

Cognitive and pragmatic aspects of metonymy

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ABSTRACT

Meronymy has been described by Lakoff and his co-workers as a conceptual mapping within a domain which involves a 'stand for' relationship between entities. In this article this conception is revised in order to draw clearer dividing lines between metonymy and metaphor, on the one hand, and between meronymy and related polysemy phenomena, on the other. Considerations of mapping types and of the status of source-target relationships are brought to bear for the understanding of meronymy; also, an analysis of how metonymies are used referentially and predicatively is provided, which introduces the pragmatic dimension into the account. Finally, it is stressed that a sound understanding of the cognitive processes underlying meronymic expressions allows us to understand better their communicative potential. Then, it is proposed that the actual communicative impact of meronymy (and of metaphor, for that matter) can be best studied with the help of some of the conceptual tools provided in pragmatics by Relevance Theory.

KEY WORDS: Metaphor, metonymy, cognition, pragmatics

RESUMEN

La metonimia ha sido descrita por Lakoff y sus colaboradores como una proyección conceptual interna a un dominio en la que una entidad se usa para representar a otra. En este artículo se revisa esta concepción con el fin de trazar, de la forma más clara posible, los límites entre metonimia y metáfora, por una parte, y entre metonimia y otros fenómenos polisémicos relacionados, por otra. Se estudia la importancia de los distintos tipos de proyección y de la naturaleza de la relación entre los dominios fuente y meta para la comprensión del fenómeno meronímico. Asimismo se estudian los usos referencial y predicativo de la metonimia, lo que introduce la perspectiva pragmática en nuestro estudio. Como conclusión, se hace hincapié en que una buena comprensión de los procesos cognitivos que subyacen al uso de expresiones meronímicas nos permite entender mejor su potencial comunicativo. Finalmente, se defienden las ventajas de la aplicación al estudio del valor comunicativo de la metonimia de algunas de las herramientas conceptuales desarrolladas en pragmática por la Teoría de la Relevancia, aplicación que se puede hacer extensible al caso de la metáfora.

PALABRAS CLAVE: Metáfora, metonimia, cognición, pragmática

I. INTRODUCTION

In Cognitive Linguistics metaphor and metonymy have both been explicitly recognized as central to a theory of knowledge organization (see Lakoff. 1987). Metaphor has been discussed at length by Lakoff and his co-workers (see the seminal studies in Lakoff & Johnson, 1980, Lakoff & Turner, 1989, Kovecses, 1990, Lakoff. 1993, Lakoff. 1996). However, metonymy has received considerably less attention, although some cognitive linguists have produced important studies on the topic (e.g., Goossens, 1990, 1995. Croft, 1993, Barcelona, 1996), and we find (rather brief) treatments in Lakoff & Johnson (1980), Lakoff & Turner (1989), Lakoff (1987), and Taylor (1989).

The studies mentioned above deal with metonymy in cognitive terms as a conceptual operation which serves a structuring function of our knowledge and which, in the same way as metaphor, has an experiential basis. However, they seem to neglect one important aspect of all knowledge systems: their use potential. It is not very reasonable to study the nature of a knowledge system without reference to its communicative purpose. This is a point that applied linguist Henry Widdowson was most careful to make a long time ago, when discourse analysts and applied linguists were starting to explore the implications of the theories of knowledge organization for linguistic production and processing (see Widdowson, 1984). Our own study attempts to incorporate the study of metonymy into the wider framework of communication theory. This will help us place the phenomenon in due perspective and criticize adequately the deficiencies of the existing accounts in cognitive linguistics.

II. PROBLEMS IN DEFINING METONYMY

Metaphor and metonymy have both been described by Lakoff and his co-workers as mappings between conceptual domains. By means of metaphor we understand and reason about one conceptual domain in terms of another. For example, if I say *John is in trouble* I am conceptualizing trouble as if it were a container or a bounded region. Or take another common every-day expression such as *He has reached his goal*. In it, a person's goal is seen as the destination in a journey. So, what is relevant about metaphors is not that some expression is substituted for another but that there is some sort of interaction between two conceptual domains. Thus, our knowledge about containers tells us, among other things, that these have boundaries that make it difficult to escape, and that once inside a container an entity is subject to the conditions prevailing in the container and may be affected by them. If a person is "in trouble", he or she is affected by it, and there may be impediments for him or her to solve the problematic situation (ie. to "get out" of the situation). These implications are to some extent part of the logic of the metaphor. Similarly, destinations are part of a system which also has its own logic. Reaching a destination involves effort and overcoming impediments to travel. This same logic can be applied to the activity of figuratively reaching a goal. It is because of logical implications like these that the following sentences make full sense:

- (1) At last he reached his goal
- (2) Too many drawbacks prevented him from reaching his goal

- (3) It was/wasn't easy for him to reach his goal
- (4) He's in trouble and he's doing nothing to get out of it
- (5) He's so deep in trouble there's not much he can do about it

A metaphor is, therefore, a mapping (i.e. a set of correspondences) between two conceptual domains where one domain (called the **source**) **serves** to **structure** and reason about another (called the target).

Metonymy has also **been** described as a mapping, but of a rather different kind. Consider the differences between the two following expressions, which we borrow from Lakoff & Johnson (1980:35):

- (6) Inflation robbed me of my savings
- (7) The ham sandwich is waiting for his check

The word "inflation" **does** not refer to a person, but to an entity to which we impute human qualities (we see inflation as an adversary). In contrast, the expression "ham sandwich" **does** refer to a person, but without ascribing human qualities to it. According to Lakoff & Johnson, the former is a case of metaphor which we **call** personification: in it, a non-human entity is mapped onto a human entity. The latter is a case of metonymy: in it, one entity is made to stand for another.

But there is more that we can say about these two expressions. In (6) inflation is **seen** as an adversary that **does** harm to the speaker. This idea is the central implication of the metaphor (ie. that inflation has done the speaker as much **harm** as a thief that had taken all his or her savings would **have** done). And in **principle** this implication is the **only** one that the speaker is entitled to expect the addressee to derive. However, the addressee may want to derive **further** implications by exploring the **connections** between the **source** and the target in the metaphor. For example, a thief's **unlawful** actions may be felt to be treacherous (i.e. the speaker, as an investor, may **have been** caught by surprise). Or the speaker may **feel** he or she has to **take** precautions for the **future** (for example, by reinvesting his or her money more wisely). **Less** central implications **like** these account for the appropriateness of the following expansions of example (6):

- (8) Inflation robbed me of my savings, but I won't **let** that happen again.
- (9) Inflation robbed me of my savings, which I didn't expect.
- (10) Inflation robbed me of my savings, which was a tremendous nuisance.

and they **also** account for the strangeness of the following (which would be best interpreted as examples of irony):

- (11) **?What a nice thing** inflation robbed me of my savings!
- (12) **?Inflation** robbed me of my savings and I will let that happen again.
- (13) **?Inflation** robbed me of my savings **just as I** wanted.

In contrast to what happens in the metaphor in (6), the metonymy in (7) **does** not seem to convey any **special** implication, neither primary nor secondary. In a restaurant context, (7) may **well** be used by a waitress as a convenient device to identify a customer.

In other words, (7) is a definite description whose purpose in the context given is to achieve successful reference in an economical way. The waitress might **have** said something like *The customer who has ordered a ham sandwich is waiting for his check*, but this would be a rather cumbersome expression if compared to the more straightforward one used in (7). Lakoff & Johnson (1980), Lakoff (1987), and Lakoff & Turner (1989), explicitly deal with metonymic expressions like (7) in terms of mappings. However, as they are careful to point out, the mappings are carried out within a single conceptual domain, which, they argue, is what ultimately makes the difference between metaphor and metonymy. In this view, the ham sandwich is mapped to (i.e. it stands for) the customer and it belongs to the same conceptual domain (i.e. the restaurant situation) as the customer. Furthermore, the ham sandwich is made to stand for the customer because of its particular salience from the point of view of the speaker's concerns. We can illustrate this if we compare (7) above with other expressions like *The brown wallet is waiting for his check* or *The pair of shoes is waiting for his check*. The former would require a very different perspectivization of the restaurant situation, while the latter would be particularly infelicitous to refer to a restaurant customer, unless we had a rather uncommon context.

To sum up, Lakoff and his collaborators define metonymy as a conceptual mapping within a single domain where one entity in a conceptual domain stands for another entity in the same domain, or for the whole domain. They also contend that metonymy is used primarily for reference (see Lakoff & Turner, 1989: 103) and that metonymies are not random occurrences but make up conventional systems. In this connection, Lakoff & Johnson (1980) provide us with a sample list of some common metonymies like PART FOR WHOLE (e.g. *We don't hire longhairs*), PRODUCER FOR PRODUCT (e.g. *I'll have a Lowenbrau*), OBJECT USED FOR USER (e.g. *The sax has the flue today*), CONTROLLER FOR CONTROLLED (e.g. *Nixon bombed Hanoi*), INSTITUTION FOR PEOPLE RESPONSIBLE (e.g. *Exxon has raised its prices again*), THE PLACE FOR THE INSTITUTION (e.g. *Wall Street is in a panic*), and THE PLACE FOR THE EVENT (e.g. *Watergate changed our politics*)²

However, not all these observations are truly definitional for metonymy and cannot be used to account for the phenomenon adequately as they stand. We can provisionally point out the following problems:

- It is pointless to say that metonymies are primarily used referentially unless it is explained why this is so. Note that metaphors can also be used referentially. For example, an expression like *The pig is waiting for his check* might be used by a waitress to refer to a particularly unpleasant customer who has kept harassing her. Conversely, it is perfectly feasible and appropriate to make a predicative use of a metonymy, as in the utterance *John is a real brain*, meaning that John is extremely intelligent.

- Metonymies are said to involve a 'stand for' relationship. Thus, "the ham sandwich" in (7) stands for the customer who has ordered a ham sandwich. But we find the same relationship in *The pig is waiting for his check*, where "the pig" also stands for the customer. This observation points to a close connection between the so-called 'stand for' relationship and the referential use of both metaphorical and metonymic expressions.

- Making a distinction between mappings within a single domain and across domains, although tenable, is a rather tricky issue. We need some solid criteria that help us to determine unequivocally when we have cases of domain-internal or domain-external mappings. The existence of sub-domains is usually clear in cases of straightforward part-

whole/whole-part relationships or when we **have** taxonomies (the 'is-a-type-of' relationship). But in other cases we need to speak of sub-domains in a rather loose sense. For example, in the sentence *John is a fine working hand*, since a hand is a physical and functional pan of John (as a person), the domain-internal mapping between John and his hand is fairly straightforward. But in *The ham sandwich is waiting for his check*, the ham sandwich is not a pan of the person referred to in the same sense as a hand would be. The difference is all the more obvious if we compare these related expressions:

- (14) The fine working hand is waiting for his pay cheque
 (15) John is a ham sandwich

While it is possible to use the expression "fine working hand" both referentially and predicatively and preserve the domain-internal nature of the mapping, it is impossible to use the expression "ham sandwich" predicatively and **have** a domain-internal mapping at the same time, as evidenced by example (15). This is so **because** a hand is more readily (and more obviously) identified as pan of the conceptual structure for 'customer' than a ham sandwich.

The ham sandwich-customer relationship is mediated by the restaurant context. But there are cases where we **also have** a rather loose association between two concepts without the intervention of any specific context. In a sense, it is possible to say that for the mapping to occur within a domain the speaker needs to **perform** a mental operation by means of which one domain is made to be subsumed, sometimes temporarily -as in the ham sandwich example-, under another. For example, in *He bought a Picasso*, the work of an may be thought to be pan of Picasso's central activity in his life, and therefore, loosely speaking, pan of him. This case is comparable to clear cases of whole-part relationships, like *Hefilled up the car* (meaning that he filled the petrol tank). In *Superman will probably no longer be able to walk again*, "Superman" (the film character) stands for the actor (Christopher Reeve), and can be loosely thought of as pan of his life. This case is comparable to clear cases of pan-whole relationships, like the use of a body pan for a type of person (consider expressions like *All hands on deck!*, *He is a good head for sums*, *She's just another pretty face*, etc.).

Now, consider:

- (16) God is an all-seeing eye

This expression may be used to emphasize God's alleged ability to see **and** observe **everything and** everyone when it is **his** will. If we want to divide metaphor from metonymy on the grounds of whether we **have** a **mapping within** a domain or a **mapping** across domains, an expression like (16) is problematic. Most **believers in** God would not contend that God **actually** has eyes in the physical sense. So, if the relationship between the concepts 'eye' and 'God' is to be one of pan-whole, this has to be in a metaphorical sense. That is to say, God has eyes **only** figuratively in an anthropomorphic conception. At the same time, (16) **makes** an predicative use of the 'eye'-'God' metonymy to highlight God's observing powers. That this is so will be **all** the more evident if we compare (16) to (17) below:

- (17) John is all eyes

People are said to be **all** eyes when they are very **observant** as if constantly looking around them eagerly. A **crucial** difference with (16) is that the relationship between 'eye' and 'John', **unlike** that between 'eye' and 'God', **does** not rest on a metaphor. In (16) there is first a mapping from the domain of human beings, with physical attributes, to the domain of spiritual beings, with non-physical attributes but with comparable functional attributes. This would be a metaphoric mapping since two different domains are involved. Then, there is a second mapping according to which an eye stands for its function. Finally, as a result of a third mapping **-between** 'eye' and 'God'-, God is made to **epitomize** observation capabilities with the **implication** that since he watches everything, he **also** watches one's deeds.

From the discussion above it may be provisionally (but safely) concluded that metonymy is distinguished from metaphor in that metonymy involves a conceptual mapping within a domain, while metaphor involves a mapping across domains. The predominantly referential character of metonymy is not a definitional criterion, nor is it to say that metonymic correspondences are of the 'stand for' type, versus the 'is a' type for metaphors. Our discussion **also** points to the need of making an adequate distinction between process and result in understanding metaphor and metonymy. Since both share referential and predicative uses, we may **have** to find the difference in the type of mapping process of which they **form part**. But before we go into this question, it will **prove** useful to discuss Croft's (1993) distinction between 'domain mapping' and 'domain highlighting'. While the analysis of mapping types **allows** us to distinguish metonymy from metaphor, the **study** of 'domain highlighting' will enable us to draw the boundaries between metonymy and related polysemy phenomena.

III. DOMAIN HIGHLIGHTING

Croft (1993) **follows Lakoff** and his collaborators in arguing that metonymy involves a mapping within a domain (or domain matrix). He adds, however, that metonymy almost invariably involves a conceptual effect **called** "domain highlighting". To give one of his examples, **think** of the expression:

(18) Proust is tough to read

In the encyclopedic view of semantics, which cognitivists uphold, the works of Proust are **part** of the concept 'Proust' although they are not as central as, for example, the fact that Proust was a person. The metonymic shift from Proust to Proust's work is quite natural since Proust is famous as a writer and the work produced is a salient element in the domain of **creative activity**. The effect produced by the shift (i.e. "domain highlighting") is one of making primary what is otherwise (in its literal **meaning**) a secondary domain. Domain highlighting is a necessary but not **sufficient** condition for metonymy. It **also** occurs **in** other types of lexical ambiguity. To borrow two of Croft's examples **in** this respect, contrast:

(19) This book is heavy

(20) This book is a history of Iraq

The concept 'book' is profiled at least in two **primary** domains: physical objects and semantic content. In (19) the domain of physical objects is highlighted; in (20) it is the semantic content domain that is highlighted. (This is due to the requirements of the predicates 'heavy' and 'a history of Iraq' respectively). Although the concepts symbolised by "this book" are different in (19) and (20), the word "book" is not to be treated as metonymic since, according to Croft, the elements profiled in each domain are highly intrinsic, that is, they make no reference to external entities (see Langacker, 1987:160). So, in this view, the difference between metonymy and other cases of domain highlighting would have to do with the extent to which the highlighted domain is considered to be intrinsic to the concept. As an example of this, Croft examines the following two uses of "window":

- (21) I broke the window
 (22) She came in through the bathroom window

We may summarize Croft's explanation as follows: the concept 'window' can be interpreted in the shape and physical object domains; being a physical object is intrinsic to the concept but the interpretation of window as an opening in the shape domain is somewhat extrinsic because it makes reference to external entities around it; however, the shape domain for 'window' seems to be less extrinsic than Proust's writings for 'Proust'; so, the example about Proust above is a clear case of metonymy, but the status of (22) is not so clear. Examples like these tend to show that there is "a continuum between clear cases of metonymy and the highlighting of highly intrinsic facets of a concept" (Croft 1993:350).

While we may agree to some extent with this conclusion and with the relevance of the highlighting process for the understanding of metonymy, there are some crucial aspects of Croft's account which seem to be essentially misled. We shall now re-examine his analysis of examples (21) and (22) above to prove that it is not intrinsicness but centrality that makes the difference between cases of metonymy and other cases of domain highlighting. In fact, the misuse of the concept of intrinsicness in semantic characterizations has led Croft to view (22) as closer to being an example of metonymy than (21), while it may be argued that it is (21) that shares more with the clearest cases of metonymy. To this we shall add the observation that highlighting is applied to metaphor as well and therefore this concept is not useful to distinguish metaphor from metonymy.

First, let us address the question of the intrinsicness of the domains involved in the different uses of the word "window". A property is intrinsic if it makes no reference to external entities. Langacker (1987:160) gives the example of shape for physical objects, in contrast to size, since size is understood by comparison with other objects. If we apply Langacker's logic, a window is a physical object with a certain shape and size; while size is an extrinsic property, shape is an intrinsic property of windows. Interestingly enough, Croft -who intends to apply Langacker's notion of "intrinsicness"- has reached exactly the opposite conclusion. The source of this contradiction is perhaps to be found in that shape can be thought of both as an intrinsic and an extrinsic property of things. It is intrinsic to the extent that, to use Langacker's own words, "it reduces to relations between the parts of an object and does not require interaction or comparison with other entities" (Langacker, 1987:160-161). It is extrinsic to the extent that, when applied to characterize a given entity, it singles the entity out from others'. Thus, if one uses the word "window" to describe a physical object in contrast to other objects in a hardware store showroom, which is Croft's

illustration (Croft, 1993: 349), shape becomes an extrinsic property. But if one is thinking of a window in a wall, a roof, or the side of a vehicle -the places where one would normally expect to find it- its shape is an intrinsic property.

If the interpretation of 'window' both in the shape domain and in the physical object domain involves intrinsic properties of the entity, it is not accurate to say, even using Croft's own logic, that (22) is (nearly) a case of metonymy, at least on the basis of its purported "extrinsicness". But the fact is that it could be argued that (21) is a clearer case of metonymy than (22), since breaking a window is normally interpreted as breaking the "window-pane": 'window' maps onto 'window-pane' (the whole object maps onto a part of the object). So we need to find a more solid criterion to distinguish metonymic from non-metonymic uses. Note that it is possible to have a window without a pane (it still serves its function as an opening in a wall that lets light come in and lets you look out), so (21) focuses on a non-central (or more peripheral) aspect of the concept. (22), on the other hand, focuses on a central aspect, since it is impossible to have a window without an opening. Degree of centrality, therefore, seems to be the criterion we are looking for. Precisely, Langacker (1987) has explained centrality in terms of a combination of criteria: it correlates with the extent to which a specification is conventional (shared by a community), generic (not idiosyncratic with a particular item), intrinsic (making no reference to external entities), and characteristic (unique to the class of items concerned). Intrinsicness is only one of the criteria.

The same division between central and peripheral specifications explains why (19) is not but (20) might be a case of metonymy. A book is a number of sheets of paper bound together. As such, it has the intrinsic property of having weight. The predicate 'heavy' in (19) applies to this central description. We also know that books have information written in them, but the book in (20) has historical information about Iraq. This semantic specification violates all the centrality criteria except perhaps intrinsicness: books are not conventionally histories of Iraq; then, being a history of Iraq is not unique to the class of items designated by "book", nor is it generic knowledge. So, (20), contrary to what Croft seems to suggest, qualifies as a case of metonymy, although to a lesser extent than other cases like (18) which violates all the centrality criteria including intrinsicness.

Let us now turn to the question of "domain highlighting". Remember that Croft argues that metonymy makes primary a domain which is secondary in its literal meaning. This description seems to hold for examples where a whole domain stands for a significant part of the same domain. But consider a different case:

(23) John is a brain

Here "brain" stands for "a person with good intellectual abilities"; part of a domain stands for the whole domain and at the same time highlights a feature which is conventionally, generically, intrinsically, and characteristically associated with brains: intelligence. So, interpretation here does not proceed by making primary a secondary domain but rather by singling out a very central feature of brains which is then attributed to John. In this respect, (23) is not very different from some metaphors. Consider:

(24) John is a lion

In this metaphor, there is a conventional **feature** of lions ('courage') which is attributed to John. **Through** cultural convention based on experience (our **observation** of the **instinctive** behaviour of lions), courage has **become** a central **feature** of our concept of lion. **In** a way similar to what happened with **intelligence** in (23), it is this central **feature** that is highlighted in (24) and then attributed to John.

The fact that there are clear cases of metonymy where no secondary domain is highlighted **does** not invalidate the relevance of the notion of 'domain highlighting' for the description of metonymy but rather places this notion **in** a different perspective. First, highlighting works both for metonymy and for metaphor. **Second**, it works in different ways depending on the status of the relationship between the **source** and target domains involved and on the primary or secondary nature of the source. There are two possibilities for the relationship between **source** and target domains: one, that the target is a conceptually significant **element** of the source, as **in** the Proust example; two, that the **source** is part of the target, as in the ham sandwich and related examples above. If the target (e.g. Proust's work in (18)) is **included** within the **source** (i.e. Proust) we will **have** a clear case of metonymy only if the target is a secondary or non-central domain. This **makes us** regard expressions like (22) or similar ones (e.g. She *looked out of* the window), where the purported target has primary status as non-metonymic or, **in** any event, as borderline cases. If it is the **source** that forms part of the target, it is **immaterial** whether the **source** is **deemed** to be a primary or a secondary domain. Thus, **in** (7) 'ham sandwich' is secondary, but in (23) 'brain' is primary. The 'ham sandwich' stands for 'the customer who has ordered a ham sandwich' **and** 'brain' for 'person with excellent intellectual abilities'. In both one **relevant** attribute is singled out, highlighted, and used to talk about the target, **in** (7) **referentially**, and **in** (23) **predicatively**.

It may be additionally noted that the mapping process precedes and motivates the highlighting process. Thus, **in** (23) the explicit correspondence between John (the target) and the brain (the source) leads the hearer to look for the most relevant **feature** in the **source** to attribute to the target. In (18), the hearer, **in** being confronted with the absence of an explicit target domain, needs to look for it within the **source** domain. Much the same occurs **in** (21) and (22) where the hearer has to **find out** whether **the** speaker is referring to a window-pane or to an opening in a wall.

IV. TYPES OF MAPPING

Examples (23) and (24) above suggest that the **crucial** difference between metaphor and metonymy **is** not a matter of domain mapping versus domain highlighting. Previously, we saw that other criteria, like **its** frequent referential use and the 'stand for' relationship between **source** and target are not **valid** (since they hold both for metaphor and metonymy) and that the only tenable difference has to do with the **domain-internal** or **domain-external** nature of the mapping. If this is **true**, and since a mapping process lies at the base of both metaphor and metonymy, it might be profitable to describe them in **terms** of the type of mapping and the effects involved.

Let us turn again to the metaphor **in** (24). It is obvious that it conveys more than the rough paraphrase "John is courageous". And it must do so, otherwise why bother to use the metaphor at **all** rather than the paraphrase? This point **is all** too obvious, too. What is more

interesting is to see how this happens. The process has been explained in detail by Lakoff & Turner (1989). They discuss the metaphor *Achilles is a lion*, which for them is a case of the PEOPLE ARE ANIMALS mapping. This metaphor is based on an interaction between the common-sense theory of things called the GREAT CHAIN and the GENEFÜC IS SPECIFIC metaphor. The GREAT CHAIN is defined by attributes and behaviour which apply to each form of being (humans, animals, plants, complex objects, natural physical things) in a hierarchy. For example, animals are endowed with instinctual attributes and behaviour, to which humans add higher-order attributes and behaviour. The GENEFÜC IS SPECIFIC metaphor is used to single out from specific concepts common generic conceptual structure. The interaction allows us to understand animal behaviour in terms of human character. On the other hand, the PEOPLE ARE ANIMALS mapping leads us to understand human character in terms of animal behaviour. In *Achilles is a lion* this results in our understanding Achilles's courage in terms of our knowledge about a lion's "courage".

According to Lakoff & Turner (1989: 196), "when we understand Achilles in terms of a lion. we map the lion onto Achilles, the lion's "courage" onto Achilles's courage, and *the relation between the lion and his "courage" onto the relation between Achilles and his courage*" (emphasis theirs). However, this is not entirely correct. Note that by experience-based convention (e.g. our knowledge about the way lions chase their quarry or defend their territory and offspring) we single out only one aspect of the source (animal behavioural attributes) and make them correspond with one aspect of the target (human behavioural attributes). There are other aspects of the target, such as Achilles's physical appearance, his manners, and so on, which play little if any role in the metaphor. Thus, we think of Achilles more readily as a fierce, indefatigable fighter than as a strong, weighty, and powerful man. We have only one mapping (or one correspondence), not three.

Lakoff and his collaborators have failed to note the importance of distinguishing between those mappings where all the implications are derived by virtue of a single correspondence -as is the case with (24) and similar metaphors- from those characterized by invoking a fully-fledged system of correspondences. For example, think of the following expression uttered by an infuriated father who is scolding his teenage son for patent misbehaviour:

(25) You are going nowhere that way!

In the context given, this expression is metaphorical and can be explained under the LIFE IS A JOURNEY mapping (see Lakoff & Turner, 1989:3-4). It must be interpreted as a warning from the father to the son about the son's predictable future. In this metaphor, the son is seen as a traveller who is unaware that he has taken a path that leads to an undesirable destination. The path is mapped onto the son's way of living (what he is doing) and the destination onto a life's goals. It is impossible to interpret (25) correctly if we leave out any of the relevant correspondences. Of course, there are other elements of a journey which are not called up -since they are not needed- but which are essential ingredients of the source for other expressions, like the vehicle in *He jumped on the bandwagon*, or the type of path in *My life has been a long, bumpy road*.

We can, therefore, make a distinction between one correspondence and many-correspondence mappings. There are two differences between these mapping types. One is that while many-correspondence mappings are primarily used to structure and reason about

as many aspects as possible of fairly abstract notions (such as love, life, quantity, etc.), one-correspondence mappings serve primarily to bring into focus and reason about one aspect of the target domain (like Achilles's instinctual courage) and are applied to concrete target domains. Another difference is related to the communicative effect of the mapping since many-correspondence mappings provide us with a wider range of meaning implications to explore, a point which will be taken up again in the next section.

So far, our discussion has made it possible for us to identify metonymies as cases of one-correspondence mappings where the target may be a part of the source or the source a part of the target. Metaphors based on one correspondence share most of their features with metonymies of the latter type. With the other type of metonymy, since the highlighting process has a different function, the similarities are fewer. Finally, the number of similarities between metaphor and metonymy is considerably smaller when it comes to cases of many-correspondence metaphors. If we take these observations into account together with our previous discussion on the role of primary and secondary domains for metonymy we will be in a position to formulate a full definition of metonymy in cognitive terms. Thus, a metonymy may be defined as a one-correspondence conceptual mapping within a domain where, if the target is part of the source, the target is not a primary or central sub-domain of the source.

V. CONTEXTUAL IMPLICATIONS

We have been able to see that it is possible to make both predicative and referential uses of metonymy. The same is true of metaphor, to such an extent that metaphors and metonymies sometimes bear a very close resemblance from the point of view of their communicative effects. Consider the following examples, borrowed from Ruiz de Mendoza (1996a):

- (26) When it comes to debating, John is a real lion
- (27) When it comes to debating, John is the lion
- (28) When it comes to debating, John is a real brain
- (29) When it comes to debating, John is the brain
- (30) When it comes to debating, we need 'the lion' to be with us
- (31) When it comes to debating, we need 'the brain' to be with us

In all these examples there is an interesting combination of mappings. On the one hand, we have the ARGUMENT IS WAR metaphor, which has been discussed by Lakoff & Johnson (1980). In this metaphor we see the person we are arguing with as an opponent in a battle. We plan tactics, attack, defend, and counterattack; we gain or lose ground, we win or we lose. On the other hand, we have the correspondence A PERSON IS A LION, which belongs to the more general PEOPLE ARE ANIMALS metaphor, and the correspondence A PERSON IS A PART OF THE BODY, which is metonymic in the sense that it is internal to a domain, as discussed above, but which actually belongs to a more general mapping labelled PEOPLE ARE ENTITIES, which, interestingly enough, would cover both cases of metaphor and of metonymy. It may be noted that (26) and (28) make a predicative use of the one-correspondence mappings involved. The rest of the examples make referential use of

them. It is when we make referential use of a mapping that a 'stand for' relationship may be said to hold between the source and target. In predicative uses we have an 'is a' relationship, independently of whether the mapping is carried out within a domain or across domains.

It is also evident that whether the mapping is domain-internal or domain-external is irrelevant in terms of the communicative effect achieved by means of it. In example (26), "a lion" can be roughly paraphrased as "a person with unyielding courage and determination"; and "a brain" in (28) as "a person with excellent intellectual abilities". Note incidentally that the hedge "real" reinforces the prominence of the attribute that is singled out by the mapping. Then, in (27) and (30) "the lion" means "the person with unyielding courage and determination", and "the brain" in (29) and (31) is "the person with excellent intellectual abilities". (27) and (29) are equative sentences where subject and complement are co-referential. Note now that the presence of hedges in referential uses would be highly infelicitous (we would not say "the real lion" or "the real brain") since in such uses attributes are not discussed but taken for granted and highlighted to achieve successful reference.

However, the nature of the mapping system does make a difference. Thus, when not used for mere referential purposes, predicative uses of one-correspondence mappings serve to place in focus and reason about a single relevant aspect of a conceptual domain. Many-correspondence mappings, on the other hand, serve the additional purpose of helping us to explore all the domain in question. It follows that many-correspondence mappings are richer in meaning implications.

One interesting thing about our account of metaphoric and metonymic mappings is that it is fully compatible with the basic requirements of Sperber & Wilson's (1986) well-known Relevance Theory. These authors see verbal communication as a form of ostensive behaviour intended to attract the hearer's attention. For an ostensive stimulus to achieve its purpose optimally it must keep a balance between cognitive economy and the communicative effects produced. Communicative effects are called contextual effects since they involve some sort of modification in the set of assumptions (ie. the hearer's mental context or cognitive environment) that the hearer brings to bear in the communication process. A verbal message will be optimally relevant for the hearer if it achieves (at least) the desired contextual effects for the least processing effort. Contextual effects are achieved when the newly-presented information interacts with the hearer's cognitive environment by strengthening, contradicting, or combining with an existing assumption. The combination of new and existing information produces contextual implications'.

Relevance theorists see metaphor as an economical way of producing a large amount of contextual effects by implication. Consider the brief analysis carried out by Blakemore (1991: 163) of the metaphor *My neighbour is a dragon*. According to this author, metaphors put us to some extra processing effort which is only justified if it is offset by the adequate range of contextual effects. The hearer is thus encouraged to explore a range of contextual implications other than the central (or strong) ones. *My neighbour is a dragon* conveys the strong implications "my neighbour is fierce" and "my neighbour is unfriendly". Other non-central (or weak) implications may have to do with the neighbour's appearance or with her overall behaviour. Since these are weaker implications the hearer must take a greater responsibility for their recovery, but they justify the speaker's utterance. Also, since it would be extremely difficult to find an alternative way of conveying the same range of implications (e.g. by means of paraphrases), the metaphor turns out to be a most convenient (and thereby economical) device.

Blakemore's analysis is based on a one-correspondence metaphor, but it may be extended to cover cases of many-correspondence metaphors. Consider again example (25) above. In it, the central correspondence is GOALS ARE DESTINATIONS. From it, we obtain the strong implication that the hearer leads a **purposeless** life (i.e. a life with no "destination"). Other weaker implications may be derived from the central one in combination with the rest of the relevant correspondences. For example, on the basis of the goal-destination correspondence, we may reason that it is possible for the hearer to find an alternative path which leads to a good, beneficial destination. The correspondence between the type of path and the hearer's way of living allows us to reason about the misled nature of the hearer's activities (there is no point in following a path that leads nowhere). And the way we understand the hearer's character traits is based on the traveller-hearer correspondence (what kind of person would take a path that leads nowhere?).

Think now of this other example:

(32) He crashed right after take-off

Imagine (32) as a remark on the **fate** of a basketball player's initially promising but eventually short-lived career in the context of an alcohol abuse problem. (32) is a case of the A CAREER IS A JOURNEY metaphor: a basketball player's career is a **journey** by aeroplane. The traveller maps onto the player, the vehicle onto the player's activities, the take-off onto the **beginning** of the career, the intended destination onto the player's goals and aspirations, the accident onto the **sudden** halt in the player's career, and the cause of the accident onto the player's excessive drinking. The central correspondence is, as with (25). DESTINATIONS ARE GOALS, and the strongest implication is that the player **ruined** his promising career not long after it had started (i.e. he didn't fulfil his aspirations). But we **have** a wider range of contextual effects. Thus, as with aeroplane accidents, we **feel** that the whole event had better never come about, that perhaps something could **have been** done about the player's problem before it **proved** fatal. In the source, we know that during take-off a lot more energy is consumed than during the flight. In the target the **beginnings** of a career as a professional player are harder and require much time, effort, and sacrifice. These **efforts** could **have been highly** rewarding but they were in vain since the player's activities came to an **abrupt** end just as the doomed flight comes to a **sudden**, unexpected, and unwanted **end**. In the **source** we know that an aeroplane can cover very long **distances** in a very short time; in the target we may reason that, much the **same** way, a lot could be expected of this player (progress is **seen** as movement towards the destination). But the promising prospects are thwarted by the untimely accident. And so on.

The cases we **have** examined in **terms** of Blakemore's analysis involve predicative uses of metaphor. We must **assume** that they would hold for cases of predicative use of metonymy as well. Thus, in *John is the brain*, there is a central implication about **John's intelligence**, and perhaps weaker implications about his behaviour, attitudes, etc. But since metonymies are restricted to one-correspondence mappings the number of contextual effects is smaller than with many-correspondence metaphors.

Referential uses of metaphor and metonymy can **also** be explained in **terms** of the balance between cognitive economy and contextual effects. Consider again examples (30) and (31) above. In (30) "the lion" stands for "the person that can be appropriately called **the lion**". Similarly, in (31) "the brain" stands for "the person that can be appropriately called

the brain". "The lion" and "the brain" refer each to a person that has a number of "quintessential" properties which are highlighted as a result of the mapping, as we saw before. The person is identified by these properties. So, all the contextual effects motivated by the mappings **serve** to **uniquely** identify the referent. Note that the metaphor and metonymy achieve in a synthetic, economical, **less cumbersome** way a **better** referential effect than could be achieved by means of a more elaborate definite description, as is the case with (33) below:

(33) When it comes to debating, we need 'the person that has excellent intellectual capabilities' to be with us.

Similar considerations hold for metonymies where the **source** is part of the target. Take the following metonymies, which we quoted at the beginning of this article:

(34)
Exxon has raised its prices again
Wall Street is in a **panic**
Watergate changed our politics

Each of these metonymies is an economical way of referring to a fairly complex target: "the people responsible for the price policies in Exxon", "the investors that buy and sell their stocks in the Wall Street stock market". and "the so-called Watergate affair" respectively. The purpose of this type of metonymy is not to invite the hearer to explore a large number of contextual effects but rather to describe a complex target in a simple way without impairing communicative success.

Metaphor and metonymy are cases of what Sperber & Wilson (1985:16) have called "loose uses" of language or "loose talk". They describe the circumstances in which it happens as follows:

The speaker **wants** to **communicate** to her hearer a certain set of propositions P, . . . P_n. They are **all** quite **easily** derivable as logical or contextual implications of a proposition Q whose truth she **does** not believe and **does** not want to guarantee. **The** best way of conveying this **information** may be to express the single proposition Q, as long as the hearer has some way of selecting those of its logical and contextual implications that **the** speaker intends to convey, and ignoring the others. (Sperber & Wilson, 1985:16, in Davis, 1991: 545)⁸.

Since it is precisely the mapping and **highlighting** processes discussed above that assist the hearer in selecting the contextual implications that the speaker intends to convey, the cognitive account of metaphor and metonymy is a pre-requisite for the pragmatic account, in such a way that the latter becomes complementary to the former. At the same time, the pragmatic account **provides** a general framework within which it is possible to define the use potential of metaphoric and metonymic mappings.

This application of Relevance Theory is contrary to Papafragou's (1995) account of metonymy within the same framework. First, Papafragou⁹ argues **against** the cognitive semantics approach to metonymy and **erroneously** states that this approach can but **deal** with

the most conventionalised metonymies. She suggests that instead of giving inventories of mappings, it is **better** to find a general pragmatic criterion powerful enough to predict "which metonymies are possible in a given context on the basis of the hearer's estimated capacity to understand them" (Papafragou, 1995: 148). Finally, she **argues** that metonymy is a **non-descriptive** use of language (an "echoic use" in relevance-theoretic terms) which (i) introduces a new name (the expression of a non-lexicalized ad hoc concept), and (ii) has as its intended referent something which **does not fall** under the normal denotation of the expression (Papafragou, 1995:155).

This view has **been** discussed in greater detail in Ruiz de Mendoza (1996a). **Here** it will be enough to point out **some** of its most fundamental problems. First, even though in **Relevance Theory** communication and cognition are closely related phenomena, Papafragou strangely excludes the cognitive approach to metonymy explicitly. For her, consistency with the principle of relevance (according to which the hearer is entitled to **assume** that the intended interpretation of an utterance creates the intended contextual effects for a minimum of processing effort) is enough to constrain **the** number of possible contextual implications of a metonymy. However, we are nowhere told what processes, if any, **regulate** the creation of contextual effects. **As** we **have seen**, the production of contextual effects is tied to the nature of the conceptual mappings involved, and what properties **become** salient in a mapping is to a large extent a matter of consistency between **domains**⁶ and of convention. Were a mapping not to be conventional or if the hearer had no previous knowledge of the mapping, nevertheless, the metaphor or the metonymy would be worked out on the basis of the hearer's conventional knowledge about the **source** and target domains. If none of these conditions hold, the metaphor or the metonymy **becomes uninterpretable**.

It must be borne **in** mind that the mappings **regulate** how contextual implications are **produced**, and that whatever is to be highlighted in a domain, although motivated by the mapping, is ultimately determined by the conventional conceptual **structure** of the domain in question. In this **connection**, our study of the cognitive processes underlying metaphorical and metonymic expressions fleshes out the rather vague relevance-theoretic proposition that contextual implications are obtained by consistency with the **principle** of relevance. For example, consider the following metonymy:

(35) You should avoid marrying a sheep at all costs (=someone born in the Year of the Sheep)

This metonymy is proposed by Papafragou (1995:148) as an example of "creative, **one-off**" metonymic use, which **cannot** be dealt with in terms of conventional **inventories** of metonymic mappings. But it must be noted that this metonymy is **virtually** impossible to **interpret unless** the hearer has access to a specific, not **easily** available piece of encyclopedic information about the Year of the Sheep (information which might as **well** derive from a **well-specified** context in which, for example, someone had **been** discussing the characteristics of the people born **in** that year). Once we can **construct** the **source** domain adequately we are no longer at a **loss** as to how to process (35), and the expression fits in **nicely** with other conventionalised ones like *You should avoid marrying a Pisces*, where the **source** domain is a sign of the zodiac and the target domain is the person born under that sign. Note **also** that, in the absence of the adequate background information, it is **still** possible for the hearer to work out the possible meaning of (35) **precisely** on the basis of the conventional mapping

which we have just described.

VI. CONCLUSION

We have been able to set up the boundaries between metonymy and metaphor, on the one hand, and between metonymy and other semantic phenomena which involve domain highlighting, on the other hand. We have also seen the importance of making a clear difference between predicative and referential uses of metaphoric and metonymic mappings, and we have analysed the communicative import of such uses. Our whole account revolves around the question of the complementariness between the cognitive and the communicative perspectives of metaphor and metonymy. Cognitive processes have not only an organizational or structuring purpose of concepts but also a communicative potential which needs to be explored. We have suggested that Relevance Theory provides us with the necessary conceptual tools to undertake this task and allows us to investigate in great detail the way we use metaphoric and metonymic mappings in common every-day language-related inferential and referential activities.

NOTES

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2. Naomi Leite has compiled a so far unpublished "Master Metonymy List", with 104 metonymies grouped according to different mapping types, which is circulated among Lakoff's students and collaborators. This effort tends to resemble the initial work made by Lakoff & Johnson (1980) with respect to metaphor where mappings were produced on a rather ad hoc basis and were not grouped under more generic headings. However, metaphor is being increasingly treated by Lakoff and his collaborators (eg. Lakoff & Tumer, 1989, Lakoff. 1993) in terms of more abstract mappings. No effort has been made, to my knowledge, to explore more generic metonymies.
3. Note, in contrast, that the concept of size may never be intrinsic to characterize a given entity. Thus, the sentence *My dog is an Alsatian* entails that I have a large dog but does not necessarily entail that I have a large animal if compared to a horse, a cow, or an elephant, for example. Both entailments require that we compare Alsatians with other entities.
4. To give an example of how a contextual implication may be derived, imagine that I have a cousin who likes bathing in the sun too long when he goes to the seaside to the extent that he usually gets sunburnt. One day a common friend lets me know that my cousin is spending the weekend at the seaside. This information allows me to derive the contextual implication that my cousin is likely to get sunburnt again.
5. Loose uses of language are common. It is interesting to note that sometimes we need to make use of hedges like "strictly speaking" or "to be precise" precisely to make it clear that we are not speaking loosely, which is the normal situation. Thus, we have a tendency to speak in rather vague terms unless there are pressing demands in the speech situation to the contrary. For example, people tend to round off figures rather than give the exact amounts, or to use rather imprecise deictic expressions such as "over there" or "then", instead of giving accurate descriptions of time and place locations.
6. As Lakoff (1990, 1993) has cogently demonstrated there are principles like the Invariance Principle which constrain metaphoric mappings. See Ruiz de Mendoza (1996bc) for discussion.

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