 2011) which allows the power-knowledge structure to define a human event as an existential threat to the survival of the community it protects.

However, the power of a myth cannot be seen only inside a system of communication: 'myths describe the nature of the universe, both natural and supernatural, and define the place of human beings within this symbolic landscape. In many cases, the symbolic landscape conforms in general outline to the physical landscape occupied by the group that has given rise to the myth. The myth describes the landscape in term of its meaning for the people who occupy it. A myth also defines the obligations people owe to each other; to the plants, animals, and geographical features that make up the landscape; and to the spirit entity or beings that created the landscape and established the order of the universe' (Womack 2005: 80-81).

At the end, the order reassures, and provides security at the individual and at the collective level. At the individual level, because as far as I order, I prioritize, and I know what to do, I have the knowledge on what and when to do something. I have 'power' on my time and actions. At the collective level, knowing what others have to do and anticipating your reaction to the interaction with the other, reinforces the security in your response and in the foresight of the other.

Then, it is possible to apply the interpretative system developed hitherto (that the meaning of security is subjective, and that security is a myth created through the development of the security dilemma and the securitization process) to the case of NATO's securitization discourse, and we can realize that for the Alliance the meaning of security is provided by its Art. 5 (1949)¹⁰: the absence of an armed attack against one of

¹⁰ The North Atlantic Treaty, Washington D.C. - 4 April 1949. 'Article 5. The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defence recognised by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of

the Alliance Members and a military self-defence response to a possible armed attack, and not ‘securitas’.

Therefore, it can be said that NATO’s security meaning coincides with the fabrication of metalanguage system (myth) which (1) is embodied by the securitization process which ‘it is not interesting as a sign referring to something more real; it is the utterance itself that is the act. By saying such words, something is done or performed (like betting, giving a promise, naming a ship)’ (Buzan, Waever, and de Wilde 1998: 26); and (2) as outcome produces the ‘security-securitization’ myth which the Alliance presents and uses as meaning, knowledge, and a protocol of interpretation.

However, when the geopolitical structure NATO-URSS broken down, the ‘visibility-identification’ of the enemy, which is no longer exclusively military, is blurred. Now, the intention to kill is not an exclusive power only in the end of States, and the existential threat to human life is fragmented. The concept of the ‘risk of...’ attached to the meaning of security has spread into the daily life of the human being (risk and insecurity related to food, water, health care, etc.) and is not contained by state borders or by military forces. In this fragmented and vague context (this discourse will be developed in the chapter dedicated to the concept of liquid security) to predict and to combat is an extremely difficult political-strategic-tactic task.

During the Cold War period, NATO’s security dilemma and security myth were represented only by an external armed attack, and its security-securing ‘pharmakon’ was condensed in a military self-defence retaliation. In NATO’s territories, in practice and in the social imaginary this myth, was staged (Wright 2007) and supported by anti-Soviet narrative-propaganda, by the official NATO securitization process, and was embodied by the Soviet enemy. NATO’s myth lasted as long its Soviet enemy was existing. However, with the evaporation of the Soviet foe and the emergence of different security threats, NATO’s survival as power-knowledge-securing-structure started to depend on a transformational exercise which needed a new myth. This means that the Alliance Cold War security myth-narrative (now considered obsolete) was a limit to NATO’s world and its capacity to act, to survive in new time, and to retain its securing status quo position. And this brings the methodological idea to look at NATO’s security concept as a ‘securitization-narrative-myth’ because these three elements combine each others. Then securitization process, more that a speech act can be interpreted as a ‘myth act’, the performative process to produce a myth, to fabricate a metalanguage.

Thus, NATO has been acting as a power-knowledge securing structure, and in the fabrication of its ‘linguistic competences’¹¹, its new security language, which represents

the North Atlantic area. Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result thereof shall immediately be reported to the Security Council. Such measures shall be terminated when the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to restore and maintain international peace and security’. At: http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_17120.htm

¹¹ For Bourdieu ‘linguistic competence is not a simple technical capacity but a statutory capacity with which the technical capacity is generally paired, if only because it imposes the acquisition of the latter through the effect of statutory attribution (*noblesse oblige*), as opposed to the commonly held belief that regards technical capacity as the basis for statutory capacity. Legitimate competence is the statutory recognized capacity of an authorized person – an “authority” – to use, on formal occasions, the legitimate (i.e. formal) language, the authorized, authoritative language, speech that is accredited, worthy of being believed, or, in a word, *performative*, claiming (with the greatest chances of success) to be effective. Given the legitimate competence, thus defined, implies the effectiveness of the performative, one can understand

the ‘authorized language’, has been assembled, adapted, and fabricated using the language of critical security studies. This linguistic adaptation and adoption has permitted NATO’s narrative to free itself from the limits of the orthodox vision of security and insecurity and to adapt its security-insecurity to the liquid dimension of critical security studies.

However, once the security myth is created by any legitimate power-knowledge structure (and NATO is a clear example) which presents itself as the only security actor, it needs an image-symbol, a ritual, a spectacle-representation in order to prompt an audience to build a coherent network of implications (feelings, sensations, thought, and intuitions). And paraphrasing Huysmans (2006) who identifies in the process of securitization a technique of governing danger, I see an ‘articulated assemblage of practices whereby heuristic artefacts (metaphors, policy tools, image repertoires, analogies, stereotypes, emotions, etc.)’ (Balzacq 2011: 3) are condensed in the ritual-spectacle of the myth security which constitutes a technique of governing the myth.

Moreover, I argue that this technique of governing the myth has to be understood inside the framework provided by the concepts of the sacralization of politics and of sacral.

The sacralization of politics, consists of bestowing a sacred character to a secular entity, as the nation, the state, the race, the political party and the leader. In these situations, politics become a religion because, through a complex of beliefs, expressed by the use of myths, rituals, and symbols, it pretends to define the meaning and the final end of the individual and the collective existence (Gentile 2007: vii).

Sacral, is ‘the capacity to become sacred; founded on ancient rites and beliefs, it is a projection of these rites and beliefs into a sphere beyond their antiquity. It is a relocation of an antiquity into a future condition, so that progress towards it is, simultaneously, a progress and a sort of regression: it is an eternal return or eternal recurrence. As far as “truth” is concerned, and the superhuman effort towards it, this

how certain experiments in social psychology have been able to establish the efficacy of an utterance, the power of conviction which is granted to it, depends on the *pronunciation* (and secondarily the vocabulary) of the person who utters it; that is, through this particularly reliable measure of statutory competence, it depends on the authority of the speaker. The practical evaluation of the symbolic relation of power that determines the criteria of evaluation prevailing in the market concerned takes into account the specifically linguistic properties of discourse only in so far as they express the social authority and social competence of those who utter them. They do so in the same way as the other non-linguistic properties such as the character of the voice (nasalization or pharynxization), a durable disposition of the vocal apparatus that is one of the most powerful of social markers, and all of the more overtly social qualities such as aristocratic and academic titles: clothing, especially uniforms and formal dress: institutional attributes like the priest’s pulpit, the professor’s platform, the orator’s rostrum and microphone, all of which place the legitimate speaker in a pre-eminent position and structure the interaction through the spatial structure which they impose on it; and, finally, the very composition of the group in which the exchange occurs. Thus the more formal is the situation is, the more likely it is that the dominant linguistic competence will function in a particular market as linguistic capital capable of imposing the law of price formation which is the most favourable to its products and of procuring the corresponding symbolic profit. For the more formal the situation is, the more it is able to impose by itself alone the recognition of the legitimacy of the dominant mode of expression, converting the optional variants (at least on the level of pronunciation) which characterize it into imperative rules, “*de rigueur*” (like black ties at formal dinners), making the recipients of these linguistic products more inclined to know and recognize the legitimacy of this mode of expression, even outside the constraints of the formal situation’ (Bourdieu 2005: 69-70).

superhumanity is necessary precisely because truth is elusive, and even if attained, can only be held momentarily in its eternal cycle' (Chan 2000: 568).

The government of the emotions (the management of conquer fear and anxiety), which is generated from power position, has disabled the capacity of reaction to the loss of rights for the sake of a security myth that does not exist, and that the same structures of power can not guarantee

2.1.b. The securitization process as a ritual

For the Italian philosopher and psychoanalyst Umberto Galimberti (2011: 9) mankind has never lived in the World, but always in its description which, in different historical periods, has been provided by religion, philosophy, science, and now technology. Mankind lives into the description of the world and his relation with it passes through the ideas that wrap the things.

The same approach can be applied here to both the idea of security and insecurity, because, they are myths, and what the mankind lives are their descriptions, their rituals and the ideas that wrap their real meanings. Without the emergence of the unexpected existential threat, its identification, its framing, and the implementation of security measures, there won't be any security policy.

Thus, the power-knowledge securing structure needs the 'staging of existential issues in politics to lift them above politics. In security discourse, an issue is dramatized and presented as an issue of supreme priority; thus by labelling is as security, an agent claims a need for a right to treat it by extraordinary means' (Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde 1998: 26).

This brings the necessity to move our gaze in the direction of the so labelled insecurity event. For Huysmans (2006: 2-4) 'insecurity is a politically and socially constructed phenomenon (...) (and) thus emerges from discursively and institutionally modulating practices in terms of security rationality that makes policies intelligible as a security practice'. In its *modus operandi* 'insecurity' follows the same Barthes' metalanguage process which I have applied to the myth of security, and the politics of insecurity is both a political spectacle and technocratic. 'Spectacle politics consists of the development and circulation of symbols in public contests of policies and power positions.' While the technocratic aspect is identifiable in the process of securitization which 'emerges at the interstice of a symbolic politics of fear generated in the field of professional politicians, which also includes the media and opinion polling institutions, and the technological governances of insecurity primarily generated in the field of security professionals, including most explicitly the different security services (police, military, and intelligence)' (Huysmans 2006: 154-155).

However, in this work I strongly sustain that the security political spectacle-representation (securitization process) staged by the power-knowledge securing structure becomes a ritual¹², or ritual of social magic (Bourdieu 2005: 111-116),

¹² A ritual 'is a stereotyped series of simple complementary transactions programmed by external social forces (...) The form of a ritual is parentally determined by tradition (...) Some formal ritual of special historical or anthropological interest have two phases: 1) a phase in which transactions are carried on under rigid parental strictures, 2) a phase of parental license in which the child is allowed more or less complete transactional freedom, resulting in an orgy' (Berne 1968: 36). The latter 'is strictly programmed, expressing

because, as beautifully formulated by Lisón Tolosana (2012: 22) ‘rituals are a universal cultural phenomenon and their complexity reflects multiple dimensions of human experience which, in turn, imbue them with mystery and make them difficult to understand. Rituals are intimately linked with important transitional moments in the life cycle and are accompanied by rhythm, dance, song, melody, music, hymns, percussion, flags, emblems, icons, illumination, color, costumes and aesthetics. A rite both signifies and transports meaning; significance and meaning that extravagantly express, symbolize, and demand hermeneutic interpretation’.

It is necessary, therefore, to look at the securitization process as a ritual performed-staged inside a specific anthropological place-space. Here below I explain this move.

Here, I claim that the security ritual (political spectacle-representation-staging), operates as a hermeneutic circle, which:

1. Becomes an ‘articulated assemblage of practices whereby heuristic artefacts (metaphors, policy tools, image repertoires, analogies, stereotypes, emotions, etc.) are contextually mobilized by a securitizing actor, who works to prompt an audience to build a coherent network of implications (feelings, sensations, thought, and intuitions) about the critical vulnerability of a referent object’ (Balzacq 2011: 3);
2. Produces a cultural system, where culture ‘denotes an historically transmitted pattern of meanings embodied in symbols, a system of inherited conceptions expressed in symbolic forms by means of which men communicate, perpetuate, and develop their knowledge about and attitudes toward life’ (Geertz 1973: 89);
3. Makes use of culture patterns (religious, philosophical, aesthetic, scientific, ideological) which are ‘programs’ that ‘provide a template or blueprint for the organization of social and psychological processes, much as genetic system provide such a template for the organization of organic processes’ (Geertz 1973: 216);
4. Actively participates in the cognitive process of identity formation in which a ‘we’ is molded in opposition to the ‘other’ constructed as enemy/threat;
5. It becomes the symbolic system of reference in which mankind discovers a new method of adapting himself to his environment (Cassirer 1972: 24);

the individual’s submission to forces “larger” or at least “other” than oneself. Ritual epitomizes the reality principle, the agreement to obey rules that are given’ (Schechner 2003: 15). ‘Ritualized behaviour, including performances, are a means of continually testing the boundaries between play and “for real”’ (Schechner 2003: 105); they employ a mythical narrative which ‘sometimes takes the form of a contest or game, a quasi-sportive or pugilistic event that evokes the rivalries inherent in the sacrificial crisis. Behind all these themes, one can detect the outline of reciprocal violence, gradually transformed into a unanimous act’ (Girard 2005: 99). However, ‘a ritual never exists alone. It is usually one ceremony among many in the larger ritual life of a person and community, one gesture among a multitude of gestures both sacred and profane, one embodiment among others of traditions of behaviour down from one generation to another. In other words, for each and every ritual, there is a thick context of social customs, historical practices, and day-to-day routines that, in addition to the unique factors at work in any given moment in time and space, influence whether and how ritual action is performed’ (Bell 2009: 171).

6. In this political spectacle-cultural system the individual following culture patterns produces his own response to anxiety and fear. For Geertz the response to an insecurity threat is cultural because, 'like a frightened animal, a frightened man may run, hide, bluster, dissemble, placate, or, desperate with panic, attack; but in his case the precise patterning of such overt acts is guided predominantly by cultural rather than genetic templates (Geertz 1973: 75);
7. Therefore, it becomes an anthropological place which 'is a place intensely symbolized, lived by individuals in which they found their spatial, temporal, individual and collective benchmarks' (Auge' 2011: 158);
8. It works as an ideology which function 'is not to offer us a point of escape from our reality but to offer us the social reality itself as an escape from some traumatic, real kernel' (Zizek 2008b: 45);
9. It prescribes a binding protocol of interpretation and of political action.

It is inside the dimension of the political spectacle which is pervaded by images produced by media, that the mankind produces myth and create-recreates his human symbolic space. The political spectacle becomes the symbolic space of reference in which the nature of the mankind (1) as 'animal symbolicum' (Cassirer 1972), as producer and consumer of myth; and (2) as 'homo ritualis' (Lison Tolosana 2012), who experiences his life through rituals, is transformed into that of the 'homo videns',¹³. For Sartori (1997) the dominance of the image on the word has undermined the so-called abstract thought and symbolic activity to being human. Homo Videns is regression, intellectual atrophy, and inability to distinguish the virtual from the real and true from false. And consequence of this decline is the growing inability of man to create his own opinion, which, by extension, means losing freedom and free will.

In this sacred political spectacle and ritual the power-knowledge securing structure decides what to show and what the 'homo videns' is allowed to see and experience. Seeing is a cognitive experience: 'seeing is not a definitive judgment but a process of mental analysis that goes backwards and forwards between different areas of the brain. It takes a brain to see, not just a pair of eyes' (Mirzoeff 2015: 82)

And the power structure 'produces a system of self-evident facts of perception based on a set horizons and modalities of what is visible and audible as well as what can be said, thought, made, or done' (Ranciere 2014: 89).

Therefore, we can fully understand that in the symbolic space of this spectacle (1) a rite of passage and a rite of intensification are performed; (2) the power-knowledge securing structure acts in this rituals as the hero who overcomes the threat; (3) the threat-enemy is dehumanized or/and orientalisised (Said 2003) meaning that he/she does not belong to the 'we' but to the 'other' who do not share our common values and culture; (4)

¹³ According to Giovanni Sartori (1997) it has been the advent of television to mark the transition from Homo Sapiens to Homo Videns, passage that does not mark an evolution but, rather, an involution. Because of television, says Sartori, for the first time in history the image predominates and prevails over the word, going to completely change the communication and the understanding of mechanisms among humans. The dominance of the image on the word has undermined the so-called abstract thought and symbolic activity to being human. Homo Videns is regression, intellectual atrophy, and inability to distinguish the virtual from the real and true from false. Consequence of this decline, according to Sartori, is the growing inability of man to create his own opinion, which, by extension, means losing freedom and free will.

the audience is transformed in liturgical mass; and (5) the rituals produce two forces: centripetal and centrifugal. Whilst the intention of the power-knowledge securing structure, behind the performance of the ritual, is to maintain his status quo power position.

The above is possible because of the nature of the ritual itself. According to Womack (2005: 91) ritual is associated with high-risk situations, including those that involve physical danger, danger of failure, and social complexity. The performance of ritual influences the performance of hazardous tasks, the formation of human groups, and the ability of humans to undergo life crises. Then, ritual is (1) repetitive: rituals occurs again and again in a given context, and/or certain elements tend to be repeated throughout the behavioral sequence; (2) stylized: ritual is formal rather than spontaneous; (3) sequential: there is an orderly progression from the beginning to end; (4) nonordinary: ritual typically are enacted at a time and place set apart as sacred or powerful; and (5) potent: ritual is believed to be innately power or powerful in controlling supernatural beings or forces.

Thus, when we look at the security ritual there is an overlapping coincidence between the phases of the rites of passage and the quality and identity of the hero which here is attributed to the power-knowledge securing structure. The rites of passage see the presence of three particular moments (separation, liminality-initiation, return-aggregation-incorporation). These three moments apply to the image of the classical hero, where 'a hero ventures forth from the world of common day into a region of supernatural wonder; fabulous forces are there encountered and a decisive victory is won; the hero comes back from its mysterious adventure with the power to bestow boons on his fellow man' (Campbell 1993: 30).

So the power-knowledge securing structure first takes the opportunity of the securitization process to perform a transition rite in which, strong in his qualities, the new unexpected insecurity event is purged by all its elements of change (Girard 2005: 107) and second, he assimilates the insecure event into a new narrative-script. As a result, the power-knowledge structure is able to assert both its own role and the identity of the group for whom it acts (Kearney 2001: 86).

Therefore, the power-knowledge securing structure in the rites of passage imitates the hero and he/she puts into practice that mimetic performance (Schechner 2003; Durkheim 2001: 261-262) in which one makes believe (Walton 1990) that s/he is the hero, the 'eternal model' (Cobley 2006: 57), and that he/she has incorporates the identity of the classical hero. This is in line with the idea that the myth (1) is 'synonymous with "eternal return", with the desire to be at one with a cosmic beginning in an eternal "now"' (Coupe 2009: 53); and (2) it equates with ideology because it confirms the status quo (Coupe 2009: 154) of an 'ideal order, and in its rite the myth makes use of an U-shaped narrative which always brings back to an 'ideal order' (Coupe 2009: 157-158).

It is, however, in the rites of intensification which are communal rites that function to intensify the social sentiments of a groups' member and the solidarity of the group, that the concept of security as an idiosyncratic concept can be best appreciated (Ercolani 2011: 72-73). This idiosyncrasy is the result of the combination of cultural idiosyncrasy and individual idiosyncrasy, in which anxiety acts as a catalyst. As cultural idiosyncrasy, it is considered what is peculiar in a culture that can spark particular anxiety-fear emotions in individuals in its geopolitical context; for individual

idiosyncrasy, it is considered the particular nature of the political leader, or agent, to which is attributed an authority, who can then perform the speech-narrative act. As a result, the combination of culture, symbolism, myth, policy, and interests, together with the political activity and nature-character of the leader-agency and the emotional element, produces a cultural concept of security which is conscious of its cultural relativism (Ercolani 2011: 72-73).

Therefore, in the fabrication and performance of the rites, the power-knowledge securing structure, strong in its newly acquired identity and status, puts into practice, in order to self-preserve and to maintain esteem and faith among its audience, those qualities that the Machiavellian's Prince must possess, as the capacity 'to colour over his failure to keep his words', and 'to appear merciful, faithful, humane, trustworthy, religious, and to be so' (Machiavelli 2005 [1513]: 61). This is because 'nothing makes a prince more esteemed than great undertakings and showing himself to be extraordinary' (Machiavelli 2005 [1523]: 76).

The securitizing actor performs a role, creates a performance, playing around like a bricoleur with fragments of meaning which he himself has not created (Kearney 2001: 13). What is peculiar to a culture that can spark particular anxiety-fear emotions in individuals in the symbolic space of the spectacle politics, and these emotions in turn form instruments that 'he finds at his disposition around him, those which are already there, which had not been especially conceived with an eye to the operation for which they are to be used and to which one tries by trial and error to adapt them, not hesitating to change them whenever it appears necessary, or to try several of them at once, even if their form and their origin are heterogeneous – and so forth' (Derrida 2005: 360).

The power-knowledge securing structure simultaneously (1) 'creates' its own language which becomes 'the' official authorized-language-grammar, which sets the rules of the security game/ritual; (2) presents himself as the one who has the solution, the 'medical remedy', and therefore the power to administer the pharmakon in order to overcome the existential threat; and (3) even proclaim that it is acting in the name of God, as demonstrated by Gentile (2008) in his work on the massive use of religious messages and performances practiced by the US Administration after the Sept 11th, 2001 terrorist attacks. This action and these responses he defines as 'theopolitics': a new experience of the sacralization of politics, carried out by those politicians who proclaim that they are acting in the name of God, so merging religion with politics, asserting that politics can not survive without religion, and that religion has to lead politics (Gentile 2008: XV).

On the whole, the spectacle politics, which now from sacral has become sacred, can be seen as a large stage, produced inside an anthropological place/space (Auge' 2011: 158) where, the political ritual and performance take the shape of a sacred Manichean duel which is staged between a hero and the forces of the evil (the insecurity event). As an example I refer to George W. Bush's 'National Day of Prayer and Remembrance' Speech on Sept. 14th, 2011, in the church of Saint Peter and Saint Paul (National Cathedral) in Washington, D.C, where he announced his intention to fight the war on terror (Gentile 2008: 113-114). Into the space of the spectacle politics even the practice and the language of existential threat is transformed into a myth (the myth of insecurity), and the security rhetoric used in the performance works in such a way that the danger

remains in the political discourse, and the existential threat is accepted by the audience (Salter 2011: 120-122).

However, 'for ritual to function and operate it must first of all present itself and be perceived as legitimate, with stereotyped symbols serving precisely to show that the agent does not act in his own name and on his own authority, but in his capacity as a delegate. (...) Ritual symbolism is not effective on its own, but only in so far as it *represents* – in the theatrical sense of the term – the delegation. Rigorous observance of the code of the uniform liturgy, which governs the sacramental gesture and words, constitutes both the manifestation and the counterpart of the contract of delegation, which makes the priest the holder of "a monopoly in the manipulation of the goods of salvation" (...) The performative magic of ritual functions fully only as long as the religious official who is responsible for carrying it out in the name of the group acts as a kind of *medium* between the group and itself; it is the group which, through its intermediary, exercises on itself the magical efficacy contained in the performative utterance. The symbolic efficacy of the words is exercised only in so far as the person subjected to it recognizes the person who exercises it as authorized to do so, or, what amounts to the same thing, only in so far as he fails to realize that, in submitting to it, he himself has contributed, through his recognition, to its establishment' (Bourdieu 2005: 115-116).

Indeed, it is in this space where the sacred envelops the notion of the performance (Girard 2006: 329) that is staged a theatre of psycho-power (Orr 2006: 15), which generates that specific psycho-power which 'represents technologies of power and techniques of knowledge developed by a normalizing society to regulate the psychological life, health, and disorders of individuals and entire populations. In part, conceptual kin and strategic ally of bio-power, psycho-power operates through psychological monitoring, measurement, and discipline, administering order in the unruly psychic realms of perception, emotion, and memory' (Orr 2006: 11). Thus, psycho-power can be seen as an exercise of 'engineering of consent' (through reason, persuasion and suggestion) which, as a manufactured product, resembles the 'panic broadcast' experiment carried out by Orson Welles on Oct 30th, 1938 through his radio adaptation of H. G. Wells' 'The War of the Worlds' (on panic broadcast, see also Orr 2006: 33-77). This can also be taken to represent 'the tendency to give up the independence of one's own individual self and to fuse one's self with somebody or something outside oneself in order to acquire the strength which the individual self is lacking' (Fromm 2006: 122).

The ritual creates two opposite forces in the psycho-geography (Coverley 2010) of the spectacle politics of the security ritual: centripetal and centrifugal.

The centripetal force is evident, when the rite, for its character of urgency, emergency, and existential threat represented by the insecurity event, participates in the reinforcement and in the recreation of the identity and status of the power-knowledge securing structure. The ritual (1) reinforces the security knowledge structure as the only holder of truth (security and insecurity knowledge); and (2) aims to direct large-group regression (which follow cultural paths), and induce that 'blind trust' in which 'the individuals within the group lose their individuality to one degree or another, follow the leader(s) blindly, and become prone to taking in (internalizing) political propaganda without really questioning its validity' (Volkan 2006: 84).

On the other hand, the centrifugal force (1) participates in the recognition of the status of the power-knowledge securing structure; and (2) generates that spark (Canetti

1972) and/or social (and religious) electricity that make an audience to be called to play not a game but an active emotional/interpretative role because this situation is inherently dramatic. Furthermore, the participants 'not only do things, they show themselves and others what they are doing or have done: actions take on a reflexive and performed-for-an-audience aspect' (Schechner 2003: 186); they also crystallize as mass, leaving aside what is a formless and shapeless quality (Canetti 1972).

Therefore, the centrifugal force of the rite spreads an emotional contagion which produces that collective 'effervescence' by which 'within a crowd moved by a common passion, we become susceptible to feelings and actions of which we are incapable on our own' (Durkheim 2001: 157). This transmits an alarm signal which participates in the construction of imagined communities (Anderson 2006) through its language. It recruits subjects among the individuals, or transforms individuals into subjects through an operation called 'interpellation', which refers to the process by which people, when 'hailed' by discourse, recognize themselves in that hailing (Althusser 1988: 55). For Fierke (2007: 86), 'interpellation assumes that different representations of the world incorporate patterns of identity and ways of functioning in the world, which are located within different power relations and which make different interests possible. Concrete individuals come to identify with these subject positions and the representations in which they appear. As subjects identify with them, the power relations and interests entailed in discourse are naturalized and these representations seem to reflect the world as it really is'. Moreover, these centrifugal and centripetal forces work like the fission and fusion theories developed by Hojrup (2003) and applied to his 'cultural-state-formation' process.

Then, it is through this process, that the significant (Buzan, Waeber, and de Wilde 1998: 27), empowering (Balzacq 2011: 8-11) and playing audience is transformed into a liturgical mass (Gentile 2007: 73). And this is possible because the Mass ritual, unlike in a theatrical representation, is efficient, and no matter how much the service has very important aesthetic dimensions, what is important is the passionate affirmation. The Mass ritual is a closed circle which includes only the congregation and those officiating, and there is no room for mere appreciators. As an obligatory action, its members enter into it, and signal to each other and to the hierarchy (Schechner 2003: 137). This might be compared also at the extreme to the Orwellian 'Two Minutes Hate Ritual' where 'a hideous ecstasy of fear and vindictiveness, a desire to kill, to torture, to smash faces in with a sledge-hammer (seems) to flow through the whole group of people like an electric current, turning one even against one's will into a grimacing, screaming lunatic. And yet the rage that one felt was an abstract, undirected emotion which could be switched from one object to another like the flame of a blowlamp' (Orwell 2000: 16).

Therefore, the Mass ritual, has completely embodied the language of the security ritual, and (1) reacts as a model reader who fully cooperates with a text (Eco 2006) because it fully recognises itself in the language and in the cultural idiosyncrasy and individual idiosyncrasy of the myth security, and then in the ritual (Ercolani 2011: 72-73); and (2) 'follows the leader(s) blindly, and become prone to taking in (internalizing) political propaganda without really questioning its validity' (Volkan 2006: 84).

In conclusion, the rite of security, with its own characteristic centrifugal force (1) captures an audience; (2) produces a liturgical mass; and (3) disciplines and fabricates docile bodies 'that may be subjected, used, transformed and improved' (Foucault 1991:

136). And thanks to its ‘mimesis didactic aspects’ (Cobley 2006: 81), the rite (1) becomes a set of statements and practices through which certain language becomes institutionalized and normalized over time’ (Neumann: 2009: 61); (2) produces a cultural artefact: ‘a cultural practice traceable to a particular historical context concerned with shaping the politics of security’ (Williams 2007: 4); and (3) shapes the security symbolic system of reference (Cassirer 1972: 24).

In foucauldian terms, the rite (1) has the power to assemble, to produce, and to fabricate knowledge (Foucault 1980: 59); and (2) acknowledges the central panoptical position of the power-knowledge securing structure from which gazes and controls through its own paradigm the territory, space and use of its security myth-ideology-concept (Foucault 1991: 195-228). As a result, the myth of security and insecurity are accepted as real knowledge. Comparably, in bourdeusian terms in this metamorphic-disciplining process, the audience-subject acquires a ‘habitus’ which represents ‘a set of disposition which incline agents to act and react in certain ways’ (Bourdieu 2005: 12).

2.2. ‘Security’ as a language and a symbol

The efficacy of the security ritual is based on the use of a specific language (the authorized, legitimate security language), and of symbols which are understood and embodied by the target audience in a specific social-cultural context (the anthropological space/place of reference). Only in this way the Mass ritual (1) accepts and recognises the ‘security myth’ as a belief, and as the ‘security knowledge’; (2) reacts as a model reader who fully cooperates with a security ritual (Eco 2006); and (3) is ready to ‘follow the leader(s) blindly, and become prone to taking in (internalizing) political propaganda without really questioning its validity’ (Volkan 2006: 84).

The followings sections exam ‘security’ as a language and as a symbol and how language and symbols are the principal elements in the fabrication of the security myth and ritual.

2.2.a. ‘Security’ as a language

Guignon (1983), who writes on Heidegger (Being and Time, 1927) and the problem of knowledge, adopts a constitutive approach to language (based on Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations), and says that language inhabits our lives and shapes the situations in which we find ourselves. Language constitutes the word, and words and world are interwoven in such a way that to enter into one is simultaneously to master the other. For Heidegger language ‘is more than one kind of equipment at our disposal for dealing with the world. Whereas the ready-to-hand is ontologically defined by its place in a total context, language plays the role of *generating* those contexts of activity and making possible the fact that there are such contexts at all. Heidegger says that language constitutes both the understanding and the situatedness of everydayness, and lays out the possibilities of grasping the world of others’ (Guignon 1983: 118-119).

Therefore, based on the points developed in the previous pages in which has been considered the centrality of the securitization process (Buzan, Waever, and de Wilde 1998; Balzacq 2011), and the importance to regard it as a political ritual performed inside an anthropological place, now (1) I sustain that security is a specific language ‘which

does not simply describe an even but it mobilizes certain meanings that modulate them in rather specific ways' (Huysmans 2006: 7); and (2) I argue that security, as a language, myth, and symbol refers to 'institutional fact' whose meaning is based on human agreement.

For John Searle (who draws heavily on Wittgenstein), there are facts which exist only by human agreement (Searle 1996). 'In a sense there are things that exist only because we believe them to exist. I am thinking of things like money, property, governments, and marriages. Yet many facts regarding these things are "objective" facts in the sense that they are not a matter of your or my preferences, evaluations, or moral attitudes. I am thinking of such facts as that I am a citizen of the United States, that the piece of paper in my pocket is a five dollar bill, that my younger sister got married on December 14, that I own a piece of property in Berkeley, and that the New York Giants won the 1991 Superbowl. These contrast with such facts as that Mount Everest has snow and ice near the summit or that hydrogen atoms have one electron, which are facts totally independent of any human opinions'. Consequently, Searle defines 'some of the facts dependent on human agreement as "institutional facts", in contrast to non-institutional, or "brute" facts (Searle 1996: 1-2).

For Searle, however, 'social fact' refers to any fact involving collective intentionality, while a special subclass of social facts are institutional facts, facts involving human institutions. For him, the entire social reality has a logic structure which is founded on language, and language is essentially constitutive of institutional reality. As has been stated, institutional facts require special human institutions for their very experience. 'Language is one of such institutions; indeed, it is a whole set of such institutions. And what are these "institutions"? To answer this question, I have introduced another distinction, the distinction between what I call "regulative" and "constitutive" rules. Some rules regulate existing activities antecedently. For example, the rule "drive on the right-hand side of the road" regulates driving; but driving can exist prior to the existence of that rule. Some rules, however, do not merely regulate; they also create the very possibility of certain activities. Thus, the rules of chess do not regulate an antecedently existing activity. It is not the case that there were a lot of people pushing bits of wood around on boards. Moreover, in order to prevent them from bumping into each other all the time and creating traffic jams, we have to regulate the activity. Rather, the rules of chess create the very possibility of playing chess. The rules are constitutive of chess in the sense that playing chess is constituted in part by acting in accord with the rules. If you do not follow at least a large subset of the rules, you are not playing chess. The rules come in systems, and the rules individually, or sometimes the system collectively, characteristically have the form

"X counts as Y" or "X counts as Y in the context C".

Thus, such and such counts as a checkmate, such and such a move counts as a legal pawn move, and so on. The claim I made was that institutional facts exist only within a system of constitutive rules. The systems of rules create the possibility of the fact of this type; and specific instances of institutional facts such as the fact that I won at chess or the fact that Clinton is president are created by the application of specific rules, rules for checkmate and for electing and swearing in presidents, for example. It is perhaps

important to emphasize that I am discussing rules and not conventions. It is a rule of chess that we win the game by checkmating the king. It is the convention of chess that the king is larger than a pawn. "Convention" implies arbitrariness, but constitutive rules in general are not in that sense arbitrary' (Searle 1996: 27-28).

Moreover, for John Gerard Ruggie (2002), social facts include 'states and their collective institutional practices (...) and the likes of marriage, money, football, property, and Valentine's Day. Social facts differ from two other kinds of socially relevant facts: "brute" facts, such as warheads, population size, market shares, or mountains, which are true (or not) apart from any shared beliefs that they are true; and (ontologically) "subjective" facts, so designated because their existence depends on being experienced by individual subjects, like an individual actor's perceptions of or preferences about the world' (Ruggie 2002: 12-13). The world of institutional facts, however, 'consists in the first instance of constitutive or enabling rules, and secondarily, of specialized regulative and enforcement rules (the distinction derives from Rawls 1955). Regulative rules are more easily understood; they are the "injunctions" that some analysts now associate with the very phenomenon of regimes. Constitutive or enabling rules are of a different nature; (...) thus, social institutions, before they do anything else – for example, act as injunctions – express rule-like practices that constitute different social "games," or more generally, classes of social actions defined by a practice. These practices include marriage, kinship, contracts, political office, and the other institutionalized relationships that make routine social interaction possible by making it mutually comprehensible. In other words, institutional facts – such as he is getting married, I am a father, we signed a lease, she is president – make sense only "within an inter-subjectively understood context" (Kratochwil 1989; 24). The same holds true of the statement, this is a regime. These practices communicate meaning and constitute practices as much as they "cause" things to happen' (Ruggie 2002: 90-91).

Furthermore, 'the feature of language essential for the constitution of institutional facts is the existence of symbolic devices such as words that, by convention, mean or represent or symbolize something beyond themselves. (...) My claim that language is partly constitutive of institutional facts amounts to the claim that institutional facts essentially contain some symbolic elements in the sense of "symbolic", or other conventional devices that mean something or express something or represent or symbolize something beyond themselves in a way that is publicly understandable. (...) (And) it is a sufficient condition for a fact to be language dependent that two conditions be met. First, mental representations, such as thoughts, must be partly constitutive of the fact; and second, the representations in questions must be language dependent (Searle 1996: 60-62).

These points are central when I analyse in the next pages the evolution of NATO's security discourse and the 'fabrication' of 'peace', and 'crisis management operations' which do employ a Civil Military approach, and see the deployment of Military personnel in a 'space/context' which has been 'generated' throughout the use of the authorized language, but that doesn't 'represent' the factual 'dangerous' reality of the insecurity-security situation (as criticized by Gen. Mini) in which 'confrontation' (Smith 2005: 16-17) is still present despite the official label of 'peace' mission.

Therefore, 'as an old maxim says "nomina si necis, perit et cognition rerum" -- 'If you do not know the names, even the knowledge of things dies'. Then, we have to bear in

mind that if a language does not provide a name to an object, this object does not exist, it is not noticeable. But there is more: words are not only simple means to detect and identify objects. Words intervene in our perception of objects and transmit interpretations and assign meaning to their referents' (Sartori 2011: 102).

2.2.b. 'Security' as a symbol

Symbol and symbols do play an important role not only in the process which sees security as a ritual, and in the marking and definition of the anthropological place-space of security itself. Not only an official security narrative (like the case of NATO's strategic concepts) is an anthropological place but, like the case of the MNCG Military CIMIC team which is considered in the chapter dedicated to the case study, the informants act inside three different security-insecurity anthropological places. All of them are places intensely symbolized, in which the military live and operate, and in which they found their spatial, temporal, individual and collective benchmarks (Auge' 2011: 158). This is the case with the anthropological places represented by (1) the MNCG military base in Motta di Livenza (Italy); (2) the UNIFIL military bases in Lebanon; and (3) the Lebanese territory where they operated outside the UNIFIL military base, and which represents the anthropological place of the 'other'.

Therefore, here the symbol has to be analyzed for the instrumental role it plays in the fabrication of the ritual of security, and as an element, a sign, that represents a benchmark to individuals. Through out human history security has assumed the image of various symbols, as a goddess during the Roman Empire, as a secular angel in the city republic of Siena (Italy), or personified as the emblem of NATO (Ercolani 2016a), and all those images have been part of security rituals. Then, it is the very nature and function of symbol that make possible to move from seeing security as a ritual, to approach security, in its whole (concept, myth, ritual, language, symbol, and territory) as an anthropological place in which the anthropologist 'can read, and decode the social relations and the common forms of belonging' (Auge' 2011: 158).

According to the Concise Oxford English Dictionary (2011 ed.), a 'symbol' is defined: '1. a mark or character used in conventional representation of something, e.g. a letter standing for a chemical element or a character in musical notation. 2. a thing that represents or stands for something else, especially a material object representing something abstract. (...)'

Geertz (1973: 91) writes that symbols 'are tangible formulations of notions, abstractions from experience fixed in perceptible forms, concrete embodiments of ideas, attitudes, judgements, longings, or beliefs'. And Womack highlights the importance and the presence of symbols in our daily life. For her 'no one can escape the power of symbols. If we are not involved in the symbolic complexes of religion and magic, we observe symbolic dramas on television, at the movies, or on the sporting field. If we manage to evade the influence of symbols in our daily lives – which is virtually impossible – we will still encounter symbols in our dreams. Wherever we look, our world is "peopled" with gods, heroes, and demons who act out our hopes, fears, conflicts, and triumphs on the large screen of mass media or on the small screen of our dreams. Symbols are the language of religion, magic, and expressive culture, including art, literature, theatre, music, festivals, and sporting events. (...) Symbols are, above all, a

means of communication. In general terms, symbols are images, words, or behaviors that have multiple levels of meaning. Symbols stand for concepts that are too complex to be stated directly in words' (Womack 2005: 1-2). The same is sustained by Álvarez Munárriz (2015: 312) according to whom the symbolic universe has to be understood as a memory or a depository where, in a conscious or unconscious way, we refer and draw in order to orient and legitimise our behaviour; therefore is a key category in explaining human actions and phenomenon. And for Lisón Tolosana (2014: 238-240) symbols are catalysts of emotions in which the symbols and their respective signs interact each other. The symbol (1) works as a *passepourtout* category in ordinary language because everything can be transformed in symbol; and (2) acts in an environment of metaphors and through corresponding analogies (the symbol appeals). Whilst the sign develops in a homonymous milieu, it is less vague and more precise and concrete.

However, it is Cassirer (1972 [1944]) who links the survival of man in his own environment to his capacity to create symbols. For Cassirer 'every organism, even the lowest, is not only in a vague sense adapted to but entirely fitted into its environment. According to its anatomical structure it possesses a certain *Mewrnetz* and a certain *Wirknetz* – a receptor system and an effector system. Without the cooperation and equilibrium of these two systems the organism could not survive. The receptor system by which a biological species receives outward stimuli and the effector system by which it reacts to them are in all cases closely interwoven. (...) (However,) man has discovered a new method of adapting himself to his environment. Between the receptor system and the effector system, which are to be found in all animal species, we find in man a third link which we may describe as the *symbolic system*. This new acquisition transforms the whole of human life. As compared with other animals man lives not merely in a broader reality; he leaves, so to speak, in a new *dimension* of reality. (...) No longer in a merely physical universe, man lives in a symbolic universe. Language, myth, art, and religion are parts of this universe. They are the varied threads which weave the symbolic net, the tangled web of human experience. All human progress in thought and experience refines upon and strengthens this net. No longer can man confront reality immediately; he cannot see it, as it were, face to face. Physical reality seems to recede in proportion as man's symbolic activity advances. Instead of dealing with the things themselves man is in a sense constantly conversing with himself. He has enveloped himself in linguistic forms, in artistic images, in mythical symbols or religious rites that he cannot see or know anything except by the interposition of this artificial medium. His situation is the same in the theoretical as in the practical sphere. Even here man does not live in a world of hard facts, or according to his immediate needs and desires. He lives rather in the midst of imaginary emotions, in hopes and fears, in illusions and disillusion, in his fantasies and dreams. (...) Hence, instead of defining man as an animal rationale, we should define him as an *animal symbolicum*' (Cassirer 1972: 24-26).

Moreover, we need to link the symbol to politics, and to power in order to completely grasp the meaning of security as a symbol. As Lewellen (2003) argues referring to the work of Abner Cohen (1974) 'man is fundamentally two dimensional: he is both Man-the-Symbolist and Man-the-Political-Being, and these two functions are in constant and inseparable interaction. Power is no less than what is expressed in any relation of domination and subordination, and is therefore an aspect of all social relationships. To think of power in terms of physical force or coercion is to miss entirely

the subtlety with which it is usually manifested, for in day-to-day transactions power is “objectified, developed, maintained, expressed or camouflaged” by the means of symbolism. All symbols - or virtually all – has a political component’, and ‘politics is thus most powerfully manifested in the overtly non political institutions such as kinship, marriage and other rites of passage, ethnicity, and various group ceremonies’ (Lewellen 2003: 105). As a result, ‘all symbolism is bivocal: it serves both existential and political ends. It is existential in the sense that it integrates the individual personality while relating that individual to his group’, whilst is political, because through the ritual the political leaders reaffirm their power. ‘Although symbolism is largely unconscious and is virtually constant in every person’s life, its political component is most clearly manifested in the compressed dramas of ritual and ceremony’ (Lewellen 2003: 106), and I say in the security ritual. Then, symbols in general, and security symbols (referring to this work) ‘serve a dual purpose: they must be at once particularistic, serving to unite the group and maintain its unique identity, and universalistic, legitimizing it as an agency of power to the great majority of outsiders’ (Lewellen 2003: 107).

This is evident in what Levi-Strauss (1963) defines the ‘effectiveness of symbols which guarantees the harmonious parallel development of myth and action. And myth and action form a pair always associated with the duality of patient and healer. (...) The effectiveness of symbols would consist precisely in this “inductive property”, by which formally homologous structures, build out of different materials at different levels of life – organic process, unconscious mind, rational thought – are related to one another’ (Levi-Strauss 1963: 201). And this idea of ‘inductive property’ of symbol can be transferred (1) to the relations securitizing actor-audience and the administration of the security pharmakon (like the relation patient healer); and (2) to the concept of the securitization process in which the securitizing actor, in order to prompt an audience to build a coherent network of implications (feelings, sensations, thought, and institutions) about the critical vulnerability of a referent object, mobilizes and assembles heuristic artefacts (metaphors, policy tools, image repertoires, analogies, stereotypes, emotions, etc.) (Balzacq 2011: 3).

However, it is in the security ritual in which the sacralisation of politics (Gentile 2007, 2008, 2016) and its sacral quality (Chan 2000) are most evident. And despite the fact that a specific religion is not immediately visible, the ritual is often replete with the emotional fervor that marks the realm of the sacred.

Lewellen (2003), writing on the relation between symbolism and ritual in secular politics, refers to David Kertzer (1988) who observed that ‘despite modern man’s illusion of political rationality and of making decisions based on the weighing of objective evidence, symbols pervades virtually every aspect of modern politics. However, because symbolism, by its nature, is unconscious and has a taken-for-granted quality, there is a tendency to treat symbolism as though they were things’ (Lewellen 2003: 68). Thus, according to Kertzer, there are three properties to true symbols. The first is condensation of meaning (in the USA flag, Stars and Stripes is funnelled the idea of ‘one nation under God’). Secondly, symbols are multivocal, that is, they encompass a wide variety of different meanings (a Christian cross, may mean very different things to different people). Finally, true symbols are possessed of ambiguity, so that they can never be fully and completely defined; they have no precise meaning. ‘Ritual is “action wrapped in a web of symbolism”’; it is highly structured and is often enacted at emotionally charged times and places (Kertzer 1988: 9).

It is through ritual, and through the individual's participation in it, that the ordinary citizen makes the crucial emotional bond with the otherwise unthinkable huge and often impersonal state. Symbols make power sacred. (...) It is this commonality of the nature of symbol and ritual that makes it difficult to distinguish the sacred from the profane in politics' (Lewellen 2003: 69). The same is valid for the security ritual and the security symbols, and the next section analyses the evolution of the concept of security referring at the same time to the symbols that have personified the meaning of security.

3. The concept of security: from orthodox to liquid dimension

Drawing from the work of an epistemological community¹⁴ I define as the orthodox dimension of security the traditional approach to security studies which is characterized by the following features: (1) security is the absence of external military threat, the study of the use of threat and control of military force; (2) the security dilemma is tied to the threat of war and military confrontation; (3) the State is the only recognised actor in the international arena and the referent object of security; (4) anarchy is the reality of the international system; (5) the struggle (war) among countries is for power (military power); (6) insecurity is military insecurity; and (7) the geopolitical spatial and temporal dimension is the Cold War period (1946 – 1989).

Therefore, once the orthodox security dimension is confronted with the seven security methodological questions ('What is reality? What is reliable knowledge? What is security? What is being secured? What is being secured against? Who provides security? What methods can be undertaken to provide it?'), it emerges that (1) the State establishes what reality since, for the State, international anarchy and external enemies are realities; (2) the State and the State structures, which act in unison with each other as an epistemological community and define, validate, and certificate what has to be considered as reliable knowledge; (3) security is the absence of external military threat and the study of the threat, use, and control of military force; (4) the State is the referent

¹⁴ S. Walt, 'The Renaissance of Security Studies', *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 35(2), 1991, pp. 211-39. Arnold Wolfers, *Discord and Collaboration: Essays on International Politics*, Baltimore and London: The John Hopkins University Press, 1962. Ian Bellamy, 'Towards a theory of international security', *Political Studies*, 29/1, 1981. Richard H. Ullman, 'Redefining security', *International Security*, 8(1), 1983. Giacomo Luciani, 'The economic content of security', *Journal of Public Policy*, 8/2, 1989. Michael Sheehan, *International Security: An Analytical Survey*, London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2005. Jack Donnelly, 'Realism', in Burchill, S., Linklater, A., Devetak, R., Donnelly, J., Paterson, M., Reus-Smit, C., True, J., *Theories of International Relations*, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005, pp. 29-54. Alan Collins (ed), *Contemporary Security Studies*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007. Guzzini, Stefano, *Realism in International Relations and International Political Economy – The Continuing Story of a Death Foretold*, London and New York: Routledge, 2002. Hans J. Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*, New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1954. Raymond Aron, *Peace and War: A Theory of International Relations*, Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1966. Reinhold Niebuhr, *Moral Man and Immoral Society: A Study of Ethics and Politics*, New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1932. George Kennan, *American Diplomacy, 1900-1950*, New York: New American Library, 1951. George Kennan, *Realities of American Foreign Policy*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1954. John H. Herz, *Political Realism and Political Idealism*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1951. Martin Wight, *Power Politics*, Leicester: Leicester University Press, 1978. Niccolò Machiavelli, (2005) [1513], *The Prince*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005 (1513).

object of security; (5) The threat (the contra-myth) is personified by the external military enemy; (6) The State with its armed forces provide security; (7) the State prepares for, prevents, or engages in war; and (8) it is assumed that the enemy will militarily react precisely like us, and that the war will be conducted according some precise duel gentlemen procedures.

Despite the pretended universality carried by the alleged infallible orthodox concept of security (and insecurity), its dimension had a precise spatial-geopolitical extension and a temporal-historical existence which were dependent on the events of the Cold War. In reading some of the security concepts produced at that time in western-capitalist-democratic territories we remark that all of them were constantly identifying the source of anxiety in the possibility of a foreign military attack (by the Former Soviet Union). And that all of them carried strategic military terminologies. This is evident in the following concepts of security developed by Wolfers (1962), Bellamy (1981), Ullman (1983) and NATO (1949). Then, in line with this orthodox interpretation of security, which in political practice becomes associated with military defence, it is not surprising that the academic research on security issue was produced in the Department of Strategic Studies.

According to Wolfers (1962: 150) “security” covers a range of goals so wide that highly divergent policies can be interpreted as policies of security. Security points to some degree of protection of values previously acquired. In the words of Walter Lippmann (1943: 51), a nation is secure to the extent that it is not in danger of having to sacrifice core values if it wishes to avoid war and is able to, and if challenged, to maintain them by victory in such war. This definition implies that security rises and falls with a nation’s ability to deter an attack or to defeat it’.

For Bellamy (1981: 102) ‘security itself is a relative freedom from war, coupled with a relatively high expectation that defeat will not be a consequence of any war that should occur’. Yet, according to Ullman (1983: 133) ‘a threat to national security is an action or sequence of events that (1) threatens drastically and, over a relatively brief span of time, to degrade the quality of life for the inhabitants of the state, or (2) threatens significantly to narrow the range of policy choices available to the government of a state or to private, non-governmental entities (persons, groups, corporations) within the state’. For Luciani (1989: 151) ‘national security may be defined as the ability to withstand aggression from abroad’.

But in practice what best summarizes the Alliance’s security dilemma and security concepts in this orthodox dimension is represented by Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, signed in Washington D.C. on April 4th, 1949. This Article is still the main pillar of the Alliance. For NATO (1) insecurity is represented by a military attack against one of its members which is going to be considered as an attack against them all; and (2) security is symbolized by the use of armed force to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area (NATO 1949).

At the time (and even now) this orthodox security dimension was strongly supported by the academia, the military, and the economical and the political establishments which regarded the definition of the threat (insecurity) only in military terms and external. And these structures were operating together as a tied epistemological community producing a hegemonic cultural-social-political vision of what had to be considered security and insecurity, and manufacturing a status quo ideology. This is most

evident in the Cold War period, where in the Western countries the dominant ideology was based on an anti-communist doctrine. Therefore, even the spatial world view of this orthodox perspective 'is based on a rigid distinction between inside and outside. Outside, the environment beyond the state's boundaries, is marked by a variety of dangers, and violence is unsanctioned. Inside the state, the government provides the necessary degree of security, and is the sole legitimate wielder of force' (Sheehan 2005: 16).

Moreover, this Manichean vision of the world was even supported by other beliefs which characterize the orthodox security concept and its vision on the human nature and State motivation: (1) anarchy is the reality of the international system; and (2) the struggle among countries is for power (military power).

The important point here, however, is to make clear that the orthodox vision and concept of security is strongly influenced by the canonical values and norms of political realism (realpolitik, power politics), which Alan Collins identifies as the main characteristics of realism. For Collins (2007: 428) realism is 'the view that world politics is anarchic (in the sense of there being no overall authority, not chaos), the key actors are states, the key element of power is military power, and the moral duty of the decision-maker is to serve the national interest. Realists assert that they see world politics as it really is, that world politics changes but does not progress and it is the inherent sense of state security that is critical in understanding the dynamics of the international politics'.

Because of the strong relation between security, realism, and international theory here are considered the 'six realist paradigms' developed by Jack Donnelly because they can summarize the environment in which the orthodox vision of security has developed.

For Donnelly such 'six realist paradigms' are drawn 'from Golden Age Athens, sixteenth-century Florence, seventeenth-century England, and twentieth-century America' (Donnelly 2002: 13). For their formulations, Donnelly looks at: (1) Hobbes (1651) and his idea that men are equal; they interact in anarchy; they are driven by competition, diffidence and glory. The conjunction of these conditions leads to the war of all against war. This results in the human being living in a condition of perpetual fear defined as 'Hobbesian Fear'. (2) Morgenthau (1954) according to whom (i) politics, like society in general, is governed by objective laws that have their roots in human nature; (ii) power and interest are variable in content across space and time; and (iii) universal moral principles cannot be applied to the actions of states. (3) Waltz's (1959, 1979) concepts of (i) international anarchy, which is the permissive cause of war representing a system which is a 'self-help' system (ii) the states (the unitary actors) are obliged to look after themselves because there is no one else to look after them; (iii) the causes of war being found in the selfish nature of man. Donnelly also considers (4) the game theory model of the Prisoner's Dilemma; and (5) Thucydides and his Melian Dialogue. Finally, he contemplates (6) Machiavelli's 'Prince' according to whom (i) a prince who wishes to maintain himself must learn how not to be good and to use this knowledge or not to use it according to necessity; (ii) due to the fact that men in general judge more by their eyes than their hands, the prince has to appear merciful, faithful, humane, religious, upright; and (iii) there is no morality in politics.

However, as demonstrated by the world events since the implosion of the Soviet Union and by the Alliance's need to transform itself, the above orthodox vision of the security dilemma and security concept are too narrow. And security cannot be any more

restricted to the study of the threat, use, and control of military forces, or to have the state as the only security referent.

This is because, since the fall of the Berlin Wall and a set of equally important other changes in the global system around 1989-92, which included the acceleration of change in China and in the Middle East as well as in East-West relations, there has been a transformation of the concept of security away from a relatively fixed, orthodox, traditional image. But, much more than changes in a concept alone, there have been transformations in social practice and in the political and discursive practices which produce and sustain ideas of security. These shifts have ranged from the everyday detail of quotidian life to the grand narratives of conflict, 'war on terror', fear and anxiety. They touch the management of international institutions and civil society as well as states and governments. They reach well beyond the traditional boundaries of academic political science and academic international relations, although they have engaged with both. What this unpredictable –and unpredicted- event revealed to us is that all those previous authenticated reports, which were sold as knowledge during the cold war, were not innocent narratives or words without responsibilities, but most of the time, all the discourses, concepts, and ideologies based on that narrative, were structures for themselves.

This begs questions about the relationships between what is understood as knowledge and received wisdom, what everyday behaviour and everyday practices imply, and the narratives, discourses, language and ideologies of security.

As a result, the emergence of a critical approach to orthodox security studies represented a moment of opening the frame in which the story of security was hitherto told. And critical security studies (CSS) permitted an examination of security issues through more multidimensional levels, drawing on board other sciences that in the orthodox dimension were not considered to be part of the official working tools. Yet, even though the official label of 'Critical Security Studies' was born with the publication in 1997 of the book edited by Keith Krause and Michael C. Williams' (1997) 'Critical Security Studies: Concepts and Cases', a collection of papers presented at a conference held at York University in Canada in 1994, here I would like to make it clear that I use the term 'Critical Security Studies' not only to refer to the intellectual results of the above publication, but even to the various schools of security that, from that original critical idea, developed their own visions: Aberystwyth, Copenhagen, Paris (Van Munster 2007: 235-243).

Nevertheless, what critical security studies have in common in all their diversified approaches, and which are considered here as the liquid dimension of security, is to challenge the orthodox security vision that: (1) the only source of insecurity for an individual-community-nation-state is represented only by war; (2) the security dilemma is not only tied to the threat of war; (3) that the remedy of this insecure condition is represented only by the use of the military instrument; and (4) they attempt to break the spatial, temporal and semantic dimensions in which the orthodox security-insecurity perceptions have been created.

In this regard, we can accept what Eriksson (1999: 311-333) says that: (1) critical security studies deal with the social construction of security; (2) the rhetorical nature of the threat discourses is examined and criticized; (3) critical security studies consider not

only threats as a construction, but the objects of security as well; and (4) critical security studies have an emancipatory goal.

Therefore, what is labeled here, using Bauman's definition of liquidity¹⁵, as the 'liquid' dimension of security, is an intellectual dimension based on the works of specific authors¹⁶, which, in order to answer the seven security methodological questions¹⁷, does not accept to be compressed inside the rigid semantic and interpretative borders of the ready-made perceptions of the world represented, and depicted, by the one-dimensional framework of the 'six realist paradigms'. If the orthodox dimension of security provides an *a priori* one-dimensional fixed definition of what security is, at the same time, with its specific, rigid, and defined realist language, it excludes elements which are not recognized and present in its security vocabulary, grammar, and logic, but which are of fundamental importance for the redefinition of what constitutes insecurity and security in the contemporary world.

In this liquid-critical dimension, which is aware of the social construction of security, a revision of what has been considered as sources of knowledge by the orthodox dimension of security is being operated. And looking at the various topics and arguments which have been included in the security analysis developed in this liquid dimension, what becomes clear is that, even if all the literature on this subject underlines the fact that the concept of orthodox security has been broadened and deepened, it is possible to argue that one of the most significant factors of the critical security environment is in the fact that what has been broadened and deepened is the very concept of insecurity.

Moreover, what emerges from this critical literature is that: (1) the globalization process has eroded the classical concept of power tied to the idea of the nation-state; (2) the concepts of security and insecurity have followed the same evolution of the society which has moved from 'defence society' (the Cold War period), to 'security society' (the

¹⁵ According to Bauman we have passed now 'from the "solid" to the "fluid" phase of modernity; and 'fluids' are so called because they cannot keep their shape for long, and, unless they are poured into a tight container, they keep changing shape under the influence of even the slightest of forces. In a fluid setting, there is no knowing whether to expect a flood or a drought - it is better to be ready for both eventualities. Frames, when or if they are available, should not be expected to last for long. They will not be able to withstand all the leaking, seeping, trickling, spilling - sooner rather than later they will drench, soften, contort and decompose', Zygmunt Bauman, *Identity*, Cambridge: Polity, 2004. p. 54.

¹⁶ Barry Buzan, *People, States and Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold Era*, London: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 2nd edn., 1991. Bradley S. Klein, *Strategic Studies and World Order: The Global Politics of Deterrence*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994. Keith Krause and Michael C. Williams (eds), *Critical Security Studies: Concepts and Cases*, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1997. David Campbell, *Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity*, Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1998. David Campbell, *National Deconstruction: Violence, Identity, and Justice in Bosnia*, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota, 1998. Barry Buzan, Ole Waever and Jaap de Wilde, *Security - A New Framework for Analysis*, London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998. Bill McSweeney, *Security, Identity and Interests: A Sociology of International Relations*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999. Ken Booth, 'Security and Self: Reflections of a Fallen Realist', in Krause, Keith and Williams, Michael C. (eds), *Critical Security Studies: Concepts and Cases*, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1997, pp. 83-119. Ken Booth (ed), *Critical Security Studies and World Politics*, London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2005. Ken Booth, *Theory of World Security*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 2007.

¹⁷ The seven security methodological questions: 'What is reality? What is reliable knowledge? What is security? What is being secured? What is being secured against? Who provides security? What methods can be undertaken to provide it?'

post-Cold War period), and 'risk society' (Beck 1992, 2002, 2006) (the post 9/11 period); and (3) the very essence, form and modalities of war have been changing in the last years.

Therefore, in this fast-changing international landscape characterized by the globalization of economies, diffusion of technology or multipolarity of security concerns, not only territorial boundaries are coming to matter a good deal less but the essence national sovereignty has to be redefined (Camilleri and Falk 1992).

This is what Joseph Krasner calls as the asymmetry of power which has violated and challenged the Westphalian concept of sovereignty and autonomy through: (1) intervention and invitations; and (2) by alternatives including human rights, minority rights, fiscal responsibility, and the maintenance of international stability (Krasner 1999).

Thus, the complex realities of the post cold war period are characterized by: (1) the restructuring of the international system; (2) the reformulation of security agenda of NATO which can best summarise the idea of 'security society'; and (3) the arrival on the stage of new great powers (more than states but less than 'superpowers') which imposes a new vision of the national and international security agenda, and generates a concern for 'complex emergencies' (Keen 2009) and what Roland Dannreuther (2008: 210) has called 'critical security threats'.

These critical security threats are based on the five sectors of security (military, political, economical, societal and environmental) originally developed by Barry Buzan (1991), and define the type of menaces and the kind of vulnerabilities that states face. These points were better developed in 'Security – A New Framework for Analysis' by Barry Buzan, Ole Waever, and Jaap de Wilde (1998) which represents another decisive contribution to the semantic and interpretative space of the liquid dimension of security. For these authors, 'security is about survival. It is when an issue is presented as posing an existential threat to a designed referent object (traditionally, but not necessarily, the state, incorporating government, territory and society). The special nature of security threats justifies the use of extraordinary measures to handle them. The invocation of security has been the key to legitimizing the use of force, but more generally it has opened the way for the state to mobilize, or to take special powers, to handle existential threats. (...) (However) when we consider the wider agenda, what do the terms *existential threat* and *emergency measures* mean? How, in practice, can the analyst draw the line between process of politicization and process of securitization on this basis? Existential threat can only be understood in relation to the particular character of the referent object in question. (...) In the military sector, the referent object is usually the state; (...) in the political sector, existential threats are traditionally defined in terms of the constituting principle – sovereignty, but sometimes also ideology – of the state; (...) in the economic sector, the referent objects and existential threats are more difficult to pin down; (...) in the societal sector (...) the referent object is large-scale collective identities that can function independent of the state, such as nations and religions; (...) In the environmental sector, the range of possible referent objects is very large, ranging from relatively concrete things, such as the survival of the individual species (tiger, whales, humankind) or types of habitat (rain forests, lakes), to much fuzzier, larger-scale issues, such as maintenance of the planetary climate and biosphere within the narrow band human beings have come to consider to be normal during their few thousand years of civilization' (Buzan, Waever, and de Wilde 1998: 21-23). As a consequence, they adopt a wide, multi-sectoral approach to security instead of the narrow, orthodox security vision.

The remedy for these critical security threats, however, cannot be limited only to the military solution-pharmakon.

Indeed, in this new globalized reality even the spatial and geopolitical separation of the world has crumbled, and as Bauman (2006: 125) writes: 'on such a planet, the past separation between the "inside" and the "outside", or for this matter between the "centre" and the "periphery" is no longer tenable'. Therefore, the Cold War period geopolitical gaze which 'triangulates the world political map from a Western imperial vantage point, measures it using Western conceptual systems of identity/difference, and records it in order to bring it within the scope of Western imaginings' (Ó Tuathail 1996: 53), cannot pretend any more to be able to map the world we live in.

If during the Cold War the citizens of the western democratic countries could apparently feel safe, secure and protected behind a wall of nuclear weapons, now, as Bauman (2006: 96-97) argues 'on a globalized planet, populated by the forcibly "opened" societies, security cannot be gained, let alone reliably assured, in one country or in a selected group of countries, not by their own means, and not independently of the state of affairs in the rest of the world'. This is because 'ours is a wholly negative globalization: unchecked, unsupplemented and uncompressed for by a "positive" counterpart which is still a distant prospect at best, though, according to some prognoses, already a forlorn chance. Allowed a free run, "negative" globalization specializes in breaking those boundaries too weak to withstand the pressure and in drilling numerous, huge and unpluggable holes through those boundaries that successfully resist the forces bent on dismantling them'. Therefore, critical security studies are aware that in this post Cold War, and post New World Order global dimension, 'no secure shelters are left where one can hide. In the liquid modern world, the dangers and fears are also liquid-like – or are they rather gaseous? They flow, seep, leak, ooze ... No walls have been invented yet to stop them, though many try to build them'.

It is precisely in this liquid modern world that emerges what Ulrich Beck calls 'the risk society'. This best depicts the picture of the present social reality marked by: (1) the process of modernization; (2) the opposition risk versus danger; (3) the idea of the reflexivity of the modernization process; and (4) the opposite concepts of risk and industrial society. For Beck: (1) 'Modernization means surges of technological rationalization and changes in work and organization, but beyond that includes much more: the change in societal characteristics and normal biographies, changes in lifestyle and forms of love, change in the structures of power and influence, in the forms of political repression and participation, in views of reality and in the norms of knowledge. In social science's understanding of modernity, the plough, the steam locomotive and the microchip are visible indicators of a much deeper process, which comprises and reshapes the entire social structure' (Beck 1992: 50); (2) 'The concept of risk is directly bound to the concept of reflexive modernization. Risk may be defined as a systematic way of dealing with hazards and insecurities induced and introduced by modernisation itself. Risks, as opposed to older dangers, are consequences which relate to the threatening force of modernization and to its globalization of doubt. They are politically reflexive' (Beck 1992: 21); (3) reflexivity of the modernization process means that the 'traditional forms of coping with anxiety and insecurity in social-moral milieus, families, marriage and male-female roles are failing' (Beck 1992: 153); and (4) 'The distinction between risk and industrial society therefore not only coincides with the distinction between the

“logics” of the production and distribution of wealth and risk production, but also results from the fact that the primary relationship becomes reversed. The concept of the industrial society suppose the dominance of the ‘logic of wealth’ and assert the compatibility of risk distribution with it, while the concept of risk society assert the incompatibility of distribution of wealth and risk, and the competition of their “logics” (Beck 1992: 154).

Finally, even when we look at the phenomenon of war, which represents the last element of our great picture of reality produced by the critical literature, we come to realize that its materiality has changed completely from the Cold War period when they were identified as interstate industrial wars¹⁸. As a result of this mutation, risk society wars-armed conflicts can have the characteristics of:

- new wars vs. old wars¹⁹;
- War amongst people²⁰;

¹⁸ For Gen. Rupert Smith ‘our understanding of the use of military force is based in large measure on the old paradigm of interstate industrial war: concepts founded on conflict between states, the manoeuvre of forces en masse, and the total support of the state’s manpower and industrial base, at the expense of all other interests, for the purpose of an absolute victory. In the world of industrial war the premise is of the sequence peace-crisis-war-resolution, which will result in peace again, with the war, the military action, being the deciding factor. In contrast, the new paradigm of war amongst the people is based on the concept of a continuous criss-crossing between confrontation and conflict, regardless of whether a state is facing another state or a non-state actor. Rather than war and peace, there is no predefined sequence, nor is peace necessarily either the starting or the end point: conflicts are resolved, but not necessarily confrontation. For example, the Korean War ended in 1953, but the confrontation with North Korea remains unresolved; or, more recently, the bombing and military action against Serbia following its abuse on the Kosovars ended in 1999, but there is still no decision on the final status of Kosovo and the confrontation between Serbia and the international community remains in place’, Rupert Smith, *The Utility of Force: The Art of War in the Modern World*, London: Allen Lane, 2005, 16-17.

¹⁹ For old wars we understand the war between states in which the aim is to inflict maximum violence; this old wars are becoming an anachronism. According to Mary Kaldor with the concept of ‘new wars’ we are in front of a new type of organized violence which could be described as a mixture of war, organized crime and massive violations of human rights. For Kaldor new wars actors are both global, and local, public and private. These new wars are fought for particularistic political goals (Kaldor talks of Identity Politics: movements which mobilize around ethnic, racial or religious identity for the purpose of claiming state power) using tactics of terror and destabilization that are theoretically outlawed by the rules of modern warfare. Mary Kaldor, *New & Old Wars – Organized Violence in a Global Era*, Cambridge: Polity, 2006.

²⁰ For Gen. Rupert Smith ‘war amongst people’ it is the reality in which the people in the street and houses and fields – all the people, anywhere – are the battlefield. Military engagements can take place anywhere: in the presence of civilians, against civilian, in defence of civilians. Civilians are the targets, objectives to be won, as much an opposing force. ‘War amongst the people is characterized by six major trends: (1) The ends for which we fight are changing from the hard absolute objectives of interstate industrial war to more malleable objectives to do with the individual and societies that are not states; (2) We fight amongst the people, a fact amplified literally and figuratively by the central role of the media: we fight in every living room in the world as well as on the streets and fields of a conflict zone; (3) Our conflicts tend to be timeless, since we are seeking a condition, which then must be maintained until an agreement on a definitive outcome, which may take years or decades; (4) We fight so as not to lose the force, rather than fighting by using the force at any cost to achieve the aim; (5) On each occasion new uses are found for old weapons: those constructed specifically for use in a battlefield against soldiers and heavy armaments, now being adapted for our current conflicts since the tools of industrial war are often irrelevant to war amongst the people; (6) The sides are mostly non-state since we tend to conduct our conflicts and confrontations in some form of multinational grouping, whether it is an alliance or a coalition, and against some party or parties that are not states’, Rupert Smith, *The Utility of Force – The art of War in the Modern War*, London: Allen Lane, 2005, p. 3.

- Large group identity-conflict²¹;
- Hybrid conflicts²²;
- Fourth Generations wars²³.

Then, it can be argued that the major specific characteristics of a concept of security, which best can illustrate the new challenges, threats and vulnerabilities of a risk society, are incorporated and put in evidence by the liquid dimension of security. Here, conscious of the fact of the social construction of security is more than a change in paradigm, what we come across is the reformulation of a semantic and interpreting security discourse which moves beyond the rigid grid of reading-explanation represented by the 'six realist paradigms'.

²¹ 'Large group identity-conflict', in which a threat against a large group identity brings a psychological regression which can spark an identity conflict. Here the concept of large-group identity describes how thousands or millions of individuals, most of whom will never meet in their life-times, are bound by an intense sense of sameness by belonging to the same ethnic, religious, national, or ideological group. When large groups are threatened by conflict, members of the group cling evermore stubbornly to these circumstances in an effort to maintain and regulate their sense of self and their sense of belonging to a large-group. At such times, large-groups process become dominant and large-group identity issue and rituals are more susceptible to political propaganda and manipulation. Political, economic, legal, military, and historical factors usually figure prominently in any attempt to manage and solve large-group conflicts, but it is also necessary to consider the profound effect of human psychology, especially specific large-group processes that evolve under stress or after massive trauma and are manipulated by leaders. Vamik Volkan, *Blind Trust – Large Groups and Their Leaders in Times of Crisis and Terror*, Charlottesville, Virginia: Pitchstone Publishing, 2004.

²² 'Although conventional in form, the decisive battles in today's hybrid wars are fought not on conventional battlegrounds, but on asymmetric battlegrounds within the conflict zone population, the home front population, and the international community population. Irregular, asymmetric battles fought within these populations ultimately determine success or failure. Hybrid war appears new in that it requires simultaneous rather than sequential success in these diverse but related 'population battlegrounds.' (...) Thus, hybrid wars are a combination of symmetric and asymmetric war in which intervening forces conduct traditional military operations against enemy military forces and targets while they must simultaneously--and more decisively--attempt to achieve control of the combat zone's indigenous populations by securing and stabilizing them (stability operations). Hybrid conflicts therefore are full spectrum wars with both physical and conceptual dimensions: the former, a struggle against an armed enemy and the latter, a wider struggle for, control and support of the combat zone's indigenous population, the support of the home fronts of the intervening nations, and the support of the international community. In hybrid war, achieving strategic objectives requires success in all of these diverse conventional and asymmetric battlegrounds. At all levels in a hybrid war's country of conflict, security establishments, government offices and operations, military sites and forces, essential services, and the economy will likely be either destroyed, damaged, or otherwise disrupted. To secure and stabilize the indigenous population, the intervening forces must immediately rebuild or restore security, essential services, local government, self-defense forces and essential elements of the economy. Historically, hybrid wars have been won or lost within these areas. They are battlegrounds for legitimacy and support in the eyes of the people.' John J. McCuen, 'Hybrid Wars', *Military Review*, March-April, 2008.

²³ These wars have four distinct characteristics: (1) the loss of the state's monopoly of war and on the first loyalty of its citizen; (2) the rise of non-state entities that command people's primary loyalty and that have the ability to wage war. These entities may be gangs, clans, religious groups, races and ethnic groups, tribes, business enterprises, ideological actors and terrorist organizations – the variety is almost limitless; (3) a return to a world of cultures, not, merely of states, in conflict; and (4) the manifestation of both developments – the decline of the state and the rise of alternate, often cultural, primary loyalties. Andy Knight, 'Civil-military cooperation and human security', in Christopher Ankersen, Ed., *Civil Military Cooperation in Post-Conflict Operations – Emerging theory and practice*, London: Routledge, 2008, 15.

Consequently, the liquid dimension of security is able to spot and verbalize security dilemmas, insecurity concerns and security remedies for a risk and globalized society in a new spatial and temporal reality. And provides more multidisciplinary answers to the seven security methodological questions. As a result of this reasoning, in this liquid dimension of security: (1) reality and reliable knowledge are not only the product of the State as the only power-knowledge structure; (2) security is not only represented by a military solution; (3) the referent object of security is not only the State; (4) the source of insecurity is not only an external armed enemy; (5) the State armed forces do not have the monopoly on security actions; and (6) the security methods are not only represented by military actions.

In conclusion, the liquid dimension of security, with its language, vocabulary, grammar, and unorthodox visions of insecurity and security has been adopted by the Alliance because this liquid vision provides to NATO those elements which it required to acquire new 'linguistic competences' for the fabrication of its winning 'securitization-narrative-myth'. And this is evident through a chronological reading of NATO's Strategic Concepts which are the official documents that outline NATO's enduring purpose and nature and its fundamental security tasks. They also identify the central features of the new security environment, specify the elements of the Alliance's approach to security and provide guidelines for the adaptation of its military forces.²⁴

4. The evolution of NATO's security and 'Crisis Management'

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization, since the implosion of the former Soviet Union (1991) (1) has been re-fabricating its own identity and functions; (2) has struggled to retain its status quo ante power position inside a changing global security environment; and (3) in this transformative exercise has modified its security language employing a CSS language, has adopted a liquid security vision, has recognized the importance of cultural and religious factors in peace-support²⁵, and its official security texts has included topics like crisis management, civil-military cooperation-coordination, complex emergencies, critical security threats²⁶.

Approaching genealogically this transformative exercise, it can be said that the former Yugoslavia ethnic conflict (1991-1999) provided to the Alliance (1) the

²⁴ At: http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_56626.htm.

²⁵ Jeffrey Schwerzel has noted the transforming attitude of NATO toward cultural and religious factors in peace-support operations. 'Peacekeepers are dependent to a large extent on the goodwill and cooperation of the local population for their own safety and their ability to perform their duties. As a result, avoiding offence is paramount. But without expertise in local cultures and religions, it is impossible to draw up effective guidelines concerning issues such as patrolling during festivities, entering places of worship, setting up roadblocks and searching women. Moreover, for fear of causing offence, commanders may unnecessarily limit their options and avoid the course of action that makes most sense from a purely military point of view.' Jeffrey Schwerzel, 'Transforming attitudes', *NATO Review*, Summer 2005.

²⁶ Critical security threats are considered those threats that do not present themselves only as military threat to security, therefore these threats can have an economic, social identity/societal, environmental, health, natural, accidental, and criminal origin. See: Roland Dannreuther, *International Security – The Contemporary Agenda*; Cambridge: Polity, 2008; Peter Hough, *Understanding Security*, London and New York: Routledge, 2004; Mark Duffield, *Global Governance and the New Wars – The Merging of Development and Security*, London and New York: Zed Books, 2005; Mary Kaldor, *New & Old Wars: Organized Violence in a Global Era*, Cambridge: Polity, 2006.

opportunity to project, for the first time in its history, its utility and power outside its own securitized territory; (2) a new security role; and (3) the necessity of a new security myths to replace the evaporated Soviet foe, and to justify its historical survival, which were formalized in two consecutive Strategic Concepts (1999 and 2010) considered here as official NATO's 'securitization-narrative-myth'

This qualitative change (from an orthodox security vision to a liquid one) becomes clear when the 1999 and 2010 NATO Strategic Concepts are confronted with the seven methodological security questions because it emerges that (1) the Alliance acts as a human power-knowledge securing structure and presents and certifies its narrative as 'the reality, and 'reliable knowledge'; (2) various threatening realities (not only of military origin) outside the Alliance territory are presented as a source of insecurity (liquid security dilemma) for its own member states; (3) a clear definition of what security and insecurity are not provided, but we can understand that the idea of security NATO has in mind is a military security while for insecurity has adopted a critical security studies vision; (4) the referent object of security are the interests of its member states and the protection for almost 900 million NATO citizens (Ruhle 2011); (5) the image of a clear and defined enemy (as it was praxis during the Cold War time with the Soviet enemy) is not provided, however, sources of insecurity are external to the territory of the alliance and are perceived as insecure human events; (6) security is provided by NATO; and (7) the methods to undertake NATO security actions, as it will be demonstrated in this research, are not only military but see the presence and cooperation with civilian elements.

It is with the 1999 NATO Strategic Concept, that officially the Alliance started to develop a role in collective security (Gulnur 1999). Articles 20 and 24 are very clear examples of how NATO 'securitization-narrative-myth' (i) has been linking new threats, to instability, and member states interests; and (ii) has produced new geographical space for the Alliance military interventions:

- Art. 20: 'Notwithstanding positive developments in the strategic environment and the fact that large-scale conventional aggression against the Alliance is highly unlikely, the possibility of such a threat emerging over the longer term exists. The security of the Alliance remains subject to a wide variety of military and non-military risks which are multi-directional and often difficult to predict. These risks include uncertainty and instability in and around the Euro-Atlantic area and the possibility of regional crises at the periphery of the Alliance, which could evolve rapidly. Some countries in and around the Euro-Atlantic area face serious economic, social and political difficulties. Ethnic and religious rivalries, territorial disputes, inadequate or failed efforts at reform, the abuse of human rights, and the dissolution of states can lead to local and even regional instability. The resulting tensions could lead to crises affecting Euro-Atlantic stability, to human suffering, and to armed conflicts. Such conflicts could affect the security of the Alliance by spilling over into neighbouring countries, including NATO countries, or in other ways, and could also affect the security of other states.'
- Art. 24: 'Any armed attack on the territory of the Allies, from whatever direction, would be covered by Articles 5 and 6 of the Washington Treaty. However, Alliance security must also take account of the global context. Alliance security interests can be affected by other risks of a wider nature, including acts of

terrorism, sabotage and organised crime, and by the disruption of the flow of vital resources. The uncontrolled movement of large numbers of people, particularly as a consequence of armed conflicts, can also pose problems for security and stability affecting the Alliance. Arrangements exist within the Alliance for consultation among the Allies under Article 4 of the Washington Treaty and, where appropriate, co-ordination of their efforts including their responses to risks of this kind. “Alliance security interests can be affected by other risks of a wider nature, including acts of terrorism, sabotage and organized crime and by the disruption of the flow of vital resources’.²⁷

However, two events have contributed to enrich the insecurity vision of NATO, its ‘securitization-narrative-myth’, and to provide the map for future Alliance securing operations.

The first is the speech entitled ‘NATO emerging security challenges’ that the NATO Secretary General Rasmussen gave at the Lloyd’s of London on Oct 1st, 2009. For the former NATO secretary general ‘the challenges we are looking at today cut across the divide between the public and the private sectors’²⁸ and the ‘*casus belli*’, or I prefer to say, the ‘*casus securus*’ (the justification for the security action) for the Alliance’s interventions, in order to secure its member states, can include piracy; cyber security/defence; climate change; extreme weather events – catastrophic storms and flooding; the rise of sea levels; population movement ...populations will move in large numbers...always where someone else lives, and sometimes across borders; water shortages; droughts; a reduction in food production; the retreating of the Arctic ice for resources that had, until now, been covered under ice; global warming; CO2 emissions; reinforcing factories or energy stations or transmission lines or ports that might be at risk of storms or flooding; energy, where diversity of supply is a security issue; natural and humanitarian disasters; big storms, or floods, or sudden movements of populations, and fuel efficiency, thus reducing our overall dependence on foreign sources of fuel.


As Rick Rozoff (2009) pointed out, ‘none of the seventeen developments mentioned can even remotely be construed as a military threat and certainly not one posed by recognized state actors’.

However, it was Lieutenant General Jim Soligan, USAF, Deputy Chief of Staff, of NATO Allied Command Transformation, who on Apr 17, 2009, at ‘The Second International Symposium on Strategic and Security Studies’, organised in Istanbul by the University of Beykent, provided the map for the future and potential NATO securing operations (Soligan 2009).

In his presentation, the NATO General showed a map of potential areas of intervention for NATO and defined potential regions of crisis as ‘Multiple Stress Zones’, adding that instability is likely to be greatest in areas of Multiple Environmental Stress, and that this instability will have repercussion on the security of the Alliance’s member states.

²⁷ NATO Summit, The Alliance’s Strategic Concept, at: www.nato.int/docu/pr/1999/p99-065e.htm.

²⁸ At: http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/opinions_57785.htm



According to the Lieutenant General Soligan, the impact of these Emerging Security Challenges on NATO will produce security and military implications:

The Security Implications are:

- Rethinking Article 5; enhancing and creating new partnerships; expanded opportunities to positively shape and influence ideas, values, and events and changes in military operations: technological vulnerabilities.

While as Military Implications, NATO will have to:

- Adapt to the demands of hybrid; adapt force structures, doctrine to train other nation's security forces; adapt C2 and organizational structures; enhance WMD detection and Consequence Management; strengthen EU/NATO/UN relationships, and win the Battle of the Narrative.

If, until the implosion of the Soviet Union, the terminology of the balance of power, nuclear weapons, the Soviet Union, and the communist enemy was framed in a defence vernacular, now - with the disappearance of a concrete, identifiable and definable enemy – (1) the foe becomes an instable situation which arises in non-NATO's area (developing crisis in the Multiple Stress Zones) which will have the potential to affect Alliance security and interests; and (2) the instability in the 'Multiple Stress Zones' is characterized by non-military sources of insecurity which are like critical security threats: water stress, demographic stress, crop decline, hunger, costal risk, and recent history of conflict.

Finally, the last historical moment in the construction of this 'securitization-narrative-myth', which defines NATO's fears, is represented by the recent NATO Strategic Concept approved in Lisbon on November 10th, 2010. Accordingly, the defence and security of the Members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation 'will be based on

an Active Engagement, Modern Defence’, and I think that art. 4 can best summarize and answer to the following methodological questions: What is being secured?; What is being secured against?; Who provides security?; and what methods can be undertaken to provide it?;

‘4. The modern security environment contains a broad and evolving set of challenges to the security of NATO’s territory and populations. In order to assure their security, the Alliance must and will continue fulfilling effectively three essential core tasks, all of which contribute to safeguarding Alliance members, and always in accordance with international law:

(a) Collective defence. NATO members will always assist each other against attack, in accordance with Article 5 of the Washington Treaty. That commitment remains firm and binding. NATO will deter and defend against any threat of aggression, and against emerging security challenges where they threaten the fundamental security of individual Allies or the Alliance as a whole.

(b) Crisis management. NATO has a unique and robust set of political and military capabilities to address the full spectrum of crises – before, during and after conflicts. NATO will actively employ an appropriate mix of those political and military tools to help manage developing crises that have the potential to affect Alliance security, before they escalate into conflicts; to stop ongoing conflicts where they affect Alliance security; and to help consolidate stability in post-conflict situations where that contributes to Euro-Atlantic security.

(c) Cooperative security. The Alliance is affected by, and can affect, political and security developments beyond its borders. The Alliance will engage actively to enhance international security, through partnership with relevant countries and other international organisations; by contributing actively to arms control, non-proliferation and disarmament; and by keeping the door to membership in the Alliance open to all European democracies that meet NATO’s standards.’²⁹

To sum up, this implies that there is a direct relationship between the maintenance of security of NATO’s territories and the NATO’s securing activity in the ‘multiple stress zones’, because ‘security of the Alliance will be challenged by a wide variety of risks, military as well as non-military, that will be often difficult to predict. These risks include uncertainty and instability in and around the Euro-Atlantic area and the possibility of regional crises at the periphery of the Alliance, both of which could develop rapidly’³⁰.

²⁹ NATO 2010 New Strategic Concept, at: <http://www.nato.int/lisbon2010/strategic-concept-2010-eng.pdf>.

³⁰ According to the NATO AJP-3.4.9, Allied Joint Doctrine for Civil Military Cooperation (February 2013): ‘0101- Large-scale conventional aggression against the Alliance is unlikely in the near future but the possibility of such a threat emerging over the longer term remains. Meanwhile the security of the Alliance will be challenged by a wide variety of risks, military as well as non-military, that will be often difficult to predict. These risks include uncertainty and instability in and around the Euro-Atlantic area and the possibility of regional crises at the periphery of the Alliance, both of which could develop rapidly. Ethnic, political and religious rivalries, territorial disputes, disputes over vital resources, inadequate or failed efforts at reform, the abuse of human rights and the dissolution of states will lead to local and regional instability. The resulting tensions could create a wide spectrum of consequences, ranging from the need to provide humanitarian assistance to armed conflict. They could also affect the security of the Alliance by spilling over into neighbouring countries, including NATO members and could affect the security of other states’. At: <http://cimic-coe.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/06/AJP-3.4.9-EDA-V1-E1.pdf>.

Therefore, NATO's new securitization-narrative-myth' is represented by 'the risk of...' emerging security challenges which can erupt in the multiple stress zones. And the Alliance's securing activity is embodied by crisis management operations which will 'employ an appropriate mix of those political and military tools to help manage developing crises that have the potential to affect Alliance security, before they escalate into conflicts'. And the strategy and tactic to these insecurity events is represented by the military function of the civil-military cooperation (CIMIC).

5. NATO's Civil-Military Cooperation and 'Conflict Ethnography'

'Civil-military cooperation (CIMIC) is a military label used to describe those occasions that see elements of armed forces engaging, and even collaborating, with civilian entities (such as local authorities or other government agencies, non-governmental organizations, or international/intergovernmental organizations). This collaboration usually takes place during some crisis situation, whether it be after natural disaster, war, or, increasingly, during complex peace support or stability operations. It can take the form of abstract contingency planning or the high level coordination of resources and objectives, but can also manifest itself as aid delivery or reconstruction activity by military forces' (Ankersen 2008: 1).

NATO has been involved in CIMIC operations since its deployment in Kosovo (1999, KFOR mission). However, perceiving and reducing the purpose of CIMIC as 'winning the hearts and minds of the local populations' is too simplistic, because CIMIC is a military function that is an integral part of modern multidimensional operations.

According to the MC 411-131 NATO document: CIMIC is 'the co-ordination and co-operation, in support of the mission, between the NATO Commander and civil actors, including national population and local authorities, as well as international, national and non-governmental organisations and agencies.' And 'the immediate purpose of CIMIC is to establish and maintain the full co-operation of the NATO commander and the civilian authorities, organisations, agencies and population within a commander's area of operations in order to allow him to fulfill his mission. This may include direct support to the implementation of a civil plan. The long-term purpose of CIMIC is to help create and sustain conditions that will support the achievement of Alliance objectives in operations.'

For the most recent NATO AJP-3.4.9, Allied Joint Doctrine for Civil-Military Cooperation (Feb 2013), 'the 21st Century strategic environment involves a myriad of ethnic, religious, ideological and capability drivers, which require sustainable solutions in societies ravaged by conflicts, disasters or humanitarian catastrophes. Solutions to these serious events are impossible to achieve by military means alone. North Atlantic Treaty Organization's (NATO) contribution to a comprehensive approach, as one of its military facilitators, is a link to the civil environment, with civil-military cooperation (CIMIC) as one of the military facilitators. This enables the military to help reaching the desired end state by coordinating, synchronizing and de-conflicting military activities with civil actors, thus linking military operations with political objectives. The influence of the vast variety of civil contributions to stabilise a dysfunctional society must continue to be considered by the military. This will enable the smooth transition from

³¹ At: <http://www.nato.int/ims/docu/mc411-1-e.htm>.

offensive/defensive operations to security/stability operations, thus reaching a status of development where Alliance forces can leave a secure area behind much sooner. CIMIC as a military function that is an integral part of modern multidimensional operations, addresses all cooperating parties within a conflict situation and facilitates mutual support of civilian capabilities to military forces and vice versa. The governing idea in all those interactions is reaching the defined and commonly desired end state, for the best of the local population, the civil actors and the Alliance, which will be, under the best of circumstances, hard to achieve.’³²

Then, when we look at the section dedicated to the ‘Detailed task of CIMIC’ we can understand the direct link between this activity and the accomplishment of the mission:

‘a. CIMIC is to interact with the appropriate civil actors on behalf of the NATO commander to accomplish the mission.

b. The long-term result of CIMIC is to create and sustain conditions that will contribute to the achievement of objectives within the overall mission, and to the implementation of a successful end state. The mid-term purpose is to link the short term and the long term purposes in a friction free way.

In accomplishing those tasks CIMIC staff will:

(1) Establish and maintain liaison with civil actors at the appropriate levels, facilitating cooperation, harmonisation, information sharing, integrated planning and conduct of operations.

(2) Identify and explain military goals, objectives, and concepts of operation (within appropriate operations security (OPSEC) and classified material release guidance) with civil actors.

(3) Facilitate concurrent, parallel, and where possible integrated planning between the joint force and friendly civil actors. When and where possible participate in civilian planning and assessment groups, teams, or cells.

(4) Integrate with other staff branches on all aspects of operations.

(5) Continuously evaluate the operational environment, including local needs and capability gaps to resolve issues.

(6) Work towards a timely and smooth transition of responsibilities to the proper civil authorities.

(7) Advise the commander on all of the above.

(8) Share information with all staff branches.’

However, it is when we look at the ‘Principles of CIMIC’, and at the military necessity to understand the context and develop an environmental awareness, that we see how these intellectual activities are similar the ones developed-employed by an anthropologist in his field work. And this is because ‘military operations now take place within a wider political and civil context than before, and commanders are increasingly

³² NATO, AJP-3.4.9, Allied Joint Doctrine for Civil Military Cooperation, February 2013, at: <http://cimic-coe.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/06/AJP-3.4.9-EDA-V1-E1.pdf>.

required to take account of social, political, cultural, religious, economic, environmental and humanitarian factors when planning and conducting these operations.³³

Therefore, the multiple stress zone, in which NATO securing 'crisis management' activity takes the shape of CIMIC operations, is transformed in an anthropological place which according to the French anthropologist Marc Auge' (2011: 158) 'is a place intensely symbolized, lived by individuals in which they found their spatial, temporal, individual and collective benchmarks. For the anthropologist, at the same time, it is a space in which he can read, and decode the social relations and the common forms of belonging'.

In order to demonstrate this point it is necessary to look at the preparation of the operation plan (OPLAN) which will cover the three core functions of CIMIC (a. civil-military liaison; b. support to the force; c. support to civil actors and their environment). Here, 'CIMIC personnel will prepare the CIMIC input to the OPLAN. They will ensure that factors relating to the civil dimension are incorporated into all aspects of planning. Inputs will be based, where possible on reconnaissance, detailed assessments and input from country/area studies and open source information. These inputs will include:

- (a) Political and cultural history, including tribal matters;
- (b) The state of national and local government;
- (c) Civil administration and services;
- (d) The needs of the population;
- (e) Population movement (internally displaced person [IDP] and refugees, situation);
- (f) The presence, mandates, capabilities and intentions of applicable civil actors;
- (g) Infrastructure;
- (h) Economy and commerce;
- (i) The mind set and perceptions of the civil population'.³⁴

Thus, it is the CIMIC input to the OPLAN that (1) produces knowledge which is needed to avoid dilemma of interpretation and to adjust and define and redefine security

³³ '0302. Principles of CIMIC. a. Understand the context and environmental awareness. (1) Cultural context. Military operations now take place within a wider political and civil context than before, and commanders are increasingly required to take account of social, political, cultural, religious, economic, environmental and humanitarian factors when planning and conducting these operations. The scale and nature of the risks and challenges within this multinational, multi-agency environment requires greater understanding of and emphasis on CIMIC at all levels of operation. The present operational environment is likely to be complex, unstable and unpredictable. Military success alone will achieve little beyond containment of a situation unless the conditions for the pursuit of civil objectives by civil actors are created. In the majority of operations, intolerance to collateral damage (both in terms of casualties and materiel), damage to the environment and legal issues will all be constraining factors in the conduct of operations. Short-term success may undermine the mid and long term by thoughtless violation of traditional cultural practices, which could lead to the loss of legitimacy of the military forces. CIMIC plays a vital role as one of the major advisors to the commander and in ensuring mission relevant cultural competence of the forces through education and training. A prerequisite is to be settled firmly into one's own cultural identity, by knowing its principles and having understood its mechanisms. Without that knowledge the identification of differences will be impossible.' At: <http://civic-coe.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/06/AJP-3.4.9-EDA-V1-E1.pdf>.

³⁴ NATO, AJP-3.4.9, Allied Joint Doctrine for Civil Military Cooperation, February 2013, p. 4-4, at: <http://civic-coe.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/06/AJP-3.4.9-EDA-V1-E1.pdf>.

responses (the dilemma of response); and (2) transforms the operational environment, the theatre of CIMIC operations in an anthropological place. Because the above inputs include the typical methodology that any social-cultural anthropologist applies to his/her field work, and makes use of observant participation, 'emic',³⁵ approach, and by what Clifford Geertz (1973: 5-9) called the 'thick description'.

The same methodology inspired David Kilcullen (2009) to develop his 'conflict ethnography' methodology which (1) was matured during his experience in fighting counterinsurgency in order to 'secure the USA'; and (2) has an active influence on the NATO CIMIC praxis.

For Kilcullen, who served as Senior Counterinsurgency Advisor to General David Petraeus in Iraq, (1) today's conflict is a complex interaction between two interdependent trends: small wars and global confrontations, local social networks and worldwide movements, traditional and postmodern cultures, separatist and imperialist ambitions, nativist and pan-Islamic traditions' (Kilcullen 2009: xxvii); (2) 'conflict ethnography treats a conflict as a "living text", which requires close reading and contextual analysis in its own terms, as well as evaluation in the "etic" perspective of the external observer' (Kilcullen 2009: 340); and (3) it is necessary to understand 'the war holistically, in its own terms and through the eyes of its actual participants, in their words and in their language. Field methods applied include participant observation, face to face interviews, open-ended interaction with key informants, proficiency in local languages, long term presence on the spot, integration of written sources with personal testimony, and developing well-founded relationship of trust with key informants – along with the fundamental ethical responsibility to protect those informants and advocate for their safety and well-being. The aim is to see beyond surface differences between societies and environments, beyond a "military orientalism" that see warfare through exotic "eastern" cultural stereotypes, to the deeper social and cultural drivers of conflict, drivers that local participants would understand on their own terms.'³⁶

³⁵ 'Emic' and 'etic', in anthropology and the social and behavioral sciences, refer to two kinds of field research done and viewpoints obtained; 'emic': from within the social group (from the perspective of the subject); and 'etic': from outside (from the perspective of the observer).

³⁶ "Conflict ethnography" methodology can be summarized as follows: Conduct the research, as far possible, using sources in the local language; Get as close as possible (in time and space) to the actual events, ideally by being present when they unfold but, at the very least, by seeking firsthand descriptions from eyewitnesses; Use documentary sources (including operational and intelligence reports, captured documents, quantitative data, maps and surveys, media content analysis, and the work of other researchers) to create a primary analysis of the environment; Use this primary analysis to identify a more limited number of "communities" (local areas, population groups, villages, or functional categories) for further detailed personal analysis at the case-study level; Conduct firsthand, on-the-spot field studies (applying an extended residential field work approach wherever possible) of these secondary communities; Work from unstructured, face to face, open-ended interviews (rather than impersonal questionnaires and surveys) during field work, but integrate this subjective qualitative perspective with quantitative data from the primary analysis; Revisit, in an iterative fashion, the results of earlier field work and analysis using follow-up interviews and contextual studies; Understand and accept the presence of personal and research bias, but act to compensate for it by using the greatest possible variety of human and documentary sources and by explicitly identifying and examining the sources of bias; Treat analogies (with other conflicts, societies, or regions) with extreme scepticism: seek to understand the conflict in its own terms rather than by analogy with some other war; Accept the fundamental ethical responsibility to protect the identity, and work to further the well-being, of any key sources and informants, seek their informed consent to research and

Both NATO CIMIC Doctrine and Conflict Ethnography approaches, however, must be read inside a specific cultural framework in which security is an idiosyncratic concept (Ercolani 2011). Here, NATO's securitization refers (1) to peculiar ethnocentric cultural phenomenon (cultural idiosyncrasy) that can spark particular anxiety-fear emotions in NATO (post-modern state) populations in their geopolitical context; and (2) on NATO (individual idiosyncrasy) intention to 'win the battle of narrative' in order to maintain its status quo position.

Therefore, this approach is considered inside the frame of a myth in which security refers only to the Alliance (post-modern state) security and not with reference to security-securitas. And it is the very CIMIC vision which bringing new actors in fabrication of a 'reality' which opens an ontological and epistemological debate on what constitute a security-insecurity reality which not always accept the Alliance 'securitization-narrative-myth'.

In conclusion, as it will be explained in chapter two, this approach is not adequate (1) to look and read the anthropological place it pretends to define-study-analyse; (2) to produce 'reality', 'reliable knowledge', and 'legitimate security knowledge' which is needed to solve the dilemma of interpretation and response to a security dilemma; and (3) to participate in the 'securing' of the 'multiple stress zones'.

This is because (1) the referent of security is NATO (post-modern states); (2) CIMIC doctrine and conflict ethnography have been developed inside a bio-medial ethnocentric mentality in which the source of the insecurity event or the rebel-terrorist-fighters are seen as a 'disease', as it is extremely clear in Kilcullen's idea of 'Accidental Guerrilla Syndrome'³⁷; (3) this approach is concentrated on the idea to win a conflict, therefore it focuses on the effects of human events, and do not address the causes that triggered the insecurity-conflictual situation (the non-military sources of insecurity: water stress, demographic stress, crop decline, hunger, costal risk, and recent history of conflict); and (4) being the result of a cultural phenomenon it represents a tentative to ethnalize the world (Aime 2004).

6. Conclusion

This chapter has presented the problem which faces any one interested to deal with security issues. Here, a general overview of the definition of security, and its evolution, has been displayed and a parallel has been created with NATO's securitization process and security dilemma. This is because in the thesis consider NATO as the military instrument of the post-modern spates, NATO is a military alliance among post-modern states. What has emerged from this approach has been the necessity to move the

publication, and advocate for policies that enhance their welfare', David Kilcullen, *The Accidental Guerrilla – Fighting Small Wars in the Midst of a Big One*, Oxford University Press, 2009, 304-305.

³⁷ 'Based on field observation in several theatres of the "War on Terrorism" since 2001, I theorize that the accidental guerrilla emerges from a cyclical process that take place in four stages: infection, contagion, intervention, and rejection. (...) Infection: Al Qaeda (AQ) establishes a presence in a remote, ungoverned or conflict-affected area; Contagion: AQ uses the safe haven to spread violence and takfiri ideology to the others regions; Intervention: outside forces intervene to deal with the AQ threat and disrupt the safe haven; Rejection: local population reacts negatively, rejecting outside intervention and allying with AQ'. David Kilcullen, *The Accidental Guerrilla – Fighting Small Wars in the Midst of a Big One*, Oxford University Press, 2009, 34-38.

security focus from macro-narrative typical of the Cold War period and the interstate industrial war, to those local micro-narratives that characterize the war amongst people, the Multiple Stress Zones, and the CIMIC operations, in order to understand the dimension, the shape, and the nature of new insecurity threats. Next chapter will present the theoretical framework, the methodology, and the methods which have been employed in this thesis. A particular grid of interpretation defined as the 'Space of Virtual Peace' has been created in order to test the official NATO CIMIC Doctrine, and the situation in which the Multinational CIMIC Group military team has operated in its UNIFIL Mission in Lebanon.

Chapter 2

Theoretical Framework, Methodology, and Methods: the Space of Virtual Peace

1. Introduction

This chapter has been constructed using a multidisciplinary approach, employing first hand Italian military experiences, psychology, cultural psychology, psychology of culture, studies on total institutions, methodology and constructivism, practice theory, works on identity, relations between language and power, and discourse-language analysis³⁸.

It explains and establishes the theoretical framework, the methodology and the methods which have been used in this thesis, and refers to the way knowledge is acquired. It argues that methodology 'concerns the logical structure and procedure of ...enquiry' (Sartori 2011: 11) while methods refer to the different specific techniques

³⁸ This chapter has been constructed using a multidisciplinary approach: (1) on the military experience in military-security operations: Mini, Fabio, *La guerra dopo la guerra: soldati, burocrati e mercenari nell'epoca della pace virtuale*, Torino: Einaudi, 2003. Mini, Fabio, *Soldati*, Torino: Giulio Einaudi editore, 2008. Mini, Fabio, *Eroi della guerra – Storie di uomini d'arme e di valore*, Bologna: il Mulino, 2011. Mini, Fabio, *Perche' siamo cosi' ipocriti sulla guerra?*, Milano: Chiarelettere, 2012. (2) On psychology, cultural psychology, psychology of culture, and multicultural mind: Anolli, Luigi (2004), *Psicologia della cultura*, Bologna: il Mulino. Anolli, Luigi e Legrenzi, Paolo (2009), *Psicologia generale*, Bologna: il Mulino. Anolli, Luigi (2010), *La mente multiculturale*, Roma-Bari: Editori Laterza. Anolli, Luigi (2011), *La sfida della mente multiculturale: nuove forme di convivenza*, Milano: Raffaello Cortina Editore. Aronson, E., Wilson, T. D., Akert, R. (2006), *Psicologia sociale*, Bologna: il Mulino. Boca, Stefano, Bocchiaro, P., Scaffifi, Abbate (2003), *Introduzione alla psicologia sociale*, Bologna: il Mulino. Smorti, Andrea (2003), *La psicologia culturale – processi di sviluppo e comprensione sociale*, Roma: Carocci. (3) On total institutions: Goffman, Erving (2010), *Asylums – Le Istituzioni totali: i meccanismi dell'esclusione e della violenza*, Torino: Einaudi. Goffman, Erving (2012), *Stigma – L'identità negata*, Verona: Ombre Corte. (4) On methodology, culture and constructivism: Burr, Vivien (2003), *Social Constructionism*, London and New York: Routledge. Gusterson, Hugh (2009), 'Ethnographic Research', in Klotz, Audie & Prakash, Deepa (eds), *Qualitative Methods in International Relations: A Pluralist Guide*, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 93-113. Højrup, Thomas (2003), *State, Culture and Life Modes*, Aldershot: Ashgate. Klotz, Audie & Prakash, Deepa (eds) (2009), *Qualitative Methods in International Relations: A Pluralist Guide*, New York: Palgrave Macmillan. (5) Practice theory: de Certeau, Michel (1988), *The Practice of Every Day*, Berkeley, Los Angeles, London: University of California Press. Ortner, Sherry B. (2006), *Anthropology and Social Theory – Culture, Power, and the Acting Subject*, Durham and London: Duke University Press. Schatzki, T. R., Knor Cetina, K. and von Savigny, Eike (eds) (2001), *The Practice Turn in Contemporary Theory*, London and New York: Routledge. (6) On identity: Hall, Stuart and du Gay, Paul (eds) (2007), *Questions of Cultural Identity*, London: Sage Publications. Jenkins, Richard (2014), *Social Identity*, London and New York: Routledge. Lawler, Steph (2008), *Identity: Sociological Perspectives*, Cambridge: Polity. Remotti, Francesco (2003), *Contro l'identità*, Roma-Bari: Editori Laterza. (7) On language, narrative, power, language and security, and language analysis: Bourdieu, Pierre (1979), 'Symbolic power', *Critique of Anthropology*, 4 (13-14): 77-85. Bourdieu, Pierre (2005), *Language & Symbolic power*, edited by John B. Thompson, Cambridge: Polity Press. Barthes, Roland (2000), *Mythologies*, London: Vintage Classics. Ciavolella, Riccardo (2013), *Antropologia Politica e Contemporaneità – Un'indagine critica sul potere*, Milano – Udine: Mimesis Edizioni. Huysmans, Jef (2006), *The Politics of Insecurity: Fear, Migration and Asylum in the EU*, London and New York: Routledge. Ignatieff, Michael (1994), *Blood and Belonging: Journeys into the New Nationalism*, London: Vintage. Ives, Peter (2004), *Language and Hegemony in Gramsci*, London: Pluto Press. Neumann, Iver B. (2009), 'Discourse Analysis', in Klotz, Audie & Prakash, Deepa (eds), *Qualitative Methods in International Relations: A Pluralist Guide*, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 61-77. Rutigliano, Enzo (2007), *Il linguaggio delle masse. Sulla sociologia di Elias Canetti*, Bari: Edizioni Dedalo.

used to collect and examine data (Crotty 1998: 3). It also reflects Michel de Montaigne's remark that 'there is more ado to interpret interpretations than to interpret things'.

This anthropological work describes and analyses the practices of a specific community (MNCG CIMIC military team) which belongs to an official institution (Italian Ministry of Defence, IMoD). This military community is called to conduct a specific military activity (CIMIC operations) in a defined theater of operations³⁹ (TO) outside the territory of Italy in a different social, cultural, and emotional context (which is called here as the space of virtual peace). With regard to the implementation and practices of its activity, the CIMIC team must go under a cultural training in order to acquire 'cultural awareness' and to operate actively and professionally in this TO. 'Cultural awareness is understood the ability to comprehend the cultural characteristics of a certain population and also be in the position to distinguish the way in which there are differentiated from others (...) Cultural awareness is the necessary ingredient for improving the knowledge of the human terrain in a conflict or a post-conflict region' (Bellou 2014: 584). NATO and UN too, give particularly importance to understand the culture of the 'other', and to acquire 'cultural awareness' in order to understand, predict, and prevent the conflicting activities of the 'other'.

However, in practice, reading the NATO CIMIC 2013 Doctrine, the CIMIC activity can be compared to intelligence activity in terms of acquisition of local information-data. At the same time the CIMIC operations make use of 'quick impact projects'⁴⁰, a tool of confidence-building, which are used to conquer 'hearts and minds'. They are small-scale, low-cost projects that are planned and implemented within a short timeframe, and they have an immediate practical or psychological impact on the local population. In this thesis these 'quick impact projects' are considered like 'gifts' in Mauss' terms (Godbout 2007; Mauss 2002).

The CIMIC operation team and its activities are attached, regulated, and framed by two security narratives which are produced by the same institution: the Italian Ministry of Defence (IMoD). The IMoD produces its own security narrative inside, in accordance, and in line with NATO's security policy (or U.N. mandate). Therefore, this institution produces a macro-security narrative which defines the threats to Italy (an NATO) and identifies the CIMIC operation as a military tool to be employed in crisis management operations. Crisis management is a term, which is employed by NATO, to define those military operations which are conducted in crisis situation in territories outside the geopolitical borders of NATO's countries. The term 'crisis' in NATO's dictionary replaces, like the term 'the risk of ...' (explained in chapter one), the image of a defined enemy, and identifies a threat to the interest of NATO's countries.

The other narrative which is produced at micro-level by the IMoD is the one which define and describe the situation, the 'reality' of the theatre of operations in which the Italian soldiers will operate. In this thesis a critical line of thoughts has been employed which is based on the experience of the Italian Army General Fabio Mini and

³⁹ In warfare, a theater of operations is an area, region, or place in which important active military operations occur or are progressing. A theater can include the entirety of the air, space, land and sea area that is or that may potentially become involved in war operations.

⁴⁰ See the recent UN publication available at:
<http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/documents/civilhandbook/Chapter12.pdf>

the results of my fieldwork experience: there is a remarkable difference between the soldiers' first hand experience encountered in their theatre of CIMIC operations, and the official micro-narrative which defines the space and the situation of the of post-conflict-crisis management operations in which these operations take place. The official micro-narrative doesn't provide a real picture of what is going on in the TO.

Moreover, this work considers the importance given by NATO and the IMoD to the 'cultural awareness' training, and the definition of culture. This is because culture and cultural differences may have very strong consequences and may lead to misunderstanding and conflict.

Culture is defined by the U.S. Army (2006, 3-37), Counterinsurgency Field Manual FM 3-34, as a 'web of meaning shared by members of a particular society or group within a society. Culture is—

- A system of shared beliefs, values, customs, behaviors, and artifacts that members of a society
- Use to cope with their world and with one another.
- Learned, though a process called enculturation.
- Shared by members of a society; there is no "culture of one."
- Patterned, meaning that people in a society live and think in ways forming definite, repeating patterns.
- Changeable, through social interactions between people and groups.
- Arbitrary, meaning that Soldiers and Marines should make no assumptions regarding what a society
- Considers right and wrong, good and bad.
- Internalized, in the sense that it is habitual, taken for granted, and perceived as "natural" by people
- Within the society.'

According to the same Counterinsurgency Filed Manual '(3-38) culture might also be described as an "operational code" that is valid for an entire group of people. Culture conditions the individual's range of action and ideas, including what to do and not do, how to do or not do it, and whom to do it with or not to do it with. Culture also includes under what circumstances the "rules" shift and change. Culture influences how people make judgments about what is right and wrong, assess what is important and unimportant, categorize things, and deal with things that do not fit into existing categories. Cultural rules are flexible in practice. For example, the kinship system of a certain Amazonian Indian tribe requires that individuals marry a cousin. However, the definition of cousin is often changed to make people eligible for marriage.

Cultural differences are based on social-cultural practices which are influenced by local symbols, heroes, rituals, and values. For Hofstede (1997: 8) cultural differences manifest themselves in different ways and differing levels of depth. Symbols are found in the outermost layer of a culture. 'Symbols represent the most superficial, as values represent the deepest manifestations of culture, with heroes and rituals in between' (e.g. words, gestures, pictures, or objects) that are familiar only to those sharing a particular culture. They are variable within the time frame. They may be copied from another culture and new symbols could appear and easily be developed, while old ones disappear.

‘Heroes are persons, past or present, real or fictitious, who possess characteristics that are highly prized in a culture.’ Heroes are used as models ‘how to behave’ in one culture.




Figure 1- Manifestation of Culture at Different Levels of Depth

Source: Hofstede, G. (1997). *Cultures and Organizations: Software of the mind*. New York: McGraw Hill, page 8.

‘Rituals are collective activities, sometime superfluous in reaching desired objectives, but are considered as socially essential (e.g. ways of greetings, paying respect to others, religious and social ceremonies, etc.).’ Values are placed in the center of a culture. ‘They are broad tendencies for preferences of certain state of affairs to others (good-evil, right-wrong, natural-unnatural).’ Sometimes values are not visible by others. Symbols, heroes, and rituals represent ‘the tangible or visual aspects of the Practices of a culture.’ Therefore, we may understand the true cultural meaning of the practices only when they are discovered and ‘interpreted by the insiders’.

However, without anticipating the results of my work, according to my anthropological research the MNCG CIMIC military team involved in this thesis did not receive a qualitatively valid cultural training. Nevertheless, the members of the MNCG CIMIC team employed their free time, and their own personal resources to build and construct their own ‘cultural awareness’ like the study of the local language (Arabic), and local culture and history. Only the personal initiatives demonstrated by the members of the MNCG CIMIC team made possible to reach high qualitative performance results.

Therefore, this study (1) takes the official security knowledge fabricated (at macro-level) by ‘power-knowledge-security-total institution’⁴¹ (PKSTI) (in hierarchical

⁴¹ I do consider a ‘power-knowledge-security-total institution’ any human agency which (1) has legitimate power: meaning that A has power over B to the extent that the can get B to do something that B would not otherwise do (Lukes 2005: 16); (2) it produces meaning and knowledge, and in this case security knowledge through the process of securitization; (3) has the monopoly of the use of force meaning that it can carry on security actions (war, crisis management operations, etc); and (4) as a total institution is a place of work and residence where a great number of similarly situated people, cut off from the wider community for a considerable time, together lead an enclosed, formally administered round of life. Total

order: NATO, the Italian Ministry of Defence, and the Multinational CIMIC Group) which wants to maintain its status quo power position; (2) observes how, the same security-power-knowledge official structures ‘culturally’ trains its own CIMIC military personnel in order to deploy them to security missions (CIMIC operations) outside the territory of Italy; (3) looks at the way ‘security knowledge’ is produced at micro-level (CIMIC mission) by the same CIMIC military personnel; and (4) evaluates the quality of the training and of the macro-level and micro-level security knowledge. At the same time, this thesis deals with the personal experiences (field work) the writer had with these security-power-knowledge structures and with the community of his study (MNCG Military Personnel).

Then, the main concerns of this thesis are about (1) the ontological and epistemological problem related to the definition of reality (security reality), and the production of knowledge (legitimate security knowledge), which are linked to the dilemma of interpretation; and (2) about the meaning of security. Therefore, the core question of this thesis becomes ‘How do we know?’ How is it possible to produce legitimate security knowledge? And the approach used here is to use the anthropological approach to produce security knowledge.

This is because, as the case of this study wants to demonstrate, we found ourselves between two producers and sources (macro level and micro level: the community of my study – MNCG Military Personnel) of narrative-knowledge which refer to the same human event (the reality-situation of the theater of operation of the CIMIC operation) which has been securitized, meaning ‘the issue is presented as an existential threat, requiring emergency measures and justifying action outside the normal bounds of political procedure’ (Buzan, Waever, and the Wilde 1998: 23-24). And this is a problem in which the security event is not defined as it for its objectively, but its interpretation is subjective (I can say is a problem of sociology of knowledge).

Thus, on one side there is an official narrative-knowledge which defines and frame at macro-level (NATO, Italian Minister of Defence, the Multinational CIMIC Group) what insecurity, security reality and security knowledge are, while on the other side we found security-reality and security knowledge which has been produced at micro-

institutions are divided by Goffman (2010) into five different types: institutions established to care for people felt to be both harmless and incapable: (1) orphanages, poor houses and nursing homes. (2) places established to care for people felt to be incapable of looking after themselves and a threat to the community, albeit an unintended one: leprosariums, mental hospitals, and tuberculosis sanitariums. (3) institutions organised to protect the community against what are felt to be intentional dangers to it, with the welfare of the people thus sequestered not the immediate issue: concentration camps, P.O.W. camps, penitentiaries, and jails. (4) institutions purportedly established to better pursue some worklike tasks and justifying themselves only on these instrumental grounds: colonial compounds, work camps, boarding schools, ships, army barracks, and large mansions from the point of view of those who live in the servants' quarters. And (5) establishments designed as retreats from the world even while often serving also as training stations for the religious; examples are convents, abbeys, monasteries, and other cloisters. Moreover, I do consider that a power-knowledge-security-total institution has the power to fabricate and to impose a ‘habitus’ (Bourdieu 2005) to its members and the same members, at the same time, identify themselves with the same structure. Here, I take the position of Richard Jenkins who argues that ‘identity is a matter of process of identification that do not determine, in any sense, what individuals do. Individual behaviour is a complex and constantly evolving combination of planning, improvisation and habit, influenced by emotional responses, health and well-being, access to resources, knowledge and world-view, the impact of the behaviour of others, and other factors too. Group membership and identity are likely to have some part to play, but they cannot be said to determine anything’ (Jenkins 2014: 10).

level by soldiers (Military CIMIC team) with the boots on the field. As demonstrated by the Italian Army General Mini (2003, 2008, 2012) most of the time the two narratives do not match and the micro level security knowledge portrays a completely different and more dangerous insecurity environment than the macro, official narrative.

As a consequence, this 'knowledge' and interpretative gap (between the macro-subjective level and the micro-subjective level) (1) has heavy consequences at tactical-strategic-political level and as protocol of security actions; (2) it shows that the official security narrative-knowledge, which has political implication and participate in the formulation of the 'security dilemma' (Booth and Wheeler 2008: 4-5) has to be considered as an 'image of knowledge' (Elkana 1981) because it is not consistent, and for this reason I do label it as an 'image of security knowledge'; (3) it proves that this 'image of security knowledge' can not be considered as 'legitimate security knowledge' and 'reliable knowledge'; (4) it confirms the fact that 'security framing is not simply a macro-level but first a micro level practice' (Huysmans 2006: 151-152); and (5) it reaffirms that security is a myth (employing Barthes 2005) and an 'essentially contested concept' (Buzan 1991: 14).

There is, however, a specificity to consider when we approach the analysis of securitization and security speech, both seen here as a text, and which makes this text and its language qualitatively different from other texts and languages that deal with security issues. This is because security speech act is not defined by uttering the word security, but what it is essential is the designation of an existential threat (NATO and its 2015 NATO Strategic Concept and 'security tool' of the crisis management; the Italian Ministry of Defence and its 2015 White Paper and its Strategic Framework) which requires emergency action or special measures and the acceptance of that designation by a significant audience. As explained in chapter one, the meaning of 'security' lies not in what people consciously think the concept means but how the 'power-knowledge-security-total institution' implicitly uses it in some ways and not others. And securitization and security speech become official interpretations and official policies-agendas of a human event which first is defined 'insecure' using what I call an 'insecurity language' and then it is absorbed in an official security text which uses a 'security language' (Huysmans 2006: 8) that here can be labeled as the 'power-knowledge-security-total institution's language' (PKSTI language)

Yet, once the 'security language', become a 'security text (the PKSTI security text, like the NATO New Strategic Concepts 1999⁴² and 2010⁴³, and the '2015 White Paper on International Security and Defence'⁴⁴ of the Italian Ministry of Defence) it becomes a one-dimensional mass communication-speech act which is a linguistic act. And because the producer of this text is considered to be in the legitimate political-power position to produce it, it becomes a social act too. Therefore, the state or a military alliance, which has the monopoly of the use of force, can produce a security text which becomes 'the security text' or 'the security speech' par excellence. And it has the power to impose a self-referential reality, vision-perspective, an agenda, a politics, a technique of governing, and 'the' interpretation of the security text-security speech.

⁴² Available at: http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_27433.htm.

⁴³ Available at: <http://www.nato.int/lisbon2010/strategic-concept-2010-eng.pdf>.

⁴⁴ Available at: http://www.difesa.it/Primo_Piano/Documents/2015/04_Aprile/LB_2015.pdf.

Moreover, the security text becomes the PKSTI's instrument to perpetuate its own status quo position in the sense that it presents itself as the only legitimate structure which can deal successfully with the insecurity concerns. At the same time, doing to the fact that NATO, the Italian Ministry of Defence, and the Multinational CIMIC Group are hierarchical organizations they have the power to order, and impose their meaning of security to the people which are part of these organizations

Relying on its technocratic dimension, the PKSTI's security text: it structures the official knowledge of security; sets a specific-bureaucratic use of the word security, a specific delimited interpretation, and a grammar of what insecurity is; it certifies and authorizes its own interpretations of what constitutes security and insecurity as reliable knowledge and 'legitimate security knowledge' (Huysmans 2006: 18); and it doesn't ask or it is not open to multiple interpretations, because it is a closed-down and binding official text, which has only one meaning; that is the interpretation of the official power-knowledge-security-total institution (NATO, the Italian Ministry of Defence, the Multinational CIMIC Group) that has produced it and which has the power to enforce that meaning, and to impose it, hegemonically, in an interpretative space (the PKSTI's space: NATO territory, Italian territory, and as we will see in the territory of the security operation, CIMIC operations, which I define the 'Space of Virtual Peace') and on an audience.

Moreover, the PKSTI, as a total institution has the power (1) to fabricate and impose a 'habitus' which 'is a set of dispositions which incline agents to act and react in certain ways. The dispositions generate practices, perceptions and attitudes which are "regular" without being consciously co-ordinated or governed by any rule. The dispositions which constitute the habitus are inculcated, structured, durable, generative and trasposable' (Bourdieu 2005: 12); and (2) to discipline and shape identity because 'our identity is constructed out of discourses culturally available to us, and which we drawn upon in our communications with other people'⁴⁵ (Burr 2007: 106).

As a logic consequence, once confronted with the basic methodological question of 'How do we know?', it emerges that the 'PKSTI's security text' (NATO New Strategic Concepts 1999 and 2010, and the '2015 White Paper on International Security and Defence' of the Italian Ministry of Defence) is a subjective, and not objective, interpretation of a human event which has been considered as an existential threat. This is because the official security text deals with social facts which are 'language-dependent-facts', thus social and institutional facts that require linguistic elements for their existence (Searle 1996: 62), and need translation and interpretation. And, as chapter one has demonstrated, 'insecurity is not a fact of nature, but always requires that it is written and talked into existence' (Huysmans 2006: 7). These social facts can be known throughout observation but there can be a mismatch between the observed social fact (the supposed

⁴⁵ For Burr (2007: 106-107) 'our identity is constructed out of discourses culturally available to us, and which we drawn upon in our communications with other people. A person's identity is achieved by a subtle interweaving of many different threads. There is the thread of age, for example they may be a child, a young adult or very old; that of class, depending on their occupation, income and level of education; ethnicity; gender; sexual orientation and so on. All these, and many more, are woven together to produce the fabric of a person's identity. Each of these components is constructed through the discourses that are present in our culture – the discourse of age, of gender, of education, of sexuality and so on. We are the end product, the combination, of the particular versions of these things that are available to us'.

insecurity event) and the described-interpreted social fact (the official security text which designate the insecurity event).

As a consequence, in order to answer the basic methodological question of 'How do we know?' we need to take an analytical, critical and constructivist position (Wyn Jones 1999; Benton and Craib 2001; Terriff, Croft, James and Morgan 2001; Ruggie 2002; Zehfuss 2002; Reus-Smit 2005; Weber 2005; Hansen 2007; Fierke 2007; Linklater 2007; Burr 2007; Balzacq 2011) between the observation and the description of the social fact, and concentrate on the complex process of the fabrication of subjective interpretations.

The danger here is represented by the fact that if we accept 'the security text' as knowledge (subjective knowledge) and truth, then naively we take the 'image of knowledge' for reliable knowledge. In brief we confuse the map for the territory.

Therefore, the methodological approach adopted here embraces the method of 'participant observation', 'emic perspective' and 'thick description'. 'Thick description' operates as a hermeneutic circle (Elkana 1981: 13). It recognizes that the researcher is dealing with an official securitization-security speech, which is labelled as 'security text'. It accepts the fact that the use of medical metaphors (Huysmans 2007: 59) and socio-medical discourse (Campbell 1998a: 83-88) in security language also testifies to an organic rendering of social relations, therefore approaches the security text as if it were a medical text that provides directions and prescribes remedies or therapies, thus defining its language as the security language. It also assumes that the human event which has been designated and translated as an existential threat creates anxiety and represents the sickness that must be defeated. The language which defines the insecurity event (which is seen as a sickness, producing anxiety) is the insecurity language; and the security text is a system of communication (Barthes 2000:109), which implies a signifying structure (PKSTI) which speaks and spread its hegemonic vision into a space (interpretative space) where it is consumed by an audience.

Consequently, the theoretical framework, the methodology and methods assembled and used in this work are considered to provide answers to what I defined the seven security methodological questions⁴⁶ which any security work should be able to answer in order to produce 'legitimate security knowledge'. These questions are formulated inside my theoretical framework, my methodology and methods and they do represent effective tools for the process of interpretation of insecurity-security human events.

As a result of this introduction and due to the fact language do play an important role in the framing of security this chapter is organized in three parts.

The first part introduces the logical structure and procedure of scientific enquiry used in this study. It defines the theoretical framework which is based on discourse analysis, critical discourse analysis, constructivism, and security narrative. It emphasizes the importance of a more technocratic understanding of the politics of security-insecurity (Huysmans 2006), and identifies that the process of securitization is transformed into a cultural system (Geertz 1973), a technique of governmentality (a technique of governing danger, Huysmans 2006) and an ideology (Zizek 2008b) which with its own language

⁴⁶ The seven security methodological questions: What is reality? What is reliable knowledge? What is security? What is being secured? What is being secured against? Who provides security? What methods can be undertaken to provide it?

sets the rules of the 'security game'. It interprets the security text as if it were a medical text in which is reflected the image and power of the power-knowledge-total institution.

The second part confirms the methodological approach and settles the method. For this purpose, the territory of the myth of security, where security is a technique of governing danger, and where securitization has a discursive and technocratic dimension, is assumed to be an 'anthropological place' (Augé 2011: 158). And based on the idea of the "Geopolitical Narrative Framework"⁴⁷ (GPNF): the space where the process of securitization becomes a more extreme version of politicization' (Ercolani 2011: 54), this space is labelled the 'Space of Virtual Peace' (SVP).

The SVP (1) is the anthropological space of the Civil-Military Cooperation in Post-conflict Operations; (2) is considered as a specific analytical and interpretative grid and time-space dimension; and (3) has been used in my interviews during my field experience, and is presented as an alternative 'way of seeing' insecurity-security to the official insecurity-security narrative. In this SVP, are identified and classified the signifying structures, and those actors and elements which help to answer the seven security methodological questions.

The third part explains the methods which have been used in this thesis. The researcher during his field work (1) has worked with the official security texts of NATO and the Italian Ministry of Defence; (2) has entered in contact with the structure of the Italian Ministry of Defence (authorization to conduct the research), with the Multinational CIMIC Group (MNCG; Italy), and the UNIFIL HQ (Lebanon); (3) has conducted several interviews (among them he has interviewed the Italian Ministry of Defence, Admiral di Paola, the commander of the MNCG, Col. Zinzone, and the UNIFIL Force Commander Gen. Serra) and has worked in very close contact with a MNCG CIMIC military team (composed by six military personnel) in Italy and in Lebanon in three phases: pre-deployment (MNCG HQ, Italy), deployment (UNIFIL Mission, Lebanon), post-deployment (MNCG HQ, Italy). The researcher argues that in order to understand and grasp the process of the fabrication of knowledge inside these institutions it is necessary to make use of anthropological tools: (1) the polyvalent position of the analyst (participant observation; emic perspective) who reads the security text and the SVP both as a model reader and as empirical reader (Eco 2006); and (2) the use of 'thick description' as a method of analysis (Elkana 1981: 10; Geertz 1973: 6-7). Thanks to this methodology and method, it is possible to operate inside the SVP an 'examination of the degree of congruence between different circumstances driving and/or constraining securitization' (Balzacq 2011: 18), where 'the security text' will be confronted with the results of the anthropological approach.

The adoption of the methodological approach presented in this chapter implies that the term 'security' is transformed inside the hegemonic cultural dimension of the SVP from a myth to an ideology of 'status quo' and to a technique of government.

⁴⁷ 'A "geopolitical-narrative-framework" is a physical and intellectual-symbolic space (as a hermeneutical circle where the three elements of the Aristotle's Rhetoric are present: Ethos, Pathos and Logos), in which emotions and perceptions are elaborated through an hegemonic narrative (narrative is a re-presentation of real or invented events, then a paradigm), in order to produce a particular image and meaning (and protocol of interpretation) to be attached to the word security' (Ercolani 2011: 54).

2. Theoretical framework: security narrative, discourse analysis, critical discourse analysis, and constructivism

This thesis deals with social science which essentially 'is about telling stories. Some stories can be matched with evidence better than others. There cannot be a perfect fit because the story would be as slow to tell as life itself. It would be a mirror on life rather than an abstraction that pulls out certain aspects of life that help us guide our actions' (Kaldor 2007: 11). And this work analysis a specific community (MNCG military team) which operates inside a well-framed spatial-temporal dimension (Jul 24th, 2012-May 7th, 2014) defined by political borders, culture, society, political and military power (NATO, the Italian Ministry of Defence). And this spatial dimension is defined as an interpretative space (the Space of Virtual Peace of Civil-Military Cooperation in Post-conflict Operations).

The logical structure and the procedure of scientific enquiry of this work, however, are based on the three following premises.

First, it accepts the suggestion provided by Kolodziej (2005), that 'the prevailing security schools must engage with each other, if they are to keep pace with the actors they are studying; if they are to adequately explain the decisions of the international actors who choose or eschew appeals to violence and threats to get their way; if they are to provide relevant advice to sole security issues, locally and globally; and if they are to enlarge our understanding of the full human dimensions of security on a par with our classical triumvirate. What was for them local challenges is now a global imperative of ending humanity's civil wars, which commenced with the ascendancy of the species on this planet' (Kolodziej 2005: 318).

Second, it seeks to emphasize the importance of a more technocratic understanding of the politics of security-insecurity, adopting the approach of Galimberti (2011, 2012), for whom we are living in the age of technology in which technology has been transformed from a means to an end, and where the vision of Huysmans (2006) recognises that both technologies and security experts play a fundamental role in modulating social and political practice. Huysmans also looks at security as a technique of governing danger, and at securitization in both its discursive and technocratic dimensions. This is a specialist use of the concept of technology. In fact, Huysmans uses the concept of 'security technique' to differentiate his 'approach from the more linguistic readings that emphasize discourses of danger, speech acts of security, or language games of insecurity. Techniques refer simultaneously to (i) a particular method of doing an activity which usually involves practical skills that are developed through training and practice, (ii) a mode of procedure in an activity, and (iii) the disposition of things according to a regular plan or design. It is embedded in training, routine, and technical knowledge and skills, as well as technological artefacts'. This suggests a technocratic view of insecurity politics in the wake of the linguistic turn in security studies. With the notion of a technocratic viewpoint 'it is based primarily on a more sceptical and critical line of thinking that runs from Weber to Foucault. This tradition is similarly based on a sociological and historical recognition that technology and expert knowledge are central to the formation of modern society and its governance of social conduct but is more sceptical about the positive valuations of the political and societal consequences of these developments' (Huysmans 2006: 9).

Third, this research adopts and employs the definition of the process of securitization provided by Buzan, Waever, and de Wilde (1998) and Balzacq (2011), explained in chapter one.

When one looks at the security text as a medical text (Huysmans 2007: 59; Campbell 1998a) which provides directions, remedies, drugs, or the *pharmakon* (Girard 2005) in order to defeat a sickness (the insecurity human event; in the case of NATO: crisis management and the military-security tool represented by CIMIC operations), then in the collective imaginary the securitizing-securing actor (power-knowledge structure, like NATO) is invested with another quality-capability: the thaumaturgic one (Bloch 1989). In other words, the actor acquires magical or ritual powers and he is surrounded by an 'aura' (Benjamin 1973: 223) which distinguishes him, and therefore, he is accepted as the legitimate actor-agency to produce 'the' meaning of security. And the security text (securitization process; speech act) too is regarded as 'the' security text *par excellence*.

Moreover, the security actor (power-knowledge-security-total institution) is recognized to possess 'linguistic competence', which is the power to persuade. This 'rests with the assumption that a given securitizing actor knows what is going on, and works for common interests. Here, knowledge (a kind of cultural capital), trust, and the power position (political or symbolic capital) are linked (Bourdieu 1979; Lupia and McCubbins 1998: 43-60; Balzacq 2011: 26). Symbolic power, which is a quasi-magical power of making people see and believe, and of confirming or transforming the vision of the world, is a power that can be exercised only if it is recognized, defined in and through a given relation between those who exercise power and those who submit to it (Bourdieu 2005: 170). As result, the official security text carries with it that symbolic power that is recognizable to that body of specialist producer of rites and discourse (Bourdieu 2005: 168).

Then, it emerges that the power of the myth, symbol, and language of security (explained in chapter one) is to shape perceptions, cognitions, and preferences of people in such a way that they accept their role in the existing order of things (Lukes 2005: 11), and to make believe (Walton 1990). And the myth of security (the process of securitization) is converted (as already explained in chapter 1) into (1) a cultural system (Geertz 1973: 89); (2) a technique of governmentality (Huysmans 2006: 9); and (3) an ideology (Žižek 2008b: 45).

However, when the security action has exceeded the time limit normally permitted to any 'emergency measures', then the exceptional security measures become the normality, and the securitization process is transformed into a state of exception which 'is not a special kind of law (like the law of war); rather, insofar as it is a suspension of the juridical order itself, it defines law's threshold or limit concept' (Agamben 2005: 4). In this process the apparently exceptional state of emergency becomes a State of Emergency meaning a form of permanent government (Ercolani 2016b).

Nonetheless, the constant here is represented by the empirical fact that the process of securitization assumes the role of a paradigm (Kuhn 1996: x), and can be seen as a conceptual machinery of universe maintenance (Berger and Luckmann 1991: 126) meaning that power is always present in the forms that the myth can assume, and the success of a particular conceptual machinery is related to the power possessed by those who operate it.

What clearly emerges from the above processes is that there is a direct relation between the production of language-knowledge and the system which produces it, because 'in social sciences the knowledge that is produced itself forms an important component of the systems being studied. So, for example, economic theories can affect the way in which individuals operate in the market place, so that a change in theory can bring about a change in the economic system being studied' (Chalmers 2011: 147). Then, based on these premises, and to avoid analytical, interpretative, and predictive mistakes highlighted by Kolodziej (2005), this thesis approaches the study of security, experiencing shifts of perception and highlighting the importance of a verbal revolution (Sartori 2011: 96) which has emerged during the field-work experience and the various interviews. And, because 'what a man sees depends both upon what he looks at and also upon what his previous visual-conceptual experience has taught him to see' (Kuhn 1996:113), and because 'the way we see things is affected by what we know or what we believe' (Berger 1972: 8), this research aims to critique and change the focus of the 'standard model' of scientific research, switching its 'visual gestalt' since, if 'in the Middle Ages when men believed in the physical existence of Hell the sight of fire must have meant something different from what it means today' (Berger 1972: 8-9). At the same time 'the marks on paper that were first seen as a bird are now seen as an antelope, or vice versa' (Kuhn 1996: 85). And 'what were ducks in the scientist's world before the revolution are rabbits afterwards. The man who first saw the exterior of the box from above, later sees the interior from below' (Kuhn 1996: 111-112, drawing on Wittgenstein). Therefore, 'at times of revolution, when the normal-scientific tradition changes, the scientist's perception of his environment must be re-educated – in some familiar situation he must learn to see a new gestalt. After he has done so, the world of his research will seem, here and there, incommensurable with the one he had inhabited before (Kuhn 1996: 111-112).

However, I do consider that the topic of security, for its particularity, it is where biology and social science interact; and in this relations language plays an important role too. This is because security concerns on how a human structure (person, group, state, NATO as a political-military-economic-social system, etc) survives in an environment which continuously changes (as explained in the NATO 2010 New Strategic Concept, and in the 2015 White Paper of the Italian Ministry of Defence) and therefore affects the way human structures preserves themselves. Therefore, security deals with those actions to fight, to escape, or to transform the external environment, which human structures activate as conditioned reflex in threatening situation in order to survive.

And, as demonstrated by the work of the French biologist and philosopher Henri Laborit (1969, 1974), the same actions are taken by human structures and living organism in order to return to a physiological equilibrium. Between the two living entities, however, there is a difference on the passage and transmission of knowledge understood as a culture to survive, which in the human beings is done through the language. For Laborit (1969: 74) words have permitted to the human experience a richness of mental abstraction which no other animal has matched. However, the biggest error committed in the human history has been to believe that there is a two-way relation between facts and words which describe them. To take the word for the object, which it is nothing more than a construction of our senses, and to not react paleo-encephaly or in other emotional

terms, towards the words, these are the likely causes of our disasters and wars that have devastated our human history.

This is confirmed by the empirical fact that everything we know is mediated by the language through which we know, and for to the Italian political scientist Giovanni Sartori our knowledge is 'onomatology' (*logos sui nomi*) meaning that it is filtered by names. And if language is the sine qua non instrument of knowledge, who seeks knowledge should have control on the instrument, because an erroneous language produces erroneous thinking, and an erroneous thinking is dangerous for everything the researcher will do in the future. Therefore, it is important to dominate the meaningful function of words, in short the semantic. To explain his approach Sartori presents an example in order to show how words are capable to interpret because their denotation is filtered by their connotation. Take for example the words 'State' and 'government'. For long time English have preferred 'government' to 'State', and indeed it has translated the French '*etat*' and the German '*Staat*' for 'State'. The Continental European literature has employed the opposite approach and has considered the 'government' as a part of the 'State' (in its general meaning). Therefore, an English man won't 'see' the State, while an Italian man who knows only Italian yes (Sartori 2011: 143-149). For Sartori, three elements are always involved in all process of knowledge: a) concepts; b) words; c) phenomenon. To be more precise a) concepts, conceptions and meanings; b) words and term; c) phenomenon and data. This distinction is based on the following stipulations: 1) an idea is a mental image, a meaning; 2) a conception is an ensemble of associated ideas related or evoked by a precise word; 3) a concept is a conception treated following of logic rules; 4) terms are words which refer unequivocally to concepts (Sartori 2011: 99-100).

Therefore, we can apply this reasoning to a human event which has been defined by a power-knowledge-security-total institution as an existential threat for its survival, and has been faced by a 'securing' action' (a pharmakon). And then, we can understand that what plays an important role between the real human event and the official security semantic-knowledge that defines it as 'insecure' (the official security text and protocol of securing-securing action), is the word-language, the idea, the image, the conception, the concept, the terms, and the security metaphor, which are employed by the power-knowledge structure to define it, and the very referent (Anolli e Legrenzi 2009: 175) of the term 'security'.

Thus, this thesis maintains that:

a. the referent of the term 'security' (freedom from danger, fear, anxiety, destitution, and so on), is represented only by its etymological meaning which bears strong emotions. 'Security' is derived from the Latin '*securitas*' and in its turn from '*sine*' (= without) + '*cura*' (= anxiety, worry). And this referent becomes the guiding interpretative toll that the security analyst has to maintain central, and 'clean' from all the interpretative manipulations represented by the power-knowledge structure's semantic-myth-ideology;

b. Any security investigation must be able to provide valid and practical answers to the seven security methodological questions in order to produce 'legitimate security knowledge'.

c. When the terms security, securitization, and insecurity framing are employed here, they refer to the work of Buzan, Waever and de Wilde (1998), Balzaq (2011) and Huysmans (2006). These authors point to the strong relation between language and security and highlight the fact that by saying-employing the word 'security' in official speech something more is done or performed: an emotional element has been added to the narrative;

d. NATO and the Italian Ministry of Defence (as systems) are considered as human structures, living-thermo-dynamic-open structures (Laborit 1969, 1974), with their own biology which, like the Prince of Machiavelli, struggle to survive and to maintain their power status quo in a changing environment, and therefore they need to transform themselves. And this transformation passes through the adoption of a new language-narrative (as demonstrated in chapter one). Therefore NATO and the Italian Ministry of Defence, as power-knowledge-total institutions fabricate (i) a securitization narrative, regarded here as a 'myth', that is presented and consumed as 'reliable knowledge'; and (ii) an insecurity-security language (PKSTI language). Aim of this narrative is to produce the 'reality' where the PKSTI's securing action is performed. This is in line with the Prince's quality 'to appear merciful, faithful, humane, trustworthy, religious, and to be so' (Machiavelli [1513] 2005: 61). Therefore, the very Prince's language-narrative has to appear and sound merciful, faithful, humane, trustworthy, and religious.

2.1. Language, discourse analysis and critical discourse analysis

The decision to give importance, in this thesis, to language-discourse-narrative is based on five assumptions. The first is based on the work of Geertz according to whom 'doing ethnography is like trying to read (in the sense of "construct a reading of") a manuscript – foreign, faded, full of ellipses, incoherencies, suspicions emendations, and tendentious commentaries, but written not in conventional graphs of sounds but in transient examples of shaped behavior' (Geertz 1973: 10).

The second takes the first hand experience of the Italian Army General Fabio Mini (2003, 2008) who, as Commander of KFOR, encountered the dangerous reality represented by commanding a mission defined officially as a 'Peace Mission' when in reality he, and his military personnel had to face and confront 'a war after the war'.

The third one has already been developed in the previous chapters in which security is considered a myth, and where it was emphasised how language plays a fundamental role in the construction of meaning (the myth of security).

The fourth assumption is based on that critical theory literature (Foucault 1980, 1994, 2003; Bourdieu 1979, 2005; Gramsci 1975, Said 1994, 2003, Adorno 2007, Marcuse 1991) that spotted, identified, and analyzed the strong relation which exists between language-discourse, production of knowledge and power, and on the work of Castells (2011) which ties together communication and power. Finally, the fifth assumption has been suggested by the importance that NATO gives to 'win the battle of narrative' (Soligan 2009: 357).

Yet, the specific definition of discourse, which is implied here as PKSTI language, is that discourse itself includes the concepts of language, discourse, text and narrative, and all the four elements are connected and interdependent. Therefore, in order

to explain this relationship, language is, first of all, analyzed because ‘language itself conditions, limits and predetermines what we see’. Thus, all reality is constructed through language so that nothing is simply “there” in an unproblematic way – everything is a linguistic/textual construct. Language does not record reality: it shapes and creates it so that the whole of our universe is textual’ (Barry, 2002: 35). As Žižek argues ‘when I observe the world around me through the lenses of a language, I perceive it actually through the lenses of the potentialities hidden, latently present, in it. What this means is that potentially appears “as such”, becomes actual *as potentially*, only through language: it is the appellation of a thing that brings to light (“posits”) its potentials’ (Žižek 2008: xi).

These assumptions are even more evident when we take into consideration the process which is followed in the description of an event and the relation it establishes with the words which have been employed to describe it: (a) Something happens (Event); (b) I sense what happens (Object); (c) I recognize what happens (Description); and (d) I generate meanings for what happens; etc. (Inferences). Then, language is a form of social and performative practice determined by social structure, and this means, in the first place, that language is part of society and not somehow external to it. Second, language is a social process. And third, language is a socially conditioned process, conditioned that is by other (non-linguistic) parts of society’ (Fairclough 2000: 18-19).


The relation of meaning to language in a specific context follows Wittgenstein’s idea of ‘language games’ (Wittgenstein 1958). As Wittgenstein argues, words become meaningful in their relation to other words within a system, or game, that is, a set of rules and practices, and ‘the metaphor of language as a game has two related elements. One is that, like games, language is based on rules, but these rules vary from game to game (and from language to language) and can even be changed within a game, as long as the players agree. There is a degree of arbitrariness to the rules. For the game actually to be played, however, the rules must have some stability. The other element of the game metaphor is that just like the word “game” the idea of “language” is not defined by a common essence but those things that qualify as languages share “family resemblances”’ (Ives 2004: 27). And due to the fact that language (and PKSTI language) is a social process, it forms a text (a spoken, written text) where ‘text’ means ‘the product rather than a process – a product of the process of text production. (...) Text analysis is correspondingly only a part of discourse analysis, which also includes analysis of productive and interpretative processes’ (Fairclough 2001: 20).

For Fairclough, adopting a ‘Critical Discourse Analysis’ (CDA) approach, the term discourse refers to the whole process of social interaction of which a text is just a part. Therefore, his vision and interpretation is wider than the typical discourse analysis approach. ‘It is for the above reasons, then, that ‘Critical Discourse Analysis’ is embraced here because ‘the controlling theoretical idea behind CDA is that texts, embedded in recurring “discursive practices” for their production, circulation and reception, which are themselves embedded in “social practice”, are among the principal ways in which ideology is circulated and reproduced. The goal of CDA is thus to uncover the ways in which discourse and ideology are intertwined. Ways of talking produce and reproduce ways of thinking, and ways of thinking can be manipulated via choices about grammar, style, wording, and every aspect of discourse. Ideologies – systems of belief – are like “culture” (...), except that ideologies tend to be seen as inevitably selective and

misleading. Ideologies are thus well suited for use by the dominant to make an oppressive social system seem natural and desirable and to mask the mechanisms of oppression (Johnstone 2008: 53-54).

Balzacq (2011: 40-41) usefully suggests how CDA ‘has affinities with Foucault’s insistence on “how discourse actively structures the social space within which actors act, through the constitutions of concepts, objects, and subject positions” (Philips and Hardy 2002: 25). Researchers who dwell on this perspective focus on dialogical struggles which are nested in power relations. In general, a critical approach to discourse will use a diverse body of data including, for example, interviews, participant observation, pictures, archival materials and newspapers coverage of the threat image concerned. This comes with one noteworthy advantage: it offers a “thick description” of the social practices associated with the construction and evolution of threat images. The variety of data and the focus of analysis point to the insight that securitization can reside in practices other than words: bureaucratic procedures and practices, technologies, norms of a given profession, and so forth. In sum, critical discourse analysis is powerful in grasping both textual and non-textual activities of securitization, and the “power tectonics” which enable or silence certain voices (Hansen 2000)’.

Therefore, in understanding the text process of production and process of interpretation, the text-discourse must be related to its interaction and context, because discourse ‘involves social conditions, which can be specified as social conditions of production, and social conditions of interpretation. These social conditions, moreover, relate to three different “levels” of social organization: the level of the social situation, or the immediate social environment in which the discourse occurs; the level of the social institution, which constitutes a wider matrix for the discourse; and the level of the society as a whole. What I am suggesting, in summary, is that these social conditions shape the way in which texts are produced and interpreted. So, in seeing language as discourse and social practice, one has committed oneself not just to analysing texts or to analysing processes of production and interpretation, but to analysing the relationship between texts, processes and their context as well as the more remote conditions of the situational and social structures, or to using the italicized terms in Fig. 2.1. (reproduced here below), the relationship between texts, interactions, and contexts’ (Fairclough 2001: 20-21).



Source: Fairclough N. (2001), *Language and Power*, London: Longman, 21.

The same critical vision is sustained by Barbara Johnstone who argues that ‘calling what we do “discourse analysis” rather than “language analysis” underscores the fact that we are not centrally focused on language as an abstract system. We tend instead to be interested in what happens when people draw on the knowledge they have about language, knowledge based on their memories of things they have said, heard, seen, or written before, to do things in the world: exchange information, express feelings, make things happen, create beauty, entertain themselves and others, and so on. This knowledge (...) is what is often referred to as “language”, when language is thought of as an abstract system of rules or structural relationships. Discourse is both the source of this knowledge (people’s generalization about language are made on the basis of the discourse they participate in) and the result of it (people apply what they already know in creating and interpreting new discourse)’ (Johnstone 2008: 3).

Johnstone’s point intersects with Fairclough’s ‘Critical Discourse Analysis’, and with Ken Booth’s view that ‘there is one world, but many realities. The one world is that progressively revealed by the natural sciences. The many realities consist of “facts by human agreement” in the social world, as John Searle (1995) puts it. It is these political and social realities – “nations,” “war,” “gender,” “capitalism,” “sovereignty,” “human nature,” and so on – that demand the primary attention of students of security. They create the structures and process by which humankind lives – or dies. Critical explorations of the ideas that made us are part of trying to answer three fundamental questions about security: What is reality? What is reliable knowledge? What might we do?’ (Booth 2005: 2). And this thesis draws directly from these ideas for its methods.

Finally, a link emerges between discourse, language and narrative and this is because narrative (1) ‘is a movement from a start point to an end point, with digressions, which involves the showing or the telling of story events. Narrative is a re-presentation of events and, chiefly, re-presents space and time’ (Cobley 2006: 236-237); (2) ‘it asserts that the domination of reality by vision is no more than a will to power, a will to truth and interpretation, and not an objective condition of history’ (Said 2003: 240); (3) even if it can be seen as a ‘story’ or a ‘plot’, in reality this is not the case: “‘story’ consists of all the events which are to be depicted. “Plot” is the chain of causation which dictates that these events are somehow linked and that they are therefore to be depicted in relation to each other. “Narrative” is the showing or the telling of these events and the mode selected for that to take place’ (Cobley 2006: 5-6); and (4) narrative uses language as a medium.

As a result of this reasoning, and due to the fact that the concept of discourse applied here includes elements drawn from the concept of language, text and narrative, a constructivist position has been adopted in this thesis. This is because in this work the fact is accepted that ‘each of us sees different things, and what we see is determined by a complicated mix of social and contextual influences and/or presuppositions’ (Mosses & Torbjorn 2007: 10). Thus, constructivists ‘recognize the important role of the observer and society in constructing patterns that we study as social scientists (...) Constructivists recognize that we do not just ‘experience’ the world objectively or directly: our experiences are channelled through the human mind – in often elusive ways. It is in this short channel between the eye and the brain – between sense and perception and the experience of the mind – that we find many challenges to naturalism. When scientific investigation is aimed at perceptions of the world rather than the world ‘as it is’, we open the possibility to multiple worlds (or, more accurately, multiple perceptions).

Consequently, constructivists recognize that people may look at the same thing and perceive it differently. Individual characteristics (such as age, gender or race) or social characteristics (such as era, culture and language) can facilitate or obscure a given perception of the world (...) as Max Weber noted 'we are cultural beings, endowed with the capacity and the will to take a deliberate attitude towards the world and to lend it significance' (Mosses & Torbjorn 2007: 10-11). At the same time, it must be added that the anthropological place of the 'Space of Virtual Peace' (explained in the next subchapter) is at the same time a rhetorical territory. For Augé this means that in this place, not only the human being lives as a cultural being, but in this rhetorical territory he is 'at home'. The rhetoric place of a character ends where his interlocutors do not understand any more the meaning he gives to his actions, his gesture, neither his admirations nor resentments. A difficulty in rhetoric communication communicates the crossing of a frontier (Augé 2009: 97).

As a consequence, 'because social contexts are filled with meaning, constructivists find utility in a much broader set of epistemological tools, including empathy, authority, myths and so on. (...) If something appears meaningful or real to a social agent, then it may affect his behaviour and have real consequences for the society around him, (...) because truth lies in the eyes of the observer, and in the constellation of power and force that supports that truth. (...) For the constructivist, that battle is not so much about truth as it is about the power, interests and identities of those involved' (Mosses & Torbjorn 2007: 11-12).

Therefore, what emerges inside the interpretative-anthropological-rhetorical space where the human being lives like a cultural being is what Moscovici (2000) calls a 'social representation' which is a stock of values, ideas, metaphors, beliefs, and practices that are shared among the members of groups and communities, and which play an important role in the interpretation of a discourse-utterance (Fairclough 2001: 8-9). 'This means that social representations are always complex, and necessarily inscribed within the "framework of pre-existing thought", hence always dependent on systems of belief anchored in values, traditions and images of the world and of existence. They are above all the object of a permanent social work, in and through discourse, so that every new phenomenon can always be reincorporated within explanatory or justificatory models which are familiar and therefore acceptable. This process of the exchange and composition of ideas is all the more necessary since it responds to the twofold demands of individuals and collectives: on the one hand to construct systems of thought and understanding, and on the other to adopt consensual visions of action which allow them to maintain a social bond, even a continuity of communication of the idea. Representations therefore always play a triple role of illumination (giving sense to realities), integration (incorporating new ideas of facts into familiar frameworks) and partition (ensuring the common sense through which a given collectivity is recognized). Systems for the interpretation of the world and of events, they are in this way the essential vectors of opinions, judgments and beliefs, direct at ensuring the relevance and regularity of our bonds and of our conduct as a community' (Moscovici 2000: 157). Thus, they represent an analysis on the relationships between language, meanings, emotions, cognition and politics.

As a result, once we approach a security text as a social representation through the lens of CDA, we have to look at how its performative language is capable of triggering

emotions which have political and social relevance. Therefore, what is important is how this language-utterance is translated by the individual. This link is offered by the point made by Fairclough (2001: 8-9) that in the work of comprehension 'you do not simply "decode" an utterance, you arrive at an interpretation through an active process of matching features of the utterance at various levels with representations you have stored in your long-term memory', which is reflected in the work of Moscovici who argues that 'emotional reactions, perceptions and rationalizations are not responses to an exterior stimulus as such, but to the category in which we classify such images, to the names we give them. We react to stimulus in so far as we have objectified it and re-created it, at least partially, at the moment of its inception. The object to which we respond can assume a number of aspects and the specific aspect it does assume depends on the response we associate with it before defining it. The mother sees the child's arms stretched out to her and not to someone else when she is already preparing to smile and is aware that her smile is indispensable to the child's stability. In other words, social representations determine both the character of the stimulus and the response it elicits, just as in a particular they determine which is which. To know them and explain what they are and what they signify is the first step in every analysis of a situation or a social encounter, and constitutes a means in predicting the evolution of a group's interactions, for instance' (Moscovici 2000: 70).

Castells is aware that political power is only one dimension of power, as power relationships are constructed in complex multiple spheres of social practice where social representations are part of them. Therefore, drawing from the work of Antonio Damasio (1994, 1999, 2003, 2008), and George Lakoff (1980, 1991, 2004, 2005, 2008), and Drew Westen (2007), Castells anchored his analysis on the relationship between communication and political practice to neuroscience and cognitive science, and to the empirical evidence in the field of political psychology that can be better understood from a neuro-scientific perspective. For Castells, emotion, cognition, communication and politics are all connected: 'communication happens by activating minds to share meaning. The mind is a process of creation and manipulation of mental images (visual or not) in the brain. Ideas can be seen as arrangements of mental images (Castells 2011: 137-138).

As Antonio Damasio has demonstrated (1994, 1999, 2003), emotions are deeply wired in our brain because they have been induced by the drive to survive throughout the process of evolution. Emotions are perceived in the brain as feelings and both are linked in the mind to orient the self toward decision-making in relation to the self's internal and external networks. For Lakoff and Johnson (1980), the brain thinks in metaphors, which can be accessed by language but are physical structure in the brain. Therefore, 'metaphors are critical to connect language (thus human communication) and brain circuitry. It is through metaphors that narratives are constructed. Narratives are composed of frames, which are the structures of the narrative that correspond to the structures of the brain that resulted from the brain's activity over time. Frames are neural networks of association that can be accessed from the language through metaphorical connections. Framing means activating specific neural networks. In language, words are associated to semantic fields. These semantic fields refer to conceptual frames. Thus, language and mind communicate by frames which structures narratives that activate networks in the brain. Metaphors frame communication by selecting specific associations between

language and experience on the basis of brain mapping. But frame structures are not arbitrary. They are based on experience, and they emerge from social organization that defines social roles within culture and then becomes wired in the brain circuits. Thus, the patriarchal family is based on the role of the father/patriarch and the mother/homemaker derived from evolution and established through domination and the gendered division of labor throughout history, which is then inscribed in brain networks through biological evolution and culture experience' (Castells 2011: 142).

To sum up, this section has highlighted those representational characteristics which put in evidence the strong link between security narrative, language, discourse, narrative, power and emotions and which form the power-knowledge-security-total institution's language, identity, time and space. Next subchapter uses a mapping approach and develops the interpretative grid of the 'Space of Virtual Peace'. This interpretative grid is necessary because the security text has 'power' into the territory of the power-knowledge-security-total institution (the geographical borders of NATO's countries; the territory of Italy for the Italian Ministry of Defence). However, the security actions which NATO and Italy are prone to implement are outside their own territories (NATO talks about 'Multiple Stress Zones, Soligan 2009), as the case of 'crisis management' operations and CIMIC operations. And it is in these territories that these institutions will deploy and will create a security narrative, a PKSTI's reality in which their soldier will operate. Next subchapter will talk precisely about this territory.

3. Mapping approach and the 'Space of Virtual Peace'

The previous pages have illustrated the relation between the meaning of security and its emotional characteristics, together with the changing nature of the most recent conflicts (which have identified the centrality of the human being, his identity, alongside his culture as the main motivations behind the reason of the combats). Now I need to illustrate the emotional discourses of these social representations on a map which defines an anthropological place which is 'a place intensely symbolized, lived by individuals in which they found their spatial, temporal, individual and collective benchmarks. For the anthropologist, at the same time, it is a space in which he can read and decode the social relations and the common forms of belonging' (Auge 2011: 158). And I call this anthropological place which represent the theatre of operations of CIMIC operations as the 'space of virtual peace'.

This approach is justified by the fact that (1) the anthropological place of the 'space of virtual peace' represents the potential theatre of crisis management operations (CIMIC operations) in which the Italian soldiers operate in what NATO defines as 'Multiple Stress Zones' (Soligan 2009); (2) the military operations in this territory are labelled and sold to the audience as crisis management, CIMIC operation⁴⁸, peace-

⁴⁸ According to the 'Allied Joint Doctrine for Civil-Military Cooperation' (NATO-AJP-3.4.9, Feb 2013) CIMIC is a military function that is an integral part of modern multidimensional operations, which addresses all cooperating parties within a conflict situation and facilitates mutual support of civilian capabilities to military forces and vice versa. The governing idea in all those interactions is reaching the defined and commonly desired end state, for the best of the local population, the civil actors and the Alliance, which will be, under the best of circumstances, hard to achieve. NATO CIMIC is 'the coordination and cooperation, in support of the mission, between the NATO Commander and civil actors,

operations, etc (Mini 2012: 27) in order to be ‘socially acceptable’ (Bourdieu 2005: 76); however, (3) ‘one of the characteristics of the “new wars” is that pre-conflict and post-conflict phases increasingly resemble each other. Agreements stabilize the violence but tend not to provide solutions. Moreover, the ‘new wars’ have a tendency to spread through criminal networks, refugees, and the virus of exclusivist ideologies. The risk is that the just war and the humanitarian peace positions could end up prolonging these wars, perhaps indefinitely’ (Kaldor 2007: 71); and, (4) despite the ‘peace’ label, the territory of a ‘peace’ operation is a theatre of ‘war’ (Mini 2003).

Moreover, it is in this anthropological place of crisis management-CIMIC operation that the CIMIC military personnel collect that local data which constitute the inputs of the NATO CIMIC main Operational Plan, and of any CIMIC operation (UN too): (1) Political and cultural history, including tribal matters; (2) The state of national and local government; (3) The needs of the population. (4) Population movement (internally displaced person and refugees situation); (5) The presence, mandates, capabilities and intentions of applicable civil actors; (6) Infrastructure; (7) Economy and Commerce; (8) The mind-set and perceptions of the civil population (NATO-AJP-3.4.9, Feb 2013).

It is in this space that the CIMIC military personnel spot, identify, classify those cultural patterns which help the CIMIC operations on the whole, to provide a cultural definition and image (local cultural framework) of the local populations in which they operate and interact: (1) Honour and face; (2) Hierarchy and social stratification; (3) Purity, danger and taboo; (4) Proxemics and body language; (5) Speech acts; (6) Worldview and belief systems (Van Meer, J.P., Veldhuis, G.J., & Schwerzel, J., 2008). And I do consider all the data collected by the CIMIC military personnel as material for the production (at micro-level) of ‘legitimate security knowledge’, which has the potentiality to modify the strategy and the politics (macro level security knowledge) of the whole mission and of the security approach.

However, linking the pre-conflict phase to the post-conflict situation takes us back to the discourse on the concept of peace so much propagandised by the PKSTI’ narrative in order to justify the security mission. For David Keen ‘the kind of peace that prevails will be linked to the kind of violence that preceded it. (...) Therefore, there should be other routes to peace that might work better than the ‘security approach’, particularly in the medium and the long term. One is the attempt to question the definition of the enemy that has been sanctioned and propagated by officialdom (in whatever form) and perhaps also by rebels and terrorists. That questioning will need to include an attempt to deconstruct the process by which a particular enemy came to be defined as the enemy. (...) A second approach is to try to map the various functions of violence for the various parties who have contributed to violence (...), and then to use this analysis as a way to trying to reduce violent behaviour’ (Keen 2009: 172-173).

I have already demonstrated, in chapter one, the importance of discourse analysis in defining the term security and how the security discourse has moved from an orthodox approach to a liquid definition of the enemy-threat. Now is the moment to move to the

including national population and local authorities, as well as international, national and non-governmental organizations and agencies’

second pillar of my methodology: the mapping approach and the construction of the anthropological space of virtual peace.

However, I believe that there are some problems with this approach due to the fact that it should provide a valid, dynamic and open representation of the rhetorical space-anthropological place where the actors-informants interact (MNCG CIMIC Military personnel). Unfortunately, this has not been the case. My interest is, undoubtedly, to provide a way to map what I call the 'Space of Virtual Peace':

- An open and dynamic 'rhetorical space-anthropological-existential place', filled with symbolism, cultural elements and emotions, which has been the 'territory-environment' of pre-conflict phases, and subsequently of an armed conflict, and
- Post-conflict situations in a 'virtual peace' dimension where there is still a 'war after the war'.

For this reason, even if the mapping approach and conflict mapping are regarded as the classical *modus operandi*, I consider them unable to reproduce the 'qualitative' reality which they suppose to represent and thus the base for a structured analysis, which I want to set in motion here with the idea of the 'space of virtual peace'.

Indeed, 'the mapping approach has been subject to a very particular (and very narrow) interpretation in the form of analysis and interventions based around the idea of "rebel greed". According to this limited perspective, the most useful interventions are those that constrain the money that rebels can make, thereby removing the cause of civil war and of its perpetuation' (Keen 2009: 173).

Despite the fact that 'conflict mapping is a first step in intervening to manage a particular conflict'⁴⁹, in my opinion, however, there are still some problems with both approaches because they participate to 'diagnositicate' a 'conflict' as a 'disease' (as demonstrated by NATO and the Italian Ministry of Defence security language and by the work of Kilcullen on conflict ethnography, 2009; and Huysmans 2007, Campbell 1998a) and they use an ethnocentric bio-medic protocol of data-identification and interpretation. In this mapping approach, based on a western Newtonian-Cartesian scientific paradigm, the dynamic relation between time and material-subject is not considered. Even a reductionist scission between the mind and the body has been operated on, not to mention the distance which has been constructed between the intervenor-doctor and the supposed patient (Rico Becerra 2009: 68-83).

⁴⁹ 'Conflict mapping is a first step in intervening to manage a particular conflict. It gives both to the intervenor and the conflict parties a clearer understanding of the origins, nature, dynamics and possibilities for resolution of the conflict. (...) Having mapped the structure of the conflict, the next step is to use the information in the map to identify the scope for the conflict resolution, preferably with the help of the parties or embedded third parties. Such an analysis would identify: changes in the context which could alter the conflict situation, including the interests and capacities of third parties to influence it; changes within and between the conflict parties, including internal leadership struggles, varying prospects for military success, the readiness of general populations to express support for settlement; possible ways of redefining goals and finding alternative means of resolving differences, including suggested steps towards settlement and eventual transformation; likely constraints on these; and how these might be overcome. (...) A conflict map is an initial snapshot. Analyst may then want to keep updating it by regular "conflict tracking"'. In Oliver Ramsbotham, Tom Woodhouse and Hugh Miall, *Contemporary Conflict Resolution*, Cambridge: Polity, 2005, pp. 74-75.

Therefore, if ‘medicalization occurs when human problems or experiences become defined as medical problems, usually in terms of illnesses, diseases, or syndromes’ (Conrad and Barker 2010: 74), these mapping approaches, or ‘medicalization-mapping approaches’ contribute to the construction of a new institutionalized concept of security: from the orthodox-militarized concept of security to a ‘medicalized’ one. For this reason, these official maps depict a symbolic space’, which I call a ‘geopolitical-narrative framework’⁵⁰: the space where the process of Securitization becomes a ‘more extreme version of politicization’ (Buzan, Waever, and the Wilde 1998: 23-24), and now as a result of a ‘securitization-medicalization’ process.

However, medical anthropology challenges the excessive biologist’s view of western medicine (the dimension of disease), and focuses more on the cultural dimension (illness) and the social dimension (sickness). This is because it is within this dimension illness-sickness where the continuum health/illness of the ‘patient’ is determined (Rico Becerra 2009: 84-85).

As a result, the mapping approach (understood as a conflict mapping – conflict tracking) will not be able to map the ‘space of virtual peace’ in which the local populations live because the time of this map has expired after the end of the war/conflict and the declaration of ‘peace’. However, the problem is not only of the time, but of the very relation which the official mapping approaches (as a bio-medical protocol) establish with the local population.

‘Peace’ is not a medicament which, once prescribed (by the intervener-doctor) and swallowed (by the warring ‘patients’), transforms the whole post-conflict situation, and the human relations which exist into the ‘space of virtual peace’.

The problem resides in the bio-medic division between body and mind, and the distance between the doctor and the patient. Here, in this dimension, the patient loses his human dimension and the medical doctor looks only at the body-disease. It is the disease that must be combated, what the patient says and feels is of no importance: once a disease is diagnosed, the bio-medical protocol takes possession of the situation.

Thus, even the continuum health/illness, the cultural/social dimension in which the ‘patient’ lives, becomes a ‘contagious’ non-existing place. However, is medical anthropology which provides us a clue to exit from this bio-medical hermeneutical cycle: the process ‘salud/enfermedad/atencion (s/e/a)’ (health/illness/treatment-attention) (Rico Becerra 2009: 83-84), focuses on the continuum health/illness, then, becoming a basic dimension of culture, gives importance to what the “patient” says and feels. It is in the treatment-attention phase of the “s/e/a” process, where the relation between the doctor and the patient is restored, and where empirical evidence plays a major role. In treating and attending to the patient as a human being, with his own identity, culture, emotion, and in listening to him, permits us to exit from the bio-medical protocol.

Then, considering the local population as human beings, in listening to their voices which verbalize their emotions, in understanding them and their cultural-social

⁵⁰ “A ‘geopolitical-narrative-framework’ is a physical and intellectual-symbolic space (as a hermeneutical circle where the three elements of the Aristotle’s Rhetoric are present: Ethos, Pathos and Logos), in which emotions and perceptions are elaborated through an hegemonic narrative (narrative is a re-presentation of real or invented events, then a paradigm), in order to produce a particular image and meaning (and protocol of interpretation) to be attached to the word security”. In Giovanni Ercolani, “Keeping Security and Peace: Behind the Strategicalization of NATO’s Critical Security Discourse”, *The Journal of Security Strategies*, Year 7, Issue: 14, December 2011, p. 54.

environment, and not pretending that they and their 'existential place' are contagious, these represent the first steps for a reinterpretation of the 'mapping approach'.

Dominique Moisi, a leading authority on international affairs, in his 2009 book 'The Geopolitics of Emotion – How Cultures of Fear, Humiliation, and Hope are Reshaping the World', reports his experiences of traveling and interviewing people around the world, and explains that in order to understand our changing world, we need to confront emotion.

'Emotions matter. They impact the attitudes of the peoples, the relationship between cultures, and the behavior of nations. Neither political leaders nor students of history nor ordinary concerned citizens can afford to ignore them' (Moisi 2010: 29). For this reason Dominique Moisi suggests that 'such a mapping involves bringing together elements as diverse as surveys of public opinion (how people feel about themselves, their present, and their future) the statements of political leaders, and cultural production such as movies, plays, and books' (Moisi 2010: 16). Taking into consideration the globalization⁵¹ process and the various sentiments which have been aroused by the impact-relation between the local and the global, the author focuses geopolitically on three emotions of culture: fear, hope, and humiliation. Following the mapping approach developed by Prof. Dominique Moisi, it is very interesting how different the culture of emotions takes place in various geopolitical areas of this planet.

While the culture of hope is an Asian hope (Moisi 2010: 30-55), and the culture of 'bad humiliation' is most present in large parts of the Arab-Islamic world (Moisi 2010: 56-89), the culture of fear is 'the dominant emotion of the West is, above all, a reaction to the events and feelings taking place elsewhere. For the first time in more than two centuries, the West is no longer setting the tune. This perception of our vulnerability and of our relative loss of centrality is at the very center of our identity crisis' (Moisi 2010: 90-91). Therefore it is possible to apply this analysis to the security narrative produced by

⁵¹ 'Today (...), quests for identity by peoples uncertain of whom they are, their place in the world, and their prospects for a meaningful future have replaced ideology as the motor of history, with the consequence that emotions matter more than ever where media are playing the role of a sounding board and a magnifying glass. (...) In an age of globalization, emotions have become indispensable to grasp the complexity of the world we live in. (...) Unlike the Cold War system, globalization is not static but a dynamic ongoing process, involving the inexorable integration of markets, nation-states, and technologies to a degree never witnessed, in a way that is enabling individuals, corporations, and countries to reach around the world farther, faster, deeper, and cheaper than ever before. This same process is also producing a powerful backlash from those brutalized or left behind by the new system. (...) The primary reason that today's world is the ideal fertile ground for the blossoming or even the explosion of emotions is that globalization causes insecurity and raises the question of identity. In the Cold War period there was never any reason to ask, "Who are we?" The answer was plainly visible on every map that depicted the two adversarial systems dividing the globe between them. But in an ever-changing world without borders, the question is intensely relevant. Identity is strongly linked with confidence, and in turn confidence, or the lack thereof, is expressed in emotions – in particular, those of fear, hope, and humiliation. Economically, globalization can be defined simply as the integration of economic activities across borders through markets. The driving forces of globalization, masterfully analyzed by Martin Wolf, are technological and policy changes that reduce the cost of transport and communication and encourage greater reliance on market forces. But this free flow of goods in economic terms also implies in political terms the free flow of emotions, including both positive emotions (ambition, curiosity, yearning for self-expression) and evil ones, including the angry passions that lead to hatred between nations, religions, and ethnic group.' Dominique Moisi, *The Geopolitics of Emotion – How Cultures of Fear, Humiliation, and Hope are Reshaping the World*, New York: Anchor Books, 2010, pp. 4-13.

the PKSTI (NATO, and the Italian Ministry of Defence) and this crisis can be described in the following terms: ‘What’s happening to us? We used to be in charge of the rest of the world. Even if, in the twentieth century, we led ourselves to self destruction [World War I] or to suicide/murder [World War II and the Holocaust] at least we did it to ourselves. Those were our own follies. Now it seems we are to be victimized by forces beyond our control. Asia is about to overtake us economically. Fundamentalists in the Islamic world are intent on destroying us. Immigrants from the southern nations are about to overwhelm us. Is there any way we can regain control of our own destiny? (Moisi 2010: 90-91).

3.1. The ‘Space of Virtual Peace’ as an anthropological place and an interpretative grid

My critic to NATO CIMIC approach and ‘conflict ethnography’ (Kilcullen 2009; presented in chapter one is based on the assumptions that (1) they are military and ethnocentric-semantic-interpretative tools; (2) their referent object is to secure NATO’s countries and not designed to free local people from anxiety (security); (3) they force to read and see the anthropological place according the specific PKSTI’s paradigm and language; (4) that ‘what a man sees depends both upon what he looks at and also upon what his previous visual-conceptual experience has taught him to see’ (Kuhn 1996: 113); and (5) as a result, ‘when I observe the world around me through the lenses of a language, I perceive its actually through the lenses of the potentialities hidden, latently present, in it. What this means is that potentially appears “as such”, becomes actual *as potentially*, only through language: it is the appellation of a thing that brings to light (“posits”) its potentials’ (Zizek 2008: xi).

To sustain my thesis I do agree with the fact that ‘critical explorations of the realities of security have to start in our heads before they can take place in the outside world’ (Booth 2005: 3). And I draw from (1) the empirical work of the former Italian Army General Fabio Mini (2003, 2008, 2012); (2) the concepts of anthropological space, contemporaneity, and super modernity elaborated by Marc Augé’ (1999, 2011); (3) the idea of emancipation developed by Ken Booth (2005); and (4) the framework provided the human security principles.

The argument which I unfold here is that these ‘anthropological places’ (1) have been included (as multiple stress zones) inside the framework of an official securitization narrative-concept produced by a power-knowledge-security-total institution; (2) they have been looked through the ‘military’ referent-label-lens-paradigm which defines only the securing mission in military terms; and (3) therefore, the way external actors perceive and understand the security of these anthropological places depends from an official semantic-narrative (like the NATO Strategic Concept and the 2015 White Paper of the Italian Ministry of Defence) which, as a macro-narrative, frames and overlaps a security threat, and its solution (securing action) to a place and a population. At the end these anthropological places, despite their peculiar identities are only defined with the generic term of ‘multiple stress zones’, converting them in ‘non-places’⁵². I can say that the

⁵² Marc Augé opposes the concept of ‘non-places’ to the concept of a sociological ‘place’, which traditionally has been associated with space and time limited in a specific culture. If a place can be defined

official and macro level security knowledge produced on these areas is the map of ‘non-places’.

However, there is a problem with the very macro-narrative of humanitarian-peace missions which is officially allocated to a military intervention and which most of the time define an ‘anthropological place’ and the insecurity cure. This is because these military interventions always start with a justifying narrative and myth (security, peace, humanitarian, human security, etc.) and they end up with another designed narrative, like the one that please anyone and which refer to the ideas-concepts-myths of ‘peace’ and ‘security’. This has been possible because ‘in a world pervaded by the mantra of peace, hypocrisy allows to believe that war operations are “peace operations” or of peace support, and military interventions become more acceptable if they are declined in all the English sauces using the prefix peace: keeping, making, enforcing, building, enhancing, support operations, etc.’ (Mini 2012: 27). Therefore, my question is ‘what peace, and what security’?

And this is the same question that the Italian Army General Fabio Mini, former Commander of KFOR, asked to himself (1) assuming an observant participation position and an ‘emic’ perspective meaning from the perspective of the people who were suffering the human insecure event-situation and were the subjects-referents of the securing-humanitarian mission; and (2) comparing the official humanitarian-peace mission macro-narrative with all the local micro-narratives he experienced through his peace missions. For Mini, in his controversial study ‘The War after the War’, which can be seen as the result of his ethnographic experiences in various ‘peace missions’, the peace that is achieved after the war is the peace of who won and not the abstract concept of ‘*pax universalis*’. There is still a war going on after the war has been declared over, and the ‘virtual peace’ achieved’ (Mini 2003: 142-143).

And it is this concept of virtual peace which means that the ‘peace’ is only apparent, and not real, that defines the reality of a conflicting situation which persists in an area after the mission has been officially declared accomplished; and question all the approaches and macro-narratives related to the military mission.

This is why ‘the symbolism of the peace intervention has replaced that of the war and even surpassed that of pacifism. (...) The culture of mission accomplished, when the problem has been solved, has been transformed in mission accomplished when the mandate expires. Generally the mandate ends because its duration expires or because its resources are limited, then the mission is fulfilled once its time is expired or its resources ended. Then, if the wretches continue to die of hunger, refugees to be persecuted, and people or the warring factions easily continue their mutual massacre, all of this is unimportant. Appeased the emotion of public opinion, the political consciousness is quiet and the militaries, satisfied as usual with some medals, consider the subject closed. Whatever it was’ (Mini 2003: 142-143).

At the end, following the experiences and reasoning of Mini, we realize that, in these areas-situations outside NATO’s territory, security has not been implemented, and the real security mission has not been accomplished. Undoubtedly, there is a link between the peace attained and the security approach used to attain it. ‘If peace is both possibility and danger, this underlines that what is desirable is not just peace per se but the right kind

as relational, historical and concerned with identity, then it is a ‘place’ – the rest would be ‘non-places’, such as for example highways, airports and supermarkets (Augé 2009a).

of peace. The distinction between different kinds of peace has been emphasized by Johan Galtung, for whom “positive peace” would include love, freedom from exploitation and repression, and the existence of a culture of peace. Galtung distinguishes “structural violence” (arising from social structures) from “direct violence” (harm that is specifically intended). “Structural violence”, for Galtung, includes exploit and marginalization – anything that limits human well-being; it contains the seeds for direct violence’ (Keen 2009: 171-172).

Therefore, what emerges is (1) that one of main purpose of ‘peace operations’ is to maintain the status quo of the power-knowledge-security-total institution which promoted the ‘peace operations’ in order to protect its own interests; (2) that the concept of security promoted by the PKSTI is nothing more than a myth, therefore, a metalanguage (Barthes 2000), which has been elevated to a status quo ideology and a social habitus (Bourdieu 2005); and (3) that the function of this ideology (i) is to act as the official-certified-authorized semantic protocol through which the anthropological places-multiple stress zones is read; and (ii) to provide us the social reality (Zizek 2008: 45).

This is even more evident when we consider the temporal and spatial dimensions of the ‘anthropological places-multiple stress zones’ which are not geographical places an societies which like ‘in vitro’ objects are completely excluded from the globalized-interconnected world but they maintain with it a simultaneous relationship characterized by an acceleration of history. Therefore, an anthropological vision which focuses only on the local human insecure event is limited, and does not acknowledge that ‘today, the planet has shrunk; information and images circulate readily, and because of this the others’ mythic dimension is fading. The “others” are in fact not so very different, or rather, their otherness remains, but the prestige of their erstwhile exoticism is gone. (...) We are experiencing an “acceleration of history” – another expression for the ‘shrinking of the planet’ – that involves both objective interactions within the “world system” and the instantaneity of information and image dissemination. Each month, every day, we experience “historical” events; each day the border between history and current events becomes a bit more blurred. The parameters of time, like those of space, are changing, and this is an unprecedented revolution’ (Auge’ 1999: 14).

Therefore for Auge’ we are living in a human-spatial-temporal dimension characterized by contemporaneity and super-modernity, and in his book ‘An Anthropology for Contemporary Worlds’ he argues that ‘the world’s inhabitants have at last become truly contemporaneous, and yet the world’s diversity is recomposed every moment; this is the paradox of our day. We must speak, therefore, of worlds in the plural, understanding that each of them communicates with the others, that each world possesses at least images of the others – images that may well be deformed, mangled, retouched, in some cases redeveloped by those who look to find in them, first and foremost, features and themes that speak to them of themselves, even if this means inventing them. Still, the referential character of these images cannot be doubted: no one can any longer doubt that the others exist. Even those who affirm with increasing vigour their own irreducible, untouchable identity draw their force and conviction from their perception of themselves as being the opposite of the image of the other, an other whom they mythify so as to be rid of this unbearable reality’ (Auge’ 1999: 89).

And this contemporaneous world is characterized by the temporal dimension of ‘super-modernity’, which is defined in opposition to modernity. Super-modernity (1) corresponds to an acceleration of history, a shrinking of space, and an individualizing of references, all of which subvert the cumulative process of modernity (Auge’ 1999: 110); and (2) is marked by three types of excesses: (i) an excess of event, which makes it difficult to conceive history; (ii) an excess of images and spatial references, the paradoxical effect of which is to close us up into a shrinking space of the world; and (iii) an excessive recourse to the individual, by which I mean that because of the collapse of intermediary bodies and the confirmed impotence of the great system of interpretation, individuals are now required to conceive their relation to history and the world by themselves (Auge’ 1999: 101-102).

However, there is another important aspect of the spatial dimensions of the ‘anthropological places-multiple stress zones’ and it is represented by the fact that most of the time their populations are present in the territories of the NATO-Western-Post-modern countries too, for the effect of migration, illegal migration, diasporas, displacements, etc. Then, I strongly believe that if a PKSTI is engaging in a ‘crisis management’ operation in a specific ‘multiple stress zone’, it should dialogue with the same ‘multiple stress zone’ communities which are present in its own PKSTI territory. And this is because the map of these operations, is not the territory and the territory (societal, emotional, imagined communities⁵³, fan base⁵⁴, etc.) of a crisis management operation in a multiple stress zone is wider than the geographical border of the local theatre of operations’ map.

Unfortunately this did not happen with the various post-modern states (Cooper 1996) ‘security’ interventions in Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, Syria, etc, when (1) the local communities which came from the above countries were not consulted by the PKSTI before the securing operation; and (2) the official PKSTI knowledge-reality produced on these areas was completely proved wrong by experiences of the PKSTI militaries on the grounds.

Moreover, what I do consider central in any security analysis is the idea of emancipation (Booth 2005) which is completely missed by the PKSTI’s approach to the multiple stress zones. Ken Booth argues that emancipation ‘should be logically be given precedence in our thinking about security over the mainstream themes of power and order. He defines emancipation as the freeing of people (as individuals and groups) from the physical and human constraints which stop them carrying out what they would freely choose to do. War and the threat of war is one of those constraints, together with poverty, poor education, political oppression and so on. Security and emancipation are two sides of the same coin. Emancipation, theoretically, is security’ (Smith 2005: 42-43). And this vision permits to see security in world politics as ‘an instrumental value that enables people(s) some opportunity to choose how to live. It is a means by which individuals and collectivities can invent and reinvent different ideas about being human’ (Booth 2005: 23).

On the same advice is Bill McSweeney who argues that ‘security only makes sense if individual human beings are seen as its primary referent, or subjectThe basic

⁵³ Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*, London: Verso, 2006.

⁵⁴ Paul Willis, *The Ethnographic Imagination*, Cambridge: Polity, 2000, p. 48.

need for security...is that which expresses itself as such in everyday life and in all social action. It is the security of social relations....It is from this elemental experience, by definition common to all individuals, that we derive the social order as the general condition of ontological security' (McSweeney, 1999: 208).

Then, what emerges, at empirical and conceptual level, from this line of analysis, is the strong necessity to return to the real etymological meaning of security (security: *securitas*, freedom from anxiety). Because, it is only in putting, at the centre of this interpretative process, the human being as the referent object of security, and the idea of security linked to the concept of emancipation (emancipate from anxiety), that it is possible (1) to read, interpret, and approach the anthropological space of the multiple stress zones; and (2) not fall in the semantic trap of the official PKSTI security narrative which puts as interpretative referent its own PKSTI security.

And this opportunity to return to the original etymological meaning of security (and not to its various contested concepts-myths) is represented by the concept of human security. The term 'Human Security' was first popularized by the United Nations Development Program in the early 1990s. It emerged in the post-Cold War era as a way to link various humanitarian, economic, and social issues in order to alleviate human suffering and assure security. For Mary Kaldor 'human security is about the security of individual and communities rather than security of states, and it combines both human rights and human development' (Kaldor 2007: 182). And, the the issues human security addresses include, but are not limited to, the following: organized crime and criminal violence, human rights and good governance, armed conflict and intervention, genocide and mass crimes, health and development, and resources and environment.

However, it is the former Secretary General of the United Nations, Mr. Kofi A. Annan, who best explained and summarized the process which brought the necessity to look at security from a new perspective different from the one employed during the Cold War period: 'during the cold war, security tended to be defined almost entirely in terms of military might and the balance of terror. Today, we know that 'security' means far more than the absence of conflict. We also have a greater appreciation for non-military sources of conflict. We know that lasting peace requires a broader vision encompassing areas such as education and health, democracy and human rights, protection against environmental degradation, and the proliferation of deadly weapons. We know that we cannot be secure amidst starvation, that we cannot build peace without alleviating poverty, and that we cannot build freedom on foundations of injustice. These pillars of what we now understand as the people-centered concept of 'human security' are interrelated and mutually reinforcing. And perhaps most crucially, no country, however powerful, can achieve human security on its own, and none is exempt from risks and costs if it chooses to do without the multilateral cooperation that can help us reach this goal' (Annan 2001: xix).

Then, it is the concept of human security which ties together security and human development. But, as Kaldor argues: 'security is often viewed as the absence of physical violence, while development is viewed as a material development – improved living standards. But this is a misleading distinction. Both concepts include "freedom from fear" and "freedom from want". Security is about confronting extreme vulnerabilities, not only in wars but in natural and man-made disasters as well – famines, tsunamis, hurricanes. Development should be about more than a decent standard of living. It is also about

feeling safe on the streets or being able to influence political decision-making. In contemporary wars, only a minority of deaths are battle deaths. Most people die in wars either because of violence deliberately targeted against civilians as a result of terror, ethnic cleansing or genocide, or because of the indirect effects of war as a result of lack of access to health care and the spread of disease, hunger and homelessness' (Kaldor 2007: 183).

As a result of the above concepts and idea developed hitherto it emerges that the causes of insecurity-crises inside the 'Multiple Stress Zones' (water stress, demographic stress, crop decline, hunger, coastal risk, recent history of conflict, organized crime and criminal violence, human rights and good governance, armed conflict and intervention, genocide and mass crimes, health and development, and resources and environment) are human security concerns (human security sources of insecurity). Then we should talk of 'human security operations' instead of NATO's 'crisis management'.

Here, I propose an interpretative grid labeled the 'space of the virtual peace' which defines the wide map and territory in which a human security mission is planned and takes place. The 'space of virtual peace' is defined by the following ten features:

1. Is an anthropological place (Augé 2011) which is a place intensely symbolized, lived by individuals in whom they found their spatial, temporal, individual and collective benchmarks. It is a space (i) in which the anthropologist, can read, and decode the social relations and the common forms of belonging; and (ii) it is dense with symbolism, cultural elements, meanings, and emotions;
2. It is an area-place affected by 'human security sources of insecurity';
3. Its geography is included in the space of a process of securitization (NATO strategic concept 2010; 'Multiple Stress Zones'; The Italian Ministry of Defence 2015 White Paper; UN mission);
4. Its referent object of security should be represented by the etymological meaning of 'security' (freedom from anxiety);
5. It is an emotional place because it was and still is the theatre of tension, stress, instability, and / or armed conflict;
6. Where peace (absence of war) has been proclaimed, but is a 'negative' peace (Galtung) and therefore the space is still in a dimension of 'virtual peace' (Mini 2003);
7. Where there is still a 'war after the war' (Mini 2003), therefore there is still insecurity;
8. Whose spatial-temporal dimension is characterized by 'contemporaneity' and 'supermodernity' (Augé 1999);
9. Its operational map is wider than the 'multiple stress zone' local geography and should consider the "multiple stress zone" population which is present as community into the PKSTI's territory too.
10. It is in this space where the military and the anthropologist act.

Here, I am convinced that the interpretative grid of the 'space of virtual peace' can provide (1) a new semantic; (2) a more precise instrument to use to translate local post-conflict situation and therefore to produce 'reality and 'reliable knowledge'; (3) a more useful and creative answers to the seven methodological security questions; (4) an

active role in the definition of what insecurity and security (as *pharmakon*) are for the 'multiple stress zone', and in the implementations of 'human security' policies; and (5) therefore contribute to the pre-'human security operation phase', in the planning, and conduct of the human security operation as demonstrated by the experience of the Italian Army General Mini because 'to evaluate the results of operations and wars is not sufficient to consider only the end of military hostilities, but we need to examine the results of the next phase of transformation which is euphemistically called reconstruction. This phase becomes an integral part of the declared engagement for peace and should be an integral part of the war engagement that preceded it.'⁵⁵

In this thesis the 'space of virtual peace' challenges the official security-insecurity framing of the PKSTI, for this reason, to check its validity, this concept has been one of the topics covered in the various interviews that the researcher has conducted during his field-work in Italy and in Lebanon. Looking through this interpretative grid it is possible to deconstruct the security dilemma and to provide more answers to it.

4. Methods of the research

This subchapter explains the methods which have been used in this thesis in order to study the community which is the main subject of this research: the Multinational CIMIC Group Military Personnel in CIMIC operations in the Space of Virtual Peace of Lebanon.

However, as the chapter three will demonstrate, the field experience produced various data. These data were not only related to the community I decided to study, but they referred to the way the PKSTI was acting towards my research project. Therefore, if at the beginning of my research my analysis was only concentrated on the MNCG CIMIC team, the personal experiences lived in this work made me aware of the attitude and behaviors of the other PKSTI, as the IMoD, the Army General Staff, and the MNCG HQ in relation to my academic interest. As a result, the anthropological places in which I operated were (1) the official contacts with the following PKSTIs: IMoD, Italian Defence Staff, Army General Staff, and MNCG HQ; and (2) my physical presence inside the MNCG barracks, and inside the UNIFIL bases in Lebanon. All these anthropological places provided me important data which I will disclose in the last chapter of this thesis.

⁵⁵ 'Countries rebuilt by the so-called international community, but dependent on the world charity in terms of economy and security are doubly enslaved: they are in the condition of dependency and in the impossibility to rebel against overwhelming and indefinite power. Therefore war is strictly tied to the post conflict and to the military and civil component. These two dimensions intertwine and influence each other in a continuity which should already be manifest before the war. These two components should be already in set in the pre-war phase, in the planning, and conduct of the war. The need of transformation and reconstruction, the costs, the duration, the sacrifices which will be imposed, the socio-economic model which should be implemented, and the identification of the personnel in charge of the post-conflict phase, all these are all those elements which should even indicate what to destroy and what to safeguard. Modern war is won or lost in relation to the results of what is done after the end of the conflict, and not in relation to the elimination of the opponent. It is from the post-war phase that we can understand if the war and the operations were worthy and if they were necessary for something or not. If those who made the war wanted peace, stability and welfare as an assertion of civilizations and solidarity, or if they just wanted to make a show of power, exercising authority, destroy, plunder, and gain extra expenses and leave. How did some barbarian hordes and all adventurers.' Fabio Mini, *La Guerra dopo la Guerra – Soldati, burocrati e mercenari nell'epoca della pace virtuale*, Torino: Einaudi, 2003, pp. 172-173.

Then, the objectives of this thesis became multiples. The first one was to enter in the official structure that provides security. This structure, which is the Multinational CIMIC Group (Motta di Livenza, Treviso, Italy) is an Italian battalion which, is part of the Italian Armed Forces (under the control and order of the IMoD), and performs CIMIC operations in NATO and UN missions. These missions are based on the political official security knowledge which is produced by the Italian Ministry of Defence (Italian Defence Staff, and Army General Staff). The same structure provides the CIMIC, and cultural awareness training which is necessary to its military personnel to operate in non-NATO territories. This cultural training, according the NATO's CIMIC doctrine represents a 'capability' in order to operate in a CIMIC theater of operation (defined in this thesis as the 'space of virtual peace').

Therefore, with my fieldwork I experienced the reality to perform this kind of research inside a PKSTI structure. The second objective was to verify the quality of the cultural awareness training, and to collect the experiences of my main informants⁵⁶ in the pre-deployment phase, in deployment (UNIFIL Mission, Lebanon) and in the post-deployment phase. In this thesis I do consider the experience matured by the informants as extremely relevant for the production of legitimate security knowledge due to the fact that is based on first hand experiences made by the military personnel with their booths on the ground.

The whole of this experience has provided (1) an image in which the PKSTI structure wants to defend its official security knowledge; and (2) despite the fact that the cultural awareness training offered to the informants was not enough, the informants themselves were able to gather information from their TO. Unfortunately, at the end of their mission there was no one from the PKSTI to collect the lesson learned from the informants in their TO. Such knowledge could have been employed at tactical, strategic and political level in order to produce a more realistic picture of the mission, and of the security needs of the local population, and as a result, produce changes in the way to provide security.

The methods which have been employed in this work (1) mirror the complexity of the study and they reflect the idea of Matera according to whom 'the method is a tool which is employed to control the situation, to objectify experiences, and to maintain the right distance between the observer and the observed, The method is needed to segment the events which form the anthropological experience, and which present themselves like an uninterrupted flow' (Matera 2015: 103); and (2) have been inspired by the work of Elkana (1981), Geertz (1973), Eco (2006), Sanmartin Arce (2003, 2007), Volkan (2004, 2006), Ramsbotham, Woodhouse and Mall (2006), and Matera (2015) amongst others, and have been represented by the observant participation, thick description, and the 'emic' perspective.

However, a specific reading strategy of the anthropological places which have been involved in this work has been adopted here. This is because the field experience has been conducted inside the military barracks of the MNCG HD (Italy), and in the 'space of virtual peace' represented by the UNIFIL Mission bases in Lebanon.

⁵⁶ The informants of this research are military personnel belonging to the Multinational CIMIC Group (Motta di Livenza, Treviso, Italy). This team was composed by two officers, two warrant-officers, and two NCOs; five men and one woman.

This specific reading strategy consists in reading both spaces and security narratives, which in these places play a structuring role in order to produce knowledge (at micro level), as an empirical reader and a model reader. For Eco the empirical reader means any given concrete reader reading a text, one of the many concrete actualizations of the abstract notion of the reader.

The model reader, instead, is one who, apart from the author, is able to interpret a text in a similar way to the author who generated it. 'The author has thus to foresee a model of the possible reader (the model reader) supposedly able to deal interpretatively with the expressions in the same way as the author deals generatively with them' (Eco 1995: 7). This is, 'the model reader is a whole of happiness conditions, textually established, which has to be satisfied in order to have the text fully actualized in its potential content' (Eco 2006: 62). For Ercolani (2011: 67), the model reader is represented by the NATO-Italy audience-reader, meaning the audience and reader who physically belong to the cultural-geopolitical space of the Alliance's Countries.

The NATO-Italy audience-reader is the one who, reading NATO narrative is capable of understanding and psychologically experiencing NATO-Italy's anxieties because the terminology of the Alliance narrative is a terminology which belongs to the reader's cultural, sociological, economic and historical environment. Consequently, the NATO audience-reader is capable of identifying himself with the 'space of virtual peace' of the power-knowledge-security-total institution point of view – and feeling what the writer feels. The PKSTI's audience-reader is the only capable of fully cooperating with the PKSTI's narrative and the PKSTI's PKSTI-ness fabrication. Therefore, for the model reader both spaces (PKSTI's territory and the 'space of virtual peace') become a one-dimensional ideological vital 'text', with its own specific 'Newspeak' Orwellian idiom (Orwell 2000: 312-326), in which its 'interpretative fate is part of its creative process: to produce a text means carrying out a strategy in which the moves of the adversary are foreseen. In military strategy, the strategist builds up a model of adversary' (Eco 2006: 54).

And in order to understand how the security text interact with the territory of the PKSTI, the 'space of virtual peace' and the activities of the MNCG military personnel the analyst-ethnographer needs to shift the whole field of research out of the imposed scientific paradigm and experience, and take, in relation to the anthropological place, three different ideal analytical positions: as an insider, as a stranger, and as an outsider (Kuhn 1996: 85, 111-115).

To take an inside position, like a model reader, two prerequisites are necessary: cultural competence and an area specialist. Acquiring a certain cultural competence is a prerequisite for discourse analysis, as for most qualitative methods, and this competence enables the researcher to use tools of discourse analysis to demonstrate variations in meaning and representation. The cultural competence I am talking about regards the culture that spawns the representations to be analyzed as specific (Neumann 2009: 63-65). The other prerequisite to be an area specialist 'is crucial in breaking down ethnocentric outlooks and opening up fresh perspectives on the human predicament. Theory and method, without area studies, encourage thinking in a vacuum and are likely to legitimize dangerous policies (as was evident in the abstract theorizing about nuclear deterrence). Unlike most of their counterparts in Cold War national security studies, students of critical security studies should become area specialists' (Booth 1997: 114).

Nevertheless, the position of the stranger (empirical reader) 'has a one great advantage over the member (of a social-cultural context) in explaining the beliefs and practices of a specific culture: the stranger is in a position to know that there are alternatives to those beliefs and practices. The awareness of alternatives and the pertinence of the explanatory project go together. The perspective of the stranger is thus a useful analytical stance to adopt in attempting to come to terms with the discipline of security studies' (Krause and Williams 1997a: xii).

Finally, the position of an outsider (empirical reader) relating to the anthropological space enables the analyst to gain distance from the local, narrow vision, and interpretation; it permits a wider, and more complex picture to emerge of how local events and the global context are connected and not isolated. 'This means that where the focus of analysis is national or local, it is important to recognize that the national and local are set within an international frame which shapes them. Actually, a better way of putting it is in terms of a dialectic between the global and the national/local, a two-way process of conditioning and shaping' (Fairclough 2001: 203).

4.1. The position of the author

Conducting and doing ethnography in a military environment is not an easy task. The security-military anthropological space is a closed, suspicious, protected, classified world in which it is possible to enter only through specific authorizations which are released by the military authority only after a certain amount of time, and after the result of clearance investigation. The authorization to enter in a military environment is not a right. This means that in this particular thesis the methodological approach of 'deep hanging' was not an option. For Geertz (2001: 107-118) 'deep hanging out' describes the anthropological research method of immersing oneself in a cultural, group or social experience on an informal level. Observations gleaned from deep hanging out may typically end up being the most poignant insights of one's anthropological research. In contrast to anthropological practices of conducting short interviews with subjects or observing behavior, deep hanging out is as form of participatory observation in which the anthropologist is physically or virtually present in a group for extended periods of time or for long informal sessions.

In this respect, the author of this thesis, being a member of the Italian Armed Forces, was in a better position to handle the bureaucracy involved with the access to the anthropological field, and had received a previous CIMIC training. And regarding his cultural competence and area specialist, the author (1) holds a PhD on International Relations and Security Studies; (2) has been serving the Italian Army for more than thirty years; (3) he was employed at the NATO COMLANDSOUTHEAST HQ, Operations Division (Izmir, Turkey) for a period of four years as Assistant Security Officer; (4) holds an Italian doctor degree in Oriental Studies (Turkish studies), has studied Islamic religion and Muslim culture, and he has more than twenty years of experience in Turkey (which is a non-Arab Muslim country); (5) he is a thesis advisor for the Peace Operations Training Institute (USA); (6) he has been lecturing on 'Global Terrorism', 'Peace-keeping and International Conflict Resolution', and 'CIMIC Operations' in various academic institutions and military institutes; (7) he has written

extensively on security issues, and anthropology and security studies; and (8) on CIMIC competences he has attended the following courses:

- ‘*Civil-Military Cooperation Course*’, Centre for High Defence Studies (Centro Alti Studi Difesa – CASD), Roma, Italy, Sept 6-17, 2010.
- ‘*NATO CIMIC Basic Course*’, Multinational CIMIC Group, Motta di Livenza (TV, Italy), Feb. 7-18, 2011.
- ‘*NATO CIMIC Liaison Module*’, Multinational CIMIC Group, Motta di Livenza (TV, Italy), Apr. 16-19, 2012 .

Before the deployment phase, the author has read (1) the United Nations documents on UNIFIL, resolutions of the Security Council; (2) the material produced by the Italian Ministry of Defence on the Italian presence in the UNIFIL Mission (Appendix 39); (3) on Lebanon, approaching the country from an historic, cultural, religious and imaginary (contemporary Lebanese literature) perspective (Amir 2008; Di Pieri 2010; Hage 2007, 2008; Maalouf 2000, 2012; Nassib 2006; Pozzo 2007; Prizzi 2012; Said 2011; VanCreveld 2002) ; (4) on the military experience of a woman Italian Officer in UNIFIL mission in Lebanon (Catena 2008); and (5) the experience of the Italian journalist Oriana Fallaci (2010) who followed the Italian Soldiers in their first mission in Lebanon in the 1982.

Referring now more specifically to the access to anthropological field in which actors perform culture represented by the military community inside their military bases in Italy and in Lebanon, the very first and big obstacle was represented by the authorization to conduct the anthropological research with a specific military group in their spaces (the MNCG Headquarter in Motta di Livenza, Treviso, Italy, and various UNIFIL military bases in Lebanon).

Therefore, the first preoccupation was represented by the request of authorization which was addressed to the Italian Defence Staff (in Appendix 1) and sent on July 24th, 2012.

In the period between this date and the one of the authorization (Jan 2013) which was received in a very informal way through a phone call, I had a couple of interviews with military personnel of the Italian Defence Staff (Stato Maggiore della Difesa, III Reparto, Roma, Italy) and the ‘Italian Joint Force Headquarters’ (COI – Comando Operativo di vertice Interforze, Roma, Italy)

Once the necessary authorization was received, it was possible for the author of this thesis to organize his methods of research (already explained in the authorization request) and his field work. However, any time I had to go to Motta di Livenza (MNCG Headquarter) to interview my military CIMIC Team another authorization was necessary, and the same happened before the deployment of Lebanon, and during my stay in various UNIFIL mission bases. It is important to highlight the fact that the present anthropological research project has been the first one to be approved by the Italian Ministry of Defence, and it represents the first time an anthropologist is conducting a research on the CIMIC operations conducted by the MNCG military personnel.

As part of his field work the researcher of this thesis (1) has worked with the official security texts of NATO and the Italian Ministry of Defence; (2) has entered in contact with the structure of the Italian Ministry of Defence (authorization to conduct the

research), with the Multinational CIMIC Group (MNCG; Italy), and the UNIFIL HQ (Lebanon); and (3) has conducted several interviews (among them he has interviewed the Italian Ministry of Defence, Admiral di Paola, the commander of the MNCG, Col. Zinzone, and the UNIFIL Force Commander Gen. Serra) and has worked in very close contact with a MNCG CIMIC military team (composed by six military personnel) in Italy and in Lebanon in three phases: pre-deployment (MNCG HQ, Italy), deployment (UNIFIL Mission, Lebanon), post-deployment (MNCG HQ, Italy).

Yet, in addition to the above reading positions (internal-model reader; stranger-outsider-empirical reader), which is an important aspect of this work in order to answer the methodological questions, and to analyse how much discourse matters for state action, and to compare micro-narratives to macro-narratives, it is necessary to register what is going on inside the 'space of virtual peace'. For this account, it is necessary to accompany these reading positions with the method of the thick description.

4.2. The thick description

For Elkana, drawing on Geertz (1973), 'one of the main analytical tools of an interpretative science is "thick description"' (Elkana 1981: 10). The distinction between 'thick description' and 'thin description' in turn comes from Ryle, who argued that the first describes the complexity of thinking through a series of layers of description while second entails the most elementary one-layer activity, such as counting the number of cars on the street. Giving an account of the complex relations of the layers enables thick description to count as a form of interpretive understanding. 'In ethnography, the problem is always one of translation, so whatever the ethnographer is describing can no longer be a thin description' (Elkana 1981: 10).

Geertz, however, puts it more clearly when he analyses Ryle's example of 'two boys rapidly contracting the eyelids of their right eye. In one, this is an involuntary twitch; in the other, a conspiratorial signal to a friend. The two movements, are, as movements, identical; (...) yet the difference (...) between a twitch and a wink is vast; (...) The winker is communicating, and indeed communicating in a quite precise and special way, deliberately, to someone in particular, to impart a particular message, and according to a socially established code. As Ryle points out, the winker has not done two things, voluntarily contracting his eyelids and winking –he has communicated through a public code which can be understood as conspiratorial. The twitcher has done only one thing, involuntarily contracting his eyelids. From this basic account Ryle moves to a fuller range of signals and meanings, a stratified hierarchy in terms of which twitches, winks, fake-winks, parodies, rehearsals of parodies are all potentially perceived and interpreted' (Geertz 1973: 6-7).

Indeed, what an ethnographer does is to look and see an event-reality in a different way. For John Berger 'seeing comes before words. It is seeing which establishes our place in the surrounding world; we explain that world with words, but words can never undo the fact that we are surrounded by it. The relation between what we see and what we know is never settled' (Berger 1972: 7). In security analysis, the ethnographer, using the tool of thick description, posits himself between what he sees and what he knows, between the observation of the insecurity event and the theory (the official security text which defines the official insecurity event). S/he 'reads' a reality, an event, a

social fact as if it was a text, and in interpreting it, sorts out those structures of signification and determines their social ground and import.

For Geertz, 'a good interpretation of anything – a poem, a person, a history, a ritual, an institution, a society – takes us into the heart of that of which is the interpretation' (Geertz 1973: 18). While a thin description reports what people did, a thick description contextualizes it by explicitly considering the socio-cultural meaning of the actions as well to create a humanistic, detailed and inferential account' (Wilkinson 2011: 100). This method forms a key element in the analysis in the next chapter, avoiding the pretension of 'scientific' explanation which Geertz, along with Booth (1997: 114) and others including this author, reject. Concepts of identity and culture are extremely important in the definition of what security and insecurity are, and how a securitization discourse is fabricated, and this interpretive approach offers the most convincing way of evaluating their interactions and dialogues in security constructions.

In conclusion, through this approach we position ourselves not only in a physical looking posture vis-à-vis an anthropological place, but our stance is between the observation and the theory, thus between what we see and what we know like an insider, a stranger and an outsider. This approach also enables the relationship between micro-narratives and macro-narratives (Campbell, 1998b: 81) to be considered.

This pins down key elements of the methods of this thesis on the methodological grounds already explained. The application of this approach is defined by (1) the position of the analyst and the use of thick description; (2) participant observation in the two spaces in which the MNCG Military Personnel operates (in Italy, and in Lebanon); (3) the 'emic' approach which has permitted to understand the practices of the security discourse in everyday life during the CIMIC operation. The latter has been possible employing semi-structured interviews which were carried out during the various phases of the research which were attached to the activity of the MNCG military personnel during: the pre-deployment phase, in which the military personnel was receiving its specific training in Italy; the deployment period in Lebanon during which the CIMIC team was involved in CIMIC operations in the 'space of virtual peace' represented by the UNIFIL mission; and finally during the post-deployment period when the military personnel returned to his military base (the MNCG HQ, in Treviso, Italy) and it was time to discuss the learned lesson after the CIMIC military mission.

Another aspect which the field work wants to analyses is that the Italian MNCG military team, in the 'space of virtual peace', has entered in contact with various cultural environments: the one represented by the multinational community of others nations military personnel present in the UNIFIL military bases, and the local populations during their CIMIC activity.

On this cultural aspect the field work has employed part of the approaches developed by the following studies regarding the so called 'cultural gap' which exist between the Italian soldier and not only the local Lebanese population:

- Van Meer, J.P., Veldhuis, G.J., & Schwerzel, J. (2008), *Bridging the Culture Gap: A Cultural Framework as a Basis for Cultural Awareness Training*, NATO: RTO-MP-HFM-142 ;
- Caligiuri, P., Noe, R., Nolan, R., Ryan, A.M., and Drasgow, F. (2011), *Training, Developing, and Assessing Cross-Cultural Competence in Military Personnel*,

U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences, Arlington, Virginia .

However, the present research, as part of the semi-structured interviews, has enriched the approach developed by Van Meer, J.P., Veldhuis, G.J., & Schwerzel, J. (2008), because their study was conducted with thirteen members of the UK Army Forces only during the post-deployment phase, and not considering, as my work does, the entire phases of the mission (pre-deployment, deployment, and post-deployment).

Other semi-structured interviews were carried out with the following personality:

- Col. Fabiano ZINZONE, Commander of MNCG (interview: Apr 18th, 2012);
- Prof. Alessandro POLITI, Director NATO DEFENSE COLLEGE FOUNDATION (interview: Feb 19th, 2013);
- Prof. (Captain) Claudio BERTOLOTTI, expert on cultural awareness and on the Afghanistan's theatre of operations (interview Feb 26th, 2013);
- The Italian Minister of Defence: Admiral Giampaolo Di Paola (interview: Feb 28th, 2013).

The author of this thesis argues that in employing the methodology and methods outlined in the previous pages, it is possible to operate inside the 'space of virtual peace' an 'examination of the degree of congruence between different circumstances driving and/or constraining securitization' (Balzacq 2011: 18), where 'the security text' will be confronted with the results of the anthropological approach (looking positions and thick description).

5. Conclusion

This chapter has unfolded the logic structure and procedure of scientific enquiry: (1) it has pointed at the importance language and language analysis play in the production of security narrative; (2) it has defined a way to look at security and the process of securitization represented by the military instrument of CIMIC operations; and (3) it has established the methodology and the methods which have been employed in this thesis. Here the anthropological space in which the anthropological research has been conducted (and in which the military personnel operates) has been constructed and defined as the 'space of virtual peace'. This space represents a grid of interpretation which contrasts with the official narrative which defines the space of CIMIC operations as 'post-conflict' operations whilst the 'space of virtual peace' highlights the fact that in these theatres of operations there is still a war after the war (or a conflict after the conflict). The methods have been identified following the formula of the participant observation, the use of thick description, and the 'emic' perspective which have been translated in the real presence of the author of this thesis with the community of his study in various 'authorized' periods and anthropological spaces, in Italy and in Lebanon, and the use of semi-structured interviews. Next chapter represents the case study of this thesis in which the methodology and methods of this work have been employed in order to produce 'legitimate security knowledge' and to answer the seven security methodological questions.


Chapter 3

Case Study: the Italian Multinational CIMIC Team in the Space of Virtual Peace of Lebanon

1. Introduction

This chapter unfolds the whole of the field experience of this work which lasted from Jul 24th, 2012 to May 7th, 2014. It started with the request of authorization addressed to the Italian Defence Staff (Appendix 1) to work on this research project which involves a specific unit of the Italian Army, and it finished with the last interviews to the MNCG CIMIC team.

The chapter is divided in four parts. The first part covers the authorization process. The second part, defined as ‘pre-deployment phase’, deals with the interviews to the MNCG CIMIC team at the MNCG base in Motta di Livenza (Treviso, Italy). The third part, presented as ‘deployment phase’, considers the time spent with the same team in their operation in Lebanon as part of the UNIFIL Mission Military Forces. The fourth part, ‘post-deployment phase’, deals with the moment when the team returned to Italy, discusses about the lesson learned by the military personnel, and concludes the field work experience. All the interviews were made in Italian language.



Moreover, there were four semi-structured interviews that I have conducted before the ‘pre-deployment phase’, which I think can really represent the whole framework of this experience because they (1) summarize, and confirm, the thesis of this work which is sustained by the work of Gen. Mini; (2) confirm the critical position of

Gen. Mini; and (3) prove the validity of the theoretical framework of the 'Space of Virtual Peace'.

In chronological order the first of these interviews was the meeting with Col. Fabiano Zinzone (Appendix 2), at that time Commander of the MNCG, that I had while I was attending as student a NATO CIMIC course. Col. Zinzone (1) said and explained very clearly that a post-conflict situation doesn't exist, but we have to continue to talk about 'war' during all the phases of the crisis management situation-military mission; and (2) he was the first person that I met who saw the importance to have anthropologist employed in CIMIC operations.

The second interview was with Prof. Alessandro Politi (Director of NATO Defence College Foundation, Roma, Italy; Appendix 3) who (1) highlighted the fact that the crisis management operations, and the other armed missions in which Italian and NATO soldiers are involved should involve a clear political vision and project for the 'future' of the local situation; and (2) due to the importance of CIMIC operations they should have at their disposal very well qualified military personnel, and the presence of cultural translators and anthropologists, but unfortunately the Italian politician have not idea about the real situation inside the territory of operations.

The third interview was conducted with an Officer of the Italian Army (Informant Y; Appendix 4) who served as Chief of Counter-Intelligence Section during the Afghanistan mission. The Officer for clear motivation asked to talk under anonymity and his/her message was extremely clear: (1) the Italian soldiers sent to missions are not very well, or not at all, culturally prepared (cultural awareness) about the cultural-social-linguist reality of the theater of operations; and (2) the very military structure (General Staff) is not very much interested to provide a qualitative relevant training on cultural awareness...they talk but in reality they do not do. At the same time the Officer (1) strongly supported the idea to have anthropologist working in CIMIC operations; and (2) validated my concept of the 'Space of Virtual Peace'.

The last part of this framework is represented by the interview I have conducted with the Italian Minister of Defence, Admiral Giampaolo Di Paola (Appendix 5). The Minister, a formal four stars Admiral, who served in NATO too, said very clearly that 'Italy has not a security policy' and that 'the Italian politicians were not interested in the security problem of the Country'. Therefore, he demonstrated (1) the total lack of interest by the political class toward the military missions in which thousand of Italian soldiers are employed; and (2) the real gap between the official political and security narrative of Italy and its real and practical implementation.

During the three phases of my field experience I conducted semi-structured interviews with the MNCG CIMIC Team. My work has been inspired by the NATO's publication 'Bridging the Culture Gap: A Cultural Framework as a Basis for Cultural Awareness Training' (Van Meer, Veldhuis & Schzerler 2008). The aim of this paper was 'to establish the validity of a cultural framework. This is done to gain increased perspective on the cultural awareness that is necessary to co-operate successfully with members of other cultures' (Van Meer, Veldhuis & Schzerler 2008: 5-1). The cultural framework was based on six pillars, each representing a category of behaviour relevant on the interaction and communication, the pillars are: Honour and face; Hierarchy and social stratification; Purity, danger and taboos; Proxemics and body language; Speech acts; and Worldview and belief system. The author assessed first-hand experience with

foreign cultures in a total of 13 interviews with British military personnel who had been deployed to Afghanistan.

However, due to the fact that the above work was based on interviews to military personnel at their return from their TO, I decided to approach the matter from a more wide angle in order to have a more complete picture of my field work experience: the relation with the official structure (Italian Ministry of Defence, Italian Armed Forces General Staff, and MNCG HQ) and with the personnel involved in my research (MNCG CIMIC Team).

Therefore, I worked on both side: the request of authorization to conduct this work, and to interview to my informants. And, differently from Van Meer, Veldhuis & Schzerler (2008) I decided to interview my informants in three periods, not only at their return. This is the reason because my semi-structured interviews were carried during the pre-deployment phase, the deployment phase, and at the return of the militaries to Italy (post-deployment phase). The pre-deployment phase questionnaire (Appendix 10) covers the previous military experiences and the cultural awareness training of the MNCG CIMIC team; the deployment phase questionnaire (Appendix 21) deals more in deep with the question of the cultural awareness training and the experience of the MNCG CIMIC team in the TO in contact with international military forces and with the local population. The post-deployment questionnaire (Appendix 32) contains questions related to the six pillars developed by Van Meer, Veldhuis & Schzerler (2008).

The material I collected with these semi-structured interviews has to be read inside the framework of my personal experiences and difficulties I had in this research.

2. Authorizations

Authorizations have represented the major problem and obstacle to the development of this thesis. As I mentioned in the previous chapter this work has been conducted inside a particular anthropological place: military locations, military theatre of operation (UNIFIL Mission in Lebanon), and with military personnel, and all these activities needed authorizations for the author not only to enter and to spend time inside the military compounds but to interview the military personnel too. Already during my Master on Social Anthropology at the University of Murcia (Spain) I made contact with the MNCG of Motta di Livenza (Treviso, Italy). This is because I attended a course on NATO CIMIC Operation. During these courses I met the MNCG Commander (at that time Col. Fabiano Zinzone) and I expressed the idea to prepare a Master Thesis on the CIMIC activity conducted by the MNCG. Therefore, on Jan 16th, 2012 (Appendix 6) I sent a letter to Col. Zinzone presenting my research project and the way to conduct my work. I did not receive a formal answer to this request, but while I was attending another course on CIMIC operations (CIMIC Liaison Module; Apr 16-19, 2012) in Motta di Livenza I had the possibility to talk to various military personnel, to collect materials, and to discuss the relation between anthropology, security, and CIMIC operations with Col. Zinzone. The results of this research were presented as a Master thesis, and became a presentation at the Conference on Anthropology organized by the Royal Anthropological Institute of London (UK) held the same year.

However, I can say that the period spent at the MNCG, and the fact that I presented a formal request to prepare an academic work on CIMIC operations set a

precedent for my further research. Then, interested to prepare a PhD thesis on this topic, and on the same military unit, and conscious of the fact that to have an authorization requires time due to its long bureaucratic process, I sent a formal request to the Italian Armed Forces General Staff on July 24th, 2012 (Appendix 1). The request was addressed to Gen. Salvatore Farina (Chief of the 3rd Department, Italian Defence Staff), and it reported my interest, the topic of my research, and my desire to spend some time with the MNCG personnel in their military base in Italy and to follow them in their theatre of operations (TO).

To this request I did not receive any formal answer too, but during the months of Sept 2012 I received a phone call from an Officer working at the 3rd Department of the Italian Defence Staff (in Roma, Italy) asking me to meet him/her in his/her office for an interview. I went to the meeting, I had the interview, and there I had the possibility to further elucidate my research project and the purpose of it. The Officer told me that it was the first time that the Italian Defence Staff had received a request of this type, related to an anthropological research, and I replied that already in the US Army and in other NATO's Countries Army the presence of anthropologist was a reality. After this meeting I did not receive any formal answer to my request to conduct my research.

On Feb 28th, 2013 (Appendix 7) I received an email from Lieutenant (psychologist) Emanuele Foglia. The Officer, working at the Training Office of the Army General Staff, was informing me that the Army was interested in the result of my research, and that my work could be of interest for the training of Italian Army. Therefore, he was communicating me that he will be present at the MNCG barracks during the period of my 'pre-deployment' interviews.

On March 3rd, 2013, through a phone call, I was invited to go to the 3rd Department of the Italian Defence Staff (Roma). Once there, I received a copy of a formal message sent by COI-DIFESA (Appendix 8) which was informing me that (1) the Chief of the Italian Defence Staff had approved my research project in all its phases (pre-deployment, deployment, and post-deployment); (2) that my deployment phase was in Lebanon (UNIFIL mission; duration: two weeks); and (3) it was establishing the calendar for the pre-deployment phase (interviews with the MNCG CIMIC personnel in Motta di Livenza).

At the same time I was informed that my research will involve six military personnel belonging to the MNCG; I will refer to them as the 'MNCG CIMIC Team', and due to the fact that for clear security reasons all of them asked to me to maintain anonymity, I will allude to them as 'Informant A..B..C..D..E..F'

The dates of this first round of interviews were established for the days of 3-4 March 2013, but they were changed in coordination with the Lieutenant Foglia. At the end the dates for the pre-deployment phase were confirmed: March 4-8, 2013.

Before starting to unfold the whole of my field experience I want to highlight the fact that two problems have accompanied this work till the end. One is represented by the authorizations which were needed any time in order to interview my informants, to meet them, and to be physically inside their 'territories' (MNCG barracks in Motta di Livenza, and UNIFIL Bases in Lebanon). In the next pages, at the beginning of the 'deployment' and 'post-deployment' phases I will spend some words on the difficulties, and headaches I had for the release of these authorizations. The second problem was represented by the attitude of the majority of the military personnel I met in this work. I experienced two

kinds of sentiments: whilst some were very positive about this work, and in it they saw (1) important material for improving the quality of the military approach to CIMIC, or more in general crisis management operations; and (2) the possibility to have their 'voice' listened and/or may be heard by the high ranks of the Italian Ministry of Defence; on the other side I have to underline that the whole of this work has been accompanied by reticence, and suspicious by quite all the military personnel I have contacted, interacted, talked, conferred, and interviewed.

However, the same reticence and suspicious was met when I contacted by email, and then by phone (Feb 26th, and Mar 4th, 2013) the Italian NGO 'Emergency'. This NGO, is composed in majority by medical doctors and operates in 'war areas' (with their own hospitals). Emergency, for its own policy, operates outside the territory controlled by the Italian Army employed in 'crisis management operations' (or other label where the term 'war' is practically forbidden to be employed), like Afghanistan, Iraq, etc. Therefore, I contacted Emergency with the question 'why you do not want to operate inside the territory securitized by the Italian Army?' but, despite the fact I sent a couple of emails to their press office, and because I did not receive any answer I called them. On the phone their answer was 'we do not want to have anything to do with the Italian Army' without explaining to me why, the reason, or to have the possibility to meet someone and have an interview. They completely shouted their door in front of me.

3. Pre-deployment phase

The Pre-deployment phase was conducted in the Multinational CIMIC Group base, in Motta di Livenza (Treviso, Italy) during the period March 4-8, 2013. Despite the fact that I already received the approval, and the authorization to conduct the present anthropological research from the Chief of Italian Defence Staff, the authorization from the 'Comando Operativo di Vertice Interforze' (COI-DIFESA) did not arrive yet to the MNCG Commander (Col. Zinzone) at the moment I embarked on the train Orte-Motta di Livenza on March 4th, 2013.



At h. 9.30 I called directly Col. Zinzone (Commander of the MNCG) who informed me that he was still waiting for the authorization, but, at the same time said to

me to take the train and to come to Motta di Livenza. At h. 11.08 (March 4th, 2013) I took the train at Orte and at h. 19.20 I arrived to the village of Motta di Livenza. The MNCG barrack is at a very short distance from the train station. When I arrived to the base, and after the normal security procedures (1) I received a 'pass' (which authorized my presence inside the military base); (2) I was assigned a comfortable bedroom with WC; and (3) I was informed that the following morning at h. 7 I would meet part of the MNCG CIMIC team and that with other military personnel I would attend a one-day course on 'Stress Management' in Gorizia. This means the following morning I had to wake up at h. 6.30. After that I called again Col. Zinzone and I informed him about my arrival, my logistic arrangements, and the program for the following day.



March 5th, 2013.

MNCG, Motta di Livenza. I woke up at h. 6.30, and at h. 7 with one member of the CIMIC Team, using an official Army car, we went to Gorizia, at the Pozzuolo del Friuli Cavalry Brigade HQ, to attend a crash course on 'Stress Management' (Appendix 9). This course (1) was designed for all the military personnel of the Brigade assigned to

the UNIFIL Mission in Lebanon; (2) it was delivered by the Lieutenant (psychologist) Soraya Barna; (3) it lasted from h. 8 to h 12.30; and (4) covered mainly the stress which was originated before the departure, therefore in pre-deployment phase. Some members of the MNCG CIMIC Team were attending the same course.

Aim of the course was (1) to identifies those 'stressors' (situations that produce stress) that produce stress in the military personnel before their deployment, therefore in 'pre-deployment' phase; and (2) to suggest some techniques/strategies to handle and/or reduce stress.

During the course the interaction between Barna and the 'students' produced a list of five elements that according to them produce stress before their assignment to a mission.

The 'stressors' in the pre-deployment phase are represented by:

1. the situation that is left behind in the family;
2. the knowledge and the uncertainties of the theatre of operations: (i) the logistic conditions (the base, and the outside the base); (ii) the purpose of the military mission; (iii) training: 'is the training we have received good enough for the mission?'; (iv) knowledge of the local language and culture;
3. problems left behind in Italy; (v) local socio-political situation
4. the duration of the mission, and the possibility to take leaves during the mission (mission that were presented to last six months, and the end they lasted nine months or more);
5. the uncertainties the personnel will face at their return related to their military position, regiment, location, etc.

At the same time, during the course were identified two techniques-strategies to overwhelm stress: (1) resilience; and (2) coping. Resilience is a capacity to win stress and is based on three factors (1) what/who I am; (2) what I have at my disposal; (3) what I can do. Through resilience the individual can win the stressful situation, find a solution, and manage the emotions. Coping is a strategy to accept the stressful event and to resist it. But how can we avoid stress? Only if we concentrate on the present, on the now. In short the course covered the stress produced in the relation military-family in the pre-deployment phase.

Moreover, due to the fact that Lieutenant Barna was informed of my presence in the classroom, and having met her during the coffee break, she asked me to present the conclusion of the course with a short presentation on the anthropological approach to the culture of 'the other' in conflict area.

At h. 14.15 I was back to the MNCG barracks (Motta di Livenza). I called Lieutenant (psychologist) Emanuele Foglia and we arranged to meet the following day (Mar 6th, 2013) after lunch.

At h. 17 I was met by a MNCG Warrant Officer which presented him/herself as interested in my job and research. As I discovered later this person was sent to 'control' what I was doing (and on Foglia too) in the base, to 'discovery' the real purpose of my research, and to check the arrival of Lieutenant Foglia.



March 6th, 2013.

MNCG, Motta di Livenza. In the morning, I met the MNCG CIMIC Team (five military personnel out of six; one informant was absent), I explained them the purpose of my research, and I handed out the 'Pre-deployment' questionnaires (Appendix 10).

The pre-deployment questionnaire was used for my semi-structured interviews. The questionnaire is divided in two parts. Part 'b' collects the personal information of the informant, his/her previous military experiences, and the reason he/she is serving in the MNCG. Part 'c' covers the whole of the foreign military experience of the informant, and here I ask (1) the list of his/her assignment in foreign missions; (2) about the course of cultural awareness that he/she has attended in order to be culturally ready to face the foreign military mission; (3) possible courses that the personnel has attended by him/herself after duty hours in order to be ready for the assignment; and (4) personal memories about the previous missions and lessons learned.

Moreover, through one of my informants I met an Officer (Informant X; Appendix 11) who had the desire to talk to me and to tell me his/her experiences in various 'military missions' (Bosnia, Kosovo, Iraq, and Afghanistan). This informant too made very clear that the cultural and linguistic training they get before the deployment in the TO is not enough, and most of the time, the cultural awareness hand book they receive from the General Staff is not update, doesn't provide enough information, or the information do not match with the local reality.

After lunch I interviewed Informant A and Informant C.

Informant A (Appendix 12) gave a very interesting opinion on the CIMIC activity based on his/her previous military experiences: 'I am here, at the MNCG, because I like the CIMIC activity. I have served in various military missions abroad (Bosnia, Kosovo,

and Afghanistan) and I realized how the CIMIC approach is different from the “only military approach”. It was during my mission in Bosnia that I came across the CIMIC activity, even if my assignment was completely different because I was employed as an interpreter between the Italian Army and the other NATO military contingents. The CIMIC activity is close to my personality, to my studies, to my curiosity. Through it you come more close to the local population, to their needs, their personality. In Afghanistan, for example, I played (I play different music instruments) with a very famous local musician and this helped to be perceived (the Italian soldiers) in a different way from the local population. I can say that as Italian the CIMIC activity is very close to our culture, our way of life, and we do not stereotype the “other” only as an enemy (US Army approach). I can say that I regarded the Afghan people as “our oriental cousins”, and I do not remember any negative moment in my mission with the local population, but a lot of respect toward us. Talking about negative experience there (in Afghanistan) this was with the US Army because they tried to impose their military regulation on us without any respect for our Italian culture, and they pretended to lecture us as if we were completely ignorant. Regarding specific courses offered by the IT Army on local culture for my missions (Bosnia, Kosovo, and Afghanistan) I only received the normal military training but not specific cultural training. However, once in the theater of operations I tried always to understand the situation we were facing. My next mission will be in Lebanon and I build my knowledge on this theater of operation talking with my colleagues that went there in mission before me, and collecting material. Regarding the course I attended on “Stress Management” I would like to say that a course like that is more fruitful at our return from the mission, because we come back completely changed. Therefore, it should be necessary to offer a stress management course during the pos-deployment phase. In my opinion CIMIC is different, and you need people that are curious, that are open minded, and that have a lot of common sense.’

The interview to Informant C (Appendix 13) was a little shorter than the previous one due to the fact that (1) I received the information that the authorization to be there (inside the MNCG) did not arrive yet from COI-DIFESA, therefore I was only authorized to stay there until the following morning (March 7th, 2013); and (2) Lieutenant Foglia had just arrived from Roma and I had to meet him.

However, what emerged from the interview was interesting and integrated the questionnaire. Informant C said: ‘I am here at the MNCG because I was assigned here after my last military mission abroad. Talking about contact with local people and culture in military missions I remember that in Kosovo I never had the possibility to meet local people, we were staying all the time in our base, it was a peacekeeping mission, and if we had to leave the compound we had to wear the full combat equipment, practically we were in war area. It was after the mission in Kosovo that I decided to learn English, and I did it by myself (I did not received any help/course from my administration). About my next mission in Lebanon (UNIFIL; duration six months) I have been selected, meaning that I did not request to go there. At the moment I construct my knowledge on Lebanon talking to colleagues that went there, and collecting material on internet. I am interested in the history of Lebanon from 1982 up to today. And I would like to learn Arabic once there. The motivation behind the missions I participated and I will participate in the future is to improve myself.’

At the end of this interview a soldier informed me that finally the authorization from COI-DIFESA had arrived. As a result I was authorized to be there until March 8th, 2013.



March 7th, 2013.

MNCG, Motta di Livenza. At h. 8.00 I observed, from the window of the military coffee-bar, the morning flag ceremony, attended by the military personnel of the MNCG together with the Commander, and accompanied by the music of the Italian national anthem. After that, during all day, until lunch time, I interviewed Informant E, D, and F.

Informant E (Appendix 14) (1) talked positively about his/her past military missions and how some of them contributed to change his/her life; (2) expressed his/her opinion that the courses he/she received were appropriate for the specific missions; and (3) said that he/she was ready for his/her next assignment in Lebanon (UNIFIL mission).

Informant D (Appendix 15) has experiences in various military missions abroad but the general sensation he/she has accumulated is that he/she did not receive the necessary cultural awareness training to face them. Despite the fact that the unit of MNCG performs specific military duties in various TO what is really missed is the interest to provide linguistic and cultural courses on the specificity of them; and to have military personnel really qualified (university degrees, education, etc.). Unfortunately, during the conversation, emerged the same critic already mentioned in the present thesis (by Gen. Mini) that there is a lack of vision on the whole planning of these missions, therefore, the problem is not only military (at tactical and strategic level) but political.

Informant F (Appendix 16) noticed from the beginning of my interview that it was the first time in his/her personal military life that someone was asking questions about himself/herself; and he/she remarked that to have a more solid knowledge of foreign language (in this case English) helped him/her to build up a more strong self-

confidence. 'This is the first time in my military life that I face an interview on myself, my life, what I want and what I am looking for, about my dreams, my knowledge, about me in general. The military experiences I had in an international environment (in contact with foreign contingents) helped me to construct a more solid self-confidence. At the beginning of these experiences I remember I was afraid but after a while I was more-confident. What I learned from my previous experiences was to leave behind my Italian believes, stereotypes, and to enter in the "other" theatre of operations with an attitude to be in contact with them, to understand them, and therefore to adapt to their way of life, culture, customs, language, etc. Regarding my next mission in Lebanon I will work inside a foreign military group and this is going to be the first experience of this kind in my life.'

After these interviews I had lunch in the military canteen with some members of the MNCG CIMIC Team, and in the afternoon all together we were invited by Lieutenant Foglia for a meeting/conversation on the purpose of my research.

The meeting with Lieutenant Foglia started at h. 15 (it lasted 40 minutes), and we were accommodated in a room inside the MNCG compounds. According to my notes Lieutenant Foglia was working for the Army General Staff, in Training Division, and his job was related to the development of the psychological dimension of military personnel in the training phase. Foglia gathered the MNCG CIMIC team and he explained that even if Ercolani's research project had received the authorization from the Armed Forces General Staff he (Foglia) came here to investigate if there were consensus toward this work from the very people involved in this research (the MNCG CIMIC team). Foglia's duty was (1) to gather the general impression about this research; and (2) to collect the different point of views on this work, and if they (the MNCG CIMIC team) were interested to collaborate with it. He expressed the fact that may be the people submitted to my interviews were experiencing some sort of discomfort. Source of this discomfort is about what to say and what not to say, what they have to answer and what not. Basically was about the authorization to speak out. At the same time Foglia said that the result of this qualitative research were of interest of the Army General Staff and that was evident that the purpose of my research was to describe the style of the cultural awareness training received by the personnel, therefore, Ercolani's job was not to evaluate the quality of the training but to describe the way the training was offered.

The informants started a conversation with Foglia, in which I was involved, and various points emerged: (1) some informants talked about the necessity to have at their disposal a kind of manual-training-education, provided by the Army General Staff on how to conduct this kind of interviews because the personal responsibility was great and they were afraid of possible repercussion, the main point was 'what I have to answer'; (2) another point was that this kind of research-interviews should be done inside the single military Units to know more about the military personnel in general, and not by an outsider (Ercolani) working for an academic institution; (3) the present research project was considered of interest with the hope that it will contribute to an improvement in the cultural awareness training (Foglia highlighted the need to better understand the experience lived by the personnel in their mission in TO); (4) it was pointed to the importance to give to strategic communication in the relations with the Commander etc.; and (5) I was informed that the MNCG CIMIC team was not going to operate as a single team in Lebanon but that the team was to be split, and that every single person, was

assigned to different locations (the various UNIFIL bases in Lebanon) and under different Commanders.

For what I understood, but this is my personal opinion, was that the Army General Staff (1) had an interest to discipline the answers of the militaries involved in this work; (2) wanted to regulate what they were allowed to say and what not to say; and (3) tried to discipline the relation-conduct of the MNCG CIMIC team toward me. At the end of the meeting I said to the MNCG CIMIC team to keep in contact through emails and that our next meeting would be in Lebanon during the summer.

March 8th, 2013.

MNCG, Motta di Livenza. During the morning I had a conversation with a Warrant-Officer who had many experience in military missions in various TO and referring to his/her personal experience he/she said that what is important in the CIMIC operations is to look at the various cultural stereotype-believes we carry with us in our missions, and therefore, to see how people adapt itself to a different cultural-social-linguistic environment in TO. At h. 12 I left the MNCG barracks.

4. Deployment phase

The deployment phase was conducted in what here I consider the ‘Space of Virtual Peace’: the UNIFIL Mission in Lebanon. This phase lasted from Ago 13th to Ago 22nd 2013 (Appendix 20) and I spent my time in three UNIFIL Mission bases: Naqoura, Shama, Al Mansuri.



This phase too was characterized by the problem of authorizations. From June 19th until Ago 12th (day of my flight from Roma to Beirut) I was in contact with COI-DIFESA several times (1) to have a clear idea about the exact dates of my deployment phase; and (2) regarding the UN authorization to enter the UNIFIL Mission Bases. I had phone calls and email exchanges with a very capable, efficient, and smart NCO of the COI-DIFESA (phone calls: June 19th; June 27th, July 2nd) and on July 10th, I received an email (Appendix 17) with the exact dates of my deployment: Ago 13-22, 2013.

At the same time, I requested to the COI-DIFESA NCO to put me in contact with the military psychologist present in the TO for an interview, and amiably he/she did. So, on Ago 5th, I received an email (Appendix 18) with (1) the exact dates of my flights; (2) the necessary contact in the TO; and (3) the email and phone contact with the military psychologist. Therefore, I immediately contacted the military psychologist with the request of an interview, which he accepted. In my request I sent him the project of this work. On Ago 8th, I send to COI-DIFESA the Relieve of Responsibility Form (for the flight Roma-Beirut; Appendix 19) that I was requested to fill out and sent back.

Ago 12th, 2013.

At h. 9.36 I received a phone call from the COI-DIFESA NCO who informed me that he/she had received an email from UN (New York Office) requesting more information about me and about my research. In order to be authorized to enter inside the conflict area under the control of UN (UNIFIL) I needed a special authorization, therefore it was necessary that myself, together with COI-DIFESA were providing these information to UN office in New York as soon as possible. The COI-DIFESA NCO immediately sent to UN New York copy of my project (in Italian; Appendix 1), and explained that this project involved only the Italian military personnel, and it was an Italian project. At the end of our phone conversation the NCO told me that he/she will keep me informed about events.

Ago 13th, 2013.

At h. 10.30 I receive a phone call from COI-DIFESA that informs me that still they have not received my authorization from UN New York office. The application for my authorization reports the date of Ago 5th, 2013. In any case COI-DIFESA will contact UN New York office at h. 14 (time difference) and they will keep me informed.

At h. 14.32 I take the train Orte-Roma Fiumicino Airport, and I am waiting the 'OK' from COI-DIFESA.

At h. 16.15, while I am on the train, I receive a phone call from the COI-DIFESA NCO who informs me that they have received the authorization from UN New York, therefore I am authorized to take the flight and to enter into the UNIFIL bases in Lebanon. I warmly thank the NCO for his/her great job.

At h. 17, I arrive to Roma Airport 'Leonardo da Vinci', Terminal T2, and I reach the meeting point where other militaries (the majority of them wearing combat uniforms) assemble before the flight. I receive my boarding card, and at h. 19 we have to be ready for passport control. At h. 20 we embark on a civilian airplane (property of the company MERIDIANA).

At h. 21.20 we land at the Trieste Airport to embark more military personnel, and at h. 21.50 we take off again, but this time we fly directly to Beirut. On the flight I meet my Point of Contact (an Officer of the Italian Army) who will help me in this trip.

Ago 14th, 2013.

Lebanon. At h. 2.10 (local time; + 1 h. from Roma) we land at the airport of Beirut. We pass through passport control. We embark on two military buses and we move into a military open air area controlled by UN forces, to have coffee, water, and biscuits. Then, escorted by UNIFIL armed vehicles, our two buses cross the city of Beirut and we reach a small harbour.

At h. 4.20 we embark on a UNIFIL ferry named 'Carolyn'. We will reach Naqoura (the UNIFIL HQ) by sea because of the threat represented by possible terrorist attacks against us.



At h. 10.30 we land at the small harbour of Naqoura, and on a UNIFIL bus, escorted by UNIFIL armed vehicles we move toward the village of Shama, where is located the UNIFIL-Sector West. Along the road I notice the presence of Hezbollah posters and propaganda. I am informed that we are in Hezbollah area.



At h. 11.30 I arrived to Shama where I met one of the members of the MNCG CIMIC Team. I received the Deployment Official Program of Activities (Appendix 20), I was assigned a bedroom with air conditioned. I received my ‘temporary pass’ (Security Briefing at Sec Cell), and then I had lunch with other Italian military personnel in the local military canteen (Italian food). For what I understand, during this deployment phase I had to pay only for my food (lunch, dinner). The Italian Army was providing me accommodation free of charge.



At h. 14 I meet the Italian General Vasco Angelotti, Commander of UNIFIL-Sector West and we arrange for a meeting at h. 19. Then I employ my afternoon to update my notes (in Spanish: ‘diario de campo’).



At h. 19 I meet Gen. Angelotti; we talked about my research project, its purpose, and my methodology (the space of virtual peace). I show him my questionnaire

(Appendix 21) and we arrange to meet on Ago 16th, at h. 20.30 for a conversation. At h. 20 I dine into the military canteen. It is not possible to leave the military base, all the military personnel live inside the base for all the period of their assignment (normally six months), and they can leave it only for duty. At h. 21.45 I am in my bedroom reading Oriana Fallaci's 'Insciallah', the 'novel' she wrote when she followed the first Italian military mission in Lebanon (1982).



Ago 15-21, 2013.

During this whole period I spent my time always into the UNIFIL bases of Shama, Naqoura (UNIFIL HQ), and Al Mansuri, because in these three bases the MNCG CIMIC Team has been assigned. For each of the three bases I was allocated a place to sleep inside a container, the same type that the other military personnel uses for themselves. For my transfer from one base to another and (1) I had to wear a helmet, and a bullet-proof vest; (2) I was escorted by an Italian officer; and (3) we were using UNIFIL military vehicles. On the route from one base to another it was forbidden to stop in any village (security reason). My days in the deployment areas made me experiencing (even if for a short time when compared with the six months period of a normal military mission) the real life of the Italian military personnel (1) who were always living inside their military bases; (2) was not possible for them to go out for security reasons expect for duty; and (3) they were on service 24 hours a day (in constant alarm).



In this period I had the possibility to meet and interview Maj. Gen. Paolo Serra (Head of UNIFIL Mission, and Force Commander), B. Gen. Vasco Angelotti (Commander of UNIFIL-Sector West), military chaplain Lieutenant Giorgio Porta, Lieutenant (psychologist) Donato Cattani, and the members of the MNCG CIMIC Team (only one of them had to leave the UNIFIL Mission and return to Italy before my arrival due to family problem). I want to add the fact that regarding the interviews I had with my main informants (MNCG CIMIC Team) I did not mention the location (always in one of the UNIFIL bases in Lebanon) and the date of the interview, the reason behind this choice is to maintain and protect the anonymity of my informants.

Moreover, during this phase, and according to the 'deployment questionnaire' (Appendix 21) I was interested: (1) to know more about the cultural awareness training-preparation; (2) to check the validity of the interpretative grid of the 'Space of Virtual Peace'; (3) to understand the space of the Operative Context in which the Italian CIMIC Informants (and the Italian soldiers) were operating. This Operative Context is divided in two spaces: (i) 'Inside the Wire', meaning the relation inside the base, between the Italian soldier and the other military personnel belonging to other nations; and (ii) 'Outside the Wire', meaning the relation outside the base, between the Italian soldier and the 'other' represented by the local population.

When I arrived to my anthropological place (UNIFIL Mission-Lebanon, which I consider a 'Space of Virtual Peace') I wanted to understand the emotional situation-condition of the people employed in this TO too. The short course on Stress Management I attended in Gorizia made me aware of it, and I do consider this point important to understand the link between emotions and cultural awareness training and reaction-response; basically the mechanism of the regression process (Volkan 2004) which combines fear-anxiety-emotions-culture.

The Italian soldier enters in a 'space of virtual peace' (UNIFIL Mission, Lebanon) which belongs to another cultural-symbolic-social-linguistic system (which is a model to understand reality) with his/her own cultural believes (i.e.: the Italian culture) to which he/she makes appeal in a natural way because they represent his/her resources, his/her capital needed to manage a critical situation. But, in order to operate in this 'space of virtual peace', and because the Italian soldier doesn't want to create problem but he/she wants to contribute to solve problem, he/she receives a cultural awareness training. This cultural awareness training (1) becomes a strategic capability; (2) should provide him/her new cultural models (belonging to the inhabitants of the 'space of virtual peace'); and (3) he/she should fully absorb them, make of them his/her second skin, his/her second nature and 'habitus' (Bourdieu 2005) (therefore an extra capital at his/her disposal).



Due to the fact that in critical situations and in contact with local population the Italian soldiers have to use this second nature-habitus (they should be able to draw

cognitive and behavioural models from the ones learned in the cultural awareness courses in a natural way), it is very important to know the emotional state of the soldiers. The question can be posed in this way: if the soldier is under stress, in a critical situation with the local 'other', will he/she be able to make use of the learned models or he/she will employ his/her native cultural models? And we know in advance that (and this is the purpose of the cultural awareness courses) in some critical situations, and in the 'space of virtual peace', to apply wrong cultural models (through which we translate a situation) create problem and can spark violent reaction or conflict.

In critical situation the local population will experience an emotional regression process (Volkan 2004) which will follow their cultural models, however, the Italian soldier, under stress, and experiencing the same regression process, should be able to use, in natural way, the same cultural model (of the local population) in order to understand, and manipulate the critical situation itself. It is only in his/her capacity to adopt, and to regress into this second culture-nature-habitus-capital, that the Italian soldier puts in practise the Ulysses' Paradigm developed by Col. Zinzone (Appendix 2 bis). In adopting the 'other' cultural-symbolic-social-linguistic system the CIMIC operator (1) is able to listen-influence-interact with the local 'other' in a 'space of virtual peace'; and (2) to contribute to recreate-shape an event-situation for the benefit of the whole mission.

On the topic of stress in TO, I had the chance to interview the military chaplain Lieutenant Giorgio Porta and the Lieutenant (psychologist) Donato Cattani. In the conversation I had with the military chaplain Porta (Appendix 22) he gave me a general picture, based on his experiences, on the stressful situation in which the Italian soldiers live their mission. The main source of stress in this TO is the fact that the military leave behind in Italy their family (wife/husband, kids, boyfriend-girlfriend, father-mother, divorce, etc.) and their problems (most economic problems), and when they arrive here it is very difficult for them to unplug, and to keep a distance from them. In the first days of the assignment there is an anxiety for internet connection, there is a strong necessity to be connected to their 'past life'. The other stressor is represented by the daily working routine; the service is 24h a day, with a lot of duties. The other stressor is the misunderstanding-incomprehension between NCO, WO, and Officer that a lot of time emerges. Only 10% of the Italian military personnel attend religious services, but everybody knows that the chaplain is there for them, ready to listen to them, and to provide a word of comfort.



For Lieutenant (psychologist) Donato Cattani (Appendix 23) the most important stressors which are always present during the meeting-conversation between the psychologist and the military are:

1. The perception of the risk; the risk of an armed attack;
2. The management of the relation between the military and his/her family back in Italy; and the fact that the military is conscious that back in Italy his/her family are suffering.

Then, using the stressor of 'the perception of the risk' I submitted to the officer my interpretative grid of the 'Space of Virtual Peace' (questionnaire Deployment; Appendix 21) and he agreed with it. According to him the fact that there is real risk (real data), and the perception of the risk (phenomena data) they both confirm the validity of the 'Space of Virtual Peace' in which the Italian soldier operates.

For Cattani, the Italian soldier is trained to deal with the stress 'inside the wire' (inside the military base), and 'outside the wire' (with the local population), but the problem is represented by the reality 'intra the wire' meaning between the military base and Italy (the relation between the military and his/her family, etc.), and for this kind of 'stress' there is not an adequate-specific training.

Describing the relation and the perception of the local population toward the Italian soldiers Cattani said that is based on respect, collaboration, and trust. This trust and respect is mutual. And this is a positive result because the Italian soldiers have not problem to interact with the local population, and they are more open and convivial than the soldiers belonging to other contingents serving the UNIFIL mission. The Italians, for their national history, have a multiculturalism which is part of their nature. Therefore, it is possible to affirm that there is an Italian way to approach and conduct military mission in TO.

As part of the deployment official program I met Maj. General Serra (Head of UNIFIL Mission, Force Commander) at the UNIFIL HQ, in Naqoura (Lebanon). The meeting was scheduled for the 16th Ago, at h. 10.30. Our conversation lasted approximately one hour (Appendix 24).

Gen. Serra asked me about my research, and its purpose and he said that this kind of research are very useful and important. I gave him a copy of my deployment questionnaire (Appendix 21).

The conversation covered the topics (1) of the 'Italian way' of the military missions; (2) the concept of the 'gift' applied to CIMIC operations; and (3) the validity of the interpretative grid of the 'Space of Virtual Peace'.

Gen. Serra argued that this peculiarity and the difference between us (Italians) and the US and north European soldiers reside (1) in the fact that in our cultural-social Italian context is present a kind of 'intuition' which helps the Italian to spot and see some situations which develop in social-cultural contexts that are not so different from ours (the Mediterranean area); and (2) in the fact that because we have grow up and matured in a Catholic context we have a predisposition to think before acting.

I asked to the Italian General if, according to his point of view based on his experiences, the CIMIC activity could be seen as a 'gift'. The General said that 'yes', and that is thank to this 'gift' that we are able to build trust with the local population.

Talking about the experience in the Afghanistan TO he compared a little hospital constructed by the Italian contingent to a 'gift'. 'When we arrived to Afghanistan we have opened a small hospital on a hill, and after few days the elders of the village, with their young nephews came for health treatments. Some days later there was a queue in front of the hospital. To this hospital-gift episode I remember that one day an old man said to us "tomorrow I do not go to that village (name of the village omitted)" and the following that a bomb exploded in that very village. Therefore we need to listen, and interact with the local population because, most of the time, they make you understand where is the danger for you.'

Gen. Serra read the questionnaire that I presented to my informants and he agreed with the validity of the concept of the 'Space of Virtual Peace' for the TO of Lebanon (UNIFIL Mission).

At the end of the conversation I had a photo with Maj. Gen. Serra who presented me, as a gift, a UNIFIL mission mug.



I collected important data in the conversation I had with B. Gen. Vasco Angelotti, Commander of Sector West (Ago 16th, 2013). I gave him a copy of my deployment questionnaire (Appendix 21). For the Italian General (Appendix 25) the situation in this TO is very fluid, and everything can happen. I have to add that during my deployment phase two terrorist attacks happened in Lebanon. Angelotti argued that in this TO it is possible to feel tension. As a result the Lebanese territory can be framed inside the 'Space of Virtual Peace'. This area can be considered as a bubble of security; however, there is an important point which is represented by the strong desire, of the local population, to have peace. The fact that the local population has accepted the presence of a UN mission means a positive attitude toward the search for peace. For the local population UNIFIL represents security, and provides security.

The B. Gen. Angelotti, in his relations with local mayors of villages in 'critical' areas, reminded how the very mayors told him that UNIFIL represents security. Here, to talk about a war after the war is misleading and for B. Gen. Angelotti should be more appropriate to use a metaphor: there is still burning charcoal beneath the ashes. Whilst

there is a strong desire for peace the conflict can spark in any moment. In short the concept of the 'Space of Virtual Peace, can be applied to the TO of Lebanon.

Regarding to the need to know the culture of the 'others', the Italian soldier in this mission has relations with two kinds of 'others': 'inside the wire' meaning inside the UN bases, because UNIFIL is a multinational mission and the Italian soldier has daily contact with foreign contingents. Therefore, to know the culture of his/her allies-colleagues is important for establishing communication and cooperation. The same is valid for the 'outside the wire' context, meaning outside the UNIFIL mission where the 'other' is represented by the local population. In this 'outside the wire' context to know the local language is not enough, but it is important to know the local culture and what is the real meaning carried by the local 'messages'.

I interviewed and spent time with my informants (MNCG CIMIC team, Informant A, B, D, E, F; Informant C was not present but he/she replied to my questionnaire and sent it back to me using an email) during the same period (Ago 15-21) and in different locations (UNIFIL bases: Naqoura, Shama, Al Mansuri).

My semi-structured interviews followed the deployment questionnaire (Appendix 21) and focused on five main points:

- (1) Cultural awareness training for the UNIFIL mission (section 'a' of the questionnaire);
- (2) The validity, or not, of the interpretative grid of the 'Space of Virtual Peace' applied to the TO of the UNIFIL mission (section 'b');
- (3) The relation of the informant with his/her operative context which is formed by two spaces (i) 'inside the wire', the relation between the informant and his/her colleagues (multinational contingent) inside the UNIFIL mission, (ii) 'outside the wire', the relation between the informant and the local population (section 'c', 'd', and 'e');
- (4) The put in practice of the paradigm 'listen-influence-interact' (section 'e');
- (5) The definition/idea of the 'Italian way' to approach international military missions (section 'e').

In order to unfold the above five topics here below I report the most salient parts of the informants' semi-structured interviews.



(1) Cultural awareness training for the UNIFIL mission.

Informant A: 'before the deployment, in Italy, I received training for this mission. The training lasted six months, it is basically military training, and during this time I received a course (two days) on the situation in Lebanon. This course was presented by MNCG CIMIC personnel who had come back from the same TO, and basically they talked about their own experiences. Inside the same course there were some lessons on cultural awareness and they were offered by some civilian personnel. I remember that in Motta di Livenza we received a briefing on the religious reality, and political situation on Lebanon (these briefings were offered by our colleagues). Once in UNIFIL mission, I received a course on cultural awareness organized by UNIFIL. This course saw the presence of civilian instructors and we received some lessons on gender awareness too. I consider these courses essential, and a good start for understanding the local cultural and social environment. My own attitude was to understand more, and for this reason I started to read and collect material on the reality of Lebanon and on the UNIFIL mission. It is essential to understand what is going on, and it is essential to know in order to do a good job. For example, I was invited several times by the local population and, despite the fact that we were using interpreters, we had to know the local customs, and tradition. To receive a good cultural awareness course will help the soldier with the booth on the ground to understand the non-verbal communication, the meaning of metaphors inside the local language, the real meaning of the messages-communications, and the local symbols.'

Informant B: 'before my assignment to UNIFIL mission, I attended a period of indoctrination on cultural awareness for this TO. The course was offered by MNCG colleagues who have lived the same experience, and they talked about their participation in the mission, on their field experiences, and about the modality and procedures to adopt in order to interact with the local population. The course was interesting and useful, but I think that if we had the possibility to have an external lecturer (coming from the academic world) I think we could have had a more wide vision and analysis of the TO. At the same time and by myself I have collected material from the official UNIFIL, UN, UNDPKO web pages, from journals (Limes), and news channel (BBC, CNN, Al Jazeera) on the situation in Lebanon.'

Informant C: 'before my assignment I received a course (duration two weeks), in which my colleagues talked about their experience in Lebanon (cultural and social context).'

Informant D: 'I cannot say that I received an appropriate cultural awareness course before my assignment in Lebanon. What I received was a two hours organized meeting with a MNCG colleague who talked about his/her previous experience in the TO of Lebanon (UNIFIL mission). Has been by myself that I gather material (a lot of open sources material) that I read to better understand the cultural-religious-social reality of Lebanon. The knowledge I constructed and assembled for myself has been useful during my mission, unfortunately the cultural awareness lessons I received in Italy did not provide enough information for me.'

Informant E: 'I attended, before the deployment, at the MNCG, a two days course on the situation in Lebanon. The course was presented by some colleagues who had matured some previous experience-mission in this TO. Basically the course was about the lesson learned. I found the course interesting and useful for my mission. To know

more about the situation here I studied by myself. However, now I can say that I wish I had more knowledge on Arabic language and Muslim culture. I am sure this could have helped me to have a better preparation for my mission. One point that I found here, is the difference of mentality. We come here with a NATO mentality, when what is needed is a UN mentality. Because I want to know and learn more I have frequent contacts with the local interpreters (called language assistants) because they act as cultural advisers too.'

Informant F: 'during my six months of military training (at the MNCG) prior my assignment to the UNIFIL mission we had something like ten hours of course, offered by colleagues with previous experience in this TO, about the culture, religion, social organizations, and geography of Lebanon. After, I started following the news (on internet, and on TV) on Lebanon. I can say that the cultural awareness course (ten hours) I had in Italy provided to me a basic knowledge on my next TO.'



(2) The validity, or not, of the interpretative grid of the 'Space of Virtual Peace' applied to the TO of the UNIFIL mission.

Informant A: 'the situation here is like walking on a frozen lake, you have to be careful where you put your feet. You have to know how to move around, and be prudent. The local environment here is full of symbolism, not only religious. It is an environment that speaks. There are different religions/confessions (Sunni, Shiah, Christians) and therefore, different ways of life. I consider suitable, from a sociological point of view, the definition of "Space of Virtual Peace" for the situation in Lebanon.'

Informant B: 'I do agree with this concept, I think it describes the TO in which we operate. I can say that the idea of "security" is a process, a becoming; however, "security" is the emblem of the myth. About the idea of "virtual", here everything looks normal, but there is tension. Here there is not peace, there is an armistice, and at the same time skepticism, and reluctance from the local population.'

Informant C: 'I do consider valid the Space of Virtual Peace interpretative grid. In this TO there still open wounds. And the UNIFIL mission is a way to provide economic stability to this country. I do agree that here there is a virtual peace.'

Informant D: 'I do consider valid the Space of Virtual Peace interpretative grid. However, I would like to say that, in our position, we receive (from our structure) our reference points, our bench marks. The symbolism which is present in this space allows

me to enter in contact with another cultural dimension. About the presence of stress, I can say that there is stress here, there is not peace here. There is a negative peace and still there is strong tension after the war.'

Informant E: 'I see that the Space of Virtual Peace can be applied to this TO. The local population (like us) is afraid of a possible conflict. Only two days ago there was a terrorist attack in Lebanon with a car bomb. Using a metaphor, here is like to live by a volcano...you never know. Our presence here is considered by the local population as useful. I can say that here there is fear. There is a say here that a Lebanese, in his live, reconstruct his house six times.'

Informant F: 'I agree with this definition of the Lebanese TO. Here there is a kind of forced peace, there is tension, and the threat of terrorist attack is a reality. A couple of days ago there was a terrorist attack in Beirut. I can talk about my experience with my two local interpreters: they have their luggage always ready just in case of a war. Here there is a fake, false calmness.'



(3) The relation of the informant with his/her operative context which is formed by two spaces (i) 'inside the wire', the relation between the informant and his/her colleagues (multinational contingent) inside the UNIFIL mission, (ii) 'outside the wire', the relation between the informant and the local population.

Informant A: 'I agree with this division of the space in which we, in general, and the CIMIC operator more in particular, operate. Both spaces are full of symbols. It is a natural process that we as human being symbolize the environment in which we live. Both spaces (inside the wire and outside the wire) are places (anthropological spaces-places) and not "non-places" (Auge'). For example this base in which I am assigned has its own identity, and symbols. However, when I move "outside the wire" I ask myself about the meaning of the local symbols. I can say that the multiculturalism is present in both contexts. Unfortunately when we talk about this TO we focus only on the religious facets but is not always like that. Regarding the "inside the wire" context is not

homogeneous. I interact on daily basis with military personnel from Ireland, Ghana, then from Malaysia, France, Slovenia, Korea, and Finland. Not to mention the relations with the local Lebanese people who are present inside the base. I do not have big problem in communicating with all of them because my English is good, and I know, and I became interested in the culture of my colleagues. I think that curiosity, and the interests toward the “other” are the most important qualities for a CIMIC operator. The lack of these qualities can have two repercussions: or the CIMIC operator is tied to a bureaucratic rigidity (he/she translates-interprets everything according rigid schemes) or he believes everything. What we need is to have at our disposal an expert on various cultures. In the “outside the wire” context I have contact with the local population and we use local interpreters. With the local we have a lot of activities like UN project, help programs, but at the same time the people here invite us to local celebrations and we are aware of the local traditions and we respect them. I can say that I meet all kind of people (social scale). Local people, most of the time, doesn’t know English, some of them know French, all know Arabic. I consider the local population welcoming, generous, and they have a lot of patience. In my experience I enjoyed meeting local people and I was invited in villages and in family that belong to the different religion and confession that are present here in Lebanon (Sunni and Shiah, and Christian). When I move I do not always carry with me my hand gun, and I do not wear the bullet-proof vest (I carry it but I do not wear it). At the same time I do not see gender discrimination toward CIMIC operators. If I had to define the local population I would like to say that they are Mediterranean people, they know how to make the best of a difficult situation, they are practical, they are optimists, and they are like us (Italians).’

Informant B: ‘I consider this spatial division appropriate for our operative context. However, in the inside the wire space I move in two contexts too. In one, which is the Italian, I find again my language, and my symbolic and cultural world; the other is represented by the space and the daily activities I have with the other nation’s armed forces. In this context I have to adapt myself to their cultural and symbolic world. I have daily contact with Indonesian soldiers, and I learned some Indonesian few words and about their culture. I have good relation with them, and with the language assistants (Lebanese women), and normally I communicate in English. I do consider interesting and useful to have a cultural awareness course about the culture of your colleagues, this can really help the working relationship. Regarding the outside the wire experience, I learned some Arabic (and I carried with me the grammar book) and this help to break the ice with the local population, and they are happy when I greet them in their language. For my duty I have a lot of contact with local people of different age, gender, social and economic position. In my contact with them I use the local interpreters. In my contacts with the local people I try to be ‘Arab’ like them. And I had a lot of good experience with them. I found them very welcoming and warm; I can say that they are like the people of South Italy. They have a pragmatic and no-systematic approach to life; this can be summarized in their expression “insallah”.’

Informant C: ‘I do agree with this definition of the operative context. Inside the wire: I do have excellent relations with my other international colleagues, I use Italian and English. I think that it could have been useful to have some cultural awareness lecturer on the culture of our other international colleagues. Here inside the base I do not feel stress. Outside the wire: for my job description I do have contact with local

population. The majority of them are men, they have a medium-high social position, their age is between 40 and 50 years of age, and they come from various religious and political groups. I can say that the relation with the local people is good, and the fact that we are Italian we are well accepted here. At the same time I see the local population a little stressed and are anti-Israel.'

Informant D: 'in the space defined as "Inside the Wire" we have reconstructed our Italian symbolism, our symbolic world (the Italian pizzeria, the distance from the different Italian cities as road panels, the emblems of our regiments, ect.). In this space I work with Italian and with locals (three language assistants, and one engineer). We have a good professional friendship. In my work I make use of Italian, English, French, and Arabic (with the help of the interpreter). I know partially the culture of my local colleagues. At this regard I would like to say that a course on the culture of our local colleagues could have been very interesting and useful. I have studied Muslim culture and this has helped me in establishing good relations with the local people I work with. For example is important to remember the various religious festivities-celebrations here. I am on duty 24h a day, but I do not perceive any stress. In the space of "Outside the Wire" I deal with different kind of local people and I have to use the interpreter for my communication-conversation, I do not speak Arabic. I can consider the relation with the local people neutral, positive, I feel accepted and I never had negative experiences.'

Informant E: 'I have contact with people of different cultures every day in IW and OW. In IW I work with Italian, Irish, and Lebanese and we communicate in Italian and English. I think that to know more about the culture of your international colleagues can help in building relationships and dialogue. What I notice in the inside the wire space is the need to adopt a UN mentality. You feel that you are part of a multinational force and you must have a UN oriented mentality. Unfortunately we come here with a NATO mentality, where CIMIC is Civil-Military Cooperation, while the UN mentality, the CIMIC is Civil-Military Coordination. Even if the difference is superficial at the end there is a big difference, and I think that this is a problem. For this reason I studied (my own initiative) a UN course on CIMIC operations. It is interesting to notice that IW the Italian soldiers carry their own Italian military symbols, rituals, etc. Regarding my position in the outside the wire space, I have frequent relations with local population, not only for duty-business reason but some time they invite us to meeting, celebrations, etc. Normally I interact with "men", here the majority of local leaders are men. I remember that in my job I meet local mayors, people working for local firms-companies, but even with school kids, etc. In this encounters I use the language advisers, but to break the ice I use some words in Arabic that I know and that I learned. I always carry with me a list of Arabic colloquial expressions that sometime I employ. Relations with the local people are good. I think that if I had known Arabic before my assignment my relation with the locals could have been even better. I carry a hand gun but I do not show it. I do not want to have an aggressive image. What is interesting is that the local approach us using Italian stereotypes. I found the Lebanese very similar to the Italians, both of us are Mediterranean people, and I met a lot of locals (or members of their families) that studied in Italy.'

Informant F: 'This division of the operative context between inside the wire and outside the wire, can be summarized in: inside the base, and outside the base. This is how I see it. Inside the base-inside the wire I work with Indonesian military personnel and two

interpreters (Lebanese women). The Indonesia are Muslim, they have a different concept of work (some time you have to push them; they lack initiative). We communicate in English and there is a lot of cooperation with the Indonesian and the two interpreters. I tried to know more on the Indonesian culture and Indonesian language...I learned some colloquial expressions that I use with them and this make them happy. At the same time I interact with French soldiers, and now I want to learn French. Regarding the activity outside the base-outside the wire, for my job description I leave the base very rarely. What I observed is that with local population rank and age is more important then gender. I consider the Lebanese very friendly, they love their family, it looks like to be in Italy.'



(4) The put in practice of the paradigm 'listen-influence-interact'.

Informant A: 'this system-method can works on both contexts (inside the wire, outside the wire), but it can works properly if all the three elements (listen, influence, interact) combine together. Of course it depends on the task of the CIMIC operator, but "listen" is very important in order to collect data on the local situation.'

Informant B: 'You have to listen because "influence" is an activity which searches the consensus through a negotiation process. I think that to have women in this CIMIC activity is necessary because women, the female gaze, can provide a different vision on the local situation, and then to enrich the knowledge we have on this TO. A lot of time local people prefer to interact with the women translators then the male translators.'

Informant C: 'unfortunately I never used this "listen-influence-interact" paradigm.'

Informant D: 'unfortunately this paradigm "listen-influence-interact" is only used partially. I can listen and understand but: for influence we do not have any policy-direction; and for interact, this is only unidirectional from me/us toward the local population, I do not have feed back, what is lack is an evaluation on our activities.'

Informant E: 'I listen and I interact, and I think the meaning of influence is a positive influence, therefore, I try to send the message that I am here to help. I have to adapt myself to the local population and I want that they understand that my mission is to help them. With my coherent behavior I was able to conquest the trust of the local population.'

Informant F: 'personally I put in practice this paradigm inside the base with the people of the other contingents. Some one said that I am a very good PR (public relation).'

(5) The definition/idea of the 'Italian way' to approach international military missions.

Informant A: 'I think that the concept of the "Italian way" to approach military missions can be summarized on some qualities. To be emphatic, not to think that we are superior to anybody, to not exaggerate with anything, to have a lot of common sense, to maintain a balance, an equilibrium. However, these qualities are not only Italian.'

Informant B: 'I do not think that to be Italian is of any help here, and I do not think that "Italians do it better". I think that the Italians have an aptitude because our country is in the middle of the Mediterranean Sea where different cultures came together. I think that the predisposition of an individual to do, is tide to his thirst for knowing-learning and a strong self discipline.'

Informant D: 'we are Mediterranean people and we Italians and the local Lebanese population feel it. We have a kind of common origin. I think that to be Italian in this TO represent a capital, an added value. We are better accepted than other foreign contingents by the local population.'

Informant E: 'when we arrive here, our stereotypes are already present. Is the typical image of "Italian nice people". Comparing with the other international contingent I can say that for our Italian culture we are more open, less aggressive, with more patience, and friendlier.'

Informant F: 'we Italians, when compared with the soldiers of other nation present in this base, we are more open, we like to interact and meet people, we like social activities, it is in our nature. But I can see the same with the Spanish.'



Ago 21st, 2013.

This was my last day of deployment. The day was busy with bureaucratic procedures, the return of the temporary pass, and the equipment I was assigned (bullet-proof vest, and helmet). I had a meeting with Gen. Angelotti who gave me as a present the emblem of the mission, and on the afternoon I was embarked again on the ferry 'Carolyn'. Once in Beirut, together with other Italian military personnel, and escorted by UN armored vehicles, we reached Beirut airport, were, after the normal security and passport control procedures, we were embarked on a flight to Roma via Verona (Italy).



5. Post-deployment phase

The ‘post-deployment’ phase occupied me from Sept 18th, 2013, until May 7th, 2014. In this period I had (1) several email exchanges and phone calls (Sept 18th, Nov 19th, Nov 25th, Nov 26; Jan 19th, 2014, Jan 23rd, Mar 5th, Mar 7th, Mar 8th, Apr 8th, Apr 11th, Apr 14th, Apr 15th, Apr 28th, May 5th) with COI-DIFESA; and (2) email exchanges with the MNCG CIMIC team in order to organize and arrange my next meeting (semi-structured interviews) with them at the MNCG barracks (Motta di Livenza, Treviso, Italy). It was necessary to work on the dates that best suit the informants, and on the authorizations to enter again inside the military base and to interview the military personnel. As a result my post-deployment phase was split in two periods in which I had the possibility to meet and interview again the MNCG CIMIC Team. The first period was Dec 1-3, 2013, and the second period was May 6-7, 2014. In order to maintain the anonymity of my informants I won’t present the dates of the interviews this is because some of my informants were not present in the MNCG barracks, some of them were moved to another military base, and others spent more time in Lebanon for duty reasons.

The post-deployment phase questionnaire (Appendix 32) was based largely on the work of Van Meer, Veldhuis, & Schwerzel (2008).

‘To address the issue of cultural awareness of military personnel, a series of cultural awareness trainings, the so called “Cultural Awareness Scenario Training” (CAST), was developed and given to the Royal Netherlands Army. A cultural framework was used as a basis for this training. This cultural framework consists in six so-called “pillars” (Honour and face; Hierarchy and social stratification; Purity, danger and taboos; Proxemics and body language; Speech acts; and Worldview and belief system). Each pillar describes a concept that enables the user to make sense of the behaviour as he or she observes it, and helps to formulate an appropriate response. These pillars are meant to form a solid backbone for the development of cultural awareness training because the pillars cover the main gist of what should be considered when learning about a new culture. In the CAST the pillars were used as the foundation for both role-play scenarios and briefing packages. The briefing packages were used as a short introduction to a new culture and as a reference guide. Also, soldiers were given the opportunity to learn and practise appropriate conduct through role-play. By engaging in role-play scenario that were based on the six pillars, the soldiers learned the main aspects of cultural life in Afghanistan’ (Van Meer, Veldhuis, & Schwerzel 2008: 5-2).

The study of Van Meer, Veldhuis, & Schwerzel (1) was conducted on 13 interviews with British military personnel who had been deployed to Afghanistan; (2) validated the cultural framework of reference (CAST); and (3) focused to gain increased perspective on the cultural awareness that is necessary to co-operate successfully with members of other culture.

Therefore, whilst these authors wanted to validate a specific cultural framework (Cultural Awareness Scenario Training) on British soldiers who had been deployed to Afghanistan, I have tried to do the same with the MNCG CIMIC team at their return from Lebanon.

Both Afghanistan and Lebanon are instable territories (1) where war, and a war after the war is present; (2) where different ethnic and religious groups (majority Muslim) lives; and (3) where foreign military contingents operate. For these foreign military contingents both Afghanistan and Lebanon are TO.

The cultural framework which I employed in my semi-structured interviews and post-deployment questionnaire (Appendix 32; part 'a' and 'b' of the questionnaire) consists in the six pillars of CAST employed and validated by Van Meer, Veldhuis, & Schwerzel (2008): Honour and face; Hierarchy and social stratification; Purity, danger and taboos; Proxemics and body language; Speech acts; and Worldview and belief system.

(i) Honour and Face. 'In many societies, honour and face play a central role in all interactions between people, though honour system may vary in detail from region to region. In cultures in which honour plays a prominent role, daily life is significantly influenced by consideration of honour. To understand fully why people do what they do, one must take honour into account. Face can be seen as the public and individual manifestation of honour. To have face means to be openly recognized as an honourable person and to be treated with appropriate respect. To lose face means that this image is somehow damaged. One cornerstone of honour system is that an individual is first and foremost a member of a group. If an individual behaves disgracefully, the honour of the entire group is stained. If, alternatively, the group's honour is blemished, the public standing of the individuals in that group is damaged as well. In some culture, the honour of a family, clan, tribe or ethnic group lies primarily with its ability to protect the women in the group as well as the home. A violation of the home (e.g., entering without permission) indicates an inability to protect the woman, diminishing one's claim to honour. There is also honour in self-sufficiency and independence (more common in western societies) which is for example violated by coercion or compulsion. Finally, honour can be found in hospitality: treating guests will gives claim to honour. Violating honour might place the requirement of revenge to restore honour. The severity of revenge may imply anything up to the actual taking of life' (Van Meer, Veldhuis, & Schwerzel 2008: 5-3).

(ii) Hierarchy and social stratification. 'Within most societies, there are classifications that determine status or rank. Social stratification is the hierarchical division of classes or levels in society. It may pertain to ethnicity, religion, demographics and professional background. Awareness of the social pecking order is imperative to understanding and interacting with a culture' (Van Meer, Veldhuis, & Schwerzel 2008: 5-3).

(iii) Purity, danger and taboo. 'All societies have certain things that are considered "dirty" or "clean". Which exact things are either dirty or clean varies from culture and culture. Certain animals, bodily emissions (mucus, pus, urine, faeces etc.), implements (handkerchiefs, toilet brushes, shoes), social contacts (marrying cousins is taboo in some societies and the preferred marriage in others), and behaviour (transvestism, mentally ill people) can be considered impure and taboo. What is considered dirty or impure is generally avoided or removed, and physical contact is usually followed by (ritual) cleansing. As purity is such an important issue in Islam, any work describing daily life in Islamic societies will cover issues such as the need for ritual cleansing. These issues also have an impact on food culture and for example the theme of virginity. The social and religious desire to remain physically and mentally clean is common to every society. Values and ideals about purity can be deeply ingrained in people such that they are often not aware that these values are not universal. Disrespect for (subconsciously) held values about purity and taboos can gravely affront people. Impurity is linked to danger as it

relates to infections or contamination. Unclean things are dangerous as they may be contagious through contact. The same is true for taboos although taboo need not always be classified as unclean but simply dangerous' (Van Meer, Veldhuis, & Schwerzel 2008: 5-4).

(iv) Proxemics and body language. 'The term proxemics refers to the use of space such as personal space and appropriate distance between people, as well as architectural concepts. Examples are the physical distance that is kept between conversation partners or the location of a toilet inside or outside a house. Architectural traditions can say something about the culture of a region. The thickness of walls or the size of windows (small windows make it hard to look inside, large windows make it easy) could be an indication of the degree of desired "privacy" in a community. Proxemics rules underlie people's behaviour in crowds, the way they decorate homes and offices, and seating arrangements during meetings. (...) body language belongs to more implicit and unspoken parts of culture. An example is that for most western European the thumbs-up gesture is interpreted as a positive and safe gesture. The inability to read someone's body language can lead to irritation, misunderstanding or distrust. An "inappropriate" gesture could wreck negotiations. Being aware of the impact of proxemics and body language is important when dealing with locals' (Van Meer, Veldhuis, & Schwerzel 2008: 5-4, 5-5).

(v) Speech act. 'The power of speech in Islam is evident (Allah created the world by speaking) and authors have often commented on the importance of speech in an Arab context. (...) Speech acts refer to the way in which greetings, introductions, meetings, speeches, and negotiations are conducted and structured. Sometimes these speech acts are purely formulaic and proceedings are ritualized. It is virtually impossible to cut through these speech acts without being impolite. Speech acts are also relevant in relation to the use of interpreters. Interpreters are the primary tool through whom the local population can be engaged' (Van Meer, Veldhuis, & Schwerzel 2008: 5-5).

(vi) Worldview and belief systems. 'Worldview can refer to cosmology, basic outlook of life, or political ideals. The a priori assumptions about reality. Worldview pertains to the basic explanations for why we are here and how the universe is constructed. The term "belief system" covers religious issues, but it also covers issues such as magic or witchcraft. (...) A belief system may be an organized religious group, but can also constitute sacred rituals, rites and ceremonies. People's beliefs and worldviews influence their behaviour and it is important to try to be aware of at least the basic tenets of local world view and belief system' (Van Meer, Veldhuis, & Schwerzel 2008: 5-5).

According to Van Meer, Veldhuis, & Schwerzel (2008: 5-5) 'the six pillars described above represent the main concepts by which crucial aspects of a variety of cultures can be made understandable. These six pillars are not meant to be mutually exclusive. In fact, they overlap continually. "Speech acts" have common ground with "honour and face" when, for example, the rules for respectful conversation are violated. "Proxemics and body language" and "purity, danger and taboo" intersect where a certain gesture or act (e.g., publicly holding hands) is considered taboo'.

In the post-deployment questionnaires that I used in my semi-structured interviews with the MNCG CIMIC Team, in part 'a' I ask the informant if, in his/her relations with the local population (outside the wire), has noted and spotted the following elements: Honour and face; Hierarchy and social stratification; Purity, danger and taboos;

Proxemics and body language; Speech acts; and Worldview and belief system. And, once noted the above elements how he/she has reacted to them. In part 'b' I ask the same questions about the inside the wire experience of the informant. No member of the MNCG CIMIC team has ever attended any official and specific 'Cultural Awareness Scenario Training', as it has resulted from the interviews in the pre-deployment and deployment phase.

In order to unfold, among others topics, the above elements here below I report parts of the informants' semi-structured interviews.

- (1) Did you have contact with the local population during your deployment time?
- (2) In your relations with the local population (outside the wire), have you noted and spotted the following elements: Honour and face; Hierarchy and social stratification; Purity, danger and taboos; Proxemics and body language; Speech acts; and Worldview and belief system?
- (3) Once noted the above elements how do you reacted to them?
- (4) In your relations with the other members of the international military forces (inside the wire), have you noted and spotted the following elements: Honour and face; Hierarchy and social stratification; Purity, danger and taboos; Proxemics and body language; Speech acts; and Worldview and belief system?
- (5) Once noted the above elements how do you reacted to them?
- (6) Now that your mission in Lebanon has ended, what do you think about the cultural awareness training you received before the deployment?

- (1) Did you have contact with the local population during your deployment time?

Informant A: 'Yes, most of the time I had contact with local authorities, but at the same time I have good memories of various dinner with local people of different social extraction. All the contacts I had with the local populations were very positive. I remember with particular pleasure an experience I had in a local village during a vet-care (together with the Italian military veterinary). At the same time I want to add that in these contacts and in helping the local populations we have to be careful in not provoke damage in good faith. This can be the case when the Italian military medical doctor visits too much the local villages and this makes that the local medical doctor lose his clients-patients. Therefore, we have always to search equilibrium with the local social reality.'

Informant B: 'during my assignment I had daily with local population and to be more specific with local institutions (composed by local authority).'

Informant C: 'yes, I did have quite regular contacts with the local population during my employment in Lebanon.'

Informant D: 'I had daily interaction with local population.'

Informant E: 'yes, in my activities I had a lot of contacts with local people, local interpreters, local suppliers, meetings with local authorities, and always I had very good relations with all of them.'

Informant F: 'most of the time I had contact with the local interpreters and with local firms. However, for my job description, I visited various villages, and I did meet local people.'

(2) In your relations with the local population (outside the wire), have you noted and spotted the following elements: Honour and face; Hierarchy and social stratification; Purity, danger and taboos; Proxemics and body language; Speech acts; and Worldview and belief system?

Informant A: 'I noticed the above elements in this order (meaning how much they were present in my encounters with the local population): 1. Honour and face, it is like in a lot of parts of South of Italy; 2. Worldview and belief system, Lebanon is tolerant to different religion, what I noticed is a lot of fatalism, at the same time I remember the beautiful and interesting experience in attending local Christian orthodox mass-rituals in local churches; 3. Hierarchy and social stratification; 4. Purity, danger and taboos, I experienced that the local populations lives under a sensation of danger, I noticed psychological tension-stress; 5. Proxemics and body language, and Speech acts, on proxemics they are Mediterranean people, they are similar to us, I did not notice any difference with the Italian proxemics. I think we (CIMIC team) we are culturally ready to interact with the local people because their culture is close to the Italian culture, in reality I noticed how much we are close more than we are far away. I adapted myself quite easily to the local customs. And a lot of time the interpreters were explaining to me the real meaning of a phrase, of body-language. And thanks to this tips the "other" is not so much "other". There is only one remark I want to make is that if you do not know the local language there is the danger that the local interpreters take control of the conversation with the "other" and you cannot check what is going on. When I arrived to Lebanon I received cultural awareness training. However, comparing with my previous mission in Afghanistan I can say that here, due to the fact that in Lebanon there is a Mediterranean culture, to spot the above elements you must concentrate. In Afghanistan the differences with our Italian culture are more marked and evident, here are more part of a common Mediterranean culture and way of life. Moreover, to spot them you have to employ your curiosity. I say that to be a CIMIC operator curiosity is a must, you must have a right sensibility, and you have always to take in consideration the purpose of your mission. I spotted these elements thanks (1) to my cultural and education background; (2) the course on cultural awareness I attended in Italy and in Lebanon (and contact with the interpreters); and (3) my curiosity and my observant participation.'

Informant B: 'despite the fact that the cultural awareness short course I had in Italy (duration: one morning) did not cover all the elements listed before (e.g., no one mention the case of honour and face, and worldview and belief system) I was able to see these elements present in the way of life of the local population. Before my assignment I started to read material on Lebanese culture, society, and history, and I started to study Arabic. The reason behind my decision is that I really wanted to enter in the mind of the local people; I wanted to understand them better. The knowledge of Arabic has represented to me the key to enter and to understand the reality in which this people live, to know their emotions, and to eliminate barriers with them. This knowledge (culture and Arabic) became a strategic capital, a capability, to be employed there.'

Informant C: 'I did remark the above six elements. I think they are very typical of Arab people, and of their cultures. And I noticed them during the conversation and meeting I had with the locals. I noticed them in this order of importance: 1. Honor and Face; 2. Worldviews and beliefs system; 3. Hierarchy and social stratification; 4. Speech acts; 5. Proxemics and body language; and 6. Purity, danger and taboo. Another thing that

I noticed in the local population was a strong hatred against the state of Israel. However, I noticed these specific characteristics thanks to my face to face contacts with the locals, and thanks to the material I read before my assignment.'

Informant D: 'Yes, I was able to spot and to observe the six cultural points. I did not receive a specific course on cultural awareness for this specific TO, but even before my assignment, I started to read and to investigate about the local history, culture, and society. And several time I asked to the interpreters to explain to me the local behaviors and social practices. Regarding religion, you have to be careful to talk openly about it.'

Informant E: 'in my frequent contacts with the local populations I did notice the above six elements, and in this order, meaning the times I noticed them in my daily contacts: 1. Honor and face, which is very eradicated, but it is like in Italy; 2. Speech acts, I remember that during the meetings with the local authorities they were very welcoming and friendly; 3. Hierarchy and social stratification, I observed that during meeting where the person with influence were standing by the local mayor and how the people reacted with respect toward the authority, and at the same time I noticed how the political influence conditioned the local relations; 4. Proxemics and body language ; 5. Purity, danger and taboo; 6. Worldviews and beliefs system. I remember interesting conversation I had with the local interpreters to know more about local religions.'

Informant F: 'yes, I did remark the above cultural elements, even if the cultural awareness course I received in Italy was only a basic discussion on Lebanon social and cultural reality. For my experience I can say that these points do play an important role when you have to interact with local people, to establish a dialogue with them, and you have to understand what is going on, and how to interpret the situation. I remember going to a village for duty reason, and I was accompanied by our local interpreters. I had a meeting with the local authorities (the village mayor) but the population of the village was all around us, looking, and listening to our conversation with the mayor, and a lot of time I noticed that the mayor, before answering to our questions or before to take a decision, was always looking for support from the local people around us. Therefore, you can understand that in situation like that most of the above elements are present in a normal meeting. At the same time I noticed that I was better not to talk about religion. I can say that for the fact that I am Italian, we are more familiar with these points because you can notice them in our culture, and most of our daily life.'

(3) Once noted the above elements how do you reacted to them?

Informant A: 'I adapted myself to the local customs and this for my personal disposition, and professional need. And I think this is part of the CIMIC qualities. Personally I tried to absorb, and interiorize the local habitus. It is necessary to adapt oneself to the local customs, however, if someone is more gifted (a kind of combination of curiosity for local culture, and personal sensibility) he adapts better, and this is good for the mission.'

Informant B: 'I noticed the six elements and I adapt to them, but I did in a very natural way. Thanks to my knowledge of local culture and of Arabic have been easier, and I can say that a lot of time, with the knowledge of Arabic I was able to conquest the trust of local people. Several times they were happy to see me speaking Arabic and they understood the effort I was doing to communicate with them. Local people appreciate you when you are natural, and spontaneous.'

Informant C: ‘definitely, I adapted to them, first because I was operating in their “homes”, and second because I thought that the local population could have taken my presence as the one of an occupation force. It is important to provide a relaxed and flexible image of ourselves when we operate in this TO.’

Informant D: ‘I adjusted myself to the local customs, and I did it in order to conquest the local population trust. If you are not accepted by them you can not do a good job here. You have to integrate yourself in this social-cultural context. But I think this is quite normal for a CIMIC operator. If you are not curious, and you are not interested to know and to interact with the other (in this case the Lebanese local population) you can not do CIMIC. CIMIC requires curiosity. For example to know about the six cultural points they helped me to interact with the local authorities. At the same time, through the knowledge I accumulated by myself I was able to read the space in which I was operating. To know the local culture and social practices help you to deconstruct the local reality.’

Informant E: ‘as I said I observed the local customs and I adapted my behaviour to them. First because I am interested to know more, second because once you adapt this produce a positive impact on your local interlocutors. For example mature and elder people liked when you treated them in a very polite way. My process of adaptation was very natural. Another reason to adapt was that I wanted to bring prestige to my Country. I received the honorary citizenship from a local village, therefore, I think that I did a good job and what I was doing was really appreciated by the locals.’

Informant F: ‘I adapted myself to the local customs, and has been easy. I can say that, even if you receive a cultural awareness training, at the end of the day you have to live this experience in the TO. You memorize the local cultural facets, and you adapt to them. It is a cognitive process. If you want answers from the local population you have to enter in their routine (customs, habits, etc.), you have to become empathic with them, and doing like that the local population become more sincere in their answers. You do not have to be impetuous, but you have to find a right balance. You have to be polite, and humble, but at the same time it is important to be determined in order to have the right answers for what you are looking for. Unfortunately not all the CIMIC operators are qualified, for example, I never attended an official CIMIC course, but at least I was interested to know more about the others I met. And sometime I noticed a number of CIMIC operators that lacked the interest to know the others, their cultures, and to enter in contact with them.’

(4) In your relations with the other members of the international military forces (inside the wire), have you noted and spotted the following elements: Honour and face; Hierarchy and social stratification; Purity, danger and taboos; Proxemics and body language; Speech acts; and Worldview and belief system?

Informant A: ‘I noticed these elements in my daily contacts with my foreign colleagues, and I noticed that we have different rhythm of work. I had relations with military personnel from Ireland, Ghana, Korea, Malaysia, China, India, Indonesia, and Tanzania. I made a list of how the above elements were present in my relations: 1. Honour and Face, and Purity, danger and taboo. I think a taboo here can be represented by the danger to bully and to diminish the other nations. This is an international context and quite everybody is praising his own nation, therefore, you must be careful not to

humiliate the other; 2. Hierarchy and social stratification, and Speech acts. Being an international context you have to be careful on how you employ English. Every nation has its own way to use English; 3. Proxemics and body language, and Worldviews and beliefs system. Regarding these points I remember my experience with the Chinese contingent, they are very kind, generous and formal, but basically they are impenetrable, you cannot understand what they think.'

Informant B: 'I had daily contact with military personnel from Nepal, Indonesia, France, Qatar, Spain, Serbia, India, Ireland, Finland, and China. I did not received any cultural training on the culture of these nations, and I am sure that to have a training of this kind could help people, in the multinational environment, to better understand each other, to make more easy the coexistence, and the human interactions. I did remarked the above six elements in many daily working experiences, and I wanted to better understand my colleagues. Therefore, when I noticed a particular cultural-social-religious behaviour always I asked to my colleagues the meaning of it. I really wanted to know better my "others" colleagues, and this helps human relations.'

Informant C: 'I had relations with the other UN foreign military personnel every day, and more frequently with militaries from Ireland and Ghana. It is in relations to these militaries that I noticed the above six points but in a different way. For the Irish soldiers honour and face, together with hierarchy and social stratification were more noticeable, followed by proxemics and body language, speech acts, worldviews and beliefs system, and purity, danger and taboo. However, the situation with the militaries from Ghana was a little different, hierarchy and social stratification was at the top. In this military context the Officer is not only a rank but an attribute of social status. Therefore, the Officer was regarded as a supreme commander. This point was followed by worldviews and beliefs system, honor and fear, proxemics and body language, and speech acts.'

Informant D: 'I had working-professional relations with military personnel coming from Ghana, Ireland, France and Lebanese Army. I noticed the six points; however, the Irish and French personnel had the same system-customs like the Italian one. I noticed more differences regarding the Ghana's military where the position of the Commander is extremely important.'

Informant E: 'I had very rare contacts with the foreign soldiers of the UNIFIL mission.'

Informant F: 'inside the UNIFIL base I had contact with military personnel coming from Brazil, France, Ghana, Tanzania, Indonesia, Serbia, and Cyprus. I noticed the six points because every nation that comes here brings with it its own culture, way of life, and symbols.'

(5) Once noted the above elements how do you reacted to them?

Informant A: 'I noticed the elements and I adapted myself to the situation. It is very important that you adapt your behaviour to your international colleagues, and this is for mutual cooperation and to avoid misunderstandings. I noticed that to make jokes is quite difficult because people can interpret your joke not in the same way you understand it. What can be a joke in your culture is not a joke in other cultures.'

Informant B: 'I adapted to them and always I had good results, because my foreign colleagues realized that I was interested to know him/her better, and therefore that I was acknowledging him/her. This really helps in establishing cooperative relations.'

Informant C: 'I realized the differences and the six points and I adopted them. However, it was easy with the Irish, more complicated with the Ghana contingent.'

Informant D: 'Even in this context I adjusted myself.'

Informant F: 'I always adapted myself to the situation, for example my colleagues were from Indonesia, they were Muslim, and I knew when it was pray time and I did not bother them with work. I always waited the end of their pray (they were praying in their office) and after that I interacted with them. I think that could have been interesting, before my assignment to have received some cultural training on our foreign colleagues. At the same time I want to say that we Italians we are more flexible, and open, and this is of great help. I noticed that the French soldiers were more rigid, formal, and they always were speaking in French.'

(6) Now that your mission in Lebanon has ended, what do you think about the cultural awareness training you received before the deployment?

Informant A: 'The first think I want to say is that we (Italian CIMIC Team) grow up in a NATO environment, with a NATO mentality (emergence in dangerous places, and if there is a security problem as to be solved), here is a UN mission, with a lot of different mentalities, different duties, and mandates. Then, about the training (duration six months; military and cultural awareness) I received before my assignment I consider that it was essential and sufficient. However, if I had to organize a similar training I would insert modules on English and on the local language (Arabic).'

Informant B: 'the cultural awareness course I received in Italy was useful and sufficient but it could be improvable. If I had to organize a cultural awareness course for this TO I would dedicate more time to the knowledge of Arabic (Lebanese), on Lebanese social and cultural history, and at the same time to dedicate time to better know the culture of our foreign colleagues in the UNIFIL mission.'

Informant C: 'before my assignment I received training in Italy. It was a military training, and the cultural awareness module was very poor indeed. I think a course like that it should be more dedicated to the local history and culture, and provide a basic Arabic course. What we need is really to enter into the culture of the other.'

Informant D: 'the training I received was good for the military side, but very poor for the cultural awareness module. I did a lot of research by myself, I read books on Lebanese. And I realized that a cultural awareness course for Lebanon should provide modules on Lebanese history, geography, religion (and on the power of religion institutions here), and courses on Arabic, which is fundamental for establishing good relationships with the local people, and to understand them better.'

Informant E: 'on the whole I enjoyed my mission. Even if the cultural awareness training I received was scarce I found a lot of similarities with the Italian culture. My curiosity about the local history and culture brought me to read more about Lebanon. I think that a good course on cultural awareness on this TO should cover not only the cultural and linguistic realities but the economic and financial system which are present here. About the language, Arabic, it is very important to study it, to know the local language is really a capability, and you notice it when you have to use, in the

communication with the locals, the interpreters and most of the time you do not know if what they are saying is really what you said, therefore, I experienced the fact to be like a prisoner inside the hands of the translators.'

Informant F: 'I received a six months training before my deployment. The military training was good, however, about the cultural awareness training, which was a simple presentation; I would like to change it completely. I think a good training could include more time on our real duty during the mission, and on how to deal with the local population. I suggest that we should study local history and politics, to know more about the local religion, study some Arabic, and to know more about the culture of our foreign colleagues in the UNIFIL bases.'

May 7th, 2014.

This day represents my last day inside the MNCG barracks where I conducted my last semi-structured interviews with my informants. With these interviews I can say that I have concluded my anthropological fieldwork experience inside a specific anthropological place.

6. Conclusion

This chapter has unfolded the whole of my fieldwork experience in my anthropological place (the MNCG barracks, and the UNIFIL bases in Lebanon). In this experience I had to work hard to get the necessary authorization to be physically present in these places and to interview the people who have provided the data for this thesis. At the same time I had to move several time to Roma, Motta di Livenza (Treviso), and then to Lebanon to reach the anthropological places. In this chapter I have focused specifically on the interviews of the informants I met during my trips, leaving aside the more narrative part dealing with the personal experiences and the sensations I lived during this work. Next chapter will present the result of this job based on the methodology I have created and adopted, and will offer the conclusion of the whole thesis.

Chapter 4

Results and Conclusion

1. Introduction

This chapter concludes the work of this PhD thesis, and presents in the next subchapter the results of the field work experience, and in the conclusion, based on the whole of the experience of the author of this work, it is exposed the idea of an engaged anthropology for the production of legitimate security knowledge.

2. Results

As the previous chapter has demonstrated, the data collected in this work have been multiples and useful for various level of analysis.

The first set of data is represented by the problem of authorization to conduct this kind of research inside the military environment and structure. This military environment is an anthropological place in which symbolism, rituals, heroes, parades, medals, do play an important role. At the same time is an environment in which the majority of its personal is under the ‘military code in peace time’, meaning that they can not act freely but they always need an authorization from the hierarchical structure. The same personal is framed and has a rigid position (and a limited freedom) inside the same hierarchical system. Whilst the Italian Defence Staff gave me the authorization to work on the whole of this project, at the same time the practicability of this authorization was nullified by the bureaucratic procedures which were necessary any time I had to contact my informants, and to enter into the space in which they were operating. The same problem was experienced with the interview to the Italian Minister of Defence; it required a lot of time, emails and phone calls with the Minister’s secretary, and the Minister’s spokesman; the interview was cancelled several times at the last moment, but at the end I met the Minister.

What emerges from the official experience I had with the structure of the IMoD and the interview with the Minister of Defence is that the ‘structure’ wants to protect the monopoly it has on the production of security knowledge. The Minister said very clearly that Italy has not a security policy, and that the politicians are not interested in security policy too. They are interested only in emergency time. Following the evolution of the production of the official security knowledge of the Italian Ministry of Defence I can say that the last ‘White Book of Italian Defence’ (2015) is vaguer in relation to geopolitical vision, while the previous Strategic Concepts (2001, 2005) produced in the past year were pointing to specific geographical areas of strategic interest for Italy. The present ‘White Book’ is completely based on a strong military, and intellectual approach to security developed inside NATO structure and mentality. Once confronted this position-vision to the ‘multiple stress zones’ presented in this thesis, and the fact that Italy is just in the middle of this area, the lack of vision and the strategic myopia is evident. The discourse is concentrated on security and defence, where both terms are used with the same meaning of ‘military defence’ (to defend us). There is not an interpretation of security in which emancipation appears, and therefore the idea of conflict, in order to preserve security-defence, is always present. And this represents a big business opportunity for the weapon industries that are behind the political decision of the IMoD.

Therefore, the official security knowledge has to be protected employing its own experts (Galimberti 2011). Any voice outside the chorus must be silenced. This in short confirms the critical thesis of Gen. Fabio Mini (2003, 2008, 2012) which is one of the pillars of the present work.

The other set of data that I collected are related to the experience and interviews I had with my various informants and the MNCG CIMIC team. What emerged are the following results which refers to (1) NATO mentality; (2) lack of a specific cultural awareness training; (3) lack of knowledge of local language; (4) good empathy; and (5) quality of a CIMIC operator.

(1) NATO mentality: NATO mentality is eradicated, meaning that even if the MNCG CIMIC team was employed in a UN mission, the NATO habitus was always present. The MNCG CIMIC team commented several time on this aptitude to approach security attitudes. The MNCG Team did not receive a UN course on CIMIC operations, therefore their background was based on previous NATO experiences. Where NATO employs the term 'Op-Plan' UN uses 'assessment', but both research have to present an image of the real security situation on a specific area of operations. And both must include the same inputs: (a) Political and cultural history, including tribal matters; (b) The state of national and local government; (c) Civil administration and services; (d) The needs of the population; (e) Population movement (internally displaced person [IDP] and refugees, situation); (f) The presence, mandates, capabilities and intentions of applicable civil actors; (g) Infrastructure; (h) Economy and commerce; (i) The mind set and perceptions of the civil population.

(2) Lack of a specific cultural awareness training. The MNCG CIMIC team attended a pre-deployment course which lasted six months. This course was primarily a military training and the hours of lessons dedicated to the TO of Lebanon were very scarce. The cultural awareness lectures were provided by military colleagues that talked about their own personal and previous experience in the same TO. Once in the TO of Lebanon only few member of the team had the possibility to attend a UN cultural awareness course. No one of the member of the team attended an official Arabic language course. However, despite this lack of training the personal results of the team were very satisfactory because they were able to spot the cultural differences based on the six points developed by Van Meer, Veldhuis, & Schwerzel (2008), and they adapt to them. But I can say that their possibility to enter in the cultural environment of Lebanon, in their area of operations, was limited by their duty and their mission. The members of the team highlighted several times that the local social and cultural environment resembled the Italian society, therefore, was easy for them to interact with the local population.

(3) Lack of knowledge of local language. The lack of knowledge of Arabic has represented a constant problem. My informants noted several times to feel prisoner of the local interpreters because they were not in a position to understand the whole conversation, therefore there was always a problem of trust. The need to attend Arabic course and good cultural awareness training has been highlighted most of the time in our interviews.

(4) Good empathy. All of the informants had personal qualities that helped them to understand the need to show empathy and respect for the local population.

(5) Quality of a CIMIC operator. All the informants said that to be a good CIMIC operator curiosity, humility, and the strong desire to know the culture of the other, are the main needed qualities. Without them is impossible to become a CIMIC operator.

(6) Lesson learned. This is a problem that came out already in the first meeting with my informants. Once they came back from the TO, their missions, etc, no one from the official structure asked or requested them to produce a report, something that can be used as security knowledge.

On the whole, all the results which I collected have produced on me the sensation that (1) the PKSTI wants to retain the hegemonic position to produce security knowledge, which at the end, being the official one, it represents the macro-level and intellectual map on which military missions are organized and implemented; and (2) due to the fact the MNCG CIMIC team did not receive a good cultural awareness training they were not in a position (i) to produce security knowledge at micro level; (ii) to decode the local messages and to enter into the rhythm and the rumors (Horowitz 2002) of the potential riots (virtual peace, the war after the war, etc). All these confirm the critical position of Gen. Mini.

Another important point is that the Italian Defence Staff (and with it NATO, or other post-modern states) is a vertebrate system which wants to operate in a system which has become cellular (Appadurai 2006, 2013) and liquid, in which the insecurity threats are liquids, or where the threats are real revolutions but interpreted with old paradigms (like the case of the mass illegal immigration in Europe).

The danger here is represented that may be this micro-level security knowledge, based on first hand experience with the booth on the ground, can challenge the necessity of the very mission. Some of my informants pointed to the fact that for them the mission they were part of, was not totally necessary, but it represented a big business opportunity for a lot of actors.

However, the most troubling data is presented by the fact to approach area of crisis (and in the near future the multiple stress zones) with a military mentality in which security is understood only as a military activity, therefore, capable to recreate the same problem that have caused the stress. If Galtung use the term of negative and positive peace (Keen 2009: 171-172), I would like to use the same approach to the term security. A security-military approach in multiple stress zones (and inside our own societies) that doesn't contemplate security as emancipation can create 'virtual peace' meaning negative security. But to work on 'positive security' means to produce critical security narrative, most of the time elaborated using an anthropological approach, meaning presenting fieldwork experiences on micro-level security problems. This work challenges the macro-level security narrative, and reveals how this official security knowledge is an image of knowledge and a political program-agenda. Security knowledge is a contested knowledge, like the security concept. To work for a positive security what is needed is a legitimate security knowledge based on a different ways to look at insecurity problems, where at the center of the definition of 'security' is restored its etymological meaning. We need a security that frees the human beings from anxiety and fear. What is needed is an engaged anthropology in security studies in order to participate and to contribute in the production of legitimate security knowledge. Only legitimate security knowledge, based on the assumption that security is emancipation, can provide a more valid picture of the whole of the insecurity human condition, and not only of the realities framed inside the

‘multiple stress zones’. The borders of these zones are liquid and we have to face the reality that we are already living in these multiple stress zones.

3. Conclusion: engaged anthropology in security studies

What now we are facing is a general, and spread use of the securitization process in which the common leitmotiv has become ‘the risk of...’. ‘The risk of ...’ is the new indefinable face of the existential threat to social community (or at least of the post-modern states-community). This has been evident at least in western political discourses that, after the terrorist attacks of Sept. 11th, 2001, have provided the justification to initiate wars in Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, and Syria. However, most of the arguments which have sustained the political decisions to go to war have been refuted years later as lies. But, the threat represented by ‘the risk of ...’ continues to be employed hitherto in the securitization spectacle-rituals around the world.

The concern is that the securitization of ‘the risk of’, a common practice nowadays in the political and emotional language, has been converted into ‘technological knowledge which confers power to all whom operate into the apparatus’ (Galimberti 2012: 218). The securitization of risk is stripped of its political nature and is not open to a political debate. It is a ‘knowledge which originates from technology and is a knowledge which can, like the Baconian saying *scientia est potentia*’ (Galimberti 2011: 263). As Galimberti has demonstrated in his ‘The Man in the Age of Technology’ (2011), this technological knowledge becomes the model for the political construction and confirms the supremacy of the technological decision over the political decision.

Therefore, technology is converted in an ideology which becomes the mirror of the reality and provides the answers to the ontological and epistemological questions on security. At the same time this technology produces new social relations based on functions in which the individual loses his individuality in the very moment he perceives social interchanges as functional, as something which are not of his concern as individual per se but as an individual with a specific function. Then, it can be said that technology is able to transform the individual, not only as a subject, but as a functionary (an individual which is represented only by his function) whose individuality has been cancelled and his perception of reality becomes a standard functional perception which must respond to the technological apparatus’s prearranged harmony.

Thus, ‘the functional perception produces that language which is functional and which reinforces the functionality of perceptions and limit the same perception. Forced under the restricted technological procedure, even the word follows the fate and becomes tautological repetition, recurred definition, hypnotic dictation, which finds its justification and meaning in that logic which is not dialectic (where for dialectic we mean contradiction) and not symbolic (meaning that each refers to a further meaning) which are typical of the common sense. (...) Under this logic there is the persuasion that there are not meanings outside the space of the “factual data” which in their set form the reality. As result of this process: “Yes to realism”. However this acceptance is taken without the minimal doubt that in this way for reality has been accredited only the official stance on an accepted reality’ (Galimberti 2011: 506-561).

Moreover, Galimberti (2012: 338-355) considers security as a myth, but not in the linguistic sense, but, because of the instability of the human nature, which is disquieting,

is not possible to predict human behaviors, the consequential of the human actions, and then the creation of a common and sharable word. This human condition is defined as 'anguish', is a sentiment that arise when we face the indeterminateness of an un-identifiable, not localizable, not predictable threat, but which is lived as certain, as something that will happen. And from the anguish there is not remedy.

Then, the technological knowledge of security is converted in the technological knowledge of anguish which is supported by the raise of the anxiety-anguish market already analyzed by the French medical doctor Henri Pradal. For Pradal (1997) the organization of the industrial society has an interest to distill anguish, to render it normal and consumable, and to distribute it harmoniously in order that every individual will receive a dose of it. Only in this way it is possible to control society, and the destiny of the individual is tied to the one of his/her society. Anguish-anxiety is the main cement in the mosaic of the human condition.

What emerges from this discourse is that the life of the contemporary western individual has been rendered 'sane' inside a space walled by the securitization process, the technological knowledge of security, and the market of anguish-anxiety. Therefore, the work of an anthropologist who enters in this space cannot be of simple observant but should carry an ethical mission in order to free individuals from this political manipulation. This can be done in framing the anthropological approach to security with the concept of emancipation developed by Booth (1991, 1999, 2005; quoted in the introduction of the thesis), because this begs questions about the relationships between what is understood as knowledge and received wisdom, what everyday behaviour and everyday practices imply, and the narratives, discourses, language and ideologies of security. Because, what I learned from my experience (fieldwork) is how a power-knowledge security structure (1) defends its own narrative; (2) disciplines its members to enforce it and to protect it; and (3) how the same structure prevents other people to poke their noses in its business.

As a result, it emerges the necessity to work in the context of an engaged anthropology, where emancipation (1) represents the ethical line to follow; (2) the instrument to criticize and to antagonize the official security narrative; and (3) to unveil the hegemonic position of the power knowledge structure and its real intentions.

And the most important question the anthropologist must pose directly to the PKSTI structure (most of the time belonging to the category of post-modern state), or when reading the narrative-script-sermon of the securitization process is: '*che vuoi?*' (What do you want?), 'Why are you telling me this?', 'you demand something of me, but what do you really want, what are you aiming at through this demand' (Zizek 2008: 123-124), meaning that a dose of skepticism toward meta-narrative is always an antidote against easy fascinations.

'To reach this goal anthropologists must play a more intentional and responsible role in working with people, communities and movements – the stake-holders with whom research is carried out. While anthropologists continue to work as decoders of cultures that are different and look difficult to understand or appreciate by society at large, it is critical for us to become more instrumental. We must participate in generating and bringing about change. We must be engaged in protecting the most vulnerable from oppression and exploitation and support the empowerment of communities to improve people's lives. This is a role not comfortably taken by tradition-bound anthropologist;

however, an engaged stance moves the application of anthropological theory, methods and practice further along towards action and activism. Engagement moves anthropologists away from traditional forms of participant observation towards a participatory role by becoming increasingly a part of those communities or social groups that we normally study' (Beck and Maida 2013: 1).

In practical-methodological terms, 'engagement includes: (1) developing trusting relationships; (2) sharing information; (3) implementing mutual learning strategies through constructive dialogues with non-experts; (4) developing local-level leaders representing different constituents; (5) recognizing lay people's knowledge and their capacity to contribute to the research as equals; (6) including youth development through community-service learning; (7) consistent and regular consortium meetings with local-level leadership; (8) a long term commitment; and (9) the sharing of resources' (Beck and Maida 2013: 9).

However, this engaged anthropology which deals with security issues must always take in consideration the macro and the micro political-cultural-social realities, ore more clearly the five sectors of security (Buzan, Waever, and de Wilde 1998; military, political, economical, societal, environmental) and the four dimensions of security (Álvarez Munárriz 2013; individual dimension: human security; social dimension: public security; symbolic dimension: cultural security; territorial dimension: geopolitical dimension) because all these elements are connected in this contemporaneous world. The official security discourse is an hegemonic discourse produced by a post-modern state centric position, and it represents the map of its fear (Moisi 2010). In this discourse-knowledge-map the post-modern state (NATO too) is posing and represents the interpretative center of reference but we need to look more in deep. It is like photography, if I use a small lens aperture (and long time) the larger becomes the depth of the field, and the result is that I create an image in which, while post-modern state-NATO is posing (interested to be itself) in front of me, on its back field (caught the depth of the field) I have other realities and perceptions which on the whole contribute to provide a different picture from the one post-modern state-NATO had originally in mind.

I need to use an anthropological lens. 'In the physics of photography, the brighter the light, the smaller the aperture of the lens; with more light, a smaller hole is sufficient to transmit the image to the film. And the smaller the aperture, the larger is the depth of the field. That is, the photographer can include in focus the background and the foreground of the object as well the object itself. If this field could be extended infinitely, it could include even the camera. Anthropology is not imprisoned in the law of optics, nor is exclusively visual; but a visual analogy may help us think concretely. Imagine a photographer who favors bright, harsh light – conditions where glare is intense. Imagine also that he seeks depth of field – to include in focus the foreground and background as well the subject itself. Anthropology seeks conditions of harsh light; this may be literally true (...) but is also true metaphorically in that anthropologists usually seek to their work in conditions that are in some sense harsh, so as to expose the raw and elemental, the fundamentals of human nature stripped of the fluff of civilization. Within those settings, anthropology focuses softly rather than sharply: rather the focus narrowly on the object, anthropology blurs the boundary between object and milieu so as to include not only the object but also its background, and foreground; this perception of the total milieu we call

holism. Were this holistic field of vision extended far enough, it would include the perceiver as well as the object perceived, and this too is a concern of anthropology, which recognizes the subjective as well the objective aspect of knowledge' (Peacock 2001: xi-xii).

This confirms again the impelling necessity to produce a paradigm revolution because what is imposed here is not only a security narrative (which operates as an hermeneutic paradigm) but a vision of the world, our position in it, the position of the 'other' in it, and an ideology presented as an utopia which doesn't 'offer us a point of escape from our reality but offers us the social reality itself as an escape from some traumatic, real kernel' (Žižek 2008b: 45).

It is an ideology which negates the fact that our human society is 'complex', which according to Edgar Morin (Morin 2015: 116) means 'humanity now finds itself gathered inside the same communal destiny. We have to acknowledge the other as different and similar to us. If we see the other only as different, we cannot understand him/her/them. And if we see the other as us we cannot understand their originality and difference'. Then, the complex thinking enlightens this 'emergency' which is the characteristic feature of the official security discourse. Because this 'emergency exists only if we analyse the security elements isolated and not as part of a whole. It is necessary to think society globally as a whole (Morin 2015: 116).

Therefore, it is necessary to move from the concept of emancipation to the one of consciousness and the need to work on a new world consciousness. Anthropology, says Álvarez Munárriz (2015: 208) is a moral science, and the mission and the specific contribution of the anthropologist is to unveil how the human being conforms him/herself to the security context through socio-cultural products that he/she creates. His/her mission is not only to explain what the human being has created and how, but the way these products shape his/her life inside the socio-physical environment in which he/she inhabits. This way to focus the study of society is essential because it helps us to discover the most intimate essence of the human being, and brings us near to his/her natural qualities, and to his/her creative impulse which is present in all men/women, therefore to this circuit of social creativity which constitutes the engine of the civilization process (Álvarez Munárriz 2015: 208).

As one day Prof. Carmelo Lisón Tolosana said during a lecture he gave at the Murcia University: 'Antropología es arte' ('Anthropology is art'), and is an art with the aim to help people to become more conscious of themselves, as individual and as a whole society without any dangerous and explosive discrimination.

Resumen, resultados y conclusión (in Spanish)

1. Resumen

Esta tesis trata sobre la producción de conocimiento de seguridad y adopta un enfoque antropológico. Por lo tanto, se trata de la capacidad de producir conocimiento sobre la seguridad por parte de un equipo militar perteneciente al grupo multinacional CIMIC (Multinational CIMIC Group, Motta di Livenza, Treviso, Italia) que ha operado en una misión de la Naciones Unidas (UNIFIL) en Líbano.

Este trabajo toma como objeto de su investigación ‘La Cooperación Civil-Militar en las operaciones post-conflicto como espacio antropológico: el caso del equipo italiano multinacional CIMIC en el espacio de la paz virtual del Líbano’ (‘The Civil-Military Cooperation in Post-Conflict Operations as an Anthropological Space: The Case of the Italian Multinational CIMIC Team in the Space of Virtual Peace of Lebanon’), y se centra en la actividad denominada ‘Cooperación-Civil Militar’ (CIMIC), que es una herramienta militar específica que se emplea para obtener el consenso de las poblaciones locales lugares de crisis donde se despliega una operación militar.

Los miembros de este equipo (seis militares) recibieron un entrenamiento de seis meses antes de su despliegue. Este entrenamiento fue de formación militar y de sensibilización cultural. La formación de sensibilización cultural (1) tuvo como objetivo proporcionar a los miembros del equipo el conocimiento cultural sobre el ‘otro’ (población libanesa); y (2) estos conocimientos culturales adquiridos representaban una capacidad que tiene que ser empleada con la población local para conquistar su confianza y recopilar información. Idealmente los miembros del equipo fueron capaces de producir conocimiento de seguridad sobre su teatro de operación.

Sin embargo, al principio de mi investigación mi análisis se concentró únicamente en el equipo MNCG CIMIC, pero las experiencias personales vividas en este trabajo me desvelaron la actitud y el comportamiento de otras estructuras (el Ministerio Italiano de Defensa, El Estado Mayor de la Defensa, el Estado Mayor del Ejército, y el Mando del MNCG) hacia mi investigación académica. Como resultado, los lugares antropológicos en los que yo operé fueron (1) los contactos oficiales y burocráticos con esas estructuras; y (2) mi presencia física dentro del cuartel MNCG, y dentro de las bases de UNIFIL en Líbano.

Entonces los objetivos de esta tesis se convirtieron en múltiples.

El primer objetivo fue de intentar entrar en la estructura oficial que proporciona seguridad y describir esta experiencia. Esta estructura, que es el Grupo Multinacional CIMIC (MNCG, Motta di Livenza, Treviso, Italia), es un batallón italiano que forma parte de las Fuerzas Armadas Italianas y realiza operaciones CIMIC en las misiones OTAN y Naciones Unidas. Estas misiones se basan en el conocimiento de seguridad producido por el Ministerio italiano de Defensa. La misma estructura MNCG proporciona la formación CIMIC y de ‘sensibilización cultural’ (‘cultural awareness’) necesaria para que su personal militar opere en territorios no pertenecientes a la OTAN. Esta formación cultural, de acuerdo con la doctrina de CIMIC de la OTAN representa una ‘capacidad’ con el fin de operar en un teatro de operaciones CIMIC (definido en esta tesis como el ‘espacio de paz virtual’). Por lo tanto, con mi trabajo de campo experimenté la realidad para realizar este tipo de investigación en contacto y dentro de una estructura militar.

El segundo objetivo fue verificar la calidad de la formación en sensibilización cultural y recoger las experiencias de mis informantes principales en tres fases: la fase previa al despliegue, durante el despliegue (misión UNIFIL en Líbano) y en la fase posterior al despliegue, que representa la vuelta a Italia. En esta tesis considero la experiencia madurada por los informantes como extremadamente relevante para la producción de conocimiento de seguridad debido a que se basa en experiencias de primera mano hechas por el personal militar en zona de operaciones.

Entonces la tesis considera el trabajo realizado por un equipo militar italiano que tiene formación y mentalidad de la OTAN y opera en una misión de las Naciones Unidas. El hecho de que el equipo haya sido desplegado en una misión de la ONU y no en una misión de la OTAN no es importante y relevante. Lo importante es que el enfoque OTAN respecto de las operaciones de gestión de crisis y el empleo de las operaciones CIMIC se está convirtiendo en una práctica y un protocolo de acción adoptada por muchos países.

Sin embargo, la tesis considera también la relación que el antropólogo ha tenido con la estructura principal (Ministerio de Defensa) que (1) tiene poder legítimo para producir conocimiento de seguridad; (2) tiene poder sobre los informantes de este trabajo; y (3) tuvo poder sobre la practicidad y producción de esta tesis.

Por lo tanto, para sostener la importancia del enfoque antropológico para la producción de conocimiento de seguridad esta tesis ha sido organizada en cuatro capítulos.

El primer capítulo, 'Conceptualización de la seguridad, la OTAN y el giro antropológico', explica y desarrolla el concepto de seguridad. Aquí la seguridad se aborda como un mito, un lenguaje y como símbolo. El 'proceso de securitización' se convierte en un ritual. A continuación, se considera la evolución del discurso de la seguridad de la OTAN, y la transformación de la actitud de la Alianza hacia la importancia de los factores culturales y religiosos en operaciones de seguridad. Se explica la doctrina CIMIC de la OTAN y se estudia el surgimiento de la etnografía de los conflictos.

El segundo capítulo, 'Marco teórico, metodología y métodos: el espacio de la paz virtual', establece la metodología y el método de la tesis que se ha aplicado a la experiencia de trabajo de campo. Aquí se desarrolla un enfoque antropológico y se crea el espacio antropológico del 'Espacio de la Paz Virtual'. Este espacio puede considerarse un marco crítico hacia la narrativa formal sobre operaciones de paz y las operaciones CIMIC.

El tercer capítulo, 'El equipo italiano CIMIC en el espacio virtual de la Paz de Líbano' representa la experiencia de trabajo de campo que duró desde el 24 de Julio de 2012, hasta que el 7 Mayo de 2014. Este capítulo cubre y registra las experiencias personales del autor de esta tesis, y las entrevistas semiestructuradas que se llevaron a cabo en la fase previa al despliegue (en el Mando MNCG, en Italia), en Líbano (misión UNIFIL), y en la fase posterior a la implementación (en el Mando MNCG, en Italia).

El cuarto capítulo, 'Resultados y conclusión', presenta la conclusión de la tesis y desarrollar la idea y la necesidad de una antropología comprometida en el campo de los estudios de seguridad.

2. Resultados y conclusión

Los datos recogidos en este trabajo han sido múltiples y útiles para varios niveles de análisis.

El primer conjunto de datos se refieren al problema de la autorización para realizar este tipo de investigación dentro de la estructura militar y con los militares. Este ambiente militar es un lugar antropológico en el que el simbolismo, los rituales, los héroes, los desfiles, las medallas, juegan un papel importante. Al mismo tiempo es un entorno en el que la mayoría de su personal está bajo el ‘código militar en tiempo de paz’, lo que significa que no pueden actuar y hablar libremente, y siempre necesitan una autorización por parte de la estructura jerárquica. El mismo personal está enmarcado y tiene una posición rígida (y una libertad limitada) dentro del mismo sistema jerárquico militar. Mientras que el Ministerio de Defensa italiano me autorizó a trabajar en todo este proyecto, al mismo tiempo, la viabilidad de esta autorización fue anulada por los procedimientos burocráticos que eran necesarios cada vez que tenía que contactar a mis informantes y para entrar en los espacios en los que ellos estaban operando. El mismo problema se experimentó con la entrevista al Ministro de Defensa italiano; requirió mucho tiempo, correos electrónicos y llamadas telefónicas con el secretario del Ministro, y el portavoz del Ministro; la entrevista fue cancelada varias veces en el último momento, pero al final entrevisté al Ministro.

Lo que emerge de la experiencia oficial que tuve con la estructura de Defensa italiana y con la entrevista con el Ministro de Defensa es que la ‘estructura’ (Ministerio de la Defensa italiana) quiere proteger el monopolio que tiene sobre la producción de conocimiento de seguridad. El Ministro dijo muy claramente que Italia no tiene una política de seguridad, y que los políticos no están interesados en la política de seguridad. Sólo están interesados en la seguridad en los momentos de emergencia. Después de la evolución de la producción del conocimiento oficial de seguridad del Ministerio de Defensa italiano puedo decir que el último ‘Libro Blanco de la Defensa Italiana’ (2015) es más vago en relación con la visión geopolítica, mientras que los anteriores ‘Conceptos Estratégicos’ (2001, 2005) producidos en el último año apuntaban a áreas geográficas específicas de interés estratégico para Italia. El presente ‘Libro Blanco’ está completamente basado en un fuerte enfoque militar e intelectual de la seguridad desarrollado dentro de la estructura y la mentalidad de la OTAN. Una vez confrontada esta posición-visión a las ‘zonas de estrés múltiple’ presentadas en esta tesis, y el hecho de que Italia está justo en medio de esta área, la falta de visión y la miopía estratégica es evidente. El discurso se concentra en seguridad y defensa, donde ambos términos se usan con el mismo significado de ‘defensa militar’ (para defendernos). No hay una interpretación de la seguridad en la que aparezca la emancipación, y por lo tanto la idea de conflicto, para preservar la defensa de la seguridad, está siempre presente. Y esto representa una gran oportunidad de negocio para las industrias de armas que están detrás de la decisión política del Ministerio de Defensa.

Por lo tanto, el conocimiento oficial de seguridad tiene que ser protegido empleando a sus propios expertos (Galimberti 2011). Cualquier voz fuera del coro debe ser silenciada. Esto confirma la tesis crítica del Gen Fabio Mini (2003, 2008, 2012), que es uno de los pilares del presente trabajo.

El otro conjunto de datos que he recopilado están relacionados con la experiencia y las entrevistas que tuve con mis varios informantes y el equipo del MNCG CIMIC. Lo

que surgió son los siguientes resultados que se refieren (1) a la mentalidad de la OTAN; (2) la falta de una formación específica de sensibilización cultural; (3) la falta de conocimiento del idioma local; (4) buena empatía; (5) la calidad de un operador CIMIC, y (6) lección aprendida.

(1) La mentalidad de la OTAN. La mentalidad OTAN es erradicada, lo que significa que aunque el equipo MNCG CIMIC estaba empleado en una misión de las Naciones Unidas, el habitus de la OTAN estaba siempre presente. El equipo de MNCG CIMIC comentó varias veces esta aptitud para abordar el concepto de seguridad. El equipo del MNCG no recibió un curso de las Naciones Unidas sobre las operaciones CIMIC, por lo tanto sus antecedentes se basaron en experiencias anteriores en operaciones OTAN. Cuando la OTAN emplea el término 'Plan Operativo', las Naciones Unidas utilizan el término 'evaluación', pero ambas investigaciones tienen que presentar una imagen de la situación real de seguridad en un área específica de operaciones. Y ambos deben incluir los mismos insumos: (a) Historia política y cultural, incluyendo asuntos tribales; (b) El estado del gobierno nacional y local; (c) Administración y servicios civiles; (d) Las necesidades de la población; (e) Movimiento de población (situación de desplazados internos y refugiados); (f) La presencia, los mandatos, las capacidades y las intenciones de los actores civiles; (g) Infraestructuras; (h) Economía y comercio; (i) La mentalidad y las percepciones de la población civil.

(2) Falta de una formación específica de 'sensibilización cultural' (cultural awareness). El equipo del MNCG CIMIC asistió a un curso de pre-despliegue que duró seis meses. Este curso era sobre todo un entrenamiento militar y las horas de clase dedicadas al área de Líbano fueron muy escasas. Las clases de sensibilización cultural fueron impartidas por colegas militares que hablaron de sus propias previas experiencias personales en el mismo teatro de operaciones. Una vez en Líbano sólo unos pocos miembros del equipo tuvieron la posibilidad de asistir a un curso de sensibilización cultural de las Naciones Unidas. Ninguno de los miembros del equipo asistió a un curso oficial de lengua árabe. Sin embargo, a pesar de esta falta de formación los resultados personales del equipo fueron muy satisfactorios porque ellos pudieron detectar las diferencias culturales basadas en los seis puntos desarrollados por Van Meer, Veldhuis y Schwerzel (2008), y se adaptaron a ellos. Pero puedo decir que sus posibilidades de entrar en el entorno cultural del Líbano estaban limitadas por sus órdenes de misión. Los miembros del equipo destacaron varias veces que el entorno social y cultural local se asemejaba a la sociedad italiana, por lo tanto, era fácil para ellos interactuar con la población local.

(3) Falta de conocimiento del idioma local. La falta de conocimiento del árabe ha representado un problema constante. Mis informantes notaron varias veces que se sentían prisioneros de los intérpretes locales porque no estaban en condiciones de entender toda la conversación, por lo tanto siempre había un problema de confianza. La necesidad de asistir a un curso de árabe y una buena formación de sensibilización cultural se ha destacado en la mayor parte del tiempo en nuestras entrevistas.

(4) Buena empatía. Todos los informantes tenían cualidades personales que les ayudaban a entender la necesidad de mostrar empatía y respeto por la población local.

(5) Calidad de un operador CIMIC. Todos los informantes dijeron que para ser un buen operador CIMIC la curiosidad, la humildad, y el fuerte deseo de conocer la cultura

del otro, son las principales cualidades necesarias. Sin ellos es imposible convertirse en un operador CIMIC.

(6) Lección aprendida. Este es un problema que salió ya en la primera reunión con mis informantes. Una vez que regresaron de sus misiones nadie de la estructura oficial (Ministerio de Defensa) pidió o les pidió de producir un informe, algo que pudiera ser utilizado como conocimiento de seguridad.

En conjunto, todos los resultados que he recogido me han producido la sensación de que (1) la estructura oficial quiere conservar la posición hegemónica para producir conocimiento de seguridad, que al final, siendo la oficial, representa a nivel macro el mapa intelectual sobre el cual se organizan e implementan las misiones militares; y (2) debido al hecho de que el equipo de MNCG CIMIC no recibió una buena capacitación de concientización cultural, no estaban en posición de (i) producir conocimientos de seguridad a nivel micro; (ii) de descodificar los mensajes locales y entrar en el ritmo y los rumores (Horowitz 2002) de los disturbios potenciales (paz virtual, guerra después de la guerra, etc.). Todo esto confirma la posición crítica de Gen. Mini.

Otro punto importante es que el Estado Mayor de Defensa (y con él la OTAN u otros estados postmodernos) es un sistema vertebrado que quiere operar en un sistema que se ha vuelto celular (Appadurai 2006, 2013) y líquido, en el que la inseguridad es líquida y estas amenazas son revoluciones reales, pero interpretadas con viejos paradigmas (como el caso de la inmigración masiva en Europa).

El peligro que aquí se presenta es que este conocimiento de seguridad a nivel micro, basado en la experiencia de primera mano, puede desafiar la necesidad de la misión misma. Algunos de mis informantes señalaron que para ellos la misión de la que formaban parte no era totalmente necesaria, sino que representaba una gran oportunidad de negocio para muchos actores.

Sin embargo, los datos más inquietantes son presentados por el hecho de acercarse al área de crisis (y en un futuro próximo esta área de crisis tendrán como teatro de operaciones las ‘zonas de estrés múltiple’) con una mentalidad militar en la que la seguridad se entiende sólo como una actividad militar, por lo tanto, capaz de recrear el mismo problema que ha causado el estrés. Si Galtung usa el término de paz negativa y positiva (Keen 2009: 171-172), me gustaría usar el mismo enfoque para el término seguridad. Un enfoque militar y de seguridad en la ‘zonas de estrés múltiple’ (y dentro de nuestras propias sociedades) que no contempla la seguridad como emancipación puede crear una ‘paz virtual’ que significa seguridad negativa. Pero trabajar por una ‘seguridad positiva’ significa producir una narrativa crítica de seguridad, la mayoría del tiempo elaborada usando un enfoque antropológico, lo que significa presentar experiencias de trabajo de campo sobre problemas de seguridad a nivel micro.

Este trabajo desafía la narrativa de seguridad a nivel macro y revela cómo este conocimiento de seguridad oficial es una imagen de conocimiento y un programa-agenda político. El conocimiento de la seguridad es un conocimiento controvertido, como el concepto de seguridad. Para trabajar por una seguridad positiva lo que se necesita es un conocimiento de seguridad legítimo basado en formas diferentes de mirar a los problemas de inseguridad, donde en el centro de la definición de ‘seguridad’ tiene que restablecerse su significado etimológico (seguridad, del Latín ‘securitas’: sin ansiedad). Necesitamos una seguridad que libere los seres humanos de la ansiedad y el miedo. Lo que se necesita es una antropología comprometida en estudios de seguridad con el fin de participar y

contribuir en la producción de conocimiento de seguridad legítimo. Sólo el conocimiento legítimo de la seguridad, basado en el supuesto de que seguridad es emancipación, puede proporcionar una imagen más válida de toda la inseguridad de la condición humana y no sólo de las realidades enmarcadas dentro de las 'zonas de estrés múltiple'. Las fronteras de estas zonas son líquidas y tenemos que enfrentar la realidad de que ya estamos viviendo en estas 'zonas de estrés múltiple'

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2012

- The Security Council extends the mandate of UNIFIL until 31 August 2013; urges all parties to abide by their obligation to respect the safety of UNIFIL and other United Nations personnel; calls upon all parties to respect the cessation of hostilities, prevent any violation of the "Blue Line" [S/RES/2064] of 30 August 2012

2011

- The Security Council extends UNIFIL's mandate, until 31 August 2012, condemning all terrorist attacks against it; calling for the rapid finalization of Lebanon's investigation into the 27 May and 26 July attacks on the Force; urging Israel to expedite the withdrawal of its army from northern Ghajar and calling for further cooperation between the Force and the Lebanese Armed Forces, of 30 August 2011

2010

- The Security Council extends the mandate of UNIFIL for one year, until 31 August 2011 without amendment, calling strongly on all parties to respect the Blue Line, the cessation of hostilities and relevant resolutions in the wake of recent violent incidents, of 30 August 2010

2009

- The Security Council decides to extend the mandate of the mission for a period of one year, until 31 August 2010, of 27 August 2009

2008

- The Security Council decides to extend the mandate of the mission for a period of one year, until 31 August 2009, of 27 August 2008

2007

- The Security Council decides to extend the mandate of the mission for a period of one year, until 31 August 2008, of 24 August 2007

2006

- The Security Council calls for a full cessation of hostilities, authorizes an increase in the forces strength of UNIFIL to a maximum of 15,000 troops, expands the mandate of the mission and extends it until 31 August 2007, of 11 August 2006
- The Security Council extends the mandate of the mission for a period of one month, until 31 August 2006, of 31 July 2006
- The Security Council extends the mandate of the mission until 31 July 2006, of 31 January 2006

2005

- The Security Council extends the mandate of the mission until 31 January 2006, of 29 July 2005
- The Security Council extends the mandate of the mission until 31 July 2005, of 28 January 2005

2004

- The Security Council, inter alia, declares its support for a free and fair electoral process in Lebanon's presidential election, of 2 September 2004
- The Security Council extends the mandate of the mission until 31 January 2005, of 29 July 2004
- The Security Council extends the mandate of the mission until 31 July 2004, of 30 January 2004

2003

- The Security Council extends the mandate of the mission until 31 January 2004, of 31 July 2004

- The Security Council extends the mandate of the mission until 31 July 2003, of 30 January 2004

2002

- The Security Council extends the mandate of the mission until 31 January 2003, of 30 July 2002
- The Security Council extends the mandate of the mission until 31 July 2002, of 28 January 2002

2001

- The Security Council extends the mandate of the mission until 31 January 2002, of 31 July 2001
- The Security Council extends the mandate of the mission until 31 July 2001, of 30 January 2001

2000

- The Security Council extends the mandate of the mission until 31 January 2001, of 31 July 2000
- The Security Council extends the mandate of the mission until 31 July 2000, of 31 July 2000

1999

- The Security Council condemns all acts of violence committed against the Force and extends the mandate of the mission until 31 July 1999, of 28 January 1999

1982

- The Security Council authorizes the Force to carry out, with the consent of the Government of Lebanon, interim tasks in the humanitarian and administrative fields and to assist the Government of Lebanon in ensuring the security of all the inhabitants of the area without any discrimination, of 18 October 1982
- The Security Council condemns the Israeli incursions into Beirut in violation of the ceasefire agreements, of 17 September 1982
- The Security Council authorizes the Force to continue carry out interim tasks in the humanitarian and administrative fields, of 17 August 1982
- The Security Council demands the immediate lifting of all the restrictions on the city of Beirut in order to permit the free entry of supplies to meet the urgent needs of the civilian population of the city, of 12 August 1982
- The Security Council expresses its concern over the Israeli invasion of Beirut, of 4 August 1982
- The Security Council authorizes the Secretary-General to deploy immediately United Nations observers to monitor the situation in and around Beirut, of 1 August 1982

1978

- The Security Council approves the guidelines for the operation of UNIFIL, of 19 March 1978
- The Security Council establishes UNIFIL and calls upon Israel immediately to cease its military action and withdraw its forces from all Lebanese territory, of 19 March 1978

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Murcia, 24 luglio 2012

**A: Generale di Divisione
Salvatore FARINA
Capo del III Reparto
Stato Maggiore della Difesa
Via XX Settembre n. 11
00187 Roma
ITALY**

Oggetto: Ricerca Antropologia – CIMIC, richiesta autorizzazione

sono il Dr. Giovanni Ercolani, nato a Milano il 5 maggio 1964, Antropologo e “*Lecturer*” in “*Security Studies*”, e attualmente opero come Ricercatore presso la “*Jean Monnet Chair*”, Dipartimento di Antropologia, Università di Murcia (Spagna).

In tale veste sto lavorando su un progetto di ricerca (approvato dalla cattedra Jean Monnet e dal Dipartimento di Antropologia) in cui, utilizzando una metodologia antropologica, analizzo la relazione, a livello operativo e addestrativo, tra la dottrina CIMIC NATO e le operazioni CIMIC delle Forze Armate, in particolare quelle italiane, considerate, anche qui in Spagna, all'avanguardia nel campo specifico.

La scelta di questa tematica, particolarmente nuova nel campo dell'antropologia e degli studi sulla sicurezza, è giustificata dal fatto che dall'implosione dell'Unione Sovietica e dall'adozione dei “*NATO Strategic Concepts*” (1999 e 2010), si è vista una sempre maggiore presenza di membri delle Forze Armate Italiane operanti in contesti culturali diversi da quelli dell'Alleanza stessa.

Indubbiamente la lettura dei testi dei “*NATO Strategic Concepts*” del 1999 e del 2010 fanno riferimento ad interventi dell'Alleanza in aree non-NATO. In tale contesto, in cui si parla di “*Comprehensive Approach*”, il discorso della CIMIC diventa di tale primaria importanza da essere definita una “*Comprehensive Capability*”. Questa è realtà indiscutibile, peraltro provata anche dagli sforzi della US Army di disporre a tutti i livelli di assetti “*Civil Affairs*” permanenti e non più

per la maggioranza affidati ad assetti della riserva, vedrà, in futuro, una sempre maggiore partecipazione di elementi CIMIC in quelle che vengono definite “*Multiple Stress Zones*”.

Tali adattamenti rappresentano, come anche testimoniato dalle esperienze dei militari italiani nei diversi teatri in cui sono stati impegnati, “una vera e propria rivoluzione culturale e concettuale”, come affermò anni fa l’Ammiraglio Di Paola, “in cui l’elemento umano resta l’elemento centrale della trasformazione nella sua duplice funzione di driver del processo e di soggetto nei confronti del quale la trasformazione è destinata a produrre il principale impatto.”

Sebbene le diverse Forze Armate dei Paesi dell’Alleanza abbiano adottato ed implementato la “*NATO Military Policy on Civil-Military Cooperation*” e la “*NATO Civil-Military Co-operation Doctrine (AJP-9)*”, parlando di fattore umano, l’importanza del “mondo culturale” da cui proviene il militare ed il suo operare in un altro “mondo/territorio culturale” colpito da un conflitto, emergenza, ecc., rivestono una importanza primaria per la buona riuscita della missione.

Quindi è nel contesto-territorio culturale non-NATO dove già operano i soldati italiani che il proprio addestramento CIMIC a cui viene aggiunto il proprio bagaglio culturale di origine diviene, utilizzando una terminologia economica, un capitale e quindi una “*key enabling capability*”.

Questa particolarità “italiana” delle operazioni CIMIC, e lo sottolineo con orgoglio di italiano, è stata non solo apprezzata nei vari teatri operativi ma ha offerto la possibilità di mettere il seme per più duraturi rapporti con la società civile e le autorità locali. Rapporto questo che ha permesso la sicurezza delle aree colpite ed un loro sviluppo, instaurando così una relazione che è andata ben oltre la stessa data della fine delle operazioni definite prettamente militari.

Ed è questo carattere culturale “italiano” che la mia ricerca vuole mettere in luce e sottolineare in un momento storico in cui la sicurezza dell’area mediterranea è tornata ad avere una sua centralità dopo gli anni della guerra fredda.

Per fare questo ho proposto un progetto di ricerca che è stato approvato dal mio Dipartimento di Antropologia (Università di Murcia, Spagna) dal titolo: “*Anthropology and Critical Security Studies: the CIMIC activity of the Italian Unit of the Multinational CIMIC Group*”. Come si evince dal titolo stesso, la mia ricerca ha come focus la componente italiana del Multinational CIMIC Group e quindi si concentrerà particolarmente sulla attività addestrativa CIMIC dei soldati italiani, per poi seguirli in terreno operativo in una zona che la mia ricerca definisce “*virtual peace territory*” come il Kosovo o il Libano.

Quello che interessa alla mia indagine è proprio questa preparazione-adattamento del personale militare in un contesto in cui la propria cultura di origine (identificata dal personale militare italiano CIMIC), trovandosi ad operare a livello tattico in contesti spazio-tempo direi “non-NATO”, deve mimetizzarsi ed adattarsi alla

vecchia formula militare FLOC (forma, lucentezza, ombra, colore). Ciò che vorrei sottolineare nel mio lavoro è la predisposizione “italiana”, insita nel patrimonio antropologico storico e culturale del nostro Paese, ad interagire a livello tattico con culture diverse non generando attriti ed incomprensioni - che in situazioni di crisi possano degenerare pericolosamente o compromettere l’esito positivo della missione.

Per questo richiedo cortesemente una Vostra autorizzazione al fine di poter seguire l’iter addestrativo CIMIC del personale militare italiano e poter poi seguire le unità italiane in Kosovo o in Libano.

Il mio lavoro di campo propriamente antropologico, sarà divisa in quattro fasi principali:

1. Interviste/questionario anonimo che verrà somministrato ai soldati italiani, prima del loro training CIMIC, inerente al/le loro interesse/motivazioni per far parte di una unità CIMIC. In queste/i interviste/questionari verranno poste inoltre domande sul loro background culturale e professionale e cosa essi intendono per “sicurezza”. Io in veste di antropologo seguirò come “osservatore partecipante” l’attività addestrativa dell’unità militare;
2. questa seconda fase, che si effettuerà al termine del training e quindi prima del *deployment*, prevederà ancora una volta interviste/questionario sull’addestramento ricevuto, le/gli materie/argomenti trattati, e le proprie aspettative pre-missione;
3. in questa terza fase, seguirò l’unità che ha terminato il proprio training in Kosovo o in Libano e sempre utilizzando interviste/questionari chiederò ai soldati italiani di commentare sul loro interagire a livello tattico con la popolazione locale, i problemi riscontrati, ed i propri commenti personali;
4. quest’ultima fase del lavoro antropologico si effettuerà con la stessa unità militare italiana, questa volta di ritorno dal Kosovo o dal Libano. Sempre utilizzando gli strumenti dell’intervista/questionario si chiederà ai soldati di valutare l’addestramento CIMIC ricevuto prima del *deployment* e integrando tale approccio con il naturale processo delle *operational lessons* trattate a livello istituzionale fornire ulteriori elementi di valutazione dell’iter addestrativo seguito.

A livello di metodologia antropologica il mio “lavoro sul campo” si avvale della “osservazione partecipante” e la “descrizione densa “ (*thick description*), inoltre la presenza costante dell’antropologo durante le distinte fasi del lavoro, permetteranno allo scrivente, insieme ai risultati delle interviste/questionari, di presentare agli Enti preposti alla funzione operativa CIMIC un controllo di qualità sul proprio operato addestrativo.

Per quanto sopra mi farò carico di tutti i costi necessari alla mia ricerca (vitto, alloggio, spostamenti, assicurazioni, clearance, ecc) ed inoltre mi impegno ad osservare in pieno, durante le fasi del mio lavoro, tutte le limitazioni poste dalle necessarie condizioni e vincoli di sicurezza imposti dalla pianificazione e dalla condotta delle operazioni.

In allegato Le invio copia del mio CV (in inglese).

In attesa di una Sua risposta mi pregio di porgerLe i miei più distinti saluti.
Cordialmente,

Giovanni Ercolani

Dr. Giovanni Ercolani

Via F. Caprini n. 4

01100 Viterbo – Italy

Email: drercolani@yahoo.co.uk

Webpage: http://www.peaceopstraining.org/view_biography/20/

Appendix 2

Interview-presentation of Col. Fabiano Zinzone, Commander of the Multinational CIMIC Group.

Location of the interview-presentation: MNCG HQ, Motta di Livenza, Treviso, Italy.

Date: Apr 12th, 2012

Duration of the interview: 01:07:01

Topics of the interview-presentation: security policy, NATO, CIMIC operations, the need to employ anthropologist in CIMIC operations, stress zones, cultural awareness, military training, post-conflict operations, peace operations, Virtual Peace Space.

Here below the main ideas and concepts expressed by the informant.

The informant said:

The first point I want to make clear is that talking about post-conflict is a contradiction. The phase it doesn't exist, post-conflict is conflict. The term post-conflict is used at political and strategic level but the reality faced by the military personnel involved in post-conflict operation is conflict. Therefore, is more appropriate to talk about CIMIC operations in conflict areas.

The image-reality of the conflict nowadays is changed. From a static position we have moved to an asymmetry situation in which the only constant is the uncertainty. I can use a formula taking the Afghan conflict: if we do not go to Afghanistan, the Afghan conflict comes to us, in our territories (using terrorism). We have moved from the classic art of war, where the armed confrontation was like a contend between gentlemen, with precise roles, and this was until the disappearance of the Warsaw Pact, to a situation in which the enemy (1) doesn't respect and follow any rule; (2) he hasn't any bond and commitment; and (3) the targets and the aims are different.

When we look at the map presented by Gen Soligan the elements which can spark a crisis are various. The continent of Africa will be the presence of the Italian military forces. It is in these 'commons', stress areas' that war will explode, and in Africa there is the center for all the illegal traffic-market that comes to Europe. In this area of crisis we will find instability and problem of governance, but at the same time hierarchical structures that deal with crime. As Gen. Rupert Smith wrote, we will fight for the people and amongst the people.

At the same time, when we talk about theater of operations for military involvement now we have to talk about a global theater of operations, we are facing a mosaic of operations, and in these operations distinct and separate phases and post-conflict do not exist any more. It is a new form of conflict.

These realities have brought changes on the vision, organization, and planning of military missions. Now the nature of the enemy can be: state, non-state, proxy, and freelance. This enemy has not rules and it is difficult to prevent.

Therefore, what we need in order to adapt ourselves to this new enemy and new hostile reality? The principles of the military operations are: impartiality, cooperation-consensus,

and credibility-respect. It is a combination of kinetic and non-kinetic approach. What is constant in these military operations which are complex operations is: to influence (to get to a political agreement); stabilization; and combat. In this complex operation we are 'guest' in a State, we are a persistent presence, therefore, we have to take in account all the aspect, not only military, of the local situation. Another important point is that military operations in transition phase are the most dangerous, Transition phases are seen as event drivers and the consequences can be devastating.

Then, the approach to follow is to work at all levels, and to produce a particular position which I defined as the 'enlightened rifleman' who (1) has to keep in mind that his behavior has a repercussion on the whole of the operation; (2) must have cultural awareness, be familiar with the local culture; and (3) must be capable to combine kinetic approach (combat) with operation of influence.

Summarizing, we have to maintain the full understanding of the operation, and we have to ask ourselves if what we are doing is good or bad.






When we look at the operation in Afghanistan we see that is composed of different ethnic groups, where every village has its own reality. Therefore, we have to produce a new paradigm to know, to understand the situation and to operate in it. This new paradigm will help use to shape the borders of the problem and then to penetrate in it, to secure it, and to expand it (security operation). The purpose is to arrive to the point that the local population becomes independent from our security and help. Security and reconstruction go together. In few words is important to understand and to shape the situation, and to give to the local population what they need.


Now the problem is that every military mission is different from each other. The lesson learned in one theater of operation may be is not employable in another theater.

At this regard I have developed what I have called 'the Paradigm of Ulysses for CIMIC for CIMIC operations', which is based on these characteristics: listen, understand, and shape. To listen is the principle function; we have to listen to the local population, and listen to what they want. After that we start to interact with our partners, and is very important to understand who are our interlocutors. Interact is very important to establish a partnership dialog based on shared responsibility. Then we can influence the situation and bring the local state of affairs to a different stage more secure. To reach this stage we have to work and look for local consent. The CIMIC operations become the main catalyst element in peace operations.

Therefore the Ulysses' paradigm must help to 'see' and 'listen' the local population-situation; must have a comprehensive approach with take in consideration the five sector of security (military, political, economic, societal, environment); and must be able to look at how the local population live. This approach bring security into a specific area, which becomes a center of influence which seduce the outside territory-situation-population therefore, as a consequence, it attract people to the peaceful center and contribute to the whole change in the big picture.





This process is difficult, of course, it is important 'to listen' the local, to empathize with him/her. The biomedical approach used by NATO and US forces is not a way to conquest the confidence, and trust of the local population. We have to work on this trust, and in the transition phase we must be able to give back the country to the full control of the local population.








THE NEW INTERNATIONAL SCENARIOS:TRENDS

- from a traditional, well set environment to a fragmented, dynamic reality with multiple/multifaceted “crises”
- uncertainty, unforeseeable threats
- security as a global, commonly shared concept
- continuum of operations (internal/external)





THE OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT AND THE OPPONENTS

(....or who is sitting with us at the gameboard)

- THE CONTEMPORARY ENVIRONMENT (TRENDS AND SHIFTS)**
- Industrial Informational
 - National Multinational
 - Organisations Coalitions
 - MOD Cross Government / (Comprehensive Approach)
 - Regional Global
 - Service Joint
 - Analogue Digital
 - Hierarchical Networked
 - Target Centric Effects Based
 - Manned Unmanned




THE EXPANDING JOA



Environments are expanding and increasingly interconnected

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RECENT OPERATIONS A TENTATIVE CLASSIFICATION

- Humanitarian relief (PAKISTAN, FYROM, ALBANIA,)
- Peace Keeping (BOSNIA, MOZAMBICO, LIBANO...)
- Peace Enforcement (KOSOVO – Joint Guardian fase 1)
- Stability Operations (AFGHANISTAN, IRAQ)
- Military Assistance (NTM-IRAQ, MALTA)
- Surveillance/Interdiction of LOCs – Counter Terrorism (Mediterranean Sea, Horn of Africa, Persian Gulf)

21


The opponents get a Vote

'If an enemy chooses, or has no practical alternative other than to wage warfare in a regular conventional way, US air power will defeat it long before US ground power comes into contact.'

Professor Colin Gray

FUTURE OPPONENTS

- Hybrid
 - Non-State
 - State
 - Proxy
- Unconstrained (from a western construct)
 - Morally
 - Legally
 - Ethically
- More agile, adaptive, innovative
- Learning, sharing, networked
- Flexible
- Resilient
- Global reach
- Numerous



MILITARY REQUIREMENTS

(..or capabilities required for the new rules of the game)



THE NEW PRINCIPLES


- Unity of Command
- Unity of Effort
- Impartiality
- Initiative
- Cooperation and Consent
- Mutual Respect
- Transparency
- Credibility
- Use of Force
- Sit'l Awareness
- Flexibility
- Freedom of Movement
- Force Protection
- Influence



KEY THEMES FOR MILITARY PLANNERS (...AND NOT ONLY)



- The Centrality of Influence in Stabilisation – to achieve a political settlement
- Stabilisation Activities & combat are both part of complex operations
- Host Nation sovereignty impacts on everything you do
- Security demands persistent presence – requires mass and is linked to capacity building
- Multinationality brings its own complexity
- Any plan must be comprehensive in its considerations – there should be an integrated theatre campaign plan
- The military are likely to have a significant role in the delivery of civil effect
- Anticipate, learn and adapt.
- Transitions – planned, managed - dynamic

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THE NEW APPROACH

- Force's ability to operate at different levels (military, diplomatic, economic, social, humanitarian, etc.)
- Functional approach to operations (i.e. *kinetic e non kinetic*) IOT exploit operational opportunities while keeping people's consensus
- Exhaustive and timely situational awareness at all levels
- In two words, comprehensive approach





STABILIZATION OPERATIONS NEW CORE CAPABILITIES

- Civil Military Cooperation (CIMIC) assets
- training and mentoring capabilities for HNS security forces
- humanitarian relief
- management of media relationships and assets to counter hostile propaganda
- evaluation/analysis of main indicators and campaign assessment (MOP/MOE)
- Force protection
- Civ/Mil Liaison
- Flexible manoeuvre forces




STABILISATION WHAT CAN CIMIC DO ABOUT IT? (... or have we learnt from recent operations???)




BACK TO BASICS or THE NEW PARADIGM FOR THE ACHILLE' DILEMMA

**ACHILLES' VIEW
(SHAPE-CLEAR-HOLD-BUILD)**

ULYSSES' VIEW

**UNDERSTAND & SHAPE – PENETRATE & SECURE –
EXPAND & DEVELOP**

*"They was never conquered
he
er
he
its
ns
at
es
at
they really wanted... in war
as in peace, your opponent
always get a vote "*



CIMIC : AN OLD/NEW CONCEPT

WHAT IS CIMIC:

- ESSENTIAL CIVIL MILITARY INTERFACE (UNDERSTAND & SHAPE – PENETRATE & SECURE)
- FUNCTION IN SUPPORT OF THE OVERALL MISSION (EXPAND & DEVELOP)
- KEY ENABLER/ FORCE MULTIPLIER IN A MODERN MULTI FUNCTIONAL CONFLICT ENVIRONMENT (POLITICAL/MILITARY END STATE)
- ~~ENABLE ALL SOURCES OF STATE/COALITION POWER SYSTEM TO WORK~~

WHAT IS NOT:

- HUMANITARIAN AGENCY
- DUPLICATE OF UN/IO/NGOs/ CIVIL ACTORS
- CAPABLE TO PROVIDE MEDIUM AND LONG TERM SUSTAINABILITY IN DEVELOPING PROJECTS


THE ULYSSES' PARADIGM FOR CIMIC (THE L-I-I MODEL)



ESSENTIAL CIVIL MILITARY INTERFACE (UNDERSTAND & SHAPE – PENETRATE & SECURE)

FUNCTION IN SUPPORT OF THE OVERALL MISSION (EXPAND & DEVELOP)




**LISTEN
INFLUENCE
INTERACT**

KEY ENABLER/ FORCE MULTIPLIER IN A MODERN MULTI FUNCTION CONFLICT ENVIRONMENT (POLITICAL/MILITARY END STATE) ENABLES ALL SOURCES OF STATE/COALITION POWER SYSTEM TO WORK





CONCLUSIONS





"Peace keeping is not a job for soldiers, but only soldiers can do it" Dag Hammarskjöld

CIMIC is a catalyst for all systems of a coalition/country/HN to come together and fit into the mission. CIMIC operators must be able to start and foster this process in any situation



MNCG MISSION (REVISED)

Dedicated CIMIC capability, to engage, as directed, in CIMIC activities in order to:

- ✓ Support the chain of command down to the last man on the ground
- ✓ Enhance the effectiveness of military operation
- ✓ Maximise the effects of all elements of State/Coalition power system on the ground (the Afghan lemma)
- ✓ Serve as an essential forum for CIMIC consultations, a planning staff and a centre of expertise.


DEPLOYABLE MODULE DM

DM Layout

A CIMIC team, with high operational readiness profile, originated from MNCG staff integrated with the CIMIC National component on a task-oriented basis. It has coordination, command and control capabilities over CIMIC assets operating on the field, and provides support on CIMIC related matters to the Force Commander.

DEPLOYABLE MODULE DM




Legend:
 Yellow box: CIMIC C2 ELEMENTS
 Green box: CIMIC EXECUTIVE ASSETS





MNCG CDR VISION

"MNCG as a niche of excellence within the CIMIC operational environment. MNCG is to fulfill its mission, primarily towards the Alliance, but also towards other International Organisations, by providing an output aimed at assuming the role of key enabler and force multiplier at the operational and tactical level. In doing so, keeping the balance between this role and the T&E support towards the Civil and Military community"

Operational Concept





Appendix 3

Interview to Prof. Alessandro POLITI, Director of the NATO Defence College Foundation, Roma, Italy.

Location of the interview: in a bar in Roma, close to Piazza Vittorio.

Date: Feb 15th, 2013.

Duration of the interview: 00:45:35; 00:17:27; 00:23:24.

Topics of the interview: security policy, NATO, CIMIC operations, the need to employ anthropologist in CIMIC operations, stress zones, cultural awareness, military training, post-conflict operations, peace operations, non-place, Virtual Peace Space.

Here below the main ideas and concepts expressed by the informant.

The informant exposed the following opinions and ideas personally, as an analyst, and not as the Director of the NATO Defence College Foundation.

The interview covered the following five points:

1. NATO's security discourse related to theater of CIMIC operations and the concept of 'non-place' developed by Marc Auge';
2. NATO's Comprehensive Approach;
3. CIMIC operations;
4. NATO's Strategic Concept (2010);
5. Cultural Awareness and the Italian Army experience.

1. NATO's security discourse related to theater of CIMIC operations and the concept of 'non-place' developed by Marc Auge'.

NATO has produced a security discourse in which has not given primary importance to the local social-cultural situation in which the armed forces of the Alliance will take place. All the mission of crisis management will occur in territories outside NATO's territories, therefore in social-cultural contexts completely different from the social-cultural realities which are present in NATO's countries. This discourse, which in its inconsistency is similar to the one on the war on terror and the other one on narco-traffic, has made this territories 'empty' of all their particular characteristics. When we look at the NATO's map presented by Gen. Soligan, in which all the territories for potential interventions of NATO's forces are defined as 'multiple stress zones', they in reality are anthropological places (Auge'). However, as the case of Italy, we lack the presence of regional experts inside the Italian Armed Forces, and it is natural that we need anthropologists capable to produce 'knowledge' on these areas.

2. NATO's comprehensive approach.

NATO has created the 'comprehensive approach' which is a late acknowledgment of the fact that security is multidimensional. Then the relation with the local population is important. However, if we take as example the USA involvement in Iraq, the relation with the local populations can be summarized with the formula to consider them friends until the moment they do not change idea. The Italian experience is different. But, this

approach has encounter some obstacles in its application: (1) the gap between doctrine and practice is immense; and (2) NATO is multinational meaning that there is a problem of linguistic interpretation among the very allies. We have to look at the following missions-operations: Kosovo, Bosnia, war against Serbia, and Afghanistan, and see how in all these theater of operations NATO was (and still) not capable to imagine, to think, a post-conflict situation. The Afghan case is still open; Kosovo's case apparently was resolved but what about the consequences? The case of Bosnia was very expensive, and here again, there is a lack of imagination on how the future will be. However, Italy, using a different approach and vision has reached positive results in Lebanon, in Burundi, and in Somalia. Regarding the Afghanistan case we do not ask ourselves 'what are we going to do if everything is going wrong?' 'What about the post-conflict situation?' At operational level the comprehensive approach should be changed, but NATO suffers of an identitarian politics which is about (1) the redefinition of its own nature; and (2) its friends have changed. The problem is represented by the facts that Cold War mentality analysts are still present inside NATO and their try to recycle. What we really need is a redefinition of NATO but this is not happening.

3. CIMIC operations.

I can summarize CIMIC vision with the formula: 'even if I am a soldier I try not to become perceived by the local population as an enemy'. When the CIMIC operation goes wrong (and this is because of political direction) the whole mission goes wrong. Therefore, the political direction of CIMIC operations is very important. We should need anthropologist working on CIMIC operation because of the different education of the politicians. They do not have a full spectrum vision of the mission and the nowadays politicians have as referent point only economics. We need anthropologist, or more clearly, cultural translator, along the command line (as used to be in ancient times). Despite our experiences in WW1, WW2 and the Cold War, still the enemy is demonized and not understood. This mentality is still present now and we continue to make the enemy incomprehensible, and this is thanks to the media, and the Italian politician is forced in his decision by his dependency on the media. The media doesn't help us to understand. To understand the enemy is important, as it is important to respect our antagonistic. And there are three motives for this: ethic, politic, and for the conduct of war. The ethic motive is that the war has not to become total but we have to arrive to an agreement with the enemy (an example is the movie of Pontecorvo 'The Battle of Algiers'). We need to understand a system, and when we understand it we try to disassemble it. The political motive is that if I have not the capacity to understand the enemy I cannot lead a war against him because I cannot do politics and deal with him. Finally regarding the conduct of war, if I do not understand the enemy how I can defeat him. What is lacked is empathy, or to be more precise cultural empathy. Then, as result is not possible to enter into the culture of the other (in whom territories we operate) and, therefore, it is impossible to reach durable and lasting positive (secure) results. What emerge clearly is that I need experts and a different approach. This instruction has to be capable to integrate different disciplines, and must be not mechanical. What I need is a mental wide vision because I cannot exit (or enter) from a non-place if I do not transform it in a real place; I need reference points. To decide to create a place means to provide a

structure and I can only construct this structure through details. The structure can be the real one or the one I assemble in my mind, but I have to select my reference points. The multiple stress zones have been transformed in non-places because we think they are out of our logic. However, I have three statements: (1) is our logic the best one? (2) can we apply our logic everywhere? (3) we have to learn from the others. All the big civilizations have moved forward themselves. We must be able to transform the enemy in a consort, we must share with him. But our model our model of the end of history, because our western world has won, now we oblige the other to adapt to it. While cultural syncretism is lacked we need cultural openness because (1) we are globalized; and (2) all the reference-cardinal points that we have imagined are disintegrating. If we are not able to open our cultural webs, we are not able to understand next threats and emergencies which will come from some lost place of the planes. The crisis is our crisis; the crisis is in our system. Therefore we have to be able to create a place (meaning an anthropological place) and security is the consequence of the creation of a place. But to create a place we need a frame. We must be able to put chaos inside a frame but this is not the case. If I do not provide a defined content I cannot define security. Only when I define what I want to do I have a clearer image of security. If inside the security frame there is only emptiness, my definition-concept of security is empty too.

4. NATO's Strategic Concept (2010).

The NATO'S Strategic Concept (2010) (1) is a document which tries to replace a strategic vision with a political vision; (2) it is an effort to look at different threats but it cannot do more; and (3) is a political tentative to stretch the Alliance agreement in another historical period.

5. Cultural Awareness and the Italian Army experience.

The main problem faced by the concept-idea of cultural awareness is 'how can I speak to this partner?'.

Cultural awareness is based on colonial knowledge, but now I need local knowledge and therefore, the existence of specific institutes that studies the culture of the others. At the end the subject who does cultural awareness in natural way are the women. Women visit the local market and they have these capacities (1) to establish dialogue; (2) to make questions; (3) to remember the answers; (4) to treasure them; and (5) to organize the answers. Is open sources intelligence and you cannot do open source information if you do not open yourself. The way Italians do CIMIC is based on our history. Italy is multicultural and the difference between the North and the South is evident. As an example we have applied our cultural differences in our mission in Lebanon and at that time we were the only contingent that was not attacked. We are familiar with secessionist forces and structures in our own country but in Iraq (the Nassirya case) we lost control of the situation, and in Somalia it was the very allies that create problem to us. It is our flexibility that in dangerous situation becomes an advantage. However, talking about the military personnel their selection to serve in missions is done at the last moment and a lot of time this personnel lack knowledge of local culture and language. Still we have to do more to know not only the local language but the local culture and to make the personnel

attached to a specific mission-territory: the military expert of local language-culture has to be always in contact with the local reality for all the time of the duration of the mission. Therefore, we have to change the vision, the gaze, we have on the whole planet.

Appendix 4

Interview to an Officer of the Italian Army, who for his profession and duties prefers to maintain anonymity.

The Officer, at the moment of the interview had the rank of Captain, is male, he has a PhD on Sociology, and he is an expert on CIMIC Operations, Intelligence-Counter Intelligence, and Afghanistan. He has served in Afghanistan (2003) as Chief Counter-Intelligence Section.

Location of the interview: Warrant Officer Club, Via della Lungara n. 81, Roma

Date: Feb 26th, 2013.

Duration of the interview: 01:10:09.

Code: Informant Y

Topics of the interview: security policy, NATO, CIMIC operations, the need to employ anthropologist in CIMIC operations, stress zones, cultural awareness, military training, post-conflict operations, peace operations, Virtual Peace Space.

Here below the main ideas and concepts expressed by the informant.

The informant said:

Before leaving for Afghanistan we received in Italy our cultural awareness course: duration 60 minutes, 120 PPT slides, and I remember on the first slide the Afghanistan flag (green, white, green), and the second slide the ethnic percentage of the local population. At the same time they provided as with some 'important' suggestion related to the conduct to have with the local population: 'do not shake hand with the lay Afghan, and if you have to do it, use gloves, because, normally the Afghan men piss on his hand because he doesn't want to offend the sacred mother land'.

When we arrived to Afghanistan we found ourselves surrounded by an army of potential enemy because they were waving a flag with strange colors: black, red, and green. We asked about it and after three days we realized that this was the flag of the new Afghan Army and the flag of Afghanistan. Therefore, I realized that the Italian officer who provided us the cultural awareness course had not any idea about Afghanistan at all. At the same time, after ten days in Afghanistan, some Afghans were asking us why the Italian soldiers before shaking hands with them were wearing gloves.

It was forbidden to accept presents from the local population. An Afghan man whom I had good relations with presented me as a gift a kid (goat) but I saw myself obliged to refuse it. The order to do not accept presents is compulsory, and the official justification is that it is like a contract, the moment you accept it at the same time you have to do a favor. In short, these were the cultural awareness instructions we received and that we have to put in practice in our daily life with the local population. Therefore, after this experience I started to be interested on the local culture, to construct knowledge by myself, and to become specialized on Sociology of Islam.

As a consequence, once back to Italy, I proposed myself to organize some courses on Islamic culture, and I was lucky enough to find a learned commander who was a strong supporter of the comprehensive approach (we have to find different way to solve our

problems). Therefore, in a period of six months (in Italy, and in collaboration with the Islamic community of Torino) we organize a course on cultural awareness for my Brigade. During that time (six months) I organized focus group with local Afghan.

I have to add that during the period 2005-2006 I have already started my studies on sociology of Islam, and in Afghanistan I was the Chief Section of Counter-intelligence and Security. Due to the fact that my duty was to interview all the local Afghan that worked with us I decided to take this opportunity to organize there (in Afghanistan) some focus group and to have informal meeting, conversations, and chats in order to understand (in very informal way) the local situation. In this gathering we were using interpreters.

Regarding the focus group that I have organized in Italy I divided the group accordingly the level of education of the participants. The sons of Afghan officers and civil servants that come to Italy to study at the Military Academy had the high level of education, while the low level was among the immigrants that come to Italy.

In short, this focus group was an approach to understand, from an 'emic' perspective', the reality in Afghanistan and therefore to provide more knowledge to the military units sent there.

And in the same period I developed (1) my PhD thesis which focuses on suicide terrorist in Afghanistan; and (2) a new approach to analyses the local Afghan environment which is based on the fact that only the local reality exists.

With all this background I propose to the Army General Staff to organize courses on cultural awareness in Afghan territory but at the end they do not want to take any responsibility. I proposed to organize this course free of charge too, but the answer was always the same...'It is interesting but...'.

Regarding the geographical area which are considered of strategic importance for Italy and the need to have regional experts able to work at political-strategic-tactical level I have presented a project to the Army. The idea was to prepare cultural mediators (Cultural Mediators Officer) who follow the unit in the theatre of operation. I have gathered fifty national experts (from anthropology, sociology, and political science background), where the anthropologist provides the local context picture, whilst the political scientist the wide context understanding; but I do not feel optimist on this project. And the official structure (Army General Staff) doesn't answer to me. Even I have been looking for a contract with the Center for High Defense Studies (CASD), which is under the authority of the Ministry of Defence, but, apart some pats on the back....nothing.

What I am experimenting, and this is more clear through my personal experiences, is that there is a general superficiality (inside the Army General Staff) on this topic even if the Iraqi mission has fully demonstrated the need of a multidisciplinary approach to the local knowledge.

I have even proposed myself not as an officer but using my academic title (Doctor) to make contact with the official institutions but the result is the same...indifference toward what I propose.

Going back to my experience in Afghanistan and the cultural awareness training I received I remember that an illogic situation: we were given Dari-Farsi course, which is the official language of Afghanistan, but we had to operate (and gather information) in Pashtuns area where Pashto is spoken. Therefore, we were speaking the 'enemy' language,

the language that is hated by the Pashtuns population. Regarding the Dari-Farsi course this was provided my teachers from the Army Foreign Language Institute (SLEE), we were more than sixty students, and what we received were set of phrases which can be useful and not.

On the topic to understand local language and the use of metaphors, I have organized, while in Afghanistan a three levels course (macro-meso-micro) and due to the fact that the Italian military personnel doesn't speak the local language I have pressed on the use of non-verbal communication approach. My course was based on daily life experience with the locals, and was centered on the knowledge of the social organization. Basically the purpose was to identify the locals, to create a local data base, which start with the family to whom one local belongs. To understand in which family an individual is part is important because you are able to identify him inside a specific social group, you can give him a name, and understand the position of the individual inside the conflict. The idea was to create the concept of the 'strategic corporal' because in practice are the private soldiers who interacts daily with the local population. The reality is that there is a war (like Mini's definition, there is a war after the war) and despite the label of 'International Security Assistance Force' (ISAF) label the situation is of conflict...as you say is a space of virtual peace.

During my experience a Chief Section Counter-Intelligence and Security we had a 'black list' however, a lot of name were transliterated wrongly, and this happen when information are provided by other military contingent (US, UK, etc.) present in the theater of operations.

To sum up I can say that (1) my cultural awareness course which I organized was reduced to six hours teaching; (2) the official structure is not able to have an interest on what is going on locally; (3) regarding the experts...in Italy everybody is an expert...so you can imagine; (4) we have recourses but they are not employed efficiently; (5) the soldiers are sent by the official structure to certain defeat; (6) the official structure lacks the will to really do something, it doesn't adjust itself to the new conflict scenarios; and (7) the official structure talks and talks but at the end of the day it doesn't do enough.

Appendix 5

Interview to the Minister of Defence, Admiral Giampaolo Di Paola

Location of the interview: Ministero della Difesa, Palazzo Baracchini, Via XX

Settembre n. 8, 00187 Roma

Date: Feb 28th, 2013

Duration of the interview: 00:18:08

Topics of the interview: security policy, NATO, CIMIC operations, the need to employ anthropologist in CIMIC operations, stress zones, cultural awareness, military training, post-conflict operations, peace operations, Virtual Peace Space.

Here below the main ideas and concepts expressed by the informant.

The informant said:

We need to have at our disposal more knowledge about the reality in the theater of operations; this is even more important at political level; there is a need to understand the reality faced by people (civilian and military) who lives and operates in the various theater of operations where the Italian Armed Forces are present.

However, there is inactivity and indifference, toward the reality of the theater of operations from the political elites.

Talking about the general training, today the Italian soldiers are better equipped since the Bosnia operation (SFOR 1996). The Afghanistan operation (Enduring Freedom 2001) put on the agenda the necessity to know the reality of the operational environment.

It can be said that the US Forces that operates on the terrain are ignorant, whilst the UK and France armed forces represent the avant-garde regarding the 'knowledge' of the environment. The Human Terrain System which has been employed by the US forces could be good to employ by the Italian forces.

But our structure is 'fragmented', in Italy we do not have experts on 'stress zones', and on our vulnerabilities. I do think that the concept of the Virtual Peace Space describe perfectly the post-conflict operations.

The problem in Italy is the political action because the experts do not solve the problems and this Country has difficulties to accept this reality and the will to change.

Therefore, the problem is political (1) there is a lack of political vision regarding the Italian security; (2) there is a political indifference and disinterest; and (3) the Italian politicians are not interested on security problems.

Since 1946 Italy has not having a White Book on Security, why? Because of this political disinterest.

The drama of this Country is that its political class-political elites (1) are immature and they gaze only at their own navel; (2) they do not 'see' and they delude themselves with the fact that others (i.e.: UN, NATO) will to their security job.

We, as military, live this situation, and therefore, we are limited, and we do not have good structures for the right training for the military personnel. We as military we do not leave an impression on the political class.

Murcia 16 gennaio 2012

N.H. Col. Fabiano Zinzone
Comandante del “Multinational CIMIC Group”
Via Riviera Scarpa,75
31045 Motta di Livenza (TV)
Italy

Oggetto: Ricerca Antropologica presso il Multinational CIMIC Group.

Il sottoscritto Dr. Giovanni Ercolani, nato a Milano il 5.5.1964, Antropologo e “*Lecturer*” in “*Security Studies*”, attualmente opera come Ricercatore presso il Dipartimento di Antropologia (Cattedra di Antropologia Politica) dell’Università di Murcia (Spagna).

In tale veste sta lavorando su un progetto di ricerca dal titolo “*Consideration on Anthropology and Critical Security Studies in a Globalized Context*” (“Linee di riflessione sopra l’Antropologia e gli Studi Critici della Sicurezza in un contesto globalizzato”), e tale ricerca verra’ presentata alla prossima conferenza internazionale “*Anthropology in the World*” organizzata dal “*Royal Anthropological Institute*” di Londra (<http://www.therai.org.uk/conferences/anthropology-in-the-world/>).

Sempre in tale sede il sottoscritto presiederà quale “*Chair*” il “*Panel: Anthropology and Security Studies*” (<http://www.nomadit.co.uk/rai/events/rai2012/panels.php5?PanelID=990>).

La ricerca di cui sopra fa inoltre parte di un progetto più ampio (in collaborazione con la Cattedra di Antropologia Politica dell’Università di Murcia, Spagna), con il fine di essere trasformato in un testo accademico, sempre nella stessa linea di investigazione, ed al riguardo il mio lavoro antropologico vorrebbe fissarsi sull’attività del “*Multinational CIMIC Group*” che Lei comanda.

I motivi di questa scelta sono vari e posso citarli brevemente:

- da un punto di vista accademico, la lettura dei testi dei “*NATO Strategic Concepts*” del 1999 e del 2010 fanno riferimento ad interventi dell’Alleanza in aree non-NATO. In tale contesto in cui si parla di “*Comprehensive Approach*” il discorso della CIMIC diventa di primaria importanza tanto da essere definita una “*Comprehensive Capability*”. Questa è una realtà

indiscutibile e nel futuro si prevede una maggiore partecipazione di elementi CIMIC in quelle che vengono definite “*Multiple Stress Zones*”.

- Da un punto di vista personale anche le motivazioni sono varie, prima fra tutte il fatto di essere Italiano ed avere alle spalle una pluridecennale esperienza militare. Oltre a queste due motivazioni ed alla mia esperienza di docente in “*Security Studies*” presso varie istituzioni accademiche, in passato ho frequentato il “*NATO CIMIC Basic Course*” (32/2011) ed ho avuto modo di apprezzare l’attività del Suo Gruppo, e questo mi ha spinto nella direzione di dedicare la parte più importante di questa mia ricerca al lavoro che viene effettuato in seno al “*Multinational CIMIC Group*”.

Il mio progetto (con l’Università di Murcia) che spero potrà avere come titolo finale “*Líneas de reflexiones sobre Antropología y Estudios Críticos de Seguridad en un contexto Globalizado: las actividades del ‘Multinational CIMIC Group’ (Italia)*” (“Linee di riflessione sopra l’Antropologia e gli Studi Critici della Sicurezza in un contesto globalizzato: l’attività del ‘Multinational CIMIC Group’ (Italia)”), vuole partire da queste premesse NATO e vedere come nel seno del suo Group questa “*Cultural and Gender awareness as key CIMIC operational tools*” viene sviluppata. La mia cornice teorica è costruita secondo le linee di ricerca sviluppate da tre autori principali:

- Gen. Fabio Mini: “*La Guerra Dopo la Guerra*”, 2003;
- Gen. Sir Rupert Smith: “*The Utility of Force*”, 2005;
- David Kilcullen: “*The Accidental Guerrilla*”, 2009.

Al riguardo e per il mio lavoro antropologico avrei necessità di:

- intervistareLa in qualità di Comandante del Gruppo;
- intervistare personale militare del Multinational CIMIC Group che sta frequentato corsi di preparazione CIMIC presso il gruppo stesso e che si stanno preparando per una missione (ho preferito circoscrivere il mio lavoro all’operazione in corso in KOSOVO);
- intervistare sempre personale militare CIMIC che è tornato da missioni in Kosovo;
- essere presente fisicamente all’attività di reparto e seguire l’iter del personale (training-deployment-mission-return).

Tutte le interviste manterranno l’anonimato (in antropologia l’intervistato diventa “*informatore A...B...C*”) e Lei quale Comandante del Group avrà accesso alla serie delle mie domande prima che queste vengano proposte al personale. Le materie toccate non saranno classificate in quanto il mio lavoro si concentrerà su come il

personale militare del “*Multinational CIMIC Group*” avendo ricevuto un training *ad hoc* adeguato sara’ in grado di interagire con “l’altro” nel teatro operativo. Quello che interessa alla mia ricerca e’ proprio questa preparazione-adattamento del Suo personale in un contesto in cui la propria cultura di origine (identificata dal personale militare italiano CIMIC), trovandosi ad operare in contesti spazio-tempo direi “no-NATO”, deve mimetizzarsi ed adattarsi alla vecchia formula militare FLOC (forma, lucentezza, ombra, colore). Il fatto che vorrei sottolineare nel mio lavoro e’ questa predisposizione “italiana” ad interagire con culture diverse al fine di non generare attriti ed incomprensioni che in situazioni di crisi possano degenerare pericolosamente.

Per questo avrei bisogno di essere presente “sul terreno” sia presso la Sua base che presso una Vostra base in Kosovo al fine di produrre un lavoro scientifico.

Questo lavoro potrebbe dividersi in quattro fasi e in quattro tempi diversi:

1. interviste generali;
2. presenza presso il Multinational CIMIC Group nel momento del training CIMIC del personale militare del Group (ed individuazione di un ristretto numero di personale militare “X” plotone-squadra sul quale lavorare);
3. presenza presso una base del Multination CIMIC Group in Kosovo (ove e’ presente “X”);
4. interviste al personale militare CIMIC (“X”) al loro ritorno al Multinational CIMIC Group.

Per quanto sopra mi faro’ carico di tutti i costi necessari alla mia ricerca (vitto, alloggio, spostamenti, ecc).

In allegato Le invio copia del mio CV (in inglese).

In attesa di una sua risposta Le giungano i miei sinceri saluti ed Auguri per la Sua attivita’ professionale.

Suo

Giovanni Ercolani

Dr. Giovanni Ercolani
Calle Aguera n. 5, int. 3-A
30001 Murcia – Spain
Tel: (+34) 67.11.535.05
Email: drercolani@yahoo.co.uk



APPENDIX n. 7

Progetto di ricerca antropologico presso il Multinational Cimic Group

Thursday, 28 February, 2013 17:37

From: "Ten. Emanuele FOGLIA" [REDACTED]

To: drercolani@yahoo.co.uk

Egregio Dott. ERCOLANI,

sono il Ten. FOGLIA, un Ufficiale psicologo effettivo presso l'Ufficio Addestramento dello Stato Maggiore Dell'Esercito, a Roma.

In considerazione del potenziale interesse che i risultati dell'indagine d Lei proposta potrebbero avere per la Forza Armata, in particolare in relazione agli aspetti addestrativi, sono stato individuato dalla mia linea di Comando per essere presente durante i momenti salienti delle diverse fasi della ricerca e, se necessario e con modalità da concordare, essere di supporto nel sensibilizzare il personale militare che parteciperà all'indagine.

Sarò lieto di conoscerLa, quindi, la prossima settimana a Motta di Livenza ma, a causa di concomitanti impegni lavorativi a Roma, potrò essere presente per un paio di giorni. Al riguardo, mi farebbe piacere sapere da Lei quali sono i giorni in cui ritiene la mia presenza maggiormente utile; personalmente ho individuato il 6 e il 7 marzo quali date di maggiore disponibilità.

Attendo una Sua cortese risposta.

Cordialmente,

Dott. Emanuele Foglia

Ten. sa. (psi.) Emanuele FOGLIA

Stato Maggiore dell'Esercito - III RIF/COE

Ufficio Addestramento

Tel. 06/47357711 Sotr. 1037711

347/9432343

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Data e ora: 04/03/2013 16.52.10Precedenza: **IMMEDIATO**

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Classifica: **NON CLASSIFICATO**☒ Trattato*Copia originale del messaggio può essere richiesta al CSC4 di competenza*

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TO RIFE/STATESERCITO ADDESTRAMENTO ROMA

RIQCRL/IT SNR LIBANO SHAMA

INFO RIFDDG/DIFESA GABINETTO

RIFD/STAMADIFESA

RIFE/STATESERCITO OPERAZIONI ROMA

RIFEK/COMFOTER VERONA

RIFEKIA/MULTINATIONAL CIMIC GROUP MOTTA DI LIVENZA

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
OGGETTO: ANTHROPOLOGY AND CRITICAL SECURITY STUDIES - THE CIMIC

ACTIVITY OF THE ITALIAN UNIT OF THE MULTINATIONAL CIMIC GROUP - DR.

GIOVANNI ERCOLANI.

SEG. MSG. N.: COI/J3O/13/0/2998 DEL 24 GEN. 2013.

1. IL CAPO DI SMD HA AUTORIZZATO IL DR. GIOVANNI ERCOLANI A SVOLGERE ATTIVITA' DI RICERCA ANTROPOLOGICA IN AMBITO CIMIC, NEL CORSO DELLE PREVISTE FASI DI FORMAZIONE, APPRONTAMENTO, IMPIEGO/MISSIONE E POST



PAGE 2 RIFDI ;0018 UNCLAS

MISSIONE DEL PERSONALE, NELLE MODALITA'/TEMPISTICHE SOTTORIPORTATE:

- FASE DI PRE-DEPLOYMENT DAL 3 AL 4 MARZO 2013 PRESSO IL

MULTINATIONAL CIMIC GROUP DI MOTTA DI LIVENZA;

- FASE DI DEPLOYMENT IN TE. OP. LIBANESE, NEL SECONDO SEMESTRE 2013

IN UN PERIODO DA INDIVIDUARE;

- FASE DI RE-DEPLOYMENT IN UN PERIODO DA STABILIRE IN BASE AL RIENTRO DEL PERSONALE A REPARTO.

2. PER QUANTO SOPRA, FATTE SALVE LE CONSUETE CAUTELE A TUTELA DELLA

D., SI ESPRIME IL NULLA CONTRO DI MASSIMA DI QUESTO COMANDO

ALL'ATTIVITA' IN PAROLA, LIMITANDO LA DURATA DELLA FASE DI DEPLOYMENT

DA SVOLGERSI IN TEATRO OPERATIVO LIBANESE AD UN MASSIMO DI N.2

SETTIMANE. AL FINE DI GARANTIRE UN'ADEGUATA SENSIBILIZZAZIONE DEL

PERSONALE PARTECIPANTE, IL TEN. PSI. FOGLIA, IN RAPPRESENTANZA DELLO

SME-ADDESTRAMENTO, SARA PRESENTE NEI MOMENTI SALIENTI DELLE VARIE

FASI DELL'ATTIVITA'.

3. AGLI ENTI IN INDIRIZZO SI CHIEDE, PER I RISPETTIVI ASPETTI DI

INTERESSE/COMPETENZA:

- PREDISPORRE IN TERMINI DI SUPPORTO TECNICO/LOGISTICO E DI

SISTEMAZIONE LE AZIONI UTILI ALLO SVOLGIMENTO DELLE ATTIVITA' NELLE

FASI DI PRE-DEPLOYMENT E RE-DEPLOYMENT PRESSO IL MULTINATIONAL CIMIC

Sigla e numero di canale HTU020 del sistema 'EMPORDENO'
Data e ora: 04/03/2013 16.52.10



PAGE 3 RIFDI ;0018 UNCLAS
GROUP DI MOTTA DI LIVENZA;
- ESPRIMERE IN FASE DI DEPLOYMENT DEL PERSONALE CIMIC IN TE. OP.
LIBANESE, LE GIORNATE PIU IDONEE ALLO SVOLGIMENTO DELL'ATTIVITA' IN
PAROLA.
PDC - COL. IANNUCCI, CAPO DIV. J3 2.9255 COMM 06.4691.9255 TEN.COL.
MONACO, CAPO SEZ. OPERAZIONI AEREE 2.9056.
FIRMATO DORDINE IL CAPO REPARTO OPERAZIONI GEN B LUCIANO PORTOLANO
BT
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Appendix 9

Course on ‘Stress management’

Lecturer: Lieutenant (psychologist) Soraya BARNA (IT Army)

Location: Pozzuolo del Friuli Cavalry Brigade HQ, Gorizia, Italy.

Date: Mar 5th, 2013.

Duration of the recording: 01:08:14; 01:32:46.

The course was directed and attended (1) by the military personnel of the Cavalry Brigade ‘Pozzuolo del Friuli’, before their deployment to the UNIFIL Mission in Lebanon: and (2) by some members of the MNCG CIMIC military team (the same team I will work for this thesis).

Aim of the course was (1) to identify those ‘stressors’ (situations that produce stress) that produce stress in the military personnel before their deployment, therefore in ‘pre-deployment’ phase; and (2) to suggest some techniques/strategies to handle and/or reduce stress.

During the course, the interaction between Barna and the ‘students’ produced a list of five elements that according to them produce stress before their assignment to a mission.

The ‘stressors’ in the pre-deployment phase are represented by:

1. the situation that is left behind in the family;
2. the knowledge and the uncertainties of the theatre of operations: (i) the logistic conditions (the base, and the outside the base); (ii) the purpose of the military mission; (iii) training: ‘is the training we have received good enough for the mission?’; (iv) knowledge of the local language and culture;
3. problems left behind in Italy; (v) local socio-political situation
4. the duration of the mission, and the possibility to take leaves during the mission (mission that were presented to last six months, and the end they lasted nine months or more);
5. the uncertainties the personnel will face at their return related to their military position, regiment, location, etc.

Once identified the stressor Barna explained that the stress not always is a negative element, but is a process of adaptation to the environment and a strategy to survive in a new situation. The stress inputs can be biological, physical, and psychological.

Phases of the stress are: (1) alarm; (2) resistance; (3) termination (end of the stress).

The rare three kinds of stress: (1) basic; (2) cumulative; (3) traumatic (this is the most dangerous).

The stress depends on the way we interpret an event. Every event is a representation and we read it according our values and culture.

Real cases have demonstrated that stressor in military operations are represented by (1) the difficulty to communicate, cultural and language barriers with local population; (2) the ambiguity of the label of the mission which can be synthesise in this question ‘am I a soldier or a peace-keeper? Is this a war, because they attack us, is a peace mission?’

During the course were identified two techniques-strategies to overwhelm stress: (1) resilience; and (2) coping.

Resilience is a capacity to win stress and is based on three factors (1) what/who I am; (2) what I have at my disposal; (3) what I can do. Through resilience the individual can win the stressful situation, find a solution, and manage the emotions.

Coping is a strategy to accept the stressful event and to resist it.

But how can we avoid stress? Only if we concentrate on the present, on the now.

Then the course concentrated on the family module and it was shown part of the movie.....

Source of stress before the deployment and after the mission can be (1) me/I toward the family; (2) the family toward me/I.

In the US Armed Forces the family of the soldier is more close to the military himself. The organization is completely different from the Italian one. The soldier's family in the US Armed Forces is really part of a community and there is a strong sense of identity, of belonging.

At the end of the course I was invited to talk about the relation between the interpellation process and cultural facts, and the fact that , more importantly, the local population (in the theatre of operation) lives in stress and drama. Here, fear and anxiety are lived according cultural patterns. Therefore, is not only important to know the local language and the local culture but we must be able to know the territory and translate that territory...as an example I talked about the Trojan war, the 'cultural' approach of Ulysses, and the invention of the 'Trojan's horse'.

UNIVERSIDAD DE
MURCIA**Ricerca Antropologica presso il Multinational CIMIC Group**

Ricercatore: Dr. Giovanni Ercolani, FRAI

Questionario per Intervista Non-Strutturata

Periodo: pre-deployment

MNCG, Motta di Livenza, ____ marzo 2013

Nome:

Cognome:

Luogo e data di nascita:

Eta', sesso:

Status civile:

Indirizzo Email:

Tel. Cell.:

a. Notizie nucleo familiare

a.1. Professione/titolo di studio del coniuge/ex coniuge/convivente:

a.2. Numero figli:

a.3. Professione/attività dei figli:

a.4. Professione/titolo di studio dei propri genitori (padre/madre di chi compila il questionario e padre/madre del coniuge/ex coniuge/convivente):

b. Notizie compilatore del questionario

b.1. Grado Militare:

b.2. Provenienza Accademia/RSU/SAS/ecc.:

b.3. Anni di servizio:

b.4. Titolo di studio al momento dell'arruolamento:

b.5. Titoli di studio acquisiti nel tempo:

b.6. Conoscenza lingue straniere:

b.7. Interessi/hobbies personali/studi/impiego del tempo libero:

b.8. Esperienze di vita/studio all'estero (luogo, durata, scopo):

b.9. Occupazione/i prima di intraprendere la carriera militare:

b.10. Motivazioni per intraprendere la carriera militare:

b.11. Incarichi militari ricoperti (luogo e durata) durante la carriera:

b.12. Perché Lei si trova presso il MNCG?

b.13. Cosa vorrebbe fare/realizzare nel suo futuro personale al fine di "divenire se stesso"?

c. Esperienze missioni militari all'estero

c.1. Elencare le esperienze di missioni all'estero, luogo, tipo di missione, incarico, e la loro durata:

c.2. Ha chiesto Lei di partire in missione? Perche?

c.3. Corsi militari o a spese dell'amministrazione, per preparare il personale alle missioni di cui sopra, e che Lei ha frequentato:

c.4. Grazie ai corsi di cui sopra Lei, prima di partire, si considerava preparato ad affrontare la missione? Perche?

c. 5. Corsi che Lei ha frequentato a proprie spese, al fine di meglio prepararsi alle missioni di cui sopra:

c.6. Questi corsi che Lei ha frequentato a proprie spese, prima di partire, l'hanno aiutata a sentirsi piu' preparato per affrontare la/e missione/i? Perche?

c.7. Potrebbe commentare, basandosi sulla Sua esperienza diretta in "contesto operativo", sui corsi frequentati (corsi militari/a spese dell'amministrazione/a proprie spese)? Sono stati utili? Erano aggiornati? Li rifrequenterebbe? Cosa cambierebbe di questi corsi?

c.8. Ricordi personali piu' salienti (positivi, negativi, difficolta', critiche) di queste esperienze di missioni all'estero:

c.9. Quali sono le Sue motivazioni per affrontare la/le missione/i all'estero:

c.10. Prossima missione militare all'estero:

c.11. Ha chiesto Lei di partire per questa nuova missione? Perché?

c.12. Corsi militari/a spese dell'amministrazione/a proprie spese, che Lei ha frequentato/sta' frequentando, per la prossima missione militare all'estero:

c.13. Si sente preparato per questa nuova missione? Cosa si aspetta da questa missione?

La presente ricerca e' stata approvata dal Dipartimento di Antropologia Sociale dell'Universita' di Murcia (Spagna), autorizzata dallo Stato Maggiore della Difesa italiano, e dal Centro Operativo Interforze, ed e' sviluppata in tre fasi: pre-deployment, deployment in teatro operativo, re-deployment.

Si fa presente che scopo di questo questionario come quello dell'intervista e' solamente scientifico, percio' si richiede la massima collaborazione e sincerita'.

Per etica professionale tutti i dati del presente questionario non verranno divulgati.

Una volta che l'intervistato avra' terminato di compilare il presente modulo, riceverà un nome in codice del tipo "Informatore A...B...C", ed in questo modo verra' identificato all'interno della ricerca antropologica.

Nel caso l'informatore volesse essere presentato nella ricerca con il suo grado, nome e cognome, dovrà richiederlo specificatamente.

Una volta terminata la ricerca antropologica questo modulo, insieme a tutto il materiale relativo alle interviste, verra' distrutto e di esso non rimarra' alcuna traccia ne' cartacea ne' informatica, od altro, ed io personalmente me ne assumo la piena responsabilita'.

In fede

Giovanni Ercolani

Dr. Giovanni Ercolani
Fellow Royal Anthropological Institute
Antropólogo Social

Universidad de Murcia
Facultad de Filosofía
Área de Antropología Social
Edificio Luis Vives
Campus de Espinardo
30100 Murcia – Spain
Email: giovanni.ercolani@um.es
Tel: (+39) 339 120 34 99
Skype: drercolani

Appendix 11

Interview to an Officer of the Italian Army, who for his/her profession and duties prefers to maintain anonymity.

The Officer, at the moment of the interview had the rank of Lieutenant, and he/she has served in military missions in Bosnia, Kosovo, Iraq and Afghanistan.

Location of the interview: MNCG barracks, Motta di Livenza, Treviso, Italy

Date: March 6th, 2013.

Duration of the interview: 00:12:08; 00:44:48; 01:10:24.

Code: Informant X.

Topics of the interview: security policy, NATO, CIMIC operations, the need to employ anthropologist in CIMIC operations, stress zones, cultural awareness, military training, post-conflict operations, peace operations, Virtual Peace Space.

Here below the main ideas and concepts expressed by the informant.

The informant said:

I have experiences in the following military missions: Bosnia, Kosovo. Iraq, and Afghanistan.

I can tell you that in all the above theatre of operations I did not receive the right cultural-linguistic training, and while serving in Bosnia I tried to learn by myself Serb-Croat. In general, and based on my previous experience I can say that if we had received more cultural training I am sure we could have reached different and more positive results. What is evident is the lack of a vision.

The mission in Iraq presented for the first time this problem because there it was real war and we really needed to understand the theatre of operation and the local population.

Before going to Iraq I made some research and I collect material (by myself) on the region, and once there I tried to learn the language.

The official structure did not provide us the needed training, and there is not an official program which aims at training the Italian soldier in local culture.

In Afghanistan what was evident was the lack of dialogue with the local population, and even if before the departure the General Staff gave us a hand manual of cultural awareness once there we realize that the reality was different from the one described in the manual.

In this mission it came evident the need to provide cultural and linguistic training to those soldiers who were involved and were in contact with the local population. At tactical level I can say that we had a positive experience, but at strategic and political level I cannot say the same.

Talking about the Soligan's map and the 'Multiple Stress Zones' all this critical areas are close to Italy but we are not ready to handle these problems.

Talking again about my experience in Afghanistan and the use of interpreters I can say that the UK army had their own certificated interpreters who were Afghan people living in UK and the UK MoD employed them in the theater of operations and this is point to the

fact that to have real interpreters is a must because we know that the reliability of the interpreters is fictitious.

There is an evident need to (1) learn local history, culture, language, and metaphors; (2) the formation of identification and identity; and (3) to pass the learned lesson (from the military personnel that have already served in the mission) to the new deployed personnel.

The knowledge of local culture helps the CIMIC operator to be accepted inside the local reality. We have now gender awareness courses.

But the problem is represented by the so called medals' hunters (Gen. Mini in his book 'La Guerra dopo la guerra' talks about this phenomenon) who are military who are only interested to bring at home a medal, they are narrow mind, and not interested to provide new ideas and approaches to the mission; they only obey to the orders but without bringing anything new that can be of benefit for the whole mission.

Due to the fact that we are employed at tactical level, in direct contact with a specific reality, there should be a dialogue, which doesn't exist, with the strategic and the political level.

Here, what is evident is a strong lack of will to change, and the results are that the training we receive is not enough for the mission we have to face and most of the time we have to 'train' ourselves (local culture-language) after duty-hours at home and spending our money.

Appendix 12

Interview to Informant A.

Officer of the Italian Army, who for his/her profession and duties prefers to maintain anonymity.

The Officer, at the moment of the interview had 27 years of active service in the Italian Army, and he/she has served in military missions in Bosnia, and Afghanistan (in Herat and Kabul).

Foreign languages: English, German.

Study: Bachelor Degree.

Location of the interview: MNCG barracks, Motta di Livenza, Treviso, Italy.

Date: March 6th, 2013.

Duration of the interview: 01:12:49.

The semi-structured interview was conducted with the 'Pre-deployment' questionnaire which is organized in Part 'a' 'b' and 'c'. Part 'a' deals with information about the family of origin; Part 'b' (1-13), is dedicated more specifically to the military career of the Informant, and Part 'c' (1-12) covers the Informant's military missions abroad. The Informant, in very informal way expressed the following ideas, concepts, and experiences:

I am here, at the MNCG, because I like the CIMIC activity. I have served in various military missions abroad (Bosnia, Kosovo, and Afghanistan) and I realized how the CIMIC approach is different from the 'only military approach'. It was during my mission in Bosnia that I came across the CIMIC activity, even if my assignment was completely different because I was employed as an interpreter between the Italian Army and the other NATO military contingents. The CIMIC activity is close to my personality, to my studies, to my curiosity. Through it you come more close to the local population, to their need, their personality. In Afghanistan, for example, I played (I play different music instruments) with a very famous local musician and this helped to be perceived in a different way from the local population. I can say that as Italian the CIMIC activity is very close to our culture, our way of life, and we do not stereotype the 'other' only as an enemy (US Army approach). I can say that I regarded the Afghan people as 'our oriental cousins', and I do not remember any negative moment in my mission with the local population, but a lot of respect toward us. Talking about negative experience there (in Afghanistan) this was with the US Army because they tried to impose their military regulation on us without any respect for our Italian culture, and they pretended to lecture us as if we were completely ignorant.

Regarding specific courses offered by the IT Army on local culture for my missions (Bosnia, Kosovo, and Afghanistan) I only received the normal military training but not specific cultural training. However, once in the theater of operations I tried always to understand the situation we were facing. My next mission will be in Lebanon and I build my knowledge on this theater of operation talking with my colleagues that went there in mission before me, and collecting material.

Regarding the course I attended on 'Stress Management' I would like to say that a course like that is more fruitful at our return from the mission, because we come back changed.

Therefore, it should be necessary to offer a stress management course during the post-deployment phase.

In my opinion CIMIC is different, and you need people that are curious, that are open minded, and that have a lot of common sense.

Appendix 13

Interview to Informant C.

Warrant-Officer of the Italian Army, who for his/her profession and duties prefers to maintain anonymity.

The Warrant-Officer, at the moment of the interview had 23 years of active service in the Italian Army, and he/she has served in military missions in Kosovo, Abu Dhabi, Malta.

Foreign languages: English.

Study: Bachelor Degree.

Location of the interview: MNCG barracks, Motta di Livenza, Treviso, Italy.

Date: March 6th, 2013.

Duration of the interview: 00:20:53.

The semi-structured interview was conducted with the 'Pre-deployment' questionnaire which is organized in Part 'a' 'b' and 'c'. Part 'a' deals with information about the family of origin; Part 'b' (1-13), is dedicated more specifically to the military career of the Informant, and Part 'c' (1-12) covers the Informant's military missions abroad. The Informant, in very informal way expressed the following ideas, concepts, and experiences:

I am here at the MNCG because I was assigned here after my last military mission abroad (Malta). Talking about contact with local people and culture in military missions I remember that in Kosovo I never had the possibility to meet local people, we were staying all the time in our base, it was a peacekeeping mission, and if we had to live the compound we were wearing the full combat equipment, practically we were in war area. It was after the mission in Kosovo that I decided to learn English, and I did it by myself (I did not received any help/course from my administration). About my next mission in Lebanon (UNIFIL; duration six months) I have been selected, meaning that I did not request to go there. At the moment I construct my knowledge on Lebanon talking to colleagues that went there, and collecting material on internet. I am interested in the history of Lebanon from 1982 up to today. And I would like to learn Arabic once there. The motivation behind the missions I participated and I will participate in the future is to improve myself.

Appendix 14

Interview to Informant E.

NCO of the Italian Army, who for his/her profession and duties prefers to maintain anonymity.

The NCO, at the moment of the interview had 18 years of active service in the Italian Army, and he/she has served in military missions in Macedonia, Croatia, Albania, Afghanistan, Lebanon.

Foreign languages: English, Spanish

Study: Secondary-school diploma and some universities studies.

Location of the interview: MNCG barracks, Motta di Livenza, Treviso, Italy.

Date: March 7th, 2013.

Duration of the interview: 01:07:49.

The semi-structured interview was conducted with the 'Pre-deployment' questionnaire which is organized in Part 'a' 'b' and 'c'. Part 'a' deals with information about the family of origin; Part 'b' (1-13), is dedicated more specifically to the military career of the Informant, and Part 'c' (1-12) covers the Informant's military missions abroad.

The Informant E (1) is a student at the Peace Operations Institute (POTI, USA) and follows UN courses online (Human Rights, etc); and (2) has attended the NATO CIMIC TACTICAL course, and the CIMIC LIAISON Module.

He/She has learned English and Spanish by him/herself; and he/she has remarked several time that he/she wants to dedicate his/her life and profession to help people.

The Informant, in very informal way expressed the following ideas, concepts, and experiences:

I am here at the MNCG because I requested it, and because this MNCG can give me the opportunity to go abroad (military mission). I love to travel and to learn new culture. And talking about my previous mission I can say that all of them they produced very interesting experience for me.

My previous mission in Lebanon put me in contact with a cultural-linguistic reality that I found fascinating. In Beirut I was shocked by the cosmopolitanism of the local population. There I had a CIMIC assignment and thanks to that I had a lot of opportunity to meet people. At the same time I was employed by the local Italian Cultural Center and for four months I taught Italian to local kids. With some of them I still have contact. I had good relation with the local interpreters and cultural awareness instructors (they were Lebanese women). During this mission I realized how it is important to know local culture and language (in the past I studied some Arabic at the university) because quite the majority of the 'bosses' of the local UN agencies were Lebanese people.

The military mission in Macedonia was very important for my life because it changed my life, and gave us a different way to see and to approach the culture of 'the other'. During this mission and thanks to my commander (a Greek Officer) I discovered a lot of the local religious believes. During this mission, despite the fact that I never had any kind of

problem with the local population I had some problems with some military personnel of the Italian contingent.

The same I can say about my mission in Albania that put me in contact with a very interesting reality.

Talking about the importance to have the Italian Ministry of Defence investing more money on the training of very motivated military personnel on local culture and languages in theatre of operation I am a little pessimistic. There is not meritocracy here.

Informant E, in the questionnaire has expressed his/her opinion that the general courses he/she received before any mission were suitable for the mission itself, and that the situations in the various theatres of operations change continuously. Regarding his/her next assignment (mission in Lebanon) he/she feels ready for it.

Appendix 15

Interview to Informant D.

Warrant-Officer of the Italian Army, who for his/her profession and duties prefers to maintain anonymity.

The Warrant-Officer, at the moment of the interview had 25 years of active service in the Italian Army, and he/she has served in military missions in Belgium (RICA), Mozambique, Kosovo, Afghanistan.

Foreign languages: English, French, German.

Study: Secondary-school diploma, he/she is attending university.

Location of the interview: MNCG barracks, Motta di Livenza, Treviso, Italy.

Date: March 7th, 2013.

Duration of the interview: 01:31:01.

The semi-structured interview was conducted with the 'Pre-deployment' questionnaire which is organized in Part 'a' 'b' and 'c'. Part 'a' deals with information about the family of origin; Part 'b' (1-13), is dedicated more specifically to the military career of the Informant, and Part 'c' (1-12) covers the Informant's military missions abroad.

The Informant D has attended, by him/herself an Arabic course; and has collected different material in order to be ready to understand the cultural and social environment for his/her new mission (UNIFIL Lebanon). The motivation behind Informant D participation in foreign countries military mission is 'duty'.

The Informant, in very informal way expressed the following ideas, concepts, and experiences:

For my mission in Mozambique I attended a Portuguese course ran by the Italian Army, and by myself I collected material on local culture, society, and history to be ready for the mission.

About my assignments in Kosovo and Afghanistan I did not receive any cultural awareness course-training, and again I collected material by myself to know more about the local culture-history etc. In general I can say that I never received any effective cultural training for my missions. About this problem I presented formal complains in the past.

My idea about the CIMIC operations and the people assigned to the MNCG for CIMIC employment is that it should be a regiment of elites, and its personnel should have a very high level of education.

About the general modules on cultural awareness that I have information they should be not only presented as simple conversations delivered by military personnel which are based on their own experience in the theatre of operations, but they should be integrated with lectures of academic professors, regional experts, and this is a need. The general sensation I have, as a result, is that I feel not ready for the mission.

On my mission to Lebanon I received the news with very short notice, while I was expecting to go to Afghanistan.

For this coming mission in Lebanon I have not received any specific cultural awareness course; I studied by myself some Arabic (for six months); and the training I received did not fit the duty of my assignment.

From my personal experience I can say that for a unit like the MNCG the study of the local language, culture, customs of the theatre of operations should be mandatory, a must. We need to know the whole, the ensemble of the theater of operation. Unfortunately, in our environment it is more important the rank than the cultural/education level of the military personnel.

On my past mission in Afghanistan I noticed a total lack in the general planning (during the mission, the purposes of it, and about the future of the area) of the whole mission; it emerged again the need to have more knowledge on the theatre of operation.

Regarding the framework of the Space of Virtual Peace I agree with it.

Appendix 16

Interview to Informant F.

NCO of the Italian Army, who for his/her profession and duties prefers to maintain anonymity.

The NCO, at the moment of the interview had 11 years of active service in the Italian Army, and he/she has served in military missions in Iraq, and Afghanistan.

Foreign languages: English, German.

Study: Secondary-school diploma.

Location of the interview: MNCG barracks, Motta di Livenza, Treviso, Italy.

Date: March 7th, 2013.

Duration of the interview: 00:29:53.

The semi-structured interview was conducted with the 'Pre-deployment' questionnaire which is organized in Part 'a' 'b' and 'c'. Part 'a' deals with information about the family of origin; Part 'b' (1-13), is dedicated more specifically to the military career of the Informant, and Part 'c' (1-12) covers the Informant's military missions abroad.

The Informant F fought to find a position inside the military environment, and at the end he/she was satisfied and happy of his/her military career. For him/her was a challenge that enjoyed. He/she sees his/her assignment to the MNCG as a starting point to serve in further military missions abroad, and already served in two missions in Iraq and in Afghanistan. Regarding his/her next mission in Lebanon it was proposed to him/her and he/she accepted. For his/her training language, more specifically English he/she attended a private school, paying for his/her tuition, and this linguistic knowledge helped him/her during his/her missions in communicating with different military contingents and with the local population in the theater of operations. He/she attended the Female Engagement Team course. However, he/she noticed that a more specific cultural awareness course on the theater of operations will be more convenient to face the new assignment and to have more self-confidence.

During his/her previous missions he/she had a lot of experiences with local population in the theater of operations, and he/she enjoyed it. However, maybe the only problem was the duration (six months) of the mission, and the fact to have leave permission only after this time (six months) has repercussion on personal life (family, boy friend, girl friend, etc.).

About his/her new assignment in Lebanon he/she has not knowledge on his/her duty, however, he/she is confident that with this mission he/she will have the opportunity to improve his/her command of English.

The Informant, in very informal way expressed the following ideas, concepts, and experiences:

This is the first time in my military life that I face an interview on myself, my life, what I want and what I am looking, about my dreams, my knowledge, about me in general.

The military experiences I had in an international environment (in contact with foreign contingents) helped me to construct a more solid self-confidence. At the beginning of these experiences I remember I was afraid but after a while I was more-confident.

What I learned from my previous experiences was to leave behind my Italian believes, stereotypes, and to enter in the 'other' theatre of operations with an attitude to be in contact with them, to understand them, and therefore to adapt to their way of life, culture, customs, language, etc.

Regarding my next mission in Lebanon I will work inside a foreign military group and this is going to be the first experience of this kind in my life.

APPENDIX n. 17

[REDACTED]

Sent: mercoledì, luglio 10, 2013 13.05

To: "UNIFIL-SECWEST-JVB" <unifil-secwest-jvb@un.org>

Cc: [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Giovanni Ercolani" <giovanni.ercolani@um.es>

Subject: Ricerca antropologica CIMIC - Dott. Giovanni ERCOLANI, fase di Deployment.

In esito a quanto espresso con la e-mail in calce ed in relazione alla disponibilità dei voli utili al raggiungimento del Teatro Operativo, si comunica, che il periodo individuato per lo svolgimento della fase di *deployment* in oggetto è il 13 – 22 agosto 2013 p.v.

Quanto sopra si inoltra, nelle more del rilascio della prevista autorizzazione di accesso in zona di operazioni UNIFIL da parte del DPKO – NY.

Distinti saluti.

e-mail autorizzata dal CAPO DIVISIONE J3 – Col. a. (ter.) s. SM. Giovanni Maria IANNUCCI. (int. 2 9255)



COMANDO OPERATIVO DI VERTICE INTERFORZE

REPARTO OPERAZIONI

Divisione J3

Sezione Operazioni Aeree

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Data: Mon, 5 Aug 2013 11:43:15 +0200 [11:43:15 CEST]

APPENDIX n. 18

Da:

A: 'Giovanni Ercolani' <giovanni.ercolani@um.es>

Oggetto: R: Ricerca antropologica CIMIC - richiesta contatto con Psicologo in teatro

Parte(i): 2 modello sgravio responsabilità per voli JMCC.doc 123 KB

1 sconosciuto 3,23 KB

UNIFIL
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Gent.le Dott. ERCOLANI,


in merito a quanto chiesto con la e-mail in calce, le comunico che può contattare il S.Ten. CATTANI al n. 3358150374 o via e-mail all'indirizzo donato.cattani@esercito.difesa.it.

Con l'occasione, le allego gli stampati relativi allo sgravio di responsabilità di cui le accennavo (da compilarsi uno per la tratta di andata ed uno per quella del ritorno), che dovrà cortesemente inoltrarmi quanto prima scannerizzati e firmati, contestualmente al passaporto.

Di seguito qualche dato relativo ai voli e PdC utili:

- il 13 agosto 2013 alle ore 20,00 L.T. partenza da Roma Fiumicino, volo MERIDIANA, presentarsi due ore prima presso il GATE T2;
- l'Ufficiale di collegamento per la "gestione transiti" da contattare in caso di necessità/comunicazioni ed info sui voli è al n. 3296604557;
- il Magg. SCIPIONI, attualmente in ferie, usufruirà del medesimo volo e può contattarlo per eventuali accordi al n. 3666488570 (ad oggi non so se si imbarcherà nel corso del volo in altro scalo diverso da Fiumicino);
- all'arrivo a Beirut sarà con il Magg. SCIPIONI quindi non ha bisogno di particolari indicazioni, verrà prelevato dal personale in Teatro Operativo e trasferito nella sede prevista;
- il 22 agosto 2013 arriverà a Roma Fiumicino alle ore 9.40 L.T. con volo MERIDIANA, la partenza da Beirut la saprà in loco, dipenderà da tratta ed eventuali scali, sarà comunque sempre a cura del personale in Teatro Operativo informarla ed accompagnarla fino al fine della attività.

Restando a disposizione per ogni ulteriore chiarimento in merito, la saluto cordialmente.



COMANDO OPERATIVO DI VERTICE INTERFORZE

REPARTO OPERAZIONI

Divisione J3

Sezione Operazioni Aeree

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DICHIARAZIONE DI SGRAVIO DI RESPONSABILITÀ

(Declaration)

LOCALITÀ E DATA Roma, 6 agosto 2013
(place and date)A (to): COI DIFESA - JMCC
CAPO EQUIPAGGIO VETT. AEREOIL/LA SOTTOSCRITTO/A GIOVANNI' ERCOLANI'
(last name, first name in capital letters)

Solleva l'Amministrazione della Difesa da ogni responsabilità per eventuali danni a sé stesso o aggravamenti della propria patologia medica derivanti dal seguente trasporto aereo, anche in caso di sua interruzione/deviazione su aeroporto alternato per cause di forza maggiore:

(Relieve the Defense Administration from the liability for any damage that might occur to him/herself or worseness of own health during the following flight, even in case of diversion/interruption on a different airport due to vis major).

TRASPORTO DA Roma A Beirut in data 13 ago. 2013
From to date

DOCUMENTO

AA 158 9990(ID card Nr.) Passaporto

FIRMA

Giovanni' Ercolani'
(signature)

1° TESTIMONE (nome cognome)

FIRMA

CARLA GARMEN PELLEGRINI
Carla Pellegrini

(1° witness) (last name first name in capital letters)

(signature)

Carla Pellegrini

2° TESTIMONE (nome cognome)

FIRMA

REMIGIO ERCOLANIRemigio Ercolani

(2° witness) (last name first name in capital letters)

DOCUMENTO

AS 5789705Comune di VITERBO

(ID card Nr.)

DOCUMENTO

AD 5458741COMUNE DI VITERBO

(ID card Nr.)

(signature)

UNITED NATION
INTERIM FORCE IN LEBANON



NATION UNIES
FORCE INTERIMAIRE AU LIBAN

Tel No: 4292
Dect: 7585
Sotrin:1840002

SECTOR WEST
Joint Visitors' Bureau
Shama

JVB 44/2013

8th August 2013

Subject: Mr. Giovanni ERCOLANI's anthropological studies on Multinational CIMIC Group (MNCG) Italian personnel employed in UNIFIL units. (amd1)

1. Mr. Giovanni ERCOLANI, an Italian anthropologist, started his anthropological studies on Multinational CIMIC Group (MNCG) Italian personnel in MNCG barracks.
2. From 14th to 22nd august 2013 Mr. Giovanni ERCOLANI will come to Lebanon to continue his anthropological studies on the abovementioned personnel now employed in UNIFIL CIMIC Unit, Sector West G9 and ITALBATT Tactical CIMIC Team (TCT) (list in Annex A).
3. All addresses, with responsibilities as mentioned, are kindly requested to take appropriate actions.
4. [REDACTED]
5. The visit program is given below:

SER NO.	DATE AND TIME	ACTIVITY	RESPONSIBILITY	REMARKS
14 august 2013				
1.	02.25	Arrival RHIA by plane	JMOU	
2.	TBD	Movement to SHAMA by car / Carolyne	CSS BN	
3.	TBD	Arrival in UNP 2-3	P.O. CSS BN	P.O. welcoming Mr. ERCOLANI
4.	TBD	Room check-in and rest period	SW Cdr's secretary	SW Cdr's secretary provide accommodation
5.	TBD	Security Briefing	SEC CELL	SEC CELL Office
6.	13.00	Lunch	G9	
7.	13.30	Administrative practices	P.O. G1	
8.	14.00	Meeting with G9	P.O. G9	
9.	16.00	Executive time		
10.	19.00	Meeting with SW Cdr	P.O. MA	

11.	19.30	Dinner	P.O.	
12.		Overnight in UNP 2-3		
15 august 2013				
13.	08.30	Activity with G9	P.O. G9	
14.	13.00	Lunch	P.O. G9	
15.	13.30	Activity with G9	P.O. G9	
16.	19.30	Dinner	P.O. G9	
17.		Overnight in UNP 2-3		
16 august 2013				
18.	08.15	Movement to UNIFIL HQ	P.O. G3	G3 task unit for transportation
19.	10.30	Office call with HoM & FC	UNIFIL Protocol	
20.	TBD	Movement to UNP 2-3	P.O. G3	G3 task unit for transportation
21.	13.00	Lunch	P.O. G9	13.00
22.	13.30	Activity with G9	P.O. G9	13.30
23.	19.30	Dinner	P.O. G9	19.30
24.		Overnight in UNP 2-3		
17 august 2013				
25.	09.15	Movement to UNP 1-26	G3	G3 task unit for transportation
26.	09.30	Activity with TCT	TCT	
27.	13.00	Lunch	TCT	
28.	13.30	Activity with TCT	TCT	
29.	19.30	Dinner	TCT	
30.		Overnight in UNP 1-26		
18 august 2013				
31.	09.30	Activity with TCT	TCT	
32.	13.00	Lunch	TCT	

33.	13.30	Activity with TCT	TCT	
34.	19.30	Dinner	TCT	
35.		Overnight in UNP 1-26		
19 august 2013				
36.	08.30	Movement to UNIFIL HQ by car	G3	G3 task unit for transportation
37.	09.00	Activity with CIMIC Unit (Italian Personnel)	CIMIC Unit (Italian Personnel)	
38.	13.00	Lunch	CIMIC Unit (Italian Personnel)	
39.	13.30	Activity with CIMIC Unit (Italian Personnel)	CIMIC Unit (Italian Personnel)	
40.	19.30	Dinner	CIMIC Unit (Italian Personnel)	
41.		Overnight in UNIFIL HQ		TBC
20 august 2013				
42.	08.30	Activity with CIMIC Unit (Italian Personnel)	CIMIC Unit (Italian Personnel)	
43.	13.00	Lunch	CIMIC Unit (Italian Personnel)	
44.	13.30	Activity with CIMIC Unit (Italian Personnel)	CIMIC Unit (Italian Personnel)	
45.	19.30	Dinner	CIMIC Unit (Italian Personnel)	
46.		Overnight in UNIFIL HQ		TBC
21 august 2013				
47.	08.00	Movement to UNP 2-3 by car	G3	G3 task unit for transportation
48.	09.00	Administrative practices Departure Briefings	P.O. G1 CAI	
49.	12.00	Lunch	P.O. G9	
50.	TBD	Movement to RHIA by car / Carolyne	CSS BN	
51.	TBD	Arrival at RHIA	CSS BN	

22 august 2013				
52.	0515	Departure for Italy <u>by plane</u>	JMOU	

Original Signed

Vasco ANGELOTTI

B.G. IT ARMY

Sector West Commander



Ricerca Antropologica presso il Multinational CIMIC Group

Ricercatore: Dr. Giovanni Ercolani, FRAI

Questionario per Intervista Non-Strutturata

Periodo: “deployment” in teatro operativo

UNIFIL Base, _____, Lebanon, ____ agosto 2013

Grado, Nome, Cognome:

Ai fini della ricerca antropologica le sarei grato se potesse rispondere sinceramente alle seguenti serie di domande (a, b, c, d, e) che non prevedono alcun materiale classificato:

a. Incarico Missione:

a.1. La data del suo deployment in Libano, la sede, e la durata;

a. 2. L’incarico da ricoprire, e/o la “job description”, e/o le funzioni CIMIC da espletare;

a.3. Ha frequentato, prima del deployment, un corso/seminario/aggiornamento sul teatro operativo in Libano e sul Libano (contesti culturali, storici, sociali, ecc.) offerto dall’Amministrazione?

a.4. Se “SI” mi puo’ dire la durata del corso, i temi/materie trattate, chi erano i docenti, e la sede presso la quale si e’ tenuto il corso?

a.5. Ha frequentato un corso fornito dall’Amministrazione di “Cultural Awareness” sulla specificita’ del contesto operativo nel quale doveva operare in Libano?

a.6. Se “SI” mi puo dire la durata del corso, i temi/materie trattate, chi erano i docenti, e la sede presso la quale si e’ tenuto il corso?

a.7. Lei personalmente si e' interessato agli aspetti storici-sociali-politico-culturali del Libano, alle risoluzioni ONU riguardanti la missione UNIFIL, profughi palestinesi, ecc, e come (libri, giornali, pagine web, blogs, etc.)? Perche'?

b. Lo "Spazio della Pace Virtuale"

Secondo una mia metodologia di lavoro ho definito lo spazio nel quale lei opera come uno "Spazio di Pace Virtuale", il quale ha le seguenti caratteristiche:

1. è un "luogo antropologico (...) uno spazio intensamente simbolizzato, abitato da individui che vi trovano dei punti di riferimento spaziali e temporali, individuali e collettivi", quindi denso di simbolismo, di elementi culturali, di significati, e di emozioni;
2. è geograficamente incluso nello spazio creato dal metalinguaggio di un processo di securitizzazione in cui "sicurezza" rappresenta il mito (Risoluzioni Consiglio di Sicurezza UN);
3. è stato teatro di tensione, "stress", instabilità, e/o conflitto armato;
4. dove quindi è stata proclamata una pace (assenza di guerra), che è una pace "negativa" e perciò si trova in una dimensione di "pace virtuale";
5. dove però c'è ancora una "guerra dopo la guerra";
6. la cui vera dimensione temporale è la "surmodernità" (accelerazione della storia, restringimento dello spazio, individualizzazione dei destini; globalizzazione e nuove tecnologie di comunicazione).

Secondo lei la definizione di cui sopra:

- e' valida/non valida, e' completa/manca qualche cosa, cosa aggiungerebbe/cosa toglierebbe?
 - puo' essere utilizzata per descrivere il teatro operativo nel quale lei opera? (SI/NO perche?)
-

c. Lo Spazio del Contesto Operativo

Secondo una mia riformulazione dello spazio/territorio nel quale lei opera ho deciso di dividere questo luogo in due spazi, chiamandoli:

- "Inside the Wire" ("dentro il reticolato", quindi la Base UNIFIL nel quale lei opera);
- "Outside the Wire" ("fuori dal reticolato", quindi il territorio/spazio fuori dalla Base UNIFIL nel quale lei interagisce con la popolazione locale).

c.1. Lei e' d'accordo con questa definizione?

c.2. E' valida/non valida, e' completa/manca qualche cosa, cosa aggiungerebbe/cosa toglierebbe?

c.3. Può essere utilizzata per descrivere gli spazi nei quali lei opera? SI/NO, perché?

d. “Inside the Wire” – Base UNIFIL

d.1. Nella sua base lei lavora con personale militare e/o civile di altre nazioni? SI/NO, quali?

d.2. Come sono i rapporti con i suoi colleghi internazionali?

d.3. La lingua di lavoro è l'inglese oppure lei usa anche altre lingue per comunicare all'interno della base? SI/NO, quali? Con chi?

d.4. Lei conosce la/e cultura/e del personale con il quale lavora quotidianamente? SI/NO, quali?

d.5. Se “d.4.” è “NO”, al fine di evitare equivoci di interpretazioni (linguistiche e non verbali, o comportamentali) pensa che sarebbe stato utile un breve corso/briefing riferito alle diverse culture del personale militare con cui lei opera quotidianamente?

d.6. Qual'è una sua giornata tipo? Orari di lavoro? Pasti (mensa IT)? Tempo libero?

d.7. Con quale livello di allerta (A, B, C, D) normalmente si lavora nella base? Si percepisce stress per la situazione operativa specifica?

d.8. Lei come si trova nella base?

d.9. Sente spesso al telefono/emails i suoi parenti/famiglia/fidanzato/a?

d.10. In questi mesi è mai stato in licenza per trovare la propria famiglia (oppure altri motivi personali)?

e. “Outside the Wire” – Contatto con la popolazione locale

- e.1. Il suo incarico prevede il contatto con la popolazione locale?
- e.2. Se “SI”, normalmente nelle sue operazioni CIMIC con che tipo di persone locali lei interagisce (sesso, posizione sociale, politica, religiosa, eta')?
- e.3. Nel comunicare con la popolazione locale lei fa uso di un interprete locale e/o a volte cerca di comunicare nella lingua locale (perche'?) o in un'altra lingua?
- e.4. Come sono i rapporti con la popolazione locale?
- e.5. Come pensa che la popolazione locale la percepisca? Pensa di essere ben accetto? Ha vissuto situazioni in cui la popolazione locale le ha dimostrato simpatia/riconoscenza/paura/ostilita', ecc.?
- e.6. Ha vissuto qualche episodio particolare (positivo/negativo) che vorrebbe raccontarmi?
- e.7. Pensa che per il fatto che lei sia ITALIANO questo sia un vantaggio nel relazionarsi con la popolazione locale? SI/NO, perche'?
- e.8. A contatto con la popolazione locale lei veste sempre la divisa, porta armi con se? Di che tipo? Sono visibili?
- e.9. Pensa che se forse lei fosse appartenuto all'altro sesso (se uomo...donna/se donna...uomo) in qualche situazione che lei ha vissuto, forse sarebbe stato meglio? SI/NO, perche'?
- e.10. Lei come trova la popolazione locale? La trova stressata, impaurita, depressa, ostile, accogliente?
- e.11. Ha avuto opportunita' di avere contatti con la popolazione locale fuori dal suo 'orario di servizio', fuori della sua attivita' CIMIC?
- e.12. Cosa pensa della popolazione locale che fino ad oggi lei ha incontrato? Come la classificherebbe?

e.13. Il MNCG ha sviluppato uno specifico paradigma per le operazioni CIMIC a livello operativo-tattico che si sintetizza nella formula “LISTEN-INFLUENCE-INTERACT” (ascoltare-influenzare/incidere-interagire). Come lei mette in pratica questo paradigma?

e.14. Quando lei esce dalla base ha paura/stress/ansia? SI/NO, perche’?

e.15. Pensa che questa missione sia utile? SI/NO, perche’?

e.16. Pensa che la sua presenza in questa missione sia utile? Perche’?

e.17. Si parla di una “via italiana” alle missioni militari internazionali, per lei questa “via italiana” cosa vuol dire? Pensa che sia vero? Perche’? Puo’ fare un confronto con le altre forze militari provenienti da altri paesi?

e.18. Quali aspettative aveva prima di venire qui? Ed ora? Si sente soddisfatto? SI/NO, perche’?

Si rende noto che:

- La presente ricerca e’ stata approvata dal Dipartimento di Antropologia Sociale dell’Universita’ di Murcia (Spagna), autorizzata da Difesa Gabinetto, dallo Stato Maggiore della Difesa italiano, e dal Centro Operativo Interforze, ed e’ sviluppata in tre fasi: pre-deployment, deployment in teatro operativo, re-deployment.
- Si fa presente che scopo di questo questionario come quello dell’intervista e’ solamente scientifico, percio’ si richiede la massima collaborazione e sincerita’.
- Per etica professionale tutti i dati del presente questionario non verranno divulgati.
- Una volta che l’intervistato avra’ terminato di compilare il presente modulo, riceverà un nome in codice del tipo “Informatore A...B...C”, ed in questo modo verra’ identificato all’interno della ricerca antropologica.
- Nel caso l’informatore volesse apparire nella ricerca con il suo grado, nome e cognome, dovra’ richiederlo specificatamente allo scrivente con lettera/email.
- Una volta terminata la ricerca antropologica questo modulo, insieme a tutto il materiale relativo alle interviste, verra’ distrutto e di esso non rimarra’ alcuna traccia ne’ cartacea ne’ informatica, od altro, ed io personalmente me ne assumo la piena responsabilita’.

In fede

Giovanni Ercolani

Dr. Giovanni Ercolani, Fellow Royal Anthropological Institute, Antropólogo Social, Email: giovanni.ercolani@um.es, Tel: (+39) 339 120 34 99, Skype: drercolani

Universidad de Murcia, Facultad de Filosofía, Área de Antropología Social, Edificio Luis Vives, Campus de Espinardo, 30100 Murcia, Spain

Interview to the Military Chaplain Lieutenant Giorgio Porta.

Location of the interview: UNIFIL-Sector West, Shama, Lebanon.

Date: Ago 15th, 2013.

Duration of the interview: 00:57:66.

Purpose of the interview was to know a little more about the living condition of the Italian Military personnel involved in this TO.

The chaplain has 13 years of service as parish priest, and in 2012 he became military chaplain with the rank of Lieutenant.

What emerged from the interview is the following:

The militaries in general represent in small scale the whole of the society. The Italian military personnel that come here, carry with him/her their problem left at home, relation husband-wife, the wife is waiting a baby, kids, economic problem, leave permissions, etc. However, once here, they ruminate these problems, and there is a human difficulty to unplug oneself from the family problem.

I can say that the first day of the assignment are characterized by an anxiety to be connected, where the new personnel is really eager to get an internet connection. They want to be in contact with their 'past' live, their family, and their problems.

Then, there are other problems that emerge here, as can be the case of divorce.

I try to be with there, and to help them to accept the painful situation and to move on, to start again, and to rebuild their lives.

Talking about the relation between the military personnel in mission and their relations back in Italy, I can say that they resemble the liquid relations studied by Bauman (2013).

There are two kinds of relations that are experienced between the military personnel and myself: the first one is the official one, people come to me because they want to talk about their problem, and for confession; the other relation is external, meaning out the building of the church, and in the casual meeting with the personnel I can see the real problem of people, because they talk to me in very informal way. Most of the case they talk about their divorce, etc.

Talking about the personnel that attend the religious services, I can say that is about the 10% of the Italian military personnel present in the base. About the rest, the 90%, they know that I am here, in a TO like them, therefore, I am accepted, and casual conversation are very easy. They know that here there is someone that can listen to you.

In Iraq and Afghanistan the situation is different, they are very dangerous TO. Someone told me that in Iraq you smell death. And in these TO there is more participation to religious services.

Talking about the stress they live I can say that the origin is (1) to be far away from the family; (2) stress in the daily job routine; and (3) misunderstanding-incomprehension between NCO, WO, and Officer.

Appendix 23

Interview to the Lieutenant (psychologist) Donato Cattani.

Location of the interview: UNIFIL-Sector West, Shama, Lebanon.

Date: Ago 15th, 2013.

Duration of the interview: 00:52:28; 00:27:31.

Purpose of the interview was (1) to know a little more about stress level of the Italian military personnel in this TO; and (2) to check the validity of my interpretative grid of the 'Space of Virtual Peace'.

The officer is in charge of the psychological service at the base of Shama; the duration of his mission is of three and half months.

According to him, and the past work made by other military psychologist who were employed in TO, the stressors for the Italian contingent are represented by:

1. Difficulty in communication; this is a difficulty which is experienced inside the military structure;
2. Problem of social interaction;
3. The gap of the expectation;
4. Perception of risk;
5. Relation with the family which is in Italy.

However, the most important stressors which are always present during the meeting-conversation between the psychologist and the military are:

1. The perception of the risk; the risk of an armed attack;
2. The management of the relation between the military and his/her family back in Italy; and the fact that the military is conscious that back in Italy his/her family are suffering.

Then, using the stressor of 'the perception of the risk' I submitted to the officer my interpretative grid of the 'Space of Virtual Peace' and he agreed with it. According to him the fact that there is real risk (real data), and the perception of the risk (phenomena data) both they confirm the validity of the Space of Virtual Peace in which the Italian soldier operate.

For him, the Italian soldier is trained to deal with the stress 'inside the wire' (inside the military base), and 'outside the wire' (with the local population), but the problem is represented by the 'intra the wire' meaning between the military base and Italy (the relation between the military and his/her family, etc.), and for this 'stress' there is not an adequate training.

Regarding the relation and the perception of the local population toward the Italian soldiers this is based on respect, collaboration, and trust. This is trust and respect is mutual. And this is a positive result because the Italian soldiers have not problem to interact with the local population, they are more convivial than the soldiers belonging to other contingents serving the UNIFIL mission. The Italians, for their national history, have a multiculturalism which is part of their nature.

Appendix 24

Conversation with Maj. Gen. Paolo Serra, Head of UNIFIL Mission, Force Commander.

Location of the conversation: UNIFIL HQ, Naqoura- Lebanon.

Date: Ago 16, 2013.

The conversation had a duration of approximately one hour.

As part of the deployment program I met Maj. General Serra at the UNIFIL HQ, in Naqoura (Lebanon). The meeting was scheduled by 10.30, and our conversation lasted approximately one hour.

Gen. Serra asked me about my research, and its purpose and he said that this kind of research are very useful and important.

The conversation covered the topics (1) of the 'Italian way' of the military missions; (2) the concept of the 'gift' applied to CIMIC operations; and (3) the validity of the interpretative grid of the 'Space of Virtual Peace'.

Gen. Serra argued that this peculiarity and the difference between us (Italians) and the US and north European soldiers reside (1) in the fact that in our cultural-social Italian context is present a kind of 'intuition' which helps the Italian to spot and see some situations which develop in social-cultural contexts that are not so different from ours (the Mediterranean area); and (2) in the fact that because we have grow up and matured in a Catholic context we have a predisposition to think before acting.

I asked to the Italian General if, according to his point of view based on his experiences, the CIMIC activity could be seen as a 'gift'. The General said that 'yes', and that is thank to this 'gift' that we are able to build trust with the local population.

Talking about the experience in the Afghanistan TO he compared a little hospital constructed by the Italian contingent to a 'gift'. 'When we arrived to Afghanistan we have opened a small hospital on a hill, and after few days the elders of the village, with their young nephews came for health treatments. Some days later there was a queue in front of the hospital. To this hospital-gift episode I remember that one day an old man said to us "tomorrow I do not go to that village (name of the village omitted)" and the following that a bomb exploded in that very village. Therefore we need to listen, and interact with the local population because, most of the time, they make you understand where is the danger for you.'

Gen. Serra read the questionnaire that I presented to my Informant and he agreed with the validity of the concept of the 'Space of Virtual Peace' for the TO of Lebanon (UNIFIL Mission).

At the end of the conversation I had a photo with Maj. Gen. Serra who presented to me, as a gift, a UNIFIL mission mug.

Appendix 25

Conversation with B. Gen. Vasco Angelotti, Sector West Commander

Location of the conversation: UNIFIL-Sector West, Shama, Lebanon.

Date: Ago 16th, 2013.

Duration of the conversation: around 50 minutes.

The conversation with B. Gen. Angelotti focused on the following topics:

1. The validity of the grid of interpretation of the 'Space of Virtual Peace';
2. The need to know the culture of the other: 'inside the wire', 'outside the wire'.

For B. Gen. Angelotti to consider the TO represented by the UNIFIL mission as a 'Space of Virtual Peace' is right. According to him, in this TO everything can happen, and the situation during my deployment phase was a critical moment (two terrorist attacks happened in Lebanon during my stay). Here it is possible to feel that there is tension, and the Lebanese territory can be framed inside the 'Space of Virtual Peace'. This area can be considered as a bubble of security, however, there is an important point which is represented by the strong desire, of the local population, to have peace. The fact that the local population has accepted the presence of a UN mission means a positive attitude toward the search for peace. For the local population UNIFIL represents security, and provide security. The Gen. Angelotti, in his relations with local mayors of villages in 'critical' areas, reminds how the very mayors told him that UNIFIL represents security. Here, to talk about a war after the war is misleading and for Gen. Angelotti should be more appropriate to use a metaphor: there is still burning charcoal beneath the ashes. Whilst there is a strong desire of peace the conflict can spark in any moment. In short the concept of the 'Space of Virtual Peace, can be applied to the TO of Lebanon. Regarding the need to know the culture of the 'others', the Italian soldier in this mission has relations with two kinds of 'others': 'inside the wire' meaning inside the UN bases, because UNIFIL is a multinational mission and the Italian soldier has daily contact with foreign contingents. Therefore, to know the culture of his/her allies-colleagues is important for establishing communication and cooperation. The same is valid for the 'outside the wire', meaning outside the UNIFIL mission where the 'other' is represented by the local population. In this context to know the local language is not enough, but it is important to know the local culture and what is the real meaning carried into the 'message'.

Appendix 26

Interview to Informant A

Location of the conversation: UNIFIL Mission - Lebanon.

Date: Ago 15-21, 2013.

Duration of the interviews: 01:59:39; 00:09:03; 00:24:51.

The interview with the Informant followed the deployment questionnaire (Appendix 21) and focused on five main points:

- (1) Cultural awareness training for the UNIFIL mission;
- (2) The validity, or not, of the interpretative grid of the 'Space of Virtual Peace' applied to the TO of the UNIFIL mission;
- (3) The relation of the informant with his/her operative context which is formed by two spaces (i) 'inside the wire', the relation between the informant and his/her colleagues (multinational contingent) inside the UNIFIL mission, (ii) 'outside the wire', the relation between the informant and the local population;
- (4) The put in practice of the paradigm 'listen-influence-interact';
- (5) The definition/idea of the 'Italian way' to approach international military missions.

(1) Cultural awareness training for the UNIFIL mission.

'Before the deployment, in Italy, I received training for this mission. The training lasted six months, it is basically military training, and during this time I received a course (two days) on the situation in Lebanon. This course was presented by MNCG CIMIC personnel who had come back from the same TO, and basically they talked about their own experiences. Inside the same course there were some lessons on cultural awareness and they were offered by some civilian personnel. I remember that in Motta di Livenza we received a briefing on the religious reality, and political situation on Lebanon (these briefings were offered by our colleagues). Once in UNIFIL mission, I received a course on cultural awareness organized by UNIFIL. This course saw the presence of civilian instructors and we received some lessons on gender awareness too. I consider these courses essential, and a good start for understanding the local cultural and social environment. My own attitude was to understand more, and for this reason I started to read and collect material on the reality of Lebanon and on the UNIFIL mission. It is essential to understand what is going on, and it is essential to know in order to do a good job. For example, I was invited several times by the local population and, despite the fact that we were using interpreters, we had to know the local customs, and tradition. To receive a good cultural awareness course will help the soldier with the booth on the floor to understand the non-verbal communication, the meaning of metaphors inside the local language, the real meaning of the messages-communications, and the local symbols.'

(2) The validity, or not, of the interpretative grid of the 'Space of Virtual Peace' applied to the TO of the UNIFIL mission.

'The situation here is like walking on a frozen lake, you have to be careful where you put your feet. You have to know how to move around, and be prudent. The local

environment here is full of symbolism, not only religious. It is an environment that speaks. There are different religions/confessions (Sunni, Shiah, Christians) and therefore, different ways of life. I consider suitable, from a sociological point of view, the definition of “Space of Virtual Peace” for the situation in Lebanon.’

(3) The relation of the informant with his/her operative context which is formed by two spaces (i) ‘inside the wire’, the relation between the informant and his/her colleagues (multinational contingent) inside the UNIFIL mission, (ii) ‘outside the wire’, the relation between the informant and the local population.

‘I agree with this division of the space in which we, in general, and the CIMIC operator more in particular, operate. Both spaces are full of symbols. It is a natural process that we as human being symbolize the environment in which we live. Both spaces (inside the wire, and outside the wire) are spaces (anthropological spaces-places) and not “non-spaces” (Auge’). For example this base in which I am assigned has its own identity, and symbols. However, when I move “outside the wire” I ask myself about the meaning of the local symbols. I can say that the multiculturalism is present in both contexts. Unfortunately when we talk about this TO we focus only on the religious facets but is not always like that. Regarding the “inside the wire” context is not homogeneous. I interact on daily basis with military personnel from Ireland, Ghana, then from Malaysia, France, Slovenia, Korea, and Finland. Not to mention the relations with the local Lebanese people who are present inside the base. I do not have big problem in communicating with all of them because my English is good, and I know, and I became interested in the culture of my colleagues. I think that curiosity, and the interests toward the “other” are the most important qualities for a CIMIC operator. The lack of these qualities can have two repercussions: or the CIMIC operator is tied to a bureaucratic rigidity (he/she translates-interprets everything according rigid schemes) or he believes everything. What we need is to have at our disposal an expert on various cultures. In the “outside the wire” context I have contact with the local population and we use local interpreters. With the local we have a lot of activities like UN project, help programs, but at the same time the people here invite us to local celebrations and we are aware of the local traditions and we respect them. I can say that I meet all kind of people (social scale). Local people, most of the time, doesn’t know English, some of them know French, all know Arabic. I consider the local population welcoming, generous, and they have a lot of patience. In my experience I enjoyed meeting local people and I was invited in villages and in family that belong to the different religion and confession that are present here in Lebanon (Sunni and Shiah, and Christian). When I move I do not always carry with me my hand gun, and I do not wear the bullet-proof vest (I carry it but I do not wear it). At the same time I do not gender discrimination toward CIMIC operators. If I had to define the local population I would like to say that they are Mediterranean people, they know how to make the best of a difficult situation, they are practical, they are optimists, and they are like us (Italians).’

(4) The put in practice of the paradigm ‘listen-influence-interact’.

‘This system-method can works on both contexts (inside the wire, outside the wire), but it can works properly if all the three elements (listen, influence, interact) combine together. Of course it depends on the task of the CIMIC operator, but “listen” is very important order to collect data on the local situation.’

(5) The definition/idea of the ‘Italian way’ to approach international military missions.

‘I think that the concept of the “Italian way” to approach military missions can be summarized on some qualities. To be emphatic, not to think that we are superior to anybody, to not exaggerate with anything, to have lot of common sense, to maintain a balance, an equilibrium. However, these qualities are not only Italia.’

Appendix 27

Interview to Informant B

Location of the conversation: in one of the UNIFIL Mission Bases - Lebanon.

Date: between Ago 15-21, 2013.

Duration of the interview: 00:58:33; 01:24:51.

The interview with the Informant followed the deployment questionnaire (Appendix 21) and focused on five main points:

- (1) Cultural awareness training for the UNIFIL mission;
- (2) The validity, or not, of the interpretative grid of the 'Space of Virtual Peace' applied to the TO of the UNIFIL mission;
- (3) The relation of the informant with his/her operative context which is formed by two spaces (i) 'inside the wire', the relation between the informant and his/her colleagues (multinational contingent) inside the UNIFIL mission, (ii) 'outside the wire', the relation between the informant and the local population;
- (4) The put in practice of the paradigm 'listen-influence-interact';
- (5) The definition/idea of the 'Italian way' to approach international military missions. In order to unfold the above four topics I here I report parts of the informants' interviews.

- (1) Cultural awareness training for the UNIFIL mission.

'Before my assignment to UNIFIL mission, I attended a period of indoctrination on cultural awareness for this TO. The course was offered by MNCG colleagues that had the lived the same experience, and they talked about their participation in the mission, on their field experiences, and about the modality and procedures to adopt for interact with the local population. The course was interesting and useful, but I think that if we had the possibility to have an external lecturer (coming from the academic world) I think we could have had a more wide vision and analysis of the TO. At the same time and by myself I have collected material from the official UNIFIL, UN, UNDPKO web pages, from journals (Limes), and news channel (BBC, CNN, Al Jazeera) on the situation in Lebanon.'

- (2) The validity, or not, of the interpretative grid of the 'Space of Virtual Peace' applied to the TO of the UNIFIL mission.

'I do agree with this concept, I think it describes the TO in which we operate. I can say that the idea of "security" is a process, a becoming; however, "security" is the emblem of the myth. About the idea of "virtual", here everything looks normal, but there is tension. Here there is not peace, there is an armistice, and at the same time skepticism, and reluctance from the local population.'

- (3) The relation of the informant with his/her operative context which is formed by two spaces (i) 'inside the wire', the relation between the informant and his/her colleagues

(multinational contingent) inside the UNIFIL mission, (ii) 'outside the wire', the relation between the informant and the local population.

'I consider this spatial division appropriate for our operative context. However, in the inside the wire space I move in two contexts too. In one, which is the Italian, I find again my language, and my symbolic and cultural world; the other is represented by the space and the daily activities I have with the other nation's armed forces. In this context I have to adapt myself to their cultural and symbolic world. I have daily contact with Indonesian soldiers, and I learned some Indonesian few words and about their culture. I have good relation with them, and with the language assistants (Lebanese women), and normally I communicate in English. I do consider interesting and useful to have a cultural awareness course about the culture of your colleagues, this can really help the working relationship. Regarding the outside the wire experience, I learned some Arabic (and I carried with me the grammar book) and this help to break the ice with the local population, and they are happy when I greet them in their language. For my duty I have a lot of contact with local people of different age, gender, social and economic position. In my contact with them I use the local interpreters. In my contacts with the local people I try to be 'Arab' like them. And I had a lot of good experience with them. I found them very welcoming and warm; I can say that they are like the people of South Italy. They have a pragmatic and no-systematic approach to life; this can be summarized in their expression "insallah".'

(4) The put in practice of the paradigm 'listen-influence-interact'.

'You have to listen because "influence" is an activity which searches the consensus through a negotiation process. I think that to have women in this CIMIC activity is necessary because women, the female gaze, can provide a different vision on the local situation, and then to enrich the knowledge we have on this TO. A lot of time local people prefer to interact with the women translators then the male translators.'

(5) The definition/idea of the 'Italian way' to approach international military missions. In order to unfold the above four topics I here I report parts of the informants' interviews.

'I do not think that to be Italian is of any help here, and I do not think that "Italians do it better". I think that the Italians have an aptitude because our country is in the middle of the Mediterranean Sea where different cultures came together. I think that the predisposition of an individual to do is tide to his thirst for knowing-learning and a strong self discipline.'

Appendix 28

Informant C

Informant C, was not present during my deployment phase, and he/she answered to my deployment questionnaire through an email.

Date: between Ago 15-21, 2013.

The interview with the Informant followed the deployment questionnaire (Appendix 21) and focused on five main points:

- (1) Cultural awareness training for the UNIFIL mission;
- (2) The validity, or not, of the interpretative grid of the 'Space of Virtual Peace' applied to the TO of the UNIFIL mission;
- (3) The relation of the informant with his/her operative context which is formed by two spaces (i) 'inside the wire', the relation between the informant and his/her colleagues (multinational contingent) inside the UNIFIL mission, (ii) 'outside the wire', the relation between the informant and the local population;
- (4) The put in practice of the paradigm 'listen-influence-interact';
- (5) The definition/idea of the 'Italian way' to approach international military missions. In order to unfold the above four topics I here I report parts of the informants' interviews.

- (1) Cultural awareness training for the UNIFIL mission.

'Before my assignment I received a course, duration two weeks, in which my colleagues talked about their experience in Lebanon (cultural and social context)'

- (2) The validity, or not, of the interpretative grid of the 'Space of Virtual Peace' applied to the TO of the UNIFIL mission.

'I do consider valid the Space of Virtual Peace interpretative grid. In this TO there still open wounds. Ant he UNIFIL mission is a way to provide economic stability to this country. I do agree that here there is a virtual peace.'

- (3) The relation of the informant with his/her operative context which is formed by two spaces (i) 'inside the wire', the relation between the informant and his/her colleagues (multinational contingent) inside the UNIFIL mission, (ii) 'outside the wire', the relation between the informant and the local population.

'I do agree with this definition of the operative context. Inside the wire: I do have excellent relations with my other international colleagues, I use Italian and English. I think that it could have been useful to have some cultural awareness lecturer on the culture of our other international colleagues. Here inside the base I do not feel stress. Outside the wire: for my job description I do have contact with local population. The majority of them are men, they have a medium-high social position, their age is between 40 and 50 years of age, and they come from various religious and political groups. I can say that the relation with the local people is good, and the fact that we are Italian we are well accepted here. At the same time I see the local population a little stressed and are anti-Israel.'

(4) The put in practice of the paradigm 'listen-influence-interact'.

'Unfortunately I never used this "listen-influence-interact" paradigm.'

(5) The definition/idea of the 'Italian way' to approach international military missions. In order to unfold the above four topics I here I report parts of the informants' interviews.

'I do not understand the question.'

Appendix 29

Interview to Informant D

Location of the conversation: in one of the UNIFIL Mission Bases - Lebanon.

Date: between Ago 15-21, 2013.

Duration of the interviews: 03:19:12; 01:34:08.

The interview with the Informant followed the deployment questionnaire (Appendix 21) and focused on five main points:

- (1) Cultural awareness training for the UNIFIL mission;
- (2) The validity, or not, of the interpretative grid of the 'Space of Virtual Peace' applied to the TO of the UNIFIL mission;
- (3) The relation of the informant with his/her operative context which is formed by two spaces (i) 'inside the wire', the relation between the informant and his/her colleagues (multinational contingent) inside the UNIFIL mission, (ii) 'outside the wire', the relation between the informant and the local population;
- (4) The put in practice of the paradigm 'listen-influence-interact';
- (5) The definition/idea of the 'Italian way' to approach international military missions. In order to unfold the above four topics I here I report parts of the informants' interviews.

(1) Cultural awareness training for the UNIFIL mission.

'I cannot say that I received an appropriate cultural awareness course before my assignment in Lebanon. What I received was a two hours organized meeting with a MNCG colleague who talked about his/her previous experience in the TO of Lebanon (UNIFIL mission). Has been by myself that I gather material (a lot of open sources material) that I read to better understand the cultural-religious-social reality of Lebanon. The knowledge I constructed and assembled for myself has been useful during my mission, unfortunately the cultural awareness lessons I received in Italy did not provide enough information for me.'

(2) The validity, or not, of the interpretative grid of the 'Space of Virtual Peace' applied to the TO of the UNIFIL mission.

'I do consider valid the Space of Virtual Peace interpretative grid. However, I would like to say that, in our position, we receive (from our structure) our reference points, our bench marks. The symbolism which is present in this space allows me to enter in contact with another cultural dimension. About the presence of stress, I can say that there is stress here, there is not peace here. There is a negative peace and still there is strong tension after the war.'

(3) The relation of the informant with his/her operative context which is formed by two spaces (i) 'inside the wire', the relation between the informant and his/her colleagues (multinational contingent) inside the UNIFIL mission, (ii) 'outside the wire', the relation between the informant and the local population.

‘In the space defined as “Inside the Wire” we have reconstructed our Italian symbolism, our symbolic world (the Italian pizzeria, the distance from the different Italian cities as road panel, the emblems of our regiments, ect.). In this space I work with Italian and with locals (three language assistants, and one engineer). We have a good professional friendship. In my work I make use of Italian, English, French, and Arabic (with the help of the interpreter). I know partially the culture of my local colleagues. At this regard I would like to say that a course on the culture of our local colleagues could have been very interesting and useful. I have studied Muslim culture and this has helped me in establishing good relations with the local people I work with. For example is important to remember the various religious festivities-celebrations here. I am on duty 24h a day, but I do not perceive any stress. In the space of “Outside the Wire” I deal with different kind of local people and I have to use the interpreter for my communication-conversation, I do not speak Arabic. I can consider the relation with the local people neutral, positive, I feel accepted and I never had negative experiences.’

(4) The put in practice of the paradigm ‘listen-influence-interact’.

‘Unfortunately this paradigm “listen-influence-interact” is only used partially. I can listen and understand but: for influence we do not have any policy-direction; and for interact, this is only unidirectional from me/us toward the local population, I do not have feed back, what is lack is an evaluation on our activities.’

(5) The definition/idea of the ‘Italian way’ to approach international military missions. In order to unfold the above four topics I here I report parts of the informants’ interviews.

‘We are Mediterranean people and we Italians and the local Lebanese population feel it. We have a kind of common origin. I think that to be Italian in this TO represent a capital, an added value. We are better accepted than other foreign contingents by the local population.’

Appendix 30

Interview to Informant E

Location of the conversation: in one of the UNIFIL Mission Bases - Lebanon.

Date: between Ago 15-21, 2013.

Duration of the interview: 01:37:08.

The interview with the Informant followed the deployment questionnaire (Appendix 21) and focused on five main points:

- (1) Cultural awareness training for the UNIFIL mission;
- (2) The validity, or not, of the interpretative grid of the 'Space of Virtual Peace' applied to the TO of the UNIFIL mission;
- (3) The relation of the informant with his/her operative context which is formed by two spaces (i) 'inside the wire', the relation between the informant and his/her colleagues (multinational contingent) inside the UNIFIL mission, (ii) 'outside the wire', the relation between the informant and the local population;
- (4) The put in practice of the paradigm 'listen-influence-interact';
- (5) The definition/idea of the 'Italian way' to approach international military missions.

- (1) Cultural awareness training for the UNIFIL mission.

'I attended, before the deployment, at the MNCG, a two days course on the situation in Lebanon. The course was presented by some colleagues who had matured some previous experience-mission in this TO. Basically the course was about the lesson learned. I found the course interesting and useful for my mission. To know more about the situation here I studied by myself. However, now I can say that I wish I had more knowledge on Arabic language and Muslim culture. I am sure this could have helped me to have a better preparation for my mission. One point that I found here, is the difference of mentality. We come here with a NATO mentality, when what is needed is a UN mentality. Because I want to know and learn more I have frequent contacts with the local interpreters (called language assistants) because they act as cultural advisers too.'

- (2) The validity, or not, of the interpretative grid of the 'Space of Virtual Peace' applied to the TO of the UNIFIL mission.

'I see that the Space of Virtual Peace can be applied to this TO. The local population (like us) is afraid of a possible conflict. Only two days ago there was a terrorist attack in Lebanon with a car bomb. Using a metaphor, here is like to live by a volcano...you never know. Our presence here is considered by the local population as useful. I can say that here there is fear. There is a say here that says that a Lebanese, in his life, reconstruct his house six times.'

- (3) The relation of the informant with his/her operative context which is formed by two spaces (i) 'inside the wire', the relation between the informant and his/her colleagues

(multinational contingent) inside the UNIFIL mission, (ii) 'outside the wire', the relation between the informant and the local population.

'I have contact with people of different cultures every day in IW and OW. In IW I work with Italian, Iris, and Lebanese and we communicate in Italian and English. I think that to know more about the culture of your international colleagues can help in building relationships and dialogue. What I notice in the inside the wire space is the need to adopt a UN mentality. You feel that you are part of a multinational force and you must have a UN oriented mentality. Unfortunately we come here with a NATO mentality, where CIMIC is Civil-Military Cooperation, while the UN mentality, the CIMIC is Civil-Military Coordination. Even if the difference is superficial at the end there is a big difference, and I think that this is a problem. For this reason I studied (my own initiative) a UN course on CIMIC operations. It is interesting to notice that IW the Italian soldiers carry their own Italian military symbols, rituals, etc. Regarding my position in the outside the wire space, I have frequent relations with local population, not only for duty-business reason but some time they invite us to meeting, celebrations, etc. Normally I interact with "men", here the majority of local leaders are men. I remember that in my job I meet local mayors, people working for local firms-companies, but even with school kids, etc. In this encounters I use the language advisers, but to break the ice I use some words in Arabic that I know and that I learned. Always I carry with me a list of Arabic colloquial expression that sometime I employ. Relations with the local people are good. I think that if I had knew Arabic before my assignment my relation with the locals could have been even better. I carry a hand gun but I do not show it. I do not want to have an aggressive image. What is interesting is that the local approach us using Italian stereotypes. I found the Lebanese very similar to the Italians, both of us are Mediterranean people, and I met a lot of locals (or members of their families) that studied in Italy.'

(4) The put in practice of the paradigm 'listen-influence-interact'.

'I listen and I interact, and I think the meaning of influence is a positive influence, therefore, I try to send the message that I am here to help. I have to adapt myself to the local population and I want that they understand that my mission is to help. With my coherent behavior I was able to conquest the trust of the local population.'

(5) The definition/idea of the 'Italian way' to approach international military missions. In order to unfold the above four topics I here I report parts of the informants' interviews.

'When we arrive here, our stereotypes are already present. Is the typical image of "Italian nice people". Comparing with the other international contingent I can say that for our Italian culture we are more open, less aggressive, with more patience, and friendlier.'

Appendix 31

Interview to Informant F

Location of the conversation: in one of the UNIFIL Mission Bases - Lebanon.

Date: between Ago 15-21, 2013.

Duration of the interview: 01:35:07.

The interview with the Informant followed the deployment questionnaire (Appendix 21) and focused on five main points:

- (1) Cultural awareness training for the UNIFIL mission;
- (2) The validity, or not, of the interpretative grid of the 'Space of Virtual Peace' applied to the TO of the UNIFIL mission;
- (3) The relation of the informant with his/her operative context which is formed by two spaces (i) 'inside the wire', the relation between the informant and his/her colleagues (multinational contingent) inside the UNIFIL mission, (ii) 'outside the wire', the relation between the informant and the local population;
- (4) The put in practice of the paradigm 'listen-influence-interact';
- (5) The definition/idea of the 'Italian way' to approach international military missions.

- (1) Cultural awareness training for the UNIFIL mission.

'During my six months of military training (at the MNCG) prior my assignment to the UNIFIL mission we had something like ten hours of course, offered by colleagues with previous experience in this TO, about the culture, religion, social organizations, and geography of Lebanon. After, I started following the news (on internet, and on TV) on Lebanon. I can say that the cultural awareness course (ten hours) I had in Italy provided to me a basic knowledge on my next TO.'

- (2) The validity, or not, of the interpretative grid of the 'Space of Virtual Peace' applied to the TO of the UNIFIL mission.

'I agree with this definition of the Lebanese TO. Here there is a kind of forced peace, there is tension, and the threat of terrorist attack is a reality. A couple of days ago there was a terrorist attack in Beirut. I can talk about my experience with my two local interpreters: they have their luggage always ready just in case of a war. Here there is a fake, false calmness.'

- (3) The relation of the informant with his/her operative context which is formed by two spaces (i) 'inside the wire', the relation between the informant and his/her colleagues (multinational contingent) inside the UNIFIL mission, (ii) 'outside the wire', the relation between the informant and the local population.

'This division of the operative context between inside the wire and outside the wire, can be summarized in: inside the base, and outside the base. This is how I see it. Inside the base-inside the wire I work with Indonesian military personnel and two interpreters (Lebanese women). The Indonesia are Muslim, they have a different concept of work (some time you have to push them; they lack initiative). We communicate in

English and there is a lot of cooperation with the Indonesian and the two interpreters. I tried to know more on the Indonesian culture and Indonesian language...I learned some colloquial expression that I use with them and this make them happy. At the same time I interact with French soldiers, and now I want to learn French. Regarding the activity outside the base-outside the wire, for my job description I leave the base very rarely. What I observed is that with local population rank and age is more important then gender. I consider the Lebanese very friendly, they love their family, it looks to be in Italy.'

(4) The put in practice of the paradigm 'listen-influence-interact'.

'Personally I put in practice this paradigm inside the base with the people of the other contingents. Some one said that I am a very good PR (public relation).'

(5) The definition/idea of the 'Italian way' to approach international military missions. In order to unfold the above four topics I here I report parts of the informants' interviews.

'We Italians, when compared with the soldiers of other nation present in this base, we are more open, we like to interact and meet people, we like social activities, it is in our nature. But I can see the same with the Spanish.'



Ricerca Antropologica presso il Multinational CIMIC Group

Ricercatore: Dr. Giovanni Ercolani, FRAI

Questionario per Intervista Non-Strutturata

Periodo: "Post-deployment"

MNCG, Motta di Livenza, __/____/2014

Grado, Nome, Cognome, eta':

Ai fini della ricerca antropologica le sarei grato se potesse rispondere sinceramente alle seguenti serie di domande (A, B, C, e D) che non prevedono alcun materiale classificato:

‘A’

Durata del ‘deployment’ in zona operativa:

Ha avuto contatti con la popolazione locale? (si/no/raramente/spesso)

Frequenza dei suoi contatti con la popolazione locale:

Lei ha qualche episodio/esperienza particolare che vuole ricordare/raccontare e che lei ha vissuto personalmente con la popolazione locale:

Riguardo al contatto con la popolazione locale ed alla loro cultura, lei ha notato la presenza, nei comportamenti/atteggiamenti/discorsi da parte dei ‘locali’ dei seguenti sei elementi qui sotto elencati? (si/no/raramente/spesso) Puo’ specificare con esempi vissuti in prima persona?

- 1. Honor and Face (presenza di atteggiamenti legati all’onore, dignita’, la paura di ‘perdere la faccia’);**
- 2. Hierarchy and social stratification (la presenza di gerarchie sociali e stratificazioni sociali);**
- 3. Purity, danger and taboo (taboo riguardo: purezza/contaminato/sporco, pericolo/i, sesso, ecc.);**

4. Proxemics and body language (distanza fisica tra due o piu' persone mentre parlano e atteggiamenti/movimenti/gestualita' nella comunicazione non verbale);
5. Speech acts (particolari modi, maniere, usanze, gestualita'/forme/formalita' nel parlare);
6. Worldviews and beliefs system (presenza di concezioni del mondo, ideologie sistema, e sistema di credenze/valori, espresse in discorsi/atteggiamenti, ecc);

Lei, come ha potuto rendersi conto delle particolarita' locali (sociali/culturali), e della presenza nella realta' locale dei sei (o meno) punti di cui sopra ?

Lei, a contatto con la popolazione locale, si e' adeguato al rispetto/modi/usanze dei sei punti sopra citati? (si/no/raramente/spesso)

Se 'si' perche'?

Se 'no' perche'?

Lei ha avuto qualche tipo di problema/incomprensioni con la popolazione locale? (si/no)

'B'

Ha avuto contatti con militari di altre Nazioni? (si/no/raramente/spesso)

Frequenza dei suoi contatti con militari di altre Nazioni:

Lei ha qualche episodio/esperienza particolare che vuole ricordare e che lei ha vissuto personalmente con militari di altre Nazioni:

**Riguardo al contatto con militari di altre Nazioni ed alla loro cultura, lei ha notato la presenza, nei comportamenti/atteggiamenti/discorsi da parte di questi soldati di altre Nazioni dei seguenti sei elementi qui sotto elencati? (si/no/raramente/spesso)
Puo' specificare con esempi vissuti in prima persona?**

1. Honor and Face (presenza di atteggiamenti legati all'onore, dignita', la paura di 'perdere la faccia');

2. **Hierarchy and social stratification** (la presenza di gerarchie sociali e stratificazioni sociali);
3. **Purity, danger and taboo** (taboo riguardo: purezza/contaminato/sporco, pericolo/i, sesso, ecc.);
4. **Proxemics and body language** (distanza fisica tra due o piu' persone mentre parlano e atteggiamenti/movimenti/gestualita' nella comunicazione non verbale);
5. **Speech acts** (particolari modi, maniere, usanze, gestualita'/forme/formalita' nel parlare);
6. **Worldviews and beliefs system** (presenza di concezioni del mondo, ideologie sistema, e sistema di credenze/valori, espresse in discorsi/atteggiamenti, ecc);

Lei, come ha potuto rendersi conto delle particolarita' sociali/culturali (oltre che linguistiche) riassunte dai sei punti di cui sopra, nei suoi contatti con i militari di altre Nazioni ?

Lei, a contatto con militari di altre Nazioni, si e' adeguato al rispetto/modi/usanze dei sei punti sopra citati? (si/no/raramente/spesso)

Se 'si' perche'?

Se 'no' perche'?

Lei ha avuto qualche tipo di problema/incomprensioni con il personale militare di altre Nazioni? (Si/no)

'C'

E' rimasto soddisfatto dalla sua missione in teatro operativo? (si/no)

Perche?

Tornerebbe in teatro operativo 'Libano-UNIFIL'? (si/no/forse)

Perche'?

Cosa pensa delle culture con cui e' venuto a contatto durante la sua esperienza operativa (con i locali libanesi, e con gli altri militari stranieri con cui ha avuto contatti)?

Cosa si 'porta a casa' da questa esperienza vissuta?

Rivedendo e ripensando ora all'addestramento che lei ha ricevuto prima del deployment in teatro operativo, cosa ne pensa? E' stato utile? Era sufficiente? Puo' commentare su questo?

Nel caso lei dovesse dare dei consigli ad un altro militare che per la prima volta viene impegnato nella missione 'Libano-UNIFIL', quale consigli darebbe?

Se a lei venisse dato l'incarico di organizzare un addestramento per il personale che verra' impiegato nella missione 'Libano-UNIFIL' (la stessa a cui lei ha partecipato), quale materie/argomenti inserirebbe nel suo corso? Perche?

'D'

Cosa pensa riguardo a questa ricerca antropologica alla quale lei ha partecipato in qualita' di 'informante'?

Cosa direbbe (consigli, suggerimenti, critiche) al Dr. Giovanni Ercolani che ha effettuato queste interviste/incontri?

E' rimasto soddisfatto/insoddisfatto/scocciato/disturbato da queste interviste e/o da alcuni atteggiamenti tenuti dal Dr. Giovanni Ercolani?

Come ha trovato il comportamento del Dr. Giovanni Ercolani?

Lei e' a conoscenza che tutto il materiale che ha fatto parte delle interviste/incontri (supporto cartaceo, conversazioni, registrazioni, ecc) verra' impiegato solo per fini

accademici e che la sua identità', insieme al grado ed il sesso, rimarranno anonimi, e che tutto il materiale (supporto cartaceo, conversazioni, registrazioni, ecc) verra' distrutto al termine del lavoro di ricerca, e che tale materiale verra' solamente trattato personalmente dal Dr. Giovanni Ercolani per soli scopi di ricerca antropologica?

Si rende noto che:

- La presente ricerca e' stata approvata dal Dipartimento di Antropologia Sociale dell'Universita' di Murcia (Spagna), autorizzata da Difesa Gabinetto, dallo Stato Maggiore della Difesa italiano, e dal Centro Operativo Interforze, ed e' sviluppata in tre fasi: pre-deployment, deployment in teatro operativo, re-deployment.
- Si fa presente che scopo di questo questionario come quello dell'intervista e' solamente scientifico, percio' si richiede la massima collaborazione e sincerita'.
- Per etica professionale tutti i dati del presente questionario non verranno divulgati.
- Una volta che l'intervistato avra' terminato di compilare il presente modulo, riceverà un nome in codice del tipo "Informatore A...B...C", ed in questo modo verra' identificato all'interno della ricerca antropologica.
- Nel caso l'informatore volesse apparire nella ricerca con il suo grado, nome e cognome, dovra' richiederlo specificatamente allo scrivente con lettera/email.
- Una volta terminata la ricerca antropologica questo modulo, insieme a tutto il materiale relativo alle interviste, verra' distrutto e di esso non rimarra' alcuna traccia ne' cartacea ne' informatica, od altro, ed io personalmente me ne assumo la piena responsabilita'.

In fede

Giovanni Ercolani

Dr. Giovanni Ercolani, Fellow Royal Anthropological Institute, Antropólogo Social, Email: giovanni.ercolani@um.es, Tel: (+39) 339 120 34 99, Skype: drercolani

Universidad de Murcia, Facultad de Filosofía, Área de Antropología Social, Edificio Luis Vives, Campus de Espinardo, 30100 Murcia, Spain

Appendix 33

Interview to Informant A

Location of the interview: MNCG barracks, Motta di Livenza, Treviso, Italy.

Date: period Sept 18th, 2013 - May 7th, 2014.

Duration of the interviews: 00:53:13; 00:28:30; 00:46:42; 01:03:16.

The semi-structured interview with the informant followed the post-deployment questionnaire (Appendix 32) and focused on the following six points:

- (1) Did you have contact with the local population during your deployment time?
- (2) In your relations with the local population (outside the wire), have you noted and spotted the following elements: Honour and face; Hierarchy and social stratification; Purity, danger and taboos; Proxemics and body language; Speech acts; and Worldview and belief system?
- (3) Once noted the above elements how do you reacted to them?
- (4) In your relations with the other members of the international military forces (inside the wire), have you noted and spotted the following elements: Honour and face; Hierarchy and social stratification; Purity, danger and taboos; Proxemics and body language; Speech acts; and Worldview and belief system?
- (5) Once noted the above elements how do you reacted to them?
- (6) Now that your mission in Lebanon has ended, what do you think about the cultural awareness training you received before the deployment?

- (1) Did you have contact with the local population during your deployment time?

‘Yes, most of the time I had contact with local authorities, but at the same time I have good memories of various dinner with local people of different social extraction. All the contacts I had with the local populations were very positive. I remember with particular pleasure an experience I had in a local village during a vet-care (together with the Italian military veterinary. At the same time I want to add that in these contacts and in helping the local populations we have to be careful in not provoke damage in good faith. This can be the case when the Italian medical doctor visits too much the local villages and this makes that the local medical doctor lose his clients-patients. Therefore, we have always to search equilibrium with the local social reality.’

- (2) In your relations with the local population (outside the wire), have you noted and spotted the following elements: Honour and face; Hierarchy and social stratification; Purity, danger and taboos; Proxemics and body language; Speech acts; and Worldview and belief system?

‘I noticed the above elements in this order (meaning how much they were present in my encounters with the local population): 1. Honour and face, it is like in a lot of parts in the South of Italy; 2. Worldview and belief system, Lebanon is tolerant to different religion, what I noticed is a lot of fatalism, at the same time I remember the beautiful and interesting experience in attending local Christian orthodox mass-rituals in local churches; 3. Hierarchy and social stratification; 4. Purity, danger and taboos, I experienced that the local populations lives under a sensation of danger, I noticed

psychological tension-stress; 5. Proxemics and body language, and Speech acts, on proxemics they are Mediterranean people, they are similar to us, I did not notice any difference with the Italian proxemics. I think we (CIMIC team) we are culturally ready to interact with the local people because their culture is close to the Italian culture, in reality I noticed how much we are close more than we are far away. I adapted myself quite easily to the local customs. And a lot of time the interpreters were explaining me the real meaning of a phrase, of body-language. And thanks to this tips the “other” is not so much “other”. There is only one remark I want to make is that if you do not know the local language there is the danger that the local interpreters take control of the conversation with the “other” and you cannot check what is going on. When I arrived to Lebanon I received cultural awareness training. However, comparing with my previous mission in Afghanistan I can say that here, due to the fact that in Lebanon there is a Mediterranean culture, to spot the above elements you must concentrate. In Afghanistan the difference with our Italian culture are more marked and evident, here are more part of a common Mediterranean culture and way of life. Moreover, to spot them you have to employ your curiosity. I say that to be a CIMIC operator curiosity is a must, you must have a right sensibility, and you have always to take in consideration the purpose of your mission. I spotted these elements thanks (1) to my cultural and education background; (2) the course on cultural awareness I attended in Italy and in Lebanon (and contact with the interpreters); and (3) my curiosity and my observant participation.’

(3) Once noted the above elements how do you reacted to them?

‘I adapted myself to the local customs and this for my personal disposition, and professional need. And I think this is part of the CIMIC qualities. Personally I tried to absorb, and interiorize the local habitus. It is necessary to adapt oneself to the local customs, however, if someone is more gifted (a kind of combination of curiosity for local culture, and personal sensibility) he adapts better, and this is good for the mission.’

(4) In your relations with the other members of the international military forces (inside the wire), have you noted and spotted the following elements: Honour and face; Hierarchy and social stratification; Purity, danger and taboos; Proxemics and body language; Speech acts; and Worldview and belief system?

‘I noticed these elements in my daily contacts with my foreign colleagues, and I noticed that we have different rhythm to work. I had relations with military personnel from Ireland, Ghana, Korea, Malaysia, China, India, Indonesia, Tanzania. I made a list of how the above elements were present in my relations: 1. Honour and Face, and Purity, danger and taboo. I think a taboo here can be represented by the danger to bully and to diminish the other nations. This is an international context and quite everybody is praising his own nation, therefore, you must be careful not to humiliate the other; 2. Hierarchy and social stratification, and Speech acts. Being an international context you have to be careful on how you employ English. Every nation has its own way to use English; 3. Proxemics and body language, and Worldviews and beliefs system. Regarding these points I remember my experience with the Chinese contingent, they are very kind, generous and formal, but basically they are impenetrable, you cannot understand what they think.’

(5) Once noted the above elements how do you reacted to them?

‘I noticed the elements and I adapted myself to the situation. It is very important that you adapt your behaviour to your international colleagues, and this is for mutual cooperation and to avoid misunderstandings. I noticed that to make jokes is quite difficult because people can interpret your joke not in the same way you understand it. What can be a joke in your culture is not a joke in other cultures.’

(6) Now that your mission in Lebanon has ended, what do you think about the cultural awareness training you received before the deployment?

‘The first think I want to say is that we (Italian CIMIC Team) grow up in a NATO environment, with a NATO mentality (emergence in dangerous places, and if there is a security problem as to be solved), here is a UN mission, with a lot of different mentalities, different duties, and mandates. Then, about the training (duration six months; military and cultural awareness) I received before my assignment I consider that it was essential and sufficient. However, if I had to organize a similar training I would insert modules on English and on the local language (Arabic).’

Appendix 34

Interview to Informant B

Location of the interview: MNCG barracks, Motta di Livenza, Treviso, Italy.

Date: period Sept 18th, 2013 - May 7th, 2014.

Duration of the interviews: 01:40:53.

The semi-structured interview with the informant followed the post-deployment questionnaire (Appendix 32) and focused on the following six points:

- (1) Did you have contact with the local population during your deployment time?
- (2) In your relations with the local population (outside the wire), have you noted and spotted the following elements: Honour and face; Hierarchy and social stratification; Purity, danger and taboos; Proxemics and body language; Speech acts; and Worldview and belief system?
- (3) Once noted the above elements how do you reacted to them?
- (4) In your relations with the other members of the international military forces (inside the wire), have you noted and spotted the following elements: Honour and face; Hierarchy and social stratification; Purity, danger and taboos; Proxemics and body language; Speech acts; and Worldview and belief system?
- (5) Once noted the above elements how do you reacted to them?
- (6) Now that your mission in Lebanon has ended, what do you think about the cultural awareness training you received before the deployment?

(1) Did you have contact with the local population during your deployment time?
'During my assignment I had daily with local population and to ne more specific with local institutions (composed by local authority)'

(2) In your relations with the local population (outside the wire), have you noted and spotted the following elements: Honour and face; Hierarchy and social stratification; Purity, danger and taboos; Proxemics and body language; Speech acts; and Worldview and belief system?

'Despite the fact that the cultural awareness short course I had in Italy (duration: one morning) did not cover all the elements listed before (e.g., no one mention the case of honour and face, and worldview and belief system) I was able to see these elements present in the way of life of the local population. Before my assignment I started to read material on Lebanese culture, society, and history, and I started to study Arabic. The reason of my decision is that I really wanted to enter in the mind of the local people; I wanted to understand them better. The knowledge of Arabic has represented to me the key to enter and to understand the reality in which this people live, to know their emotions, and to eliminate barriers with them. This knowledge (culture and Arabic) became a strategic capital, a capability, to be employed there.'

(3) Once noted the above elements how do you reacted to them?

'I noticed the six elements and I adapt to them, but I did in a very natural way. Thanks to my knowledge of local culture and of Arabic have been easier, and I can say that a lot of

time, with the knowledge of Arabic I was able to conquest the trust of local people. Several times they were happy to see me speaking Arabic and they understood the effort I was doing to communicate with them. Local people appreciate you when you are natural, and spontaneous.'

(4) In your relations with the other members of the international military forces (inside the wire), have you noted and spotted the following elements: Honour and face; Hierarchy and social stratification; Purity, danger and taboos; Proxemics and body language; Speech acts; and Worldview and belief system?

'I had daily contact with military personnel from Nepal, Indonesia, France, Qatar, Spain, Serbia, India, Ireland, Finland, and China. I did not received any cultural training on the culture of these nations, and I am sure that to have a training of this kind could help people, in the multinational environment, to better understand each other, to make more easy the coexistence, and the human interactions. I did remarked the above six elements in many daily working experiences, and I wanted to better understand my colleagues. Therefore, when I noticed a particular cultural-social-religious behaviour always I asked to my colleagues the meaning of it. I really wanted to know better my "others" colleagues, and this help in human relations.'

(5) Once noted the above elements how do you reacted to them?

'I adapted to them and always I had good results, because my foreign colleagues realized that I was interested to know him/her better, and therefore that I was acknowledging him/her. This really helps in establishing cooperative relations.'

(6) Now that your mission in Lebanon has ended, what do you think about the cultural awareness training you received before the deployment?

'The cultural awareness course I received in Italy was useful and sufficient but it could be improvable. If I had to organize a cultural awareness course for this TO I would dedicate more time to the knowledge of Arabic (Lebanese), on Lebanese social and cultural history, and at the same time to dedicate time to better know the culture of our foreign colleagues in the UNIFIL mission.'

Appendix 35

Interview to Informant C

Location of the interview: MNCG barracks, Motta di Livenza, Treviso, Italy.

Date: period Sept 18th, 2013 - May 7th, 2014.

Duration of the interviews: 01:23:56; 00:47:27.

The semi-structured interview with the informant followed the post-deployment questionnaire (Appendix 32) and focused on the following six points:

- (1) Did you have contact with the local population during your deployment time?
- (2) In your relations with the local population (outside the wire), have you noted and spotted the following elements: Honour and face; Hierarchy and social stratification; Purity, danger and taboos; Proxemics and body language; Speech acts; and Worldview and belief system?
- (3) Once noted the above elements how do you reacted to them?
- (4) In your relations with the other members of the international military forces (inside the wire), have you noted and spotted the following elements: Honour and face; Hierarchy and social stratification; Purity, danger and taboos; Proxemics and body language; Speech acts; and Worldview and belief system?
- (5) Once noted the above elements how do you reacted to them?
- (6) Now that your mission in Lebanon has ended, what do you think about the cultural awareness training you received before the deployment?

(1) Did you have contact with the local population during your deployment time?

‘Yes, I did have quite regular contacts with the local population during my employment in Lebanon.’

(2) In your relations with the local population (outside the wire), have you noted and spotted the following elements: Honour and face; Hierarchy and social stratification; Purity, danger and taboos; Proxemics and body language; Speech acts; and Worldview and belief system?

‘I did remark the above six elements. I think they are very typical of Arab people, and of their cultures. And I noticed them during the conversation and meeting I had with the locals. I noticed them in this order of importance: 1. Honor and Face; 2. Worldviews and beliefs system; 3. Hierarchy and social stratification; 4. Speech acts; 5. Proxemics and body language; and 6. Purity, danger and taboo. Another thing that I noticed in the local population was a strong hatred against the state of Israel. However, I noticed these specific characteristics thanks to my face to face contact with the locals, and thanks to the material I read before my assignment.’

(3) Once noted the above elements how do you reacted to them?

‘Definitely, I adapted to them, first because I was operated in their “homes”, and second because I thought that the local population could have take my presence as the one of an occupation force. It is important to provide a relaxed and flexible image of ourselves when we operate in this TO.’

(4) In your relations with the other members of the international military forces (inside the wire), have you noted and spotted the following elements: Honor and face; Hierarchy and social stratification; Purity, danger and taboos; Proxemics and body language; Speech acts; and Worldview and belief system?

‘I had relations with the other UN foreign military personnel every day, and more frequently with militaries from Ireland and Ghana. It is in relations to these militaries that I noticed the above six points but in a different way. For the Irish soldiers honour and face, together with hierarchy and social stratification were more noticeable, followed by proxemics and body language, speech acts, worldviews and beliefs system, and purity, danger and taboo. However, the situation with the militaries from Ghana was a little different hierarchy and social stratification was at the top. In this military context the Officer is not only a rank but an attribute of social status. Therefore, the officer was regarded as a supreme commander. This point was followed by worldviews and beliefs system, honour and fear, proxemics and body language, and speech acts.’

(5) Once noted the above elements how do you reacted to them?

‘I realized the differences and the six points and I adopted them. However, it was easy with the Irish, more complicated with the Ghana contingent.’

(6) Now that your mission in Lebanon has ended, what do you think about the cultural awareness training you received before the deployment?

‘Before my assignment I received training in Italy. It was a military training, and the cultural awareness module was very poor indeed. I think a course like that it should be more dedicated to the local history and culture, and provide a basic Arabic course. What we need is really to enter into the culture of the other.’

Appendix 36

Interview to Informant D

Location of the interview: MNCG barracks, Motta di Livenza, Treviso, Italy.

Date: period Sept 18th, 2013 - May 7th, 2014.

Duration of the interviews: 01:16:16.

The semi-structured interview with the informant followed the post-deployment questionnaire (Appendix 32) and focused on the following six points:

- (1) Did you have contact with the local population during your deployment time?
- (2) In your relations with the local population (outside the wire), have you noted and spotted the following elements: Honour and face; Hierarchy and social stratification; Purity, danger and taboos; Proxemics and body language; Speech acts; and Worldview and belief system?
- (3) Once noted the above elements how do you reacted to them?
- (4) In your relations with the other members of the international military forces (inside the wire), have you noted and spotted the following elements: Honour and face; Hierarchy and social stratification; Purity, danger and taboos; Proxemics and body language; Speech acts; and Worldview and belief system?
- (5) Once noted the above elements how do you reacted to them?
- (6) Now that your mission in Lebanon has ended, what do you think about the cultural awareness training you received before the deployment?

(1) Did you have contact with the local population during your deployment time?

‘I had daily interaction with local population.’

(2) In your relations with the local population (outside the wire), have you noted and spotted the following elements: Honour and face; Hierarchy and social stratification; Purity, danger and taboos; Proxemics and body language; Speech acts; and Worldview and belief system?

‘Yes, I was able to spot and to observe the six cultural points. I did not receive a specific course on cultural awareness for this specific TO, but even before my assignment, I started to read and investigate about the local history, culture, and society. At the same time several time I asked to the interpreters to explain the local behaviors and social practices. Regarding religion, you have to be careful to talk openly about it.’

(3) Once noted the above elements how do you reacted to them?

‘I adjusted myself to the local customs, and I did it in order to conquest the local population trust. If you are not accepted by them you can not do a good job here. You have to integrate yourself in this social-cultural context. But I think this is quite normal for a CIMIC operator. If you are not curious, and you are not interested to know and to interact with the other (in this case the Lebanese local population) you can not do CIMIC. CIMIC requires curiosity. For example to know about the six cultural points they helped me to interact with the local authorities. At the same time, through the knowledge

I accumulated by myself I was able to read the space in which I was operating. To know the local culture and social practices help you to deconstruct the local reality.'

(4) In your relations with the other members of the international military forces (inside the wire), have you noted and spotted the following elements: Honour and face; Hierarchy and social stratification; Purity, danger and taboos; Proxemics and body language; Speech acts; and Worldview and belief system?

'I had working relations with military personnel coming from Ghana, Ireland, France and Lebanese Army. I noticed the six points; however, the Irish and French personnel had the same system-customs like the Italian one. I noticed more differences regarding the Ghana's military where the position of the Commander is extremely important.'

(5) Once noted the above elements how do you reacted to them?

'Even in this context I adjusted myself.'

(6) Now that your mission in Lebanon has ended, what do you think about the cultural awareness training you received before the deployment?

'The training I received was good for the military side, but very poor for the cultural awareness module. I did a lot of research by myself, I read books on Lebanese. And I realized that a cultural awareness course for Lebanon should provide modules on Lebanese history, geography, religion (and on the power of religion institutions here), and courses on Arabic, which is fundamental for establishing good relationships with the local people, and to understand them better.'

Appendix 37

Interview to Informant E

Location of the interview: MNCG barracks, Motta di Livenza, Treviso, Italy.

Date: period Sept 18th, 2013 - May 7th, 2014.

Duration of the interviews: 01:02:44; 00:03:25.

The semi-structured interview with the informant followed the post-deployment questionnaire (Appendix 32) and focused on the following six points:

- (1) Did you have contact with the local population during your deployment time?
- (2) In your relations with the local population (outside the wire), have you noted and spotted the following elements: Honour and face; Hierarchy and social stratification; Purity, danger and taboos; Proxemics and body language; Speech acts; and Worldview and belief system?
- (3) Once noted the above elements how do you reacted to them?
- (4) In your relations with the other members of the international military forces (inside the wire), have you noted and spotted the following elements: Honour and face; Hierarchy and social stratification; Purity, danger and taboos; Proxemics and body language; Speech acts; and Worldview and belief system?
- (5) Once noted the above elements how do you reacted to them?
- (6) Now that your mission in Lebanon has ended, what do you think about the cultural awareness training you received before the deployment?

(1) Did you have contact with the local population during your deployment time?

‘Yes, in my activities I had a lot of contacts with local people, local interpreters, local suppliers, meetings with local authorities, and always I had very good relations with all of them.’

(2) In your relations with the local population (outside the wire), have you noted and spotted the following elements: Honour and face; Hierarchy and social stratification; Purity, danger and taboos; Proxemics and body language; Speech acts; and Worldview and belief system?

‘In my frequent contacts with the local populations I did notice the above six elements, and in this order, meaning the times I noticed them in my daily contacts: 1. Honor and face, which is very eradicated, but it is like in Italy; 2. Speech acts, I remember that during the meetings with the local authorities they were very welcoming and friendly; 3. Hierarchy and social stratification, I observed that during meeting where the person with influence were standing by the local mayor and how the people reacted with respect toward the authority, and at the same time I noticed how the political influence conditioned the local relations; 4. Proxemics and body language ; 5. Purity, danger and taboo; 6. Worldviews and beliefs system. I remember interesting conversation I had with the local interpreters to know more about local religions.’

(3) Once noted the above elements how do you reacted to them?

‘As I said I observed the local customs and I adapted my behaviour to them. First because I am interested to know more, second because once you adapt this produce a positive impact on your local interlocutors. For example mature and elder people liked when you treated them in a very polite way. My process of adaptation was very natural. Another reason to adapt was that I wanted to bring prestige to my Country. I received the honorary citizenship from a local village, therefore, I think that I did a good job and what I was doing was really appreciated by the locals.’

(4) In your relations with the other members of the international military forces (inside the wire), have you noted and spotted the following elements: Honour and face; Hierarchy and social stratification; Purity, danger and taboos; Proxemics and body language; Speech acts; and Worldview and belief system?

‘I had very rare contacts with the foreign soldiers of the UNIFIL mission.’

(5) Once noted the above elements how do you reacted to them?

(6) Now that your mission in Lebanon has ended, what do you think about the cultural awareness training you received before the deployment?

‘On the whole I enjoyed my mission. Even if the cultural awareness training I received was scarce I found a lot of similarities with the Italian culture. My curiosity about the local history and culture brought me to read more about Lebanon. I think that a good course on cultural awareness on this TO should cover not only the cultural and linguistic realities but the economic and financial system which are present here. About the language, Arabic, it is very important to study it, to know the local language is really a capability, and you notice it when you have to use, in the communication with the locals, the interpreters and most of the time you do not know if what they are saying is really what you said, therefore, I experienced the fact to be like a prisoner inside the hands of the translators.’

Appendix 38

Interview to Informant F

Location of the interview: MNCG barracks, Motta di Livenza, Treviso, Italy.

Date: period Sept 18th, 2013 - May 7th, 2014.

Duration of the interviews: 01:11:18.

The semi-structured interview with the informant followed the post-deployment questionnaire (Appendix 32) and focused on the following six points:

- (1) Did you have contact with the local population during your deployment time?
- (2) In your relations with the local population (outside the wire), have you noted and spotted the following elements: Honour and face; Hierarchy and social stratification; Purity, danger and taboos; Proxemics and body language; Speech acts; and Worldview and belief system?
- (3) Once noted the above elements how do you reacted to them?
- (4) In your relations with the other members of the international military forces (inside the wire), have you noted and spotted the following elements: Honour and face; Hierarchy and social stratification; Purity, danger and taboos; Proxemics and body language; Speech acts; and Worldview and belief system?
- (5) Once noted the above elements how do you reacted to them?
- (6) Now that your mission in Lebanon has ended, what do you think about the cultural awareness training you received before the deployment?

- (1) Did you have contact with the local population during your deployment time?

‘Most of the time I had contact with the local interpreters and with local firms. However, for my job description, I visited various villages, and I did meet local people.’

- (2) In your relations with the local population (outside the wire), have you noted and spotted the following elements: Honour and face; Hierarchy and social stratification; Purity, danger and taboos; Proxemics and body language; Speech acts; and Worldview and belief system?

‘Yes, I did remark the above cultural elements, even if the cultural awareness course I received in Italy was only a basic discussion on Lebanon social and cultural reality. For my experience I can say that these points do play an important role when you have to interact with local people, to establish a dialogue with them, and you have to understand what is going on, and how to interpret the situation. I remember going to a village for duty reason, and I was accompanied by our local interpreters. I had a meeting with the local authorities (the village mayor) but the population of the village was all around us, looking, and listening to our conversation with the mayor, and a lot of time I noticed that the mayor, before answering to our questions or before to take a decision, was always looking for support from the local people around us. Therefore, you can understand that in situation like that most of the above elements are present in a normal meeting. At the same time I noticed that I was better not to talk about religion. I can say that for the fact that I am Italian, we are more familiar with these points because you can notice them in our culture, and most of our daily life.’

(3) Once noted the above elements how do you reacted to them?

‘I adapted myself to the local customs, and has been easy. I can say that, even if you receive a cultural awareness training, at the end of the day you have to live this experience in the TO. You memorize the local cultural facets, and you adapt to them. It is a cognitive process. If you want answer from the local population you have to enter in their routine (customs, habits, etc.), you have to become empathic with them, and doing like that the local population become more sincere in their answers. You do not have to be impetuous, but you have to find a right balance. You have to be polite, and humble, but at the same time it is important to be determined in order to have the right answers for what you are looking for. Unfortunately not all the CIMIC operators are qualified, for example, I never attended an official CIMIC course, but at least I was interested to know more about the others I met. And sometime I noticed a number of CIMIC operators that lacked the interest to know the others, their cultures, and to enter in contact with them.’

(4) In your relations with the other members of the international military forces (inside the wire), have you noted and spotted the following elements: Honour and face; Hierarchy and social stratification; Purity, danger and taboos; Proxemics and body language; Speech acts; and Worldview and belief system?

‘Inside the UNIFIL base I had contact with military personnel coming from Brazil, France, Ghana, Tanzania, Indonesia, Serbia, and Cyprus. I noticed the six points because every nation that comes here brings with it its own culture, way of life, and symbols.’

(5) Once noted the above elements how do you reacted to them?

‘I always adapted myself to the situation, for example my colleagues were from Indonesia, they were Muslim, and I knew when it was pray time and I did not bother them with work. I always waited the end of their pray (they were praying in their office) and after that I interacted with them. I think that could have been interesting, before my assignment to have received some cultural training on our foreign colleagues. At the same time I want to say that we Italians we are more flexible, and open, and this is of great help. I noticed that the French soldiers were more rigid, formal, and they always were speaking in French.’

(6) Now that your mission in Lebanon has ended, what do you think about the cultural awareness training you received before the deployment?

‘I received a six months training before my deployment. The military training was good, however, about the cultural awareness training, which was a simple presentation; I would like to change it completely. I think a good training could include more time on our real duty during the mission, and on how to deal with the local population. I suggest that we should study local history and politics, to know more about the local religion, study some Arabic, and to know more about the culture of our foreign colleagues in the UNIFIL bases.’



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**PARTECIPAZIONE ITALIANA
ALLA MISSIONE ONU**

UNIFIL – Operazione “Leonte”

*(United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon – Operazione
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LIBANO



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LIBANO

UNIFIL – Operazione “Leonte”

Impegno Italiano

GENERALITA’

La missione UNIFIL (<http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/missions/unifil/index.html>) è stata costituita con la Risoluzione 425 adottata in data 19 marzo 1978 da parte del Consiglio di Sicurezza delle Nazioni Unite, a seguito dell’invasione del Libano da parte di Israele (marzo 1978). Successive Risoluzioni hanno prorogato, con cadenza semestrale, la durata della missione.

A seguito di un attacco alle Israeli Defence Force (IDF), avvenuto il 12 luglio 2006, a Sud della Blue Line nelle vicinanze del villaggio israeliano di Zar’it, da parte di elementi Hezbollah, vennero uccisi otto soldati israeliani mentre altri sei vennero feriti e due catturati da dette milizie. Al rifiuto della richiesta di rilascio, Israele iniziò una campagna militare in Libano mirata ad annientare le milizie di Hezbollah ed altri elementi armati; in conseguenza di ciò, milizie Hezbollah condussero degli attacchi contro infrastrutture civili israeliane nel Nord di Israele. L’escalation delle ostilità portò le IDF a condurre una vasta campagna militare nel Nord della Blue Line contro le milizie armate di Hezbollah. Le ostilità continuarono per 34 giorni durante i quali venne svolta una intensa attività diplomatica internazionale tesa al conseguimento di una tregua/cessate il fuoco per la successiva creazione di stabili condizioni di pace, che è culminata con la Risoluzione n. 1701 dell’11 agosto 2006 con la quale si sanciva la cessazione delle ostilità a partire dal 14 agosto 2006.

Dall’inizio del cessate il fuoco, le IDF continuarono ad occupare larghi tratti dell’Area di Operazioni (AO) di UNIFIL mentre gli Hezbollah e gli elementi armati rimasero nel Sud del Libano. Durante i giorni di conflitto, inoltre, i contingenti di UNIFIL di India e Ghana continuarono ad occupare le proprie postazioni nella AO mentre, dal 24 luglio 2006, i 4 posti di osservazione in Libano della missione UNIFIL vennero abbandonati dagli osservatori ONU.

AVVIO DELL’OPERAZIONE “LEONTE”

A partire dal 16 agosto 2006, in accordo alla Risoluzione 1701 (2006), le IDF hanno iniziato il ritiro dal sud del Libano verso la Blue Line; tale ritiro, verificato da UNIFIL, è coinciso con il parallelo dispiegamento, deciso dal Governo libanese il 7 agosto 2006, di quattro Brigate delle Lebanese Army Forces (LAF) a sud del fiume Litani, iniziando a prendere il controllo delle aree precedentemente occupate dalle IDF. In tale contesto le unità di UNIFIL, su richiesta del Governo libanese, hanno agito come “forze cuscinetto” tra le IDF e le LAF.

Il Consiglio di Sicurezza delle Nazioni Unite, nel richiedere la cessazione delle ostilità fra Hezbollah e lo Stato di Israele e sollecitare l’intervento delle Nazioni per assumere una vasta gamma di responsabilità di carattere politico, umanitario e militare, ha previsto il potenziamento del contingente militare di UNIFIL (che a quel momento contava circa

2.000 u.) fino ad un massimo di 15.000 uomini, da schierare in Libano in fasi successive, espandendo l'area di operazioni a tutto il territorio libanese a sud del fiume Litani.

In base alla citata Risoluzione n. 1701 dell'11 agosto 2006, il mandato della Forza di UNIFIL è esteso fino al 31 agosto 2007.

Il 1° novembre 2006 il Comandante della Joint Landing Force – Lebanon assumeva la responsabilità del Settore Ovest dell'AoR (Area of Responsibility) di UNIFIL e, contestualmente, della Brigata Ovest della forza ONU, composta da due battaglioni italiani, un battaglione francese ed un battaglione ghanese.

Il 2 febbraio 2007, il Generale di Divisione italiano Claudio GRAZIANO, dando il cambio al Generale di Divisione francese Alain PELLEGRINI, assumeva il Comando della forza ONU in Libano (UNIFIL).

ANTEFATTO

Nel 1970 aumentò la tensione lungo il confine tra Israele e Libano. In particolare, dopo la ricollocazione degli elementi armati palestinesi dalla Giordania nel Libano, s'intensificarono le operazioni dei commando palestinesi contro Israele e le rappresaglie di Israele contro le basi palestinesi. L'11 marzo 1978, un attacco di commando in Israele provocò molti morti e feriti tra la popolazione israeliana; l'Organizzazione per la Liberazione della Palestina (OLP) rivendicò la responsabilità di tale incursione. In risposta, le forze israeliane invasero il Libano la notte tra il 14 e il 15 marzo, e in alcuni giorni occuparono l'intera parte meridionale del Paese, ad eccezione della città di Tiro e dell'area limitrofa.

Il 15 marzo 1978, il Governo Libanese avanzò una dura protesta al Consiglio di Sicurezza delle nazioni Unite contro l'invasione israeliana, dichiarando che essa non aveva alcuna connessione con l'operazione del commando palestinese. Il 19 marzo, il Consiglio adottò le Risoluzioni 425 e 426, nelle quali si richiama Israele a cessare immediatamente le proprie azioni militari e ritirare le sue forze da tutto il territorio libanese.

Il Consiglio di Sicurezza decise inoltre la costituzione immediata della United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL). Le prime truppe UNIFIL arrivarono nell'area il 23 marzo 1978.

La Risoluzione 425 stabilì due requisiti: con il primo, il Consiglio di Sicurezza richiamò lo stretto rispetto dell'integrità territoriale, della sovranità e dell'indipendenza politica del Libano entro i confini riconosciuti in campo internazionale; con il secondo, il Consiglio di Sicurezza richiamò Israele a cessare immediatamente la sua azione militare contro l'integrità del territorio libanese e a ritirare subito le sue forze da tutto il territorio libanese. Il Consiglio di Sicurezza decise inoltre, alla luce della richiesta del Governo del Libano, di costituire immediatamente una forza di interposizione delle Nazioni Unite nel Libano meridionale.

Questa forza fu creata per i seguenti tre scopi:

- confermare il ritiro delle forze di Israele;
- ristabilire la pace e la sicurezza internazionale;
- assistere il Governo del Libano nella ripresa della sua effettiva autorità nell'area.

Con la risoluzione 426 il Consiglio di Sicurezza approvò il rapporto del Segretario Generale sull'implementazione della Risoluzione 425. Tale rapporto conteneva, tra l'altro, le linee guida per le operazioni di UNIFIL.

Nel giugno 1982, dopo un intenso scambio di fuoco nel Libano meridionale e attraverso il confine israeliano-libanese, Israele invase nuovamente il Libano, raggiungendo i

sobborghi di Beirut. Per tre anni, UNIFIL rimase dietro le linee di Israele, con il suo ruolo limitato a fornire il più possibile protezione e assistenza umanitaria alla popolazione locale. Nel 1985, Israele effettuò un parziale ritiro, ma mantenne il controllo di un'area nel Libano meridionale gestita dalle Israel Defence Forces (IDF) e dalle Lebanese de Facto Forces (DFF), il cosiddetto "South Lebanon Army" (SLA). Le ostilità continuarono tra Israele e le forze ausiliarie da una parte, e i gruppi libanesi che proclamavano la loro resistenza contro l'occupazione d'Israele dall'altra.

Nel corso del 1985, il Consiglio di Sicurezza confermò il suo mandato sull'integrità territoriale, sovranità ed indipendenza del Libano, mentre il Segretario Generale continuò i suoi sforzi per persuadere Israele a lasciare la zona occupata. Israele affermò che tale zona rappresentava una sistemazione temporanea per motivi di sicurezza. Il Libano richiese il ritiro di Israele si ritirasse, ritenendo tale occupazione illegale e contraria alle risoluzioni delle Nazioni Unite.

Sebbene UNIFIL trovasse impedimento nell'adempiere compiutamente il suo mandato, la Forza si adoperò per limitare il conflitto, di contribuire alla stabilità nella regione e di proteggere la popolazione dell'area dai peggiori effetti della violenza. Nonostante il perdurare della situazione d'impasse, il Consiglio di Sicurezza delle Nazioni Unite ha ripetutamente esteso il mandato di UNIFIL su richiesta del Governo del Libano e su raccomandazione del Segretario Generale.

IL RITIRO DI ISRAELE

Il 17 aprile 2000, il Segretario Generale ricevette formale notifica dal Governo d'Israele che esso avrebbe ritirato le sue forze dal Libano entro luglio 2000, "in pieno accordo con le risoluzioni 425 e 426 del Consiglio di Sicurezza". Egli fu inoltre informato che in tal modo il Governo di Israele intendeva "cooperare pienamente con le Nazioni Unite". Il Segretario Generale informò il Consiglio di Sicurezza di tale notifica lo stesso giorno, dichiarando che avrebbe iniziato i preparativi per consentire alle Nazioni Unite di adempiere le loro responsabilità in linea con quelle risoluzioni. Il 20 aprile, il Consiglio approvò la decisione del Segretario Generale di iniziare tali preparativi.

Come primo passo, il Segretario Generale mandò il suo Inviato Speciale, Terje Roed-Larsen (Norvegia), insieme al Comandante di UNIFIL e a un team di esperti, ad incontrarsi con i Governi di Israele e del Libano e con gli Stati Membri interessati nella regione, inclusi Egitto, Giordania e la Repubblica Araba della Siria. La delegazione s'incontrò, altresì, con l'OLP e la Lega degli Stati Arabi. Durante la missione, esperti cartografi, legali e militari delle Nazioni Unite esaminarono gli aspetti tecnici riguardanti l'implementazione della risoluzione 425. Contestualmente alla missione, che ebbe luogo dal 26 aprile al 9 maggio 2000, il Segretario Generale si consultò con gli Stati Membri, inclusi quelli che avevano contribuito ad inviare truppe ad UNIFIL.

Dal 16 maggio 2000, molto prima del previsto, IDF e DFF iniziarono a lasciare le loro posizioni. Dal 21 maggio, folle di Libanesi, accompagnate da elementi armati, entrarono nei villaggi nell'area controllata da Israele. Nello stesso tempo, molti componenti delle DFF, insieme alle loro famiglie, sconfinarono in Israele; altri si arresero alle autorità libanesi. Entro alcuni giorni, tali forze si trovarono completamente sbandate. Il 25 maggio 2000, il Governo di Israele notificò al Segretario Generale che Israele aveva ridislocato le sue forze in accordo alle Risoluzioni 425 e 426.

I requisiti e i compiti relativi all'implementazione di tali risoluzioni alla luce di tali nuove circostanze furono illustrate nel rapporto del Segretario Generale e che fu approvato dal Consiglio di Sicurezza.

CONFERMA DEL RITIRO

Dal 24 maggio al 7 giugno 2000, l'Inviato Speciale viaggiò in Israele, in Libano e nella Repubblica Araba della Siria per portare a termine l'implementazione del rapporto del 22 maggio del Segretario Generale. I cartografi delle Nazioni Unite, assistiti da UNIFIL, lavorarono sul terreno per identificare una linea sul terreno conforme ai confini del Libano riconosciuti in campo internazionale, sulla base della migliore documentazione cartografica disponibile.

Il lavoro fu completato il 7 giugno. Una mappa rappresentante la linea del ritiro israeliano fu trasmessa formalmente dal Comandante di UNIFIL alle controparti libanese ed israeliana. Nonostante le loro riserve sulla linea, i Governi di Israele e del Libano confermarono che l'identificazione di tale linea era un'esclusiva responsabilità delle Nazioni Unite e come tale essi l'avrebbero rispettata. L'8 giugno, i team di UNIFIL cominciarono il lavoro di verifica del ritiro di Israele dietro tale linea di demarcazione.

Il 16 giugno, il Segretario Generale riferì al Consiglio di Sicurezza che Israele aveva ritirato le sue forze dal Libano in accordo con la risoluzione 425 e risposto ai requisiti definiti nel suo rapporto del 22 maggio 2000 – cioè, Israele aveva completato il ritiro in accordo con la linea identificata dalle Nazioni Unite. Il Segretario Generale disse che il Governo del Libano si era mosso per ristabilire la sua effettiva autorità nell'area mediante la dislocazione delle proprie forze di sicurezza, ed aveva informato le Nazioni Unite che avrebbe inviato una forza composta da Esercito e da personale della sicurezza interna, di base a Marjayoun. Il Governo libanese dichiarò inoltre che avrebbe preso in considerazione il dislocamento delle sue forze armate nel Libano meridionale a seguito della conferma da parte del Segretario Generale del ritiro di Israele.

Il Segretario Generale fece notare che il dispiegamento delle forze armate era un elemento essenziale per il ritorno dell'effettiva autorità governativa nell'area. Tale dispiegamento doveva essere condotto in coordinamento con il ridislocamento di UNIFIL nella sua area d'operazione.

Il 18 giugno, il Consiglio di Sicurezza accolse il rapporto del Segretario Generale ed approvò il lavoro fatto dalle Nazioni Unite. Il Consiglio, tra l'altro, richiamò tutte le parti interessate a cooperare con le Nazioni Unite, facendo notare inoltre che le Nazioni Unite non potevano emanare leggi ed esercitare funzioni che erano responsabilità proprie del Governo libanese. Il Consiglio accolse favorevolmente i primi passi mossi dal Governo libanese al riguardo, e lo raccomandò di procedere appena possibile, con l'assistenza di UNIFIL, al dispiegamento delle sue forze armate sul territorio libanese lasciato libero da Israele.

VIOLAZIONI DELLA LINEA DI CONFINE

Dopo il ritiro di Israele, UNIFIL riscontrò un certo numero di violazioni relative all'attraversamento della linea da parte di automezzi israeliani e delle IDF. Ciò interruppe il dispiegamento di UNIFIL e delle truppe libanesi verso le aree liberate. Il Consiglio di Sicurezza fu informato di tali violazioni. Il Governo del Libano dichiarò che avrebbe consentito il dislocamento di UNIFIL nelle aree liberate solo dopo la cessazione delle violazioni da parte di Israele.

Dal 17 al 23 giugno 2000, il Segretario Generale visitò la regione, incontrandosi con diversi leader, tra i quali quelli di Israele e del Libano. I principali punti della loro discussione verterono sull'implementazione della risoluzione 425 del Consiglio di Sicurezza. L'Inviato Speciale del Segretario Generale ebbe altri incontri con le autorità israeliane e libanesi dal 6 al 14 luglio.

Il Governo di Israele s'impegnò a far cessare tutte le violazioni israeliane della linea di confine entro la fine di luglio 2000.

ATTIVITA' DI UNIFIL

Dalla fine di maggio 2000, la situazione nell'area dell'operazione UNIFIL è rimasta generalmente calma. L'Esercito, la gendarmeria e la polizia libanesi stabilirono dei punti di controllo (check-points) nell'area liberata, controllando i movimenti e mantenendo l'ordine. L'Esercito libanese recuperò le armi pesanti abbandonate dalle IDF e DFF. UNIFIL pattugliò l'area e, insieme alle autorità libanesi, diede assistenza umanitaria fornendo acqua, medicine e cibo alle famiglie bisognose. UNIFIL diede altresì assistenza agli ex-membri delle DFF e alle loro famiglie che decidevano di ritornare da Israele al Libano. UNIFIL controllò la linea di confine su base giornaliera, mediante mezzi aerei e terrestri, ed esaminò le possibili violazioni da entrambe le parti della linea, siccome molte aree erano accessibili soltanto dal lato israeliano, a causa della presenza di mine e bombe inesplose sul lato libanese. L'intermediazione di UNIFIL fornì un costante collegamento tra il Capo delle Operazioni delle IDF e il Direttore della Sicurezza Generale Libanese, come pure con le normali catene di comando di entrambe le parti. Qualsiasi violazione della linea di confine è stata immediatamente portata all'attenzione della parte interessata.

ESTENSIONE DEL MANDATO DI UNIFIL

Nel suo rapporto, sottoposto il 20 luglio 2000 al Consiglio di Sicurezza, il Segretario Generale dichiarò che nel Libano meridionale erano avvenuti drammatici cambiamenti. Le forze israeliane erano uscite, i loro supporti locali erano sbandati, e dopo oltre vent'anni le armi avevano cessato di sparare. Egli avvertì, tuttavia, che nonostante i positivi progressi raggiunti nel settore israeliano-libanese, la situazione non andava sottovalutata in quanto esistevano ancora potenziali focolai che avrebbero potuto originare seri incidenti. Perciò, entrambe le parti dovevano mantenere un efficace collegamento con UNIFIL e prendere tempestive azioni per evitare qualsiasi violazione o incidente.

In una lettera dell'11 luglio indirizzata al Segretario Generale, la Rappresentanza Permanente del Libano presso l'ONU esprime la richiesta del proprio Governo intesa ad ottenere dal Consiglio di Sicurezza l'estensione del mandato di UNIFIL per un ulteriore periodo di 6 mesi, ossia fino al 31 gennaio 2001. Nel suo rapporto del 20 luglio, il Segretario Generale raccomandò che il Consiglio accogliesse tale richiesta, significando che la Forza sarebbe stata pienamente in grado di dislocarsi e funzionare nella propria area di operazioni, e che le autorità libanesi avrebbero intensificato la loro presenza dislocando nell'area ulteriori truppe e forze di sicurezza interna. Il dislocamento di UNIFIL doveva essere strettamente coordinato con quello delle forze libanesi.

Si presentava una "buona occasione", disse il Segretario Generale, per conseguire nei mesi seguenti gli obiettivi della risoluzione 425 del Consiglio di Sicurezza e per UNIFIL di completare i compiti inizialmente assegnatigli. Egli disse che avrebbe riferito al Consiglio di Sicurezza entro la fine di ottobre sugli ultimi sviluppi di situazione.

Il Segretario Generale richiamò inoltre l'opportunità di incrementare gli aiuti stranieri a favore del Libano, osservando che il reinsediamento nell'area meridionale avrebbe imposto un pesante fardello sul Libano e che la rimozione delle mine e del munizionamento inesploso dovevano essere un "grande compito" che richiedeva l'assistenza internazionale. "Desidero incoraggiare gli Stati Membri di cooperare con il Governo del Libano e con le agenzie ed i programmi delle Nazioni Unite per supportare la ricostruzione e lo sviluppo dell'area, non solo per i propri interessi bensì come un importante contributo alla stabilità di questa parte del mondo."

RIMOZIONE DELLE VIOLAZIONI SULLA LINEA DI CONFINO

Il 24 luglio 2000, il Segretario Generale informò il Consiglio di Sicurezza che le autorità israeliane avevano interrotto tutte le violazioni della linea di confine. Nello stesso giorno, in un incontro con l'Inviato Speciale del Segretario Generale, il Presidente Libanese Emile Lahoude ed il Primo Ministro Selim el-Hoss diedero il loro consenso al completo dispiegamento di UNIFIL. Il dispiegamento della Forza fu programmato per il 26 luglio per il successivo dispiegamento nell'ex area controllata da Israele delle forze libanesi.

APPROVAZIONE DELL'ESTENSIONE DEL MANDATO DI UNIFIL

Adottando all'unanimità la risoluzione 1310 del 27 luglio 2000, il Consiglio di Sicurezza decise di estendere il mandato di UNIFIL fino al 31 gennaio 2001 ed al tempo stesso raccomandò il Governo del Libano di assicurare il ripristino della sua autorità e presenza nel sud del Paese mediante, in particolare, un rilevante dispiegamento delle sue forze armate. Recependo la dichiarazione del Segretario Generale indicante che in data 24 luglio il Governo di Israele aveva rimosso tutte violazioni della linea di confine, il Consiglio raccomandò le parti di rispettare tale linea e di cooperare pienamente con le Nazioni Unite ed UNIFIL.

ESPANSIONE DI UNIFIL

Nel rapporto del 22 maggio 2000, il Segretario Generale descrisse i mezzi aggiuntivi necessari a UNIFIL per portare a termine i suoi compiti nell'ambito delle risoluzioni 425 e 426 conseguentemente al ritiro degli Israeliani. Egli dichiarò che UNIFIL doveva essere gradatamente rinforzata per adempiere alle sue responsabilità alla luce della situazione di sicurezza nel Libano meridionale, tenendo pure conto l'aumento del territorio da controllare a seguito della ritirata degli Israeliani. La forza totale di truppe necessarie per assolvere tali compiti doveva aumentare dalle precedenti 4.513 unità ad approssimativamente 5.600 unità. Una volta confermato il ritiro di Israele, UNIFIL doveva essere rinforzata portando la sua forza ad un totale di otto battaglioni più le appropriate unità di supporto, ovvero approssimativamente 7.935 uomini.

Nel suo successivo rapporto, sottoposto al Consiglio di Sicurezza il 20 luglio, il Segretario Generale disse che la prima fase del rinforzamento di UNIFIL era in corso. Nel giugno, la capacità di sminamento di UNIFIL era aumentata di due unità fornite da Svezia ed Ucraina. In aggiunta, era previsto entro la fine di luglio l'arrivo in UNIFIL di un battaglione del genio di 600 Ucraini, erano state rinforzate le unità della Finlandia, Ghana, Irlanda e Nepal ed, inoltre, era in corso il rinforzamento delle unità delle Figi e dell'India.

RICONFIGURAZIONE DI UNIFIL

Il 30 gennaio 2001, il Consiglio di Sicurezza, con la Risoluzione 1337, decise di estendere il mandato di UNIFIL per ulteriori sei mesi (fino al 31 luglio 2001), con la prospettiva di ridurre entro tale data la forza ai livelli precedenti il ritiro israeliano (4500 uomini). Fu chiesto, inoltre, al Governo libanese di assumere progressivamente il controllo completo della regione meridionale del Paese, dispiegandovi le proprie truppe e le forze di polizia. Secondo la situazione del 30 giugno 2001, UNIFIL comprendeva 5.496 uomini (appartenenti ai seguenti Paesi: Figi, Finlandia, Francia, Ghana, India, Irlanda, Italia, Nepal, Polonia e Ucraina), avvalendosi anche dell'assistenza di 51 osservatori militari di UNTSO ("United Nations Truce Supervision Organization") nella missione di supervisione per il controllo del cessate il fuoco. Con la prevista partenza dei contingenti irlandese e finnico nell'autunno, la Forza si ridusse a circa 3.600 uomini.

La riconfigurazione prevista dal Segretario Generale considerava il dislocamento della maggioranza delle truppe in posizioni protette a ridosso della linea di confine ("linea blu"). Mantenendo la sua capacità di sminamento, la Forza fu gradatamente ridotta a 2000 uomini, comprendendo il contributo di Francia, Ghana, India, Italia, Polonia e Ucraina. In tale ottica, UNIFIL mantenne una forza di 3.600 uomini fino a gennaio 2002, prevedendo di raggiungere la completa riconfigurazione entro la fine del 2002.

ULTERIORE ESTENSIONE DEL MANDATO

Secondo il rapporto presentato dal Segretario Generale, risulta che nel periodo da gennaio a luglio 2001 la situazione nell'area si è mantenuta generalmente stabile. Inoltre, a causa del mancato raggiungimento di una completa pace con Israele, il Governo libanese non aveva ancora provveduto a rischierare le proprie Forze armate lungo la "linea blu".

Con la risoluzione 1428 del 31 luglio 2002, il Consiglio di Sicurezza ha esteso il mandato di UNIFIL al 31 gennaio 2003, con la raccomandazione alle parti in causa di rispettare pienamente la linea di confine ed esprimendo preoccupazione su una positiva risoluzione della controversia nel caso permanesse la situazione di tensione lungo la linea di confine. Ancora una volta il Consiglio di Sicurezza ha invitato il Governo libanese ad assicurare il ritorno della propria effettiva autorità nella zona meridionale del paese, dispiegando in tale area le proprie forze armate.

Nel suo successivo rapporto del 14 gennaio 2003, il Segretario Generale riporta che per la maggior parte, l'area di operazioni di UNIFIL si è mantenuta tranquilla anche se continua a sussistere un clima di tensione. Come enfatizzato dal Segretario Generale, ogni violazione della “Blue Line” e qualsiasi provocazione attuata da entrambe le parti rischia di alimentare escalation e tensioni, con possibilità di scontri armati.

Per quanto riguarda la riconfigurazione di UNIFIL, il predetto rapporto riferisce che essa è stata completata alla fine del 2002, comportando l'assestamento della Forza a 2.000 unità.

MISSIONE

Prima della crisi di luglio/agosto 2006 la missione delle forze UNIFIL era quella di verificare il ritiro delle truppe israeliane dal Libano, assistere il Governo libanese nel ristabilire la propria autorità nell'area ripristinando così la sicurezza e la stabilità internazionale.

Con la risoluzione 1701 dell'11 agosto 2006 <http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N06/465/03/PDF/N0646503.pdf?OpenElement> il Consiglio di Sicurezza delle Nazioni Unite ha previsto il potenziamento del contingente militare di UNIFIL con lo scopo di:

- supportare le Forze Armate libanesi nell'attuazione di quanto previsto con la Risoluzione 1701;
- facilitare il dispiegamento delle F.A. regolari libanesi nel Sud del Libano fino alla Blue Line, mentre Israele ritira le sue forze dal Libano, coordinandosi con i Governi di Israele e del Libano;
- monitorizzare la fine delle ostilità fra Israele e Hezbollah;
- contribuire alla creazione di condizioni idonee alla realizzazione di una situazione di pace e sicurezza;
- assistere le Forze Armate libanesi nella loro dislocazione nella zona meridionale del Paese fino al confine con Israele, consentendo il completo ritiro delle forze israeliane

dai territori nel sud del Libano;

- assicurare la libertà di movimento/azione al personale delle Nazioni Unite e dei convogli umanitari;
- stabilire le condizioni necessarie per un accordo permanente di cessate il fuoco e per favorirne la sua implementazione;
- assistere, su richiesta, il Governo libanese nel controllo delle linee di confine per prevenire l'immissione illegale di armi.

CONTRIBUTO NAZIONALE

ATTUALE

Dal 2 febbraio 2007, il Generale di Divisione italiano Claudio GRAZIANO (Force Commander) è al Comando della forza UNIFIL in Libano.

Una componente dell'Aviazione dell'Esercito (53 militari), costituito da 4 elicotteri AB 205 di stanza a Naqoura (sede del Comando UNIFIL), svolge compiti d'evacuazione sanitaria, ricognizione, ricerca e soccorso e collegamento tra UNIFIL HQ e le unità operative dipendenti.

Inoltre, l'Italia, allo scopo di contribuire all'incremento del pacchetto di forze a disposizione di UNIFIL per l'assolvimento dei compiti assegnati, in accordo alla Risoluzione n. 1701 (2006), e al conseguimento degli obiettivi e finalità stabiliti dalle Nazioni Unite per prevenire la ripresa delle ostilità e ristabilire una situazione di pace e sicurezza nel Libano meridionale, partecipa alla missione internazionale con un contingente militare, denominata in ambito nazionale, Operazione “Leonte” (autorizzati a partecipare 2.450 militari).

Attualmente, dal 22 aprile 2007 il Generale di Brigata dell'Esercito Maurizio FIORAVANTI è al Comando del Settore Ovest di UNIFIL e del Contingente nazionale (National Contingent Commander –NCC) che costituisce la Joint Task Force italiana in Libano (JTF-L) su base della Brigata paracadutisti “Folgore”. Alle sue dipendenze operano 2 Battle Group di manovra, un gruppo di supporto di aderenza che garantisce il sostegno logistico al contingente, e unità specialistiche (genio, trasmissioni, CIMIC, NBC, EOD), assetti dell'aviazione dell'Esercito, Forze Speciali ed una componente di Polizia Militare dell'Arma dei Carabinieri. Il comando del contingente è stanziato nella base Tibnin (sede anche del Comando del settore ovest di UNIFIL), mentre le unità di manovra e i supporti sono suddivisi tra le basi di Maraka, Zibqin, Bayyadah, Hariss e Chaama.

Nell'ambito del Contingente nazionale operano unità di Francia, Ghana, Qatar e Slovenia.

Presso il Dipartimento per le Operazioni di Peace-Keeping (Department of Peacekeeping Operations – DPKO) dell'ONU a New York, su decisione del Segretario Generale delle Nazioni Unite, è stata istituita una Cellula di Direzione Strategica (Military Strategic Cell – MSC) della Missione UNIFIL con il compito di fornire le linee guida e la direzione strategico militare al responsabile della componente militare di UNIFIL. Dal 21 marzo 2007 il Cotrammiraglio Raffaele CARUSO ricopre l'incarico di Deputy MSC. Fino al 2 marzo 2007, il Generale di Corpo d'Armata italiano Giovanni RIDINO' ha ricoperto l'incarico di Direttore della Cellula Militare Strategica.

PRECEDENTE

A seguito della rimozione da parte delle Autorità israeliane del blocco navale imposto di fronte alle coste libanesi, ed in esito ad una specifica richiesta avanzata dal Segretario Generale delle Nazioni Unite, il Governo italiano, approvava l'impiego del Gruppo Navale italiano, per contribuire alla costituzione di una “Maritime Task Force” (MTF) ad “interim” in supporto alla Marina libanese per il controllo delle acque territoriali.

Dall'8 settembre 2006 al 16 ottobre 2006, l'Italia ha avuto il ruolo di Lead Nation nell'attività di controllo/sorveglianza del traffico mercantile diretto verso le acque territoriali libanesi. Tale attività di riporto/segnalazione di naviglio non identificato/sospetto viene svolta tenendo conto della lista dei mercantili diretti in Libano (fornita su base giornaliera dalle Autorità della Marina libanese) al di fuori delle acque territoriali e del sovrastante spazio aereo e vede la partecipazione anche di unità francesi, britanniche e greche.

Inoltre, fu costituita una Joint Amphibious Task Force – Lebanon (JATF-L) articolata su un Gruppo Navale ed una Joint Landing Force – Lebanon (JLF-L) dispiegata in teatro, nel ruolo di Early Entry Force (EEF), per il rinforzo del contingente UNIFIL e dare avvio alle necessarie attività organizzative per la ricezione di successive Follow On Forces (FOF) con il ruolo di forza di stabilizzazione e implementazione compiuta del mandato delle Nazioni Unite.

Il 29 agosto 2006, al termine delle operazioni di imbarco dei materiali e degli assetti del Reggimento “San Marco”, del Reggimento lagunari “Serenissima”, unità di supporto (NBC, EOD, genio) dell'Esercito e del plotone di Polizia Militare dei Carabinieri, partiva dall'Italia il Gruppo Anfibia interforze (JATF-L) al Comando dell'Ammiraglio di Divisione DE GIORGI (COMFORAL).

La JATF-L, composta dalla Portaeromobili GARIBALDI (flagship), dalle Navi da sbarco “San Giusto”, “San Giorgio” e “San Marco” e dalla Corvetta “Fenice”, oltre ad assetti aerei organici, conduceva, nei giorni 2 e 3 settembre 2006, lo sbarco della JLF-L presso la spiaggia di Tiro ed il porto di Naqoura.

Il 14 settembre 2006 la Nave San Giorgio veniva distaccata per il successivo rientro in Patria.

Il 18 settembre 2006 veniva completato il trasferimento degli assetti della JLF-L e del Comando della stessa nella Base di Tibnin (futura sede del Comando del Settore Ovest).

Il 19 settembre 2006 la Nave San Giusto veniva distaccata per il successivo rientro in Patria.

Il 7 ottobre 2006 Nave Fenice veniva avvicinata dalla Fregata “Espero”.

Il 16 ottobre 2006, successivamente alla cerimonia di passaggio di Comando del dispositivo navale internazionale alla Marina Militare tedesca, la Nave “Garibaldi” e la Nave “Espero” iniziavano il viaggio di rientro in Patria.

Il 19 ottobre 2006 la Nave “San Marco” terminava la missione nelle acque antistanti la costa libanese e iniziava il rientro in Patria.

La JLF-L, composta da circa 1.000 militari al comando del Contrammiraglio Claudio CONFESSORE fino al suo rientro l'8 novembre 2006, vide la partecipazione di personale appartenente al Reggimento “San Marco” della Marina Militare, al Reggimento lagunari “Serenissima” ed unità di supporto (NBC, EOD, genio) dell'Esercito, del plotone di Polizia Militare dei Carabinieri stanziati presso la base Tibnin, di Maraka, Zibqin, Chaama e di Al Hinnyah.

L'8 novembre 2006 si svolgeva la cerimonia di passaggio di consegne del settore Ovest tra la JLF-L e la JTF-L su base Brigata di cavalleria “Pozzuolo del Friuli”, che rientrava in Patria il 22 aprile 2007.

INCIDENTI E CADUTI

Il 6 agosto 1997, durante un volo di addestramento notturno, un AB205 cade al suolo a causa dell'improvviso peggioramento delle condizioni meteorologiche causando la morte del Capitano El Antonino SGRO', Capitano El Giuseppe PARISI, Maresciallo Capo El Massimo GATTI e l'Appuntato dei Carabinieri Daniel FORNER.